Reverse Cross-listings—The Coming Race to List in Emerging Markets and an Enhanced Understanding of Classical Bonding

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Studies have found that when a U.S. issuer lists abroad on a foreign exchange, its shares exhibit negative abnormal returns. This negative movement may be because the market expects that the foreign listing will facilitate undetectable insider trading on the foreign exchange or other conduct impermissible in the United States.1

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Introduction

India has already seen the first listing by a foreign-domiciled issuer on the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE), via Standard Chartered Bank PLC’s Indian Depositary Receipt (IDR) initial public offering in May of 2010. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange seem poised to establish an “international board,” allowing non-PRC-domiciled issuers to conduct initial public offerings (IPO) into the purely domestic Chinese equity markets.

These proposed and accomplished listings by foreign firms in India, China, and some other emerging markets may seem surprising. Indeed, much of the discussion of cross-listing—the practice of firms from one country listing in another country—has focused on listing by non-United States and non-U.K. firms on U.S. and U.K. exchanges. Cross-listing in the latter direction may be motivated by a number of considerations, but one that seems to have captured a great deal of attention is the desire of foreign firms to be subject to the corporate and securities laws and enforcement of the U.S. and the U.K., which may be perceived as being stronger than those in their own country. This theoretically allows such firms to signal that they can meet these higher standards, which in turn may attract some investors who are willing to pay a higher price. This account—commonly known as the “legal bonding” hypothesis—does not intuitively suggest that U.S. or U.K. firms would want to list in jurisdictions in the opposite direction, such as in India or China. Listing in a country perceived to have weaker investor protections might send a correspondingly negative signal. Yet the world has already seen these listings in the opposite direction, and we anticipate such transactions will only increase in the future. Accordingly, these types of cross-listings (which we call “reverse cross-listings”) may present something of a puzzle for analysts and theorists alike.

In this brief Article we ponder what reverse cross-listing may mean for (i) a more nuanced view of what drives the traditional “legal bonding” account, and (ii) a more complete picture of the motivations of those issuers seeking to raise capital in a foreign venue. Indeed, our analysis here reminds us that there are likely to be multiple important determinants of

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3. As will be readily understood in the context of this article, we do not include the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong) within the defined term “PRC” or “China”, even though Hong Kong became an integral part of the sovereign PRC after July 1, 1997. Under the promise of “One Country-Two Systems” and the PRC Hong Kong Basic Law, the Hong Kong legal system, foreign exchange system and capital markets remain largely separate from the equivalent systems and markets of the rest of the PRC (what many people in Hong Kong refer to as the “mainland” or “mainland China”).


an issuer’s choice of where to list in our truly global capital markets. These include (i) the simple quest for capital from any available capital market; (ii) the possibility of obtaining higher initial valuations in capital controls-segmented markets, with the promise of higher secondary market trading values upon achieving enhanced global liquidity; (iii) the desire for capital in local currency (especially where the local currency is not fully convertible and the foreign issuer has significant investments and operations in the country); (iv) attempts to list in a market with a less burdensome regulatory environment; and (v) what we call “consumer-commercial markets bonding.”

Here we explore the concept of consumer-commercial markets bonding in greater depth, as it may play a critical role in understanding the likelihood of reverse cross-listing in India, China, and other similar markets. Our notion of this kind of consumer-commercial markets bonding includes (i) the advertisement of products, services and corporate identity; (ii) identification of the issuer as a global firm with a local identity and ownership; (iii) demonstrated commitment to key products markets as well as customers and regulators in those markets; (iv) a “tipping of the hat” to the sovereign and legal-regulatory establishment governing the receiving market; and (v) an appeal to the receiving market’s regulators for the provision of franchising or licensing benefits.6 It is indeed conceivable that, for some firms at least, these potential benefits could be enough to outweigh the potential costs for listing in a market with lesser perceived investor protections as originally suggested by the “legal bonding” hypothesis.

We should note that we are cognizant of how problematic terms like “developing” and “developed,” “emerging” and “mature,” and “well-regulated” and “un-” or “badly-regulated” are when applied to national jurisdictions, their legal and regulatory systems, and political economies.7 Accordingly, we prefer to distinguish countries with “better or stronger perceived investor protections” from those with “weaker perceived investor protections.” We are referring, of course, to more than the formal laws and regulations related to investor protection. Specifically, we are trying to capture differences in the common perceptions of how corporate governance and market regulation systems are implemented, enforced, and followed.8 Thus, we will include the U.S. and the U.K. under the category of jurisdictions with better investor protections, and India and China under the category of nations with weaker investor protections—evaluations captured in

8. This could also include evidence of general transparency; legislative/regulatory design competence; predictability, consistency, fairness, technical competence, and efficiency in application; general conformity with rule of law principles; independence from political considerations; robust and unbiased enforcement against bad market actors of whatever political or economic background; and levels of corruption.

However, we are aware of how many of these perceptions may not be fully accurate, or are exaggerated. For example, it is not the case that the U.S. and the U.K. have been immune from scandals and market manipulations; the experience of the last 13 years clearly belies such a belief. Moreover, the ease with which investors can seek redress before the judicial system or regulatory agencies of the United States appears to be diminishing if one takes into account recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court such as \textit{Stoneridge}\footnote{Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC \textit{v.} Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).} and \textit{Morrison.}\footnote{Morrison \textit{v.} Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).} Conversely, both of us have written on the ways in which India’s and China’s developing markets, for example, are better governed than is commonly assumed and have been taking steps to enhance effective investor protection.\footnote{See infra note 68 and accompanying text.} Notwithstanding these developments, a great deal of the discourse in this area is predicated on those commonly-held perceptions.\footnote{See, e.g. \textit{World Bank}, supra note 9.} Accordingly, we will use these terms to identify the jurisdictions we invoke and analyze.

Finally, we want to be clear about what we do not address in this Article. First, we do not rehearse the many reasons why weaker perceived investor protection markets like India and the PRC have a strong desire for direct listings by issuers from jurisdictions with greater investor protections. Second, we discuss only issuers domiciled and truly headquartered in stronger perceived investor protection jurisdictions who engage in reverse cross-listing. Thus, we do not discuss situations where, for instance, Russian firms might cross-list into India or China\footnote{For example, the 2010 US $2.6 billion IPO and listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) of Russia’s United Company RUSAL. Andrea Papuc, ed., \textit{Rusal Raises $2.24 Billion in Hong Kong IP (Update 1)}, Bloomberg (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/21/rusal-ipo-deripaska-markets-equities-hong-kong.html.} (because Russia is perceived to have weaker investor protection than the U.S. or U.K.\footnote{World Bank, supra note 9.}), or where firms with business primarily in India or China, but officially domiciled in a stronger perceived jurisdiction (e.g., Hong Kong or Bermuda), cross-list in India or China,\footnote{For example, the Shanghai Stock Exchange IPOs of several foreign domiciled PRC-controlled “Red Chips,” like China Mobile.} or where issuers from stronger perceived jurisdictions list in, for example, Hong Kong\footnote{For example, Standard Chartered Bank’s longtime listing on the HKSE, or Prada’s US$ 2.14 billion IPO and listing on the HKSE in 2011. Bettina Wassener, \textit{Prada’s I.P.O. Debuts in Hong Kong Amid Investor Jitters}, N.Y. Times (June 23, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/pradass-i-p-o-debuts-in-hong-kong-amid-investor-jitters/?_r=0.} (which is associated with stronger investor protections). Third, we do not rehearse the discourse in the United States as to why cross-border capital raising appears
to have turned away from the U.S.\textsuperscript{18} or why some foreign private issuers have sought to de-list from U.S. exchanges.\textsuperscript{19} It is often asserted, somewhat ironically in the context of this article, that this is the result of the burdens of over-regulation in the United States.\textsuperscript{20} Instead, our narrow focus here is on issuers, originating from jurisdictions that are perceived to have stronger investor protections, seeking to raise capital and have their equity publicly-listed in jurisdictions with weaker perceived investor protection. This might be viewed as consistent with an emphasis on an “issuer choice” analysis\textsuperscript{21} as well as being responsive to the assumed directional vector of the “legal bonding” hypothesis (i.e., rest-of-world issuers listing on U.S. or U.K. exchanges).

I. The “Legal Bonding” Hypothesis

The “legal bonding” hypothesis has a long and distinguished history. Over two decades of theoretical and empirical work across countries has led to accretions, alterations, and refinements of the hypothesis.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, judging from the recent literature grappling with the concept,\textsuperscript{23} the “legal bonding” hypothesis continues to have real force and relevance. For the purposes of this article, it is instructive to go back to the earliest theoretical articulations of what the “legal bonding” motivation/ effect was supposed to be in the 1990s – the heyday of cross listings to the U.S. In his seminal


\textsuperscript{19} Id. at 50.


\textsuperscript{21} “Issuer choice” analysis is the idea that capital formation operates most efficiently when issuers are allowed to choose the (national) regulatory regime applicable to them, rather than being subject to exclusive regulation applied pursuant to territorial-based jurisdiction. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity, Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903, 921 (1997-1998).


1999 article, John Coffee tried to counter anxiety about a potential transnational “race to the bottom” in both the corporate governance and securities regulation spheres with the introduction of a “legal bonding” hypothesis, which he summarized as follows:

Large firms can choose the stock exchange or exchanges on which they are listed, and in so doing can opt into governance systems, disclosure standards, and accounting rules that may be more rigorous than those required or prevailing in their jurisdiction of incorporation. This process of migration may over time prove to be as important as the standard American interjurisdictional competition for corporate charters. In theory, migration should give rise to a form of regulatory arbitrage, under which firms seek to play one legal regime against another by threatening to migrate to less “regulatory” jurisdictions. Yet, the most visible contemporary form of migration seems motivated by the opposite impulse: namely, to opt into higher regulatory or disclosure standards and thus to implement a form of “bonding” under which firms commit to governance standards more exacting than that of their home countries.24 [emphasis added]

Professor Coffee further speculated on the reasons why foreign firms, even those that have never offered or issued securities in the U.S., might make the very costly election to list on a U.S. stock exchange. These reasons may include (i) gaining liquidity (especially for issuers confined to smaller markets); (ii) the pursuit of international recognition and/or prestige; (iii) raising additional capital; (iv) increasing share value; and (v) the creation of currency (U.S.-listed stock) for U.S.-focused acquisitions.25

Professor Coffee then suggested that the “bonding” effect may play a critical role:26

But greater motivation probably lies in the finding, repeatedly observed by financial economists, that the announcement of a dual listing on a U.S. exchange by a foreign firm typically increases the firm’s share value . . . . One explanation . . . is that such a listing represents a bonding mechanism: the foreign issuer is increasing the share value of its public shares by agreeing to comply with the generally higher disclosure standards that prevail in the United States. Some evidence supports this interpretation, as opposed to the explanation that dual markets simply increase the demand for stock, because other studies have found that when a U.S. issuer lists abroad on a foreign exchange, the opposite occurs: its shares exhibit negative abnormal returns. This negative movement may be because the market expects that the foreign [i.e., non-U.S.] listing will facilitate undetectable insider trading on the foreign exchange or other conduct impermissible in the United States.27

Finally, Coffee speculated on a final reason for this apparent “race to the top” style of regulatory arbitrage, at least for newer firms: the issuer’s home

24. Future as History, supra note 1, at 651–52.
25. Id. at 673–74.
27. Future as History, supra note 1, at 674–75.
market evidences a relative lack of legal protections for minority shareholders, making it difficult for such companies to win the trust and confidence of investors (whereas older companies are asserted to have higher reputational capital, a substitute for the weakness in legal protections). Subsequently, Professor Coffee developed his views to focus on how and why firms with concentrated, rather than dispersed, ownership structures act across global capital markets.

The mature form of the “legal bonding hypothesis” can thus be summarized as follows:

- Cross-listing on a U.S. exchange commits the foreign issuer to respect minority rights and to provide for fuller disclosure. This is because:
  - The foreign issuer becomes subject to the enforcement powers of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC);
  - Investors acquire the power to exercise effective and low-cost legal remedies, such as class actions and derivative actions that may not be available in the issuer’s home jurisdiction;
  - Entry into the markets of the United States commits the firm to provide fuller financial information per SEC requirements and to reconcile financial statements to the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) followed in the United States;
- Foreign issuers become subject to the scrutiny of U.S. reputational intermediaries or gatekeepers, including underwriters, accountants,

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28. Id. at 678–79.
29. To predict that “those firms that decline to migrate to “high disclosure” exchanges will be disproportionately those with controlling shareholders who prefer to maximize their receipt of the private benefits of control rather than to maximize the share price of their firms’ publicly-held minority shares.” See Racing to the Top, supra note 22, at 1765. In our view, there is an unstated corollary to the prediction: that even some issuers from concentrated ownership jurisdictions will be willing to bear the costs, liability risks and regulatory risks of a U.S. listing if the other benefits (reputational, liquidity enhancing and price effects) are substantial enough. This is certainly what occurred with the initial listings by PRC corporatized state-owned enterprises like Shanghai Petrochemical (via a Hong Kong Stock Exchange listing backed into a U.S.-listed ADR program) and then Shandong Huaneng Power Development (direct IPO and listing on the NYSE) in 1992–1994. See generally Mark S. Bergman, Richard S. Borisoff, & Nicholas C. Howson, First Direct Listing for Chinese Company in New York, 13 INT’L. FIN. L. REV. 41 (1994).
30. Racing to the Top, supra note 22, at 1780.
31. See id.
32. Although listing in the U.S. by a non-U.S. issuer may subject the firm to the risk of U.S. securities fraud class actions, it is not clear to us how a U.S. listing by a non-U.S. issuer incorporated in a jurisdiction that does not have a corporate derivative action can subject the board of directors of that company to a derivative action authorized and available under U.S. state law.
35. Coffee was of course writing before Enron, WorldCom, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, or the very strict 2014 SEC enforcement action against global but U.S. or
credit rating agencies and securities analysts;\textsuperscript{36} and

- Foreign issuers will become subject to U.S. exchange-imposed\textsuperscript{37} corporate
governance-related requirements.\textsuperscript{38}

It is the insights and the style of thinking implicit in this theory, even as subsequently critiqued,\textsuperscript{39} that we use to inform our initial analysis of the potential coming trend in transnational securities offerings. That trend will see issuances and listings in non-U.S. jurisdictions move in precisely the opposite direction—public capital raising transactions by issuers going from perceived stronger investor protection jurisdictions to weaker perceived investor protections—in India and the PRC.


\textsuperscript{38}See \textit{Racing to the Top}, supra note 22, at 1779-83.

\textsuperscript{39}See, for example, Amir N. Licht, \textit{Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?}, 4 COLUM. J. INT’L L. 141, 142 (Spring 2003) (“Based on a comprehensive review of the literature, I argue that the [bonding role of cross-listing] has been greatly overstated. A large body of evidence, using various research methodologies, indicates that the bonding theory is unfounded. Indeed, the evidence supports an alternative theory, which may be called the ‘avoiding hypothesis.’ To the extent that corporate governance issues play a role in the cross-listing decision, it is a negative role. The dominant factors in the choice of cross-listing destination markets are access to cheaper finance and enhancing the issuer’s visibility. Corporate governance is a second-order consideration whose effect is either to deter issuers from accessing better-regulated markets or to induce securities regulators to allow foreign issuers to avoid some of the more exacting domestic regulations.”).
II. Issuers from Stronger Perceived Investor Protection Jurisdictions

IPO in India

Since 2000, Indian law has allowed foreign issuers to raise capital in India via the Indian Depository Receipt (IDR) program. Moreover, a number of regulatory changes that facilitated IDRs were made between 2000 and 2009 by the various regulators (i.e., the Ministry of Company Affairs (MCA), Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)).

A foreign issuer may use the IDR program if it meets the requirements for a domestic issuer along with the following key requirements: (i) a track record of distributable profits for a minimum of three of the previous five years, (ii) a continuous trading history for the three immediately preceding years on its home country exchange, (iii) net tangible assets of at least Rs. 3 crore (approximately USD 500,000 at current exchange rates; a crore is 10 million rupees) in each of the three preceding years (they must be full years), (iv) net worth of at least Rs. 1 crore in each of the three preceding years (they must be full years), (v) no prohibition against the issuance of securities by any regulatory body, and (vi) a track record of compliance with securities regulation requirements in its home country.

When engaging in an IDR offering, a minimum of 50% of the issue is to be allotted to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs), 30% to retail individual investors, and the remainder to non-institutional investors and employees. IDRs can be converted into equity shares in the foreign issuer after one year from the issuing of the IDR, but this is subject to other Indian laws—e.g., foreign exchange laws—that may hamper the IDR’s fungibility. Conversion from equity shares into IDRs is also available.

As noted at the start of this article, only one firm has thus far under-
taken an IDR issuance—Standard Chartered Bank in 2010. Its quite explicit motivation was not legal bonding, but instead something that more closely conforms to the thrust of this article: a signaling of its commitment to the Indian subcontinent and an effort to boost its foreign market visibility. However, it should be noted that the Standard Chartered IDR was largely subscribed by Foreign Institutional Investors (who made up at least 85% of investors). Therefore, and perhaps contrary to appearances, the IDR did not succeed in creating a large base of Indian investors who owned Standard Chartered.

Since then, there have been reports of other foreign firms considering an IDR (e.g., Vodafone, HSBC, Citibank), but they have not proceeded further at this stage. The lack of interest in further IDRs seems related to questions about fungibility, tax uncertainty, and the requirements for allocating 50% of the IDR issuance to certain types of investors. At present, IDRs are not automatically convertible into the underlying shares; SEBI now permits shareholders to convert IDRs into equity shares (and vice versa), but conversion is only allowed upon RBI approval. In contrast, persons resident in India are allowed to hold the shares in order to sell within 30 days of the conversion.

Recently, the Government of India has begun consideration of an expert committee report that suggests revamping the IDR program—including a new name of “Bharat Depository Receipts”—and opening up the possibility of more foreign firms cross-listing in India, amongst other changes. The Government of India appears interested in promoting

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50. See SEBI, supra note 41, Ch. 5 Clause 98 Conditions for Issue of IDR.

51. See id. Ch. 5 Clause 100 Fungibility.

52. See Procedure for Transfer and Redemption of IDRs, Reserve Bank of India, July 22, 2009.

India as an international financial center and increasing options for Indian investors. With these changes, it is quite likely that the stalled interest in IDRs/Bharat Depository Receipts would move into higher gear.

III. Issuers from Stronger Perceived Investor Protection Jurisdictions

Raising Capital in the People’s Republic of China

As of this writing, the PRC has seen nothing like the 2010 Standard Chartered Bank IDR IPO and listing on the NSE described immediately above. However, there has been a very rich discussion—for more than a decade—about the real possibility of establishing (i) a China Depositary Receipts (CDR) program pursuant to which non-PRC issuers would issue non-Renminbi yuan (RMB) -denominated China Depositary Shares to back CDRs listed on a Chinese exchange; these CDRs would be held and traded in RMB by PRC citizens, resident investors, or PRC-domiciled institutions (and of course Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) permitted entry into the A share markets); and (ii) an “international board” whereby non-PRC issuers might accomplish an IPO and listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange of A shares.

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54. See BhDRs, supra note 53; Reboot BhDRs, supra note 53; Sahoo_I, supra note 53; Sahoo_II, supra note 53.

55. Without delving too deeply into the alphabet soup comprising PRC equity securities designations, “A shares” are RMB-denominated equity securities, issued by PRC-domiciled firms to PRC resident natural persons and PRC-domiciled legal persons (and foreign-domiciled QFIIs who participate in the RMB markets up to a given quota of exchange capital investment), and traded in RMB. They can be contrasted with what are known as “B shares,” RMB-denominated equity securities issued by PRC-domiciled firms to foreign persons, foreign-domiciled legal persons, and, since February 2001, PRC natural and legal persons with authorized access to foreign exchange. Because of size and volume constraints imposed by foreign exchange capital account restrictions and a radical lack of liquidity, the B share markets have long been considered moribund, especially when compared to the A share markets. Finally, “H shares” (a market idiom used to describe all of the original “H” (or Hong Kong-listed) and “N” (New York-listed), “L” (London-listed), “S” (Singapore-listed, etc. shares) are equity shares listed by PRC-domiciled issuers on foreign (including Hong Kong) exchanges and traded in foreign currencies. The issues discussed in this article center on the opening up of the A share markets for foreign-domiciled issuers, matching in a sense what the QFII initiative did for the A share markets on the foreign-domiciled investor side, and to be distinguished on the PRC-domiciled issuer side from the dual A share/H share listings by major corporatized PRC state-owned enterprises.

56. For Shanghai listings by foreign-domiciled issuers, see Enoch Yiu, Shanghai Bourse Studies Listing of Multinationals, South China Morning Post (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.scmp.com/article/616267/shanghai-bourse-studies-listing-multinationals; Stephanie Tong, Whole Bank, Not Just HSBC China, for Shanghai Listing, The Standard (Dec. 15, 2007); Sundee Tucker & Justine Lau, Beijing Set to Encourage Foreign Listings, FT Times (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7954771a-c51b-11dc-811a-0000779f2ac.html#a2cc37f7af5e5a; NYSE Set to List on Shanghai Exchange, South China Morning Post (April 13, 2008); see Li-Gang Liu, How an International Board will Free up China’s Stock Market, China Daily (last updated Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2013-01/07/content_16091877.htm; David Barboza,
While this was frequently in the news almost a decade ago, official and popular Chinese interest in a CDR program has recently faded. That is because the long-standing PRC domestic investor appetite for the equities of non-PRC domiciled or listed but PRC-controlled issuers was largely sated by two developments: (i) the increased repatriation of the PRC’s corporatized state-owned enterprise issuers and their dual “H” and “A” share listings, and (ii) the establishment of a PRC Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) program in April 2006. That appetite will only be further met with the imminent mutual recognition of investment funds between the PRC and Hong Kong, which will allow mutual funds domiciled in Hong Kong to sell interests directly to PRC investors (and, less importantly in the context of this writing, vice versa). In short, fast moving regulatory developments providing a robust channel for PRC-domiciled Shanghai Exchange Finalizing Plans for Foreign Listings, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/business/global/16exchange.html?_r=0; Shanghai Mayor Says Timing Not Right for Exchange’s International Board, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 16, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-16/shanghai-mayor-says-timing-not-right-for-international-board.html. For CDRs, see Zhang Jiwei, CDR Zoufeng [CDR Whirlwind], 39 CAIJING MAGAZINE 58–60 (June 2001); Michael Wei & Jason Subler, Reuters Summit – BNY Mellon Sees First China Depositary Receipt Listings Next Year, REUTERS FIN. REGULATORY FORUM (Sept. 2, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2009/09/02/reuters-summit-bny-mellon-sees-first-china-depositary-receipt-listings-next-year/. 57. See Shanghai Mayor Says Timing Not Right, supra note 56. 58. So-called “Red Chips” and/or indirect PRC issuers, organized and established under Hong Kong or foreign law, and/or only listed in Hong Kong or overseas which are really or primarily China businesses. See generally HONG KONG IPO GUIDE 2013 63 (LexisNexis 2013). 59. Contrast the transaction histories of China Mobile Limited, a Hong Kong-domiciled and Hong Kong Stock Exchange-listed (with ADRs on the NYSE) issuer, which issues shares that cannot be purchased on the PRC’s domestic capital markets, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, a PRC-domiciled issuer which effected simultaneous IPOs of H shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and A shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 60. See Y. Nancy Ni, China’s Capital Flow Regulations: The Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor and the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor Programs, 28 REV. BANKING AND FIN. L. 299, 316 (2009). In mid-2013, after reviewing the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) website, one law firm reported that as of the end of June 2013, there were 112 PRC QDIIs holding over US$85 billion in overseas investments, with those QDIIs including 29 commercial banks, 47 securities companies and fund managers, 28 insurance companies and 8 trust companies. See Richard Mazzochi, Minny Siu & Hayden Finn, KWM Connect: QDII - An Offshore Perspective, KING AND WOOD MALLESONS, available at: www.kwm.com/hong-kong/documents/KWM_Connect_Jul_13_v4_LR.pdf. 61. Following on the heels of another pilot program started in September 2013, a Qualified Domestic Limited Partner (QDLP) program, whereby six foreign hedge funds were allowed to raise up to US$50 million in RMB yuan from PRC institutions slated for foreign investments. See David S. Wang, Yi Lu, Jenny Sheng & Coral Yu, Hong Kong Based Funds May be Open to Investments from PRC Investors, Paul Hastings LLP (January 8, 2014), available at www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/China-Matters-Alert-on-Mutual-Recognition-Program.pdf. For the near-certain future path in this area, see Alexa Lam, Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Hong Kong Stock and Futures Commission, Keynote Speech at the 7th Hong Kong Investment Funds Association Annual Conference (December 4, 2013), available at www.sfc.hk/web/files/ER/PDF/Speeches/Alexa_20131204.pdf.
retail and institutional investment in foreign equities and funds have overtaken, and will continue to overtake, the original need for a CDR program. The original CDR goals now appear too narrowly focused on individual foreign-issued equities for China’s investment population.

Ambitions for a Shanghai “international board” are, conversely, still very much front and center in China’s specialist and popular discourse. This attention is perhaps only increased by the PRC central government’s acknowledged desire to make Shanghai into an “international financial center” by 2020 (as with India’s recent reform proposals in a similar direction). Indeed, the late 2013 announcement about the establishment of a new “China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone” led to a frenzy in China and abroad about that Zone being approved as the venue for the Shanghai “international board.” The CSRC was forced to issue a categorical denial of any preparations or approvals regarding the establishment of the “international board” in or through the Zone through a Chinese social networking website, Weibo.

While it is true that there are abundant issues connected with the establishment of a viable “international board” at or under the Shanghai Stock Exchange, perhaps the biggest difficulty stems from the continued constraints on convertibility of the RMB on the capital account. These restraints have operated since the very start of China’s reform and opening to the outside world policy, and it appears that China is moving inexorably towards the final elimination of those constraints. If and when those blocks are removed, there will be no significant obstacle to the implementation of an international board on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, nor on IPOs by specific non-PRC domiciled issuers directed towards the citizenry of China.


64. See generally Qi Bin, Chen Yimin & Jiang Xinghui, Jingwai Qiye Jingnei Shangshi De Zhanlue Sikao [Study on the Domestic Listings of Foreign Enterprises Strategy], CSRC (May 2008), available at http://www.csirc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/yjzx/yjbxg/200908/p0200908066748706262611 (detailing the reasons for the initiative, the conditions already in place for it, issues that remain to be solved, and specific proposals designed to bring the idea to fruition).

IV. Additional Transnational Capital-raising Hypotheses

A. Introduction

Given the contemporary developments sketched out above, and with the central tenets of the legal bonding hypothesis in mind, it is useful to consider some of the many reasons why foreign—and in particular widely-held—issuers from stronger perceived investor protection markets like the United States or the U.K. would seek an IPO and listing on a Chinese, Indian, or similar nation’s exchange. This inquiry is useful for a more nuanced understanding of the legal bonding hypothesis in two ways. First, it may alter our perceptions about whether the primary reason for cross-listing is that securities issuers are opting into higher regulatory or disclosure standards (than their home countries) to implement a form of legal bonding. Second, it may also dilute the force of a long-standing negative intuition of the bonding hypothesis—when issuers engage in reverse cross-listing, their shares exhibit negative abnormal returns as the result of market expectations that the foreign listing will facilitate conduct that would be impermissible in the home market. Through this analysis, we may come to a better understanding of the ways in which issuer choice in the global capital markets operates.

What, then, are some of the theories or justifications for why issuers engage in reverse cross-listing? Here, we offer some initial ideas before discussing what we will call consumer-commercial markets bonding.

B. “Bonding” into Perceived Weaker Investor Protection Jurisdictions?

First we ask the perhaps counter-intuitive question urged upon us by the “legal bonding” hypothesis: do India and China have superior corporate governance and market regulation, or at least the appearance of such regulation, which delivers on the “legal bonding” promise for the foreign issuers who access their markets? While both of us, and others, have explored the complexities of India’s and China’s evolving corporate governance and market regulation regimes and often found encouraging developments,
common perceptions of their investor protections has not yet shifted to “strong.” Indeed, the perception seems to be that their legal systems and institutions are quite opaque, corrupt, inconsistent, poorly administered, inefficient, and riddled with sub-standard public and private enforcement.69 If the legal bonding hypothesis seems unlikely as an explanation, then why else would a foreign issuer (e.g., from the United States or U.K.) seek an IPO and listing in India or China?

C. The Simple Quest for Capital; and the Quest for Unconvertible Currency

One potential explanation may be that India and China are both countries with many actual and potential investors who have limited domestic investment options, and both countries have a high demand for offerings. Accordingly, a listing for a foreign issuer might offer the prospect of increased investor liquidity and price benefits in the future, even if these benefits are not presently available because of capital controls and resulting market segmentation.70 In addition, an IPO in these jurisdictions is an


69. See Afsharipour, Promise and Challenges, supra note 68, at 34, 54, 59; see Howson, Corporate Law, supra note 68, at 321-25, 417–19.

70. See Just in Case: Capital Controls Are Back as Part of Many Countries’ Financial Armoury, The Economist, Oct. 12, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21587383-capital-controls-are-back-part-many-countries-financial-armoury-just-case (discussing the lack of liquidity due to capital control’s and China’s motivation for such controls); See also Y. Nancy Ni, supra note 60, at 299. At the same time, initial market segmentation resulting from capital controls, positioned alongside relative scarcity, may also produce a positive price differential for issuers, as between the perceived weaker investor protections capital markets-traded stock and the rest-of-world traded stock. The great natural experiment/expression of this phenomenon is the very significant price differential between A share and H shares (including shares listed in London and New York) listed by PRC-domiciled issuers on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
excellent way to raise local currency, especially when capital account controls are in effect. These funds can then be used for local investments and/or business operations, rather than converting hard currency into local currency with the attendant exchange rate, remittance, and taxation risks. This rationale might hold true for a wide range of foreign businesses, from products manufacturers seeking to capitalize or operate productive facilities, to financial institutions keen to transact and lend in the local currency. This dynamic is visible in the push for a Shanghai Stock Exchange international board, and was additionally evidenced in 2010 by the use of so-called “Dim Sum Bonds” by non-PRC foreign multinational McDonalds Corporation. McDonalds used these instruments to directly raise RMB yuan, the PRC’s only partially-convertible currency, for its in-country operations.

D. The Race to the Less-costly Middle; Rule 10b-5 and the Morrison Effect; Pre-bonded Issuers

Public securities issuances, especially in the U.S. markets, are very expensive in absolute terms—they require the involvement of underwriters, lawyers, and accountants. Expenses continue indefinitely with the burdens of continuing disclosure, which require the continued involvement of lawyers and accountants. Foreign markets, especially those with perceived weaker investor protections, must appear ex ante to be comparatively cheaper both on the primary transaction side and with respect to continuing disclosure.

One specific “cost” that issuers from stronger perceived investor protection nations, particularly non-U.S. firms, may be interested in avoiding are the costs associated with Rule 10b-5 class action litigation by private attorneys. Here, issuers from stronger perceived investor jurisdictions and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (or London, New York, etc.) respectively. The Hong Kong equivalent of the Dow Jones or S&P indices, The Hang Seng Index, even goes so far as to track this differential via a separate index, the “Hang Seng China A1 Premium Index.” This differential will remain as long as PRC capital account controls remain in place, and there is no significant opportunity for arbitrage between A and H share holdings. See Shanghai-Hong Kong Valuation Gap Narrows on Stock Arbitrage Bets, BLOOMBERG, July 28, 2014, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-28/china-s-stock-index-futures-rise-after-industrial-profits-climb.html (indicating that the differential between A and H shares has narrowed recently due to increased arbitrage opportunities arising from the relaxing of capital controls on the capital markets).


72. See McDonalds, supra note 71 (reporting that McDonalds will consider a second issuance of RMB bonds in Hong Kong after its RMB 200 million yuan 3% three year notes issued in 2010).

73. For a general discussion see Racing Towards the Top, supra note 22; Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1173 (2012); Beit-
may share the perceptions of fellow issuers from weaker perceived investor protection jurisdictions that have run into the teeth of the orthodox legal bonding promise. For issuers from relatively stronger perceived investor protection market issuers, avoidance of 10b-5 class actions can be achieved not only by refusing to enter the U.S. capital markets, but also by affirmatively entering another national market which 10b-5 cannot reach. This is where the change signaled by Justice Scalia’s opinion in the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court case Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. becomes highly relevant. In Morrison, the Court laid aside the long-standing “conduct” and “effects” tests used by the lower federal courts for application of U.S. federal securities anti-fraud laws, stating that civil liability under such laws would attach only to transactions in securities listed on a U.S. stock exchange and to securities transactions taking place in the U.S. Accordingly, the opinion provided a solid rationale for any non-U.S. issuer’s election to list on non-U.S. exchanges (and prohibit any ADR program on their non-U.S.-listed shares).

Even U.S.-domiciled or headquartered firms might take advantage of Morrison by having their non-U.S.-domiciled subsidiaries achieve listings on non-U.S. exchanges (especially if they keep the proceeds outside of the U.S.), which might include weaker perceived investor protection markets, thereby neatly avoiding the threat of 10b-5 class action lawsuits (and perhaps even SEC enforcement under the “conduct” or “effects” tests). Of course, any such U.S. issuer would have to calculate the degree to which such a strategy might be noted inside the United States and the resulting costs of being perceived as “off-shoring.”


76. “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.” See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 2888. Dodd-Frank, at Section 929P(b) amending 1934 Act Section 27, restored federal court jurisdiction for just SEC enforcement actions under 10b-5 based on the previously in effect conduct and effects tests.

77. Conversely, some strong investor protection jurisdiction issuers might not find home jurisdiction listing too costly, but may simply be unable to access the public capital markets in their home jurisdiction— for instance, where underwriters will not underwrite, and mutual funds are not interested in, small cap, development stage firms. For these issuers, after the private or venture capital markets have been exhausted, a foreign listing, even in a weaker perceived investor protections market, may be the only way forward. See Graham Bowley, Fleeing to Foreign Shores - Fast-Growing Companies Look
There may also be issuers from stronger perceived investor protection markets who can both benefit from traditional “legal bonding” and also access capital in weaker perceived investor protection markets. These issuers include firms with established listings in stronger perceived protections markets, which then do a follow-on IPO and listing in a less well-perceived market. Standard Chartered Bank is an excellent example of this phenomenon, as it is listed on the London Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and now has an IDR listing on India’s NSE. According to the legal bonding hypothesis, Standard Chartered is already “bonded” to the apparently better norms associated with its primary listing jurisdiction. A listing in an apparently weaker jurisdiction does not disturb that valuation support.

There are other potential costs for such issuers arising from this kind of secondary listing, however. For example, what if India’s NSE listing requirements, securities law, or corporate law mandated that any issuer listing stock on the NSE have a board of directors that is entirely independent? Or what if an issuer from a perceived stronger investor protections market completes an IPO on a future international board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, where CSRC regulations and now PRC law require that one-third of the board directors be independent directors as understood under Chinese law? In short, an issuer from a perceived stronger investor protections jurisdiction with a dual-listing in both a well-regarded market and a weaker perceived market might thereby subject itself to even more onerous corporate governance norms, with limited benefit from legal bonding.

Whatever the true effect such dual listings have on the value of these firms, we suspect that in the short term it is precisely these kinds of stronger investor protection jurisdiction issuers that are likely to engage in IPOs in weaker perceived investor protection markets. Those firms will seek such listings for the “consumer-commercial markets bonding” that we discuss immediately below. Thus, we may expect to see established multinational firms with longtime listings in environments perceived to have stronger investor protection accessing capital through entry points like India’s IDR program or Shanghai’s future international board.78

E. “Consumer-commercial Markets Bonding”

There is, however, another factor that we think is thrown into prominence by our consideration of the coming reverse listing traffic, which is infrequently discussed even under the traditional legal bonding hypothesis.

Abroad for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 8, 2011, at B1 (focusing on start-up companies’ migration to foreign exchanges even for IPOs).

78. Only when we see a non-U.S. or non-U.K.-listed issuer IPO directly and exclusively in India or China—for instance, if Prada had listed immediately and only on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (instead of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange), or a U.S. or European pharmaceutical company completes an IDR IPO on the NSE without a prior IPO in the U.S. or U.K.—will the world have a suitable “control” for the theoretically negative value effects of entanglement with a weaker perceived investor protections jurisdiction, or indeed no effect whatsoever.
This factor is the desire of issuers to effect a kind of broad advertising-commitment bonding into the receiving markets, distinct from the reputational punch of perceived better governance/regulation at the heart of the legal bonding hypothesis.

This broad consumer-commercial markets bonding consists of several components: (i) a straight advertising-type appeal to the receiving jurisdiction’s products and services markets and the consumers who participate in such markets; (ii) reputational enhancement as a global firm with a local identity (and presumably local understanding); (iii) the signaling of long-term commitment by the issuing firm to that specific market, as well as the prospect of products/services market consumer ownership; (iv) acknowledgment of the sovereign legal-regulatory establishment of the nation in which the issuer is listing; and (v) an appeal to the receiving market’s regulators for the provision of franchise or licensing benefits.

To illustrate how these motivations and effects may operate, consider the following example. Let us assume that J.P. Morgan Chase conducts an IPO on a future Shanghai international board. It can be credibly assumed that the transaction would: (i) aid that U.S. bank in advertising its financial products and services in the Chinese domestic markets, while comparing favorably against the less nimble PRC state-owned banks and relatively unknown foreign banks; (ii) establish in the minds of Chinese investors and government officials that Chinese retail investors and institutions have ownership of one of the world’s most important financial institutions; (iii) signal a deep long-term commitment to China above and beyond profiting off of business operations in China and favorable wage rates; (iv) display formal recognition of and submission to the Chinese legal and regulatory system and its institutions; and (v) aid the U.S. bank in obtaining operational, investment, or organizational preferences under China’s post-World Trade Organization (WTO)-accession regulation of foreign commercial banking and/or investment banking operations inside the PRC.\(^79\) Indeed, this example of strategic aims conceived for a hypothetical J.P. Morgan Chase listing on the coming Shanghai international board may have informed the actual Standard Chartered Bank IDR IPO on India’s NSE.\(^80\) It is important to note the significance of the Standard Chartered Bank listing in India due to the bank’s history in the sub-continent.\(^81\) Perhaps a future Hong Kong Shanghai Bank Corporation or AIG IPO on the Shanghai international board may have greater significance than the entry of J.P. Morgan

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in the Chinese context.\(^\text{82}\)

Although these benefits may matter a great deal for industries where developing the trust of local customers is of great importance (e.g., in India – IDR interest by Vodafone (cell phone services), HSBC and Citigroup (banking and financial services)), they may also be beneficial in other industries. Indeed, examples focusing on large multinational consumer products firms like Procter & Gamble, Unilever, Carrefour, McDonalds, or large carmakers, where local consumers only interact more broadly with the foreign issuer’s consumer products, would underline the benefits to be won by an Indian or Chinese IPO for those firms.

We want to emphasize that these aims almost certainly also informed non-U.S. issuers’ decisions to cross-list into the United States—the traditional focus of the legal bonding hypothesis—even though the theoretical literature on traditional legal bonding rarely addresses this. Thus, aside from the legal and reputational benefits offered and the access to the “deepest, most liquid” pool of capital in the world, many developing world non-U.S./U.K. issuers cross listed in the United States as part of an advertising strategy focused on the products and services that they hoped to offer, or the developed market companies that they hoped to acquire and control. One need only think of Tata Motors Limited and Lenovo in this regard. The same can also be said for developed markets issuers listing in the U.S. markets, like Daimler (i.e., before its purchase of Chrysler), Deutsche Telecom, Vodaphone, etc.

F. Measuring Success

The difficulty with evaluating this notion of consumer-commercial markets bonding is that it potentially delivers very long-term benefits for the issuer, which may not manifest so directly in the price effects on the less investor-protective jurisdiction’s IPO stock. Prior research on the legal bonding hypothesis has focused, quite appropriately, on the pricing value apparently delivered by entanglement with more stringent corporate governance and market regulation in the listing firm’s home country (e.g., the price effect, on the Brazilian Stock Exchange, of a Brazilian firm’s cross listing in the United States). If, as we theorize here, the motivating benefits for a reverse cross-listing are longer-term, highly dependent, and relate largely to the enhancement of business operations and product development in the receiving jurisdiction, then it would seem that tracking the price effects would present some empirical challenges; as an example, it

\(^{82}\) Just as Standard Chartered Bank has a strong history in India, Hong Kong Shanghai Bank Corporation and American International Group have roots in Shanghai, China. See HSBC’s History, HSBC, http://www.hsbc.com.hk/1/2/about/home/hsbc-s-history (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (“The HSBC Group is named after its founding member, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, which was established in 1865 in Hong Kong and Shanghai to finance the growing trade between China and Europe.”); see also Our 90 Year History, AIG, http://www.aig.com/our-90-year-history_3171_437854.html (last updated Sept. 4, 2014) (“AIG traces its roots to 1919, when American Cornelius Vander Starr established a general insurance agency, American Asiatic Underwriters, in Shanghai, China.”).
would be problematic to try to estimate the price effect on the IPO price in Shanghai of a NYSE-listed U.S. firm cross-listing in Shanghai based on these longer-term benefits. Indeed, the price effect of greatest interest is likely to be the impact on the price of the issuer's stock in its home jurisdiction (i.e., the NYSE in the above example) after a cross-listing transaction. This may present its own challenges.

G. What Kinds of Foreign Issuers?

If the above is true, we can speculate about the kinds of issuers that may seek to be listed on the perceived weaker investor protection markets. This may also help us understand the relative importance of the sub-strains within what we have identified as a general theory of consumer-commercial markets bonding as against the other motivations we highlight here, such as capital availability or the negative implication of the traditional legal bonding hypothesis that foreign listings by U.S. companies conjure negative price abnormalities.

As a starting point, it seems that firms in businesses depending on high levels of customer or supplier trust would benefit from consumer-commercial markets bonding more than others. Sectors such as banking and financial services, personal services, and technology-related services (e.g., cell phones) seem particularly suited to explore reverse cross-listing. Firms representing these sectors appear to have expressed interest in reverse cross-listing, at least in India. In addition, and as we note above, foreign firms that have a significant appetite for local currency, especially a non-convertible or partially convertible currency, should also be very interested in cross-listing. However, sectors in which this level of trust is not so necessary—for example, where there is no need for local currency

85. See id. at 2 (speculating on the kinds of issuers that may be attracted to reverse-listing); see Mike W. Peng & Dane P. Blevins, Why Do Chinese Firms Cross-List in The United States?, in The Convergence of Corporate Governance: Promises and Prospects 257 (Abdul A. Rasheed & Toru Yoshikawa eds., 2012) (discussing the reputational benefit of “global status”).
86. Chen et al., supra note 84, at 2.
87. Future as History, supra note 1, at 674–75.
financing, or where there is a mystique to remaining overtly foreign—are the ones where the value of this kind of bonding is less, making reverse cross-listing less likely. For example, if high-end luxury producers of goods such as Louis Vuitton bags or high-end Belgian Chocolates felt that caché arose from their “otherness” or “foreignness,” they would probably prefer to avoid any contrary association implicated by reverse cross-listing. Issuers connected to such “snob effect” goods or services would be ones that might find it counter-productive to do a reverse cross-listing. This kind of industry/sector breakdown may be helpful in forming a base from which to explore the potentially differential effects of reverse cross-listings.

Conclusion

In our increasingly global capital markets, the development of reverse cross-listing seems, at first cut, to be slightly counter-intuitive. Prior scholarship indicates that one of the most common reasons for firms to cross-list in the United States or the U.K. is to obtain the benefits associated with being listed in a jurisdiction perceived to be more protective of investors than the firm’s home country—the legal bonding hypothesis. This added level of perceived protection may make the firm a more appealing investment opportunity and cause investors to value the issuer more highly. However, reverse cross-listing runs in the opposite direction—firms from stronger perceived investor protection regimes, such as the United States or the U.K., may still list in weaker perceived investor protection regimes, such as India or China. This article provides an initial exploration into why reverse cross-listing might arise with respect to specific product markets, and what the practice may tell us about the decision to cross-list generally, regardless of the listing direction.

Our analysis is necessarily preliminary because the level of real reverse cross-listing has been minimal or clearly triggered by very specific circumstances (e.g., corporatized PRC state-owned enterprises domiciled offshore, or “Red Chips,” seeking domestic listings) in both India and China. However, the fact that it happens at all, that important jurisdictions like India and China seem keen for more of it to happen, that firms from the more developed markets appear quite interested in engaging in more reverse cross-listing into India and China, and that there is some disenchantment with capital formation in the highly-regulated United States, all suggest that reverse cross-listing is something that will grow. We explore a number of potential explanations for reverse cross-listing that pertain to two radically different political economies (e.g., tapping Indian or Chinese investors’ interest, raising capital in currency-controlled countries for expenditure therein, avoiding expensive U.S. securities enforcement), but argue that the strongest explanation lies in our notion of consumer-commercial markets bonding. This involves the developed world listing firm’s

substantial advertising into, or substantial commitment to, the receiving country’s market and regulatory establishment.

This explanation for reverse cross-listing leads to predictions on which types of firms may find reverse cross-listing an attractive option to pursue. In particular, firms in sectors in which high levels of customer or supplier trust are valuable, such as banking and financial services, or in which there is an urgent need to raise local currency finance where that currency is non- or partially-convertible, such as in manufacturing or in restaurant services, might find reverse cross-listing attractive. Conversely, sectors where customers value the “foreignness” of an issuer’s product, such as in the foreign-branded luxury goods industry, are less likely to follow this approach. These predictions can then be tested as more instances of reverse cross-listing arise.

This approach may also, conversely, provide deeper insights into why some non-U.S. or non-U.K. firms may decide to list in the United States or the U.K. on the transaction vector that originally triggered the legal bonding discussion. It may not always be entirely about legal bonding and anticipated positive valuation effects, but also about obtaining other commercial advantages. Such a multi-factor analysis may aid in better understanding the effects of cross-listing generally on share prices. Sometimes the increase in share price may reflect in part legal bonding, but may also reflect some of these other benefits highlighted here. At times it may reflect an offsetting of legal bonding and other effects. The newly-emphasized dynamic highlighted by our initial consideration of reverse cross-listing allows us to develop a more nuanced understanding of the cross-listing phenomena generally as it develops in the future, and regardless of its direction—orthodox or “reverse.”