Behind the Mirage in the Desert—
Customary Land Rights and the
Legal Framework of Land Grabs

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Introduction

As of 2012, U.S. and foreign corporations have invested an estimated fourteen billion dollars of private capital in farmland and agricultural infrastructure.1 These investments reflect a trend of increasing land deals worldwide that covers an area of nearly 1,148 million acres.2 Of this land, approximately two-thirds were acquired in Africa.3 Africa therefore appears to be at the center of this wave of investment.4 In West Africa alone, there have been about 115 large-scale land deals in agriculture, with the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia as some of the largest primary and secondary investors.5

Social scientists attribute these large investments to impending food security concerns; countries will soon require an increase in agricultural output to meet the predicted demand.6 Others state more generally that Africa is attractive to investors because of the perceived abundance of available land and resources, as well as favorable fiscal and tax incentives.7 Based on the volume of these investments, scholars have likened the phenomenon to a gold rush where investors—led by states, agribusinesses, and private equity funds—move feverishly in pursuit of resources.8

The level of investment over the past ten years has been so potent that countries such as Sierra Leone and South Sudan have sold about 32% and

3. Id.
10% of their landmass, respectively.\(^9\) Large-scale land acquisitions, however, are not inherently detrimental. In theory, these investments could mutually benefit foreign investors and local populations. Investors gain access and rights to the land and its resources, which could improve their enterprises, while local populations potentially receive more jobs, export earnings, and advanced technologies.\(^10\) At the state level, large-scale investment could also satisfy countries’ needs to improve productivity and market access.\(^11\) As the Comprehensive Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) illustrates, Africa needs 250 billion dollars of investment to develop infrastructure in rural areas between 2002 and 2015.\(^12\) Thus, the African continent has a strong interest in allowing large-scale land investments.

In reality, these development opportunities are not realized and investment rarely results in win-win situations. Studies reveal that with the promise of agricultural value, these land deals actually result in devastating consequences for local communities. Notably, these export-driven land deals do not account for local interests\(^13\) and evict local farmers from land they have long regarded as their own.\(^14\) This result is particularly striking when considering deals that involve investors from the financial sector. In these cases, less than 12% of the acquired land is put under production, suggesting that the land only supports highly speculative ventures.\(^15\) Therefore, the local population does not even get to experience the potential upside of investment—development. For these reasons, critics of the large-scale land acquisitions more accurately describe the phenomenon as “land grabbing.”\(^16\)

Reporters Harry Verhoeven and Eckart Woertz assert, however, that Africa’s land grab is a myth—nothing more than a “mirage in the desert.”\(^17\) They argue that despite years of heated debate, scholars know very little about what occurs on the ground.\(^18\) In the case of Sudan, for example, confidential Ministry of Investment statistics revealed that only about 20% of agricultural partnerships saw some degree of implementation, sug-

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9. LandMatrix, supra note 5.
11. Id.
13. Opportunity, supra note 2 (referring to International Labor Commission reports saying that the jobs created are few, short-lived, and low paid, and that the public revenues are limited by tax exemptions).
14. See Bowman, supra note 6; see also Opportunity, supra note 2 (discussing ILC study finding that in Uganda, 200,000 people claimed to be evicted from their land as a result of large land deals).
15. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 3 (referring to the Oxfam case study of Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali and Tanzania).
17. Id.
18. Id.
gesting that the established view of land grabs was distorted.\(^\text{19}\) Prevailing scholarship and current statistics, however, reveal that land grabbing and their effects are real.\(^\text{20}\) Verhoeven and Woertz’s argument nevertheless highlights the level of uncertainty and vagueness underlying land grabs. Scholars concede that land grabs often result from secret deals where the details of the agreements are not disclosed to the public.\(^\text{21}\) Further, scholars also find that land grabs seem to eschew democratic planning and evade local participation that would otherwise create a system of rights and responsibilities for enabling the people to voice their consent to sell the land. The question remaining is how these large-scale land acquisitions are possible. Perhaps Verhoeven and Woertz’s mirage is not in the effects of land grabs, but is instead in the legal framework under which land grabbing occurs.

The Note undertakes this review by examining the sources of law at the national and international level that govern the way in which large-scale land transactions occur in Africa. Part I begins by briefly introducing the bifurcated legal system in Africa, where African customary law\(^\text{22}\) and common law govern the people’s rights and responsibilities.\(^\text{23}\) Section A defines customary law from a historical perspective. As this system is a relic of the post-independence governments,\(^\text{24}\) the hierarchical relationship of authority corresponds with the subject of dispute and ethnic background of the parties.\(^\text{25}\) Section B describes the investors in large land transactions and how they may complicate land deals. Part II then analyzes the land rights that the systems afford. Part III describes the structure of land deals and examines how land rights operate when foreign investors seek to purchase large tracts of land. Recognizing the negative ramifications of land grabs on local communities, Part IV then contends that African customary law, when supported by international law, can adapt to afford real property rights rather than a mirage.

19. \textit{Id.} (basing findings on confidential statistics from Sudan’s Ministry of Investment).


22. Technically a single “African customary law” does not exist. The customary law, sometimes noted as “traditional law” differs by tribe and ethnic group, although certain characteristics underlie all of the customary law systems in Africa. See a full discussion of the topic in Part I of this Note. Here, I employ the term “African customary law” to avoid confusion in Part VI where the Note discusses the distinct customary international law.


24. \textit{Id.}

25. See \textit{Joireman}, \textit{supra} note 20, at 9 (attributing Africa’s poorly defined property rights to the colonial era where the indigenous people were thought to hold land in common); William Twining, Lecture at the University of Chicago: The Place of Customary Law in The National Legal System of East Africa (Jan. 1, 1964) (describing the relationship between customary law and the common law).
To better understand the legal context of land grabbing, it is helpful to illustrate (1) the complexity of the domestic legal systems in Africa, and (2) the complications that investors pose on this framework. Scholars characterize Africa’s legal environment with the term “legal pluralism,” where multiple systems of law coexist in a single jurisdiction. More broadly, practitioners understand legal pluralism as the “state of affairs in which a category of social relations is within fields of operation of two or more bodies of legal norms.” In Africa, the relevant legal norms are the common law and African customary law systems.

A. Defining African Customary Law

At the time of independence, state constitutions in Africa defined customary law as understood during the colonial era. As a result, scholars find complementary definitions of customary law among various states with similar colonial legacies. For example, Ghana interprets customary law as “comprising of rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities . . . not being rules of common law under any enactment providing for the assimilation of such rules of customary law, as are suitable for general application.” In Sierra Leone, the constitution defines “customary law” as “any rule, other than a rule of general law, having the force of law in any chiefdom of the provinces whereby rights and correlative duties have been imposed . . . .” Nigeria similarly sees customary law as “local custom that includes a rule, which in a particular district or among members of a tribe or clan . . . has from long usage, obtained the force of law.”

In practice, there is no single “African customary law.” Customary law varies by country and by ethnic group. In Nigeria alone, there are 350 ethnic groups, each with its own system of customary law. Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics of customary law that are consistent across ethnic groups. Primarily, customary law operates on a personal level, inva-

30. Id. (referring to Sierra Leone’s Local Courts Act 1963 (No. 20 of 1963), s. 2).
31. Id.
32. Legal Pluralism, supra note 26, at 235 (citing Orafemi Awolowo, Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution 24 (1966)).
riably tying a person to the customary law of his ancestors. Adherents further describe customary law as living law that adapts over time to the needs of the community. Accordingly, this Note will refer to African customary law as the personal law relating to members living under the traditional African legal system.

B. African Customary Law in the Common Law Context

Once incorporated into the formal legal system during colonialism, African customary law was forced to comply with the requirements of the dominant legal culture. This hierarchical view of the common law and African customary law has formed through the colonial regime. During the nineteenth century, for instance, colonial courts limited the recognition of African customary law under the “repugnancy proviso,” also known as the “repugnancy clause.” The repugnancy clause prevented African customary law from applying in so far as it “oppose[d] the principles of public policy and natural justice.” Courts understood these principles to characterize Western European ideas of moral propriety. Consequently, the common law and Western ideals functioned as a “check” on the authority of African customary law. This meant, for example, that even in customary law marriage, which was wholly governed by African customary law, the bride’s uncles negotiated the marriage arrangement on her behalf, and the bride had to consent. Similarly, custody awards determined under African customary law had to be decided on the basis of the child’s best interests regardless of payment or bride wealth. In both circumstances, African customary law had to adapt to fit within the dominant legal framework.

Later in the twentieth century, courts declined to invoke the repugnancy clause because of two emerging schools of thought: functionalist anthropology and legal positivism. Functionalist anthropology compelled scholars and lawmakers to regard customary law on its own standards rather than in European terms. Legal positivism then “de-contextualized law by abstracting it from its social and moral or ethical background.” Despite these movements, modern courts will not apply

33. Id. at 237.
35. Id. at 18–35. Although this work pertains to the South African legal system, the analysis of African customary law is widely applicable to other African countries with bifurcated legal systems.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id.
38. Id.
40. Bennet, supra note 34, at 24.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 24–25.
43. Id. at 24; KAPLAN & MANNERS, CULTURE THEORY 55ff (1972).
44. Bennet, supra note 34, at 25 (citing R.B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 31-34 (1978)).
African customary law if the customary law fails to satisfy modified conceptions of the repugnancy and incompatibility tests. As such, customary law is “[still] only applicable as long as it is not repugnant to justice and morality.”

The sustained hierarchical relationship between common law and African customary law is most evident when we look to African states’ constitutions. One prime example is the Kenyan constitution’s supremacy clause and section on judicial authority. Under the supremacy clause Article 2(4), the constitution states that “any law, including customary law that is inconsistent with the constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency . . . .” The constitution is thus clearly placed on a higher level than African customary law. The constitution further explains common law’s supremacy in Article 159 on judicial authority. There, Clause 3 states that traditional dispute resolution, recognized in African customary law, “shall not be used in a way that . . . is repugnant to justice and morality or results in outcomes that are repugnant to justice or morality; or is inconsistent with this constitution or any written law.” Clause 3 seemingly indicates that African customary law is lower than not only the constitution, but also lower than any codified law. From the language “repugnant to justice or morality,” it is clear that vestiges of the colonial conception of customary law persist in the modern legal system.

Similar distinctions exist in the African court systems. In Nigeria, for example, the judiciary established separate courts to administer the different laws. The resultant problem is that there is a divergence in the quality of justice, given the different procedural rules and the fact that the racial origin of the litigant determines the court system that the litigant can use.

C. Land Grabs Reveal Endemic Problem of the Bifurcated Legal System

The arguably larger problem with the bifurcated legal system involves choosing which law to use. In most cases, the applicable legal system is not prescribed. Relevant considerations thus reflect choice of law principles. The general rule is that parties “may select the law to be applied to their relationship, provided that the decision does not prejudice a third party’s rights.” Apart from this general rule, courts look to objective elements that include (1) the nature and form or a prior transaction; (2) the subject matter and environment of a transaction; and (3) the litigant’s cultural orientation. For land tenure that involves members of a tribe or

45. The Definition of Customary Law, supra note 29, at 162.
46. Id.
48. Id. art. 159 (3)(b)-(c).
49. Legal Pluralism, supra note 26, at 236.
50. Id. at 238.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 314–15.
chiefdom transferring rural land, African customary law typically applies. The local sellers’ “cultural orientation”—the rural environment and traditional society that they belong to—helps establish African customary law as controlling in this characteristically informal and small-scale tenure. If both parties (seller and buyer) live under the same traditional system, the choice of law is even clearer. Large-scale land acquisitions, however, operate differently. As the actors involved in these large-scale transactions differ from those in traditional tenure, land grabs present a different scenario for the law to operate.

D. Understanding the Participants in the African Land Grab

Researchers observe that three types of investors participate in the African land market. The first group encompasses cash-rich but food-insecure states, particularly from the Gulf Region and Asia. This group of actors operates through sovereign wealth funds and state trading enterprises. The second group includes Western “agribusinesses” that aim to expand market opportunities. The third and newest group to the African land market comes from the financial sector. Here, banks, private equity funds, pension funds, and hedge funds acquire land for speculative ventures. Private equity funds include institutional investors and wealthy individuals. Many of these private equity funds investing in farmland, however, are not listed on a stock exchange and very little of their information is publicly available. By contrast, pension funds are highly regulated investors that essentially manage the public’s money. Hedge funds, like mutual funds, pool and professionally manage investments. Hedge funds are, however, “more flexible in their investment strategies and generally adopt a more aggressive approach with high levels of speculation.” This third group of financial sector investors, as the Note will reveal, is the most problematic.

Part of the legal quandary stems from the investors’ aims. Investors are primarily interested in balancing risks and returns. For this reason, investors see farmland as an opportunity for potentially high, long-term returns and as a way of diversifying risk away from traditional assets such as...
as equity and bonds.” 68 Specifically, investors like agribusinesses expect high returns from rising farmland values and increased agricultural productivity on acquired lands. 69 Some investors also pursue large-scale land acquisitions with high yield potential and invest further in agricultural productivity,70 with the goal of increasing their annual returns.71 As the value of the returns fluctuates with the price of agricultural commodities in export and domestic markets, investors can protect themselves from short-term swings by leasing out land and transferring risk to the farm operators.72 Generally, the investors are more interested in the long-term effects on commodity prices.73 Consequently, their investment strategy allows them to realize growing returns from agriculture.74 These long-term, large-scale economic goals require neither day-to-day control over the land, nor personal relationships with those on neighboring tracts. In that sense, the fundamentally detached and formal nature of large-scale land transactions differs from the small-scale, informal, and personal transactions that operate under African customary law. The emerging legal issue with land grabbing is that sellers transfer large tracts of rural land by using customary law in commercial transactions that by nature and subject matter are historically governed by the common law.

II. Contrasting Land Rights Under African Customary Law and Common Law

In Africa, land tenure regimes, like legal norms, can vary within a single country.75 In some cases, the “traditional” or “communal” land tenure system exists side by side with “modern” individualized tenure.76 Common law, which recognizes private ownership, governs the transfer of land in the export sector. Thus, in a valid export-oriented land transaction, the title and use of land goes from the private owner to the buyer, as stipulated in the contract. By contrast, African customary law establishes communal property rights for rural land, where the chief has the power to allocate land on behalf of the community.

The division between these legal norms and land tenure regimes became less distinct with the individualization of property rights in Africa over the course of the twentieth century.77 This development effectively gave greater rights to the individual cultivating household, reducing the

68. IIED, supra note 61, at 1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. IIED, supra note 61, at 1.
authority of extended family groups and chiefs.\textsuperscript{78} Currently, rural land in Sub-Saharan Africa generally falls within two types: the communal regime and the user rights regime.\textsuperscript{79} In the communal regime, traditional authorities continue to exercise political influence and play an important role in resource allocation.\textsuperscript{80} Under the user rights regime, state agents instead play an ongoing role in local resource allocation,\textsuperscript{81} thus altering the character of customary land rights to reflect the private ownership aim of the common law.

A. Traditional Land Ownership in Customary Law Lands

1. General Rights

Generally, “traditional” or “communal” land tenure is the system in which the land belongs to the whole community and is not owned by individuals with the right of disposal.\textsuperscript{82} Here, individuals “only have rights of access for use,” whether for residential, agricultural, or other purposes.\textsuperscript{83} This land does not include communal production and consumption.\textsuperscript{84} The traditional land tenure system is thus communal in the sense that an individual accepts that, as a member of a particular community, he or she has an inherent right to allotted land for residence and subsistence cultivation.\textsuperscript{85} Accordingly, membership in local community, village, clan, or kinship group confers land-use rights.\textsuperscript{86} Such membership rights also include the community’s right to keep its land from being sold and removed from the community through a headman once the holder ceases to be a member of the community.\textsuperscript{87} Further, all members have equal access to undivided grazing land of the village or ward.\textsuperscript{88} Thus, under the traditional system—when completely set apart from the common law’s individualized system—all land is either unclaimed no-man’s land or is under the exclusive dominion of a particular clan.\textsuperscript{89} In the communal regime, state action upholds and ratifies these arrangements, enabling non-elected, non-state local level actors like chiefs to exercise traditional land management powers.\textsuperscript{90}

2. The Power to Distribute Land

Traditionally, a chief’s power correlates with his “control over access to

\textsuperscript{78} Id.
\textsuperscript{79} Boone, supra note 75, at 565.
\textsuperscript{80} Id.
\textsuperscript{81} Id.
\textsuperscript{82} Ruggege, supra note 76, at 34.
\textsuperscript{83} Id.
\textsuperscript{84} Id. at 35.
\textsuperscript{85} Id.
\textsuperscript{86} Boone, supra note 75, at 563.
\textsuperscript{87} Id.
\textsuperscript{88} Ruggege, supra note 76, at 35 (citing C.K. Meek, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies 18–19, London: OUP (1946)).
\textsuperscript{89} Id. (citing Philip Meyer & Iona Meyer, Land Law in the Making, in AFRICAN LAW: ADAPTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 59 (Hilda Kruper & Leo Kuper eds., 1965)).
\textsuperscript{90} Boone, supra note 75, at 563.
agricultural and residential land by people under [his] jurisdiction.”

Thus, in a communal regime, the chief’s role as custodian of the land often includes settling disputes between lineages, reallocating land among lineages, and superintending transfers to land within the community.

Scholars emphasize the importance of the chief’s duty to allocate land. In fact, a statute in Letheroll specifically stated, “All chiefs and headmen must by law provide people living under them with lands to cultivate.”

The authority to distribute land is particularly important to land grabs. Under the African customary law arrangement, the chief in the area must sanction the transfer of the right to use land. The ideology is that the land belongs to the community as a whole, and the king only administers the land on the behalf of the community to control scarce resources.

Even in the pre-colonial period of customary law, land was not alienable by its holders, whether for consideration or gratis. The community as such has no real control over the distribution of land. In that regard, chiefs have the sole authority to redistribute and allocate land in their role of determining who is part of the community.

3. When the Power to Distribute Creates the Power to Revoke and Transact Land

As custodian of the land, the chief can revoke land from individuals for either one of two reasons: inspection or neglect. Under the chief’s power of inspection, the chief can take arable land away from the head of household if the chief is satisfied that the household has more than it needs for subsistence. Practitioners justify inspection on the grounds that the land is allocated according to need. If the circumstances change, then revocation makes egalitarian sense in terms of equity vis-a-vis the entire community. Nevertheless, the chief has discretion in deciding whether to reallocate the land.

A chief can also take arable land away from a subject due to neglect or non-utilization. The original idea was to prevent people who migrated away from the area from claiming fields back on their return. The chief’s power in this instance is unchecked, resulting in a unilateral decision to divest land. In that way, the chief’s discretion under African customary law can become a pretext for land transactions that exclude the local people’s input.

91. Rugege, supra note 76, at 33.
92. Bubb, supra note 77, at 559.
93. Rugege, supra note 76, at 39.
94. Id. (citing Laws of Leroholl 1992. Law No. 8).
95. Id. at 37.
96. Id. at 36.
97. Rugege, supra note 76, at 39.
98. Id. at 40.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 41.
4. **Scope of Customary Law Title is Too Narrow to Counteract Chief Decision-Making**

In the communal land tenure system, title includes everything above and below the ground. Title therefore encompasses not only the acreage of land, but also the crops and minerals. Here, the king or chief has paramount title.103 For the Akan in Ghana, whose spiritual belief considers the ancestral stool the head of the community, the stool has paramount title. The chief therefore holds the title in trust for the community. Similarly, when examining Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia) an anthropologist observed that “all land and its products belonged to the nation through the king.”104 This common title of the nation to all the land translates to individual access to plots of land allotted by the king through his village headmen to heads of households for use.105

This is particularly problematic in circumstances where land investors choose to transact directly with chiefs. Even if locals oppose the chief’s power to allocate and revoke land under the African customary law system, the individual’s lack of title to the land renders him unable to adequately affect the transaction.

**B. Identifying the Problem: Weak Customary Land Rights For Individuals Yield Vulnerable Sellers in Land Grabs**

On crucial issues regarding who owns land under customary law and whether land can be sold, there is considerable agreement. As the previous subsection illustrates, chiefs have the paramount title while individuals in their communities have usufruct rights. The broader problem for individuals is that the use rights are not codified, but only locally understood. Consequently, foreign investors are more likely to transact under the guises of the user rights regime.

1. **User Rights Regime Dilutes Customary Rights**

Under the user rights regime, governments challenge pre-existing rights, land management processes, and land-allocation authorities by standing behind land claims of “whoever uses the land.”106 The conflict with African customary land rights occurs in situations where the user rights rule enforces the land rights of individuals who are unrecognized members of the local community. These individuals include immigrants or migrants (“strangers”) who have created plots outside their home locales but within another locale that observes African customary law’s communal regime. As explained above, the chief has the ability to determine community membership through land allocation. Under the communal regime, strangers who migrate outside of their home communities typically have to

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104. Rugege, supra note 76, at 35 (citing M. Gluckman, Politics, Law, and Ritual in Tribal Society (1963)).
105. Id.
106. Boone, supra note 75, at 564 (discussing farming context, but applying the statement more generally to use rights).
bargain with the chief of their host community and pay some form of regular tribute in exchange for the right to use land.107 In those circumstances, the community retains a reversionary interest in the land.108 When investors instead impose a user-rights regime on individual land users, they circumvent the chief’s power, removing the equitable exchange for rights that would occur under African customary law’s communal regime. In the interim, this legal conflict creates a seemingly irreconcilable apparent versus actual authority issue. The ultimate result is that individuals that transact directly with investors for land are stuck between legal systems, where their rights and those of the community are uncertain. As these individuals are typically farmers with low levels of education, they are typically less equipped to defend their interests. Consequently, parties permit deals that evict local farmers from land that they regarded as their own.109 Therefore, it is not surprising that less than 12% of the land acquired through these transactions is put under production, suggesting that the land only supports highly speculative ventures.110 This is the legal framework through which land grabbing occurs.

III. Mechanics of a Deal: African Customary Law and Common Law in Action

Even in Mozambique, which is seen as having one of the best land reform systems in Africa due to the country’s provision of legal title to communities, the government still allocates land under legal community title to foreign investors.111 This suggests that the African customary law land rights have little weight in large-scale land acquisitions. Part III of this Note will deconstruct the land deal process in Africa to reveal (1) why parties do not recognize African customary land rights and (2) how decision-makers can improve the process.

A. Land Deals From the Investor Perspective

Land deals begin with investor action, where investors typically interact with one another. In theory, each investment undergoes the same internal process: due diligence; screening against the fund’s investment strategy; board approval; establishment of legal structures to provide investors with various forms of ownership; and management to facilitate risk as well as investment entrance and exit.112 The only large difference occurs with public investors, such as sovereign wealth funds. Public investors begin investment by paying a management fee to an asset management company.113 Then, as with other modes of investment, fund managers

107. Bubb, supra note 77, at 559.
108. Id.
109. Bowman, supra note 6; see also Opportunity, supra note 2.
110. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 3. (referring to Oxfam case study of Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali and Tanzania).
111. Making Investment Work, supra note 4.
112. IIED, supra note 61, at 3.
113. Id.
seek investment funds that go through the process of due diligence, screening, and board level approval. 114 At that time, capital is put in the farmland of these large-scale land acquisitions. 115 Through this process investors expect a return on their investment to funnel back through the channels of investment. 116

Observers typically begin to see inequitable results once investors interact with the state in which the land is located. One can attribute this result in part to investors’ expectations over the course of a land deal. Investors regard the domestic laws and regulations of the host country as the primary source of law. In the typical transaction, the host government enters into a contract where it defines the price, quantity, and duration for the purchase or lease of the land. 117 Here, the host government uses a framework agreement to commit itself to making the land available to the investor. 118 The later process involves more specific instruments (primarily contractual) that actually transfer all or part of the land. 119 As part of the agreement, the seller provides a range of rights and remedies for the investor in addition to the contract mentioned above. Yet, the degree to which these deals are negotiated or standardized varies across countries and across the different stages of the negotiation, where instruments that allocate land tend to be more standardized. 120 The parties then layer the contracts over the domestic law.

From the host country’s perspective, the preparation and negotiation processes for large-scale land deals often involve multiple government agencies. 121 Even in states that offer a central point of contact within the government for prospective investors, this contact will not address all aspects of the land deal. 122 At minimum, the contact engages with authorities (typically government agencies) at the local level. In Tanzania, for example, this requires several governmental agencies to coordinate: the Tanzania Investment Center must formally approve the investment for financial viability; the Ministry of Agriculture must assess the agricultural viability of the land; and the Ministry of Lands and Housing Development must look at the land registration. In practice, this communication is poor and undermined in part by the agencies’ preference to only report positive outcomes. 123

The final contracts between the host governments and incoming investors are not public. 124 This privacy exacerbates potential inequalities. On

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114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 7.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 65–66.
121. Id. at 66.
122. Cotula, supra note 118, at 66.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 68.
the investor’s end, as described above, each investment also undergoes an internal process of due diligence; screening against the fund’s investment strategy; board approval; establishment of legal structures to provide investors with various forms of ownership; and management to facilitate risk, as well as investment entrance and exit. 125 Yet, as most fund managers and institutional investors manage other people’s money, they have a “fiduciary duty to ensure that they invest with appropriate advice to maximize returns commensurate with an acceptable level of risk.” 126 This assessment, however, is economically focused and pressures investors to maximize profit absent other considerations127 that could better account for customary land rights.

B. Finding a Place for Customary Land Rights

Theoretically, the local populations’ land rights could enter the state level of the land deal. In practice, however, the rights do not apply. The question is why. One reason could be that the party seeking the land is not always the state. Instead, there are investors that may either work with the state and bypass the local population or transact directly with individuals who have little bargaining power. Further, there is little recourse at the state level for deals that take advantage of the weak African customary land rights. For example, investors can negotiate directly with landowners, who are typically farmers with low levels of education and less equipped to defend their interests. Yet, these negotiations appear acceptable because deals continue to take place behind closed doors, and the details of the agreements are not made public. Given the diminishing authority of African customary law and increasing desire for foreign companies and governments to invest in large “unoccupied” land, African customary law seems to provide a false sense of rights to those living on customary lands. Consequently, customary land occupies a gap in the legal system that investors and beneficiaries can exploit.

The result is a process that lacks the local population’s consent and participation. African customary law, however, deals with the collective. Thus, granting individual title is not likely to solve the problem. For the legal framework to protect customary land rights, it must account for this aspect of group use and communal rights while providing the consent missing from the land deal process.

IV. The Potential for International Law to Reinforce Customary Land Rights

As African customary law is living law, in theory, it can adapt to mitigate the effects of land grabs. The question is how. Part IV of the Note argues that local authorities can look to the international legal system.

125. IIED, supra note 61, at 3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
Gathering inspiration from international law is easiest for monist states. Under the monist theory of international law, domestic law is subordinate to international law. As a consequence of this unified legal system, domestic courts may look to sources of international law—such as treaties and international customs—when determining cases that implicate international concerns. Even if state authorities were to subscribe to the dualist theory, where international law and domestic law occupy different legal spheres, international law could at least persuade, if not compel, domestic legal outcomes. Thus, examining sources of general international law may be helpful in addressing rights in the African context.

The constitutions of several states, including Senegal, Namibia, and Cameroon, explicitly refer to international law. These states’ documents indicate that their domestic laws are subject to binding international law. Simultaneously, common law systems in Africa, as explained in Part II of this Note, acknowledge that African customary law is part of the law of the state so long as the customary law is not repugnant to the state’s constitution. Thus, the state’s body of law accounts for both international law and African customary law existing in the same legal framework. This section of the Note will therefore discuss the ways in which international law can reinforce customary land rights without changing the fundamental characteristics of African customary law. The text will reveal that even when constitutions do not expressly refer to international law, people can look to regional institutions that recognize international law. These regional institutions have successfully applied international human rights law to the issue of land rights. Accordingly, the remainder of this section will analyze the potential for international human rights law to reinforce the property rights under African customary law.

A. Existing Sources of International Law Support Land Rights for Indigenous Peoples

International law recognizes the right of indigenous peoples over lands and territories that they have traditionally occupied. Scholars assert that the principle of reallocation, in theory, should protect indigenous peo-

128. 65 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933) [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
129. Id.
132. Id. at 125 (citing CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (2014), § 199 ch. I, 12(1)).
133. Udombana, supra note 130, at 126.
134. DAMROSH, HENKIN, MURPHY & SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 975 (5th ed. 2009).
from encroachment on land for large-scale investment because the declarations require “free and informed consent.” Free and informed consent is the “right of indigenous peoples to make free and informed choices about the development of their lands and resources.” The aim of the provision is to “ensure that indigenous peoples are not coerced or intimidated” and that their consent is sought and freely given “prior to the authorization and start of any activities.” Practically, this requires the state or investors, depending on the structure of the land transaction, to give the people full information about the scope and impact of any proposed developments. Fundamentally, this process would ensure that the peoples’ “choice to give or withhold consent is respected.”

Yet, this free and informed consent likely only affects international legal obligations when recognized as a treaty, customary international law, general principle, decision from an international tribunal, or part of international legal scholars’ work. As detailed below, the principle of free and informed consent exists in treaty law. In some cases, however, the relevant treaty may not directly apply to an African state if the state is not a signatory to the treaty. For this reason, local populations will have a stronger case for defending land rights if free and informed consent is also considered international custom. An international custom is defined as state practice supported by opinio juris. Thus, a practice becomes international custom when exercised widely among states due to a sense of legal obligation or reciprocity. As the remainder of this section will illustrate, the requirement of “free and informed consent” appears in several sources of international law, which strongly suggests that the requirement has become an international custom.

The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples reiterates support for indigenous peoples’ free and informed consent. This United Nations General Assembly resolution provides that states “should consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples involved through their own representative institutions in order to obtain free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their land or

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138. CHR Standard Setting, supra note 137, at 47.

139. Id.

140. See International Court of Justice, art. 38.

141. See infra Part IV at 25.

142. See Vienna Convention, supra note 130, art. 11–12.

143. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations of the United States §102(2) (1987); see also infra note 166.

resources . . . particularly with regards to the utilization or exploitation of mineral, water, or other resources." 145 The resolution likely comports with African customary law’s framework because the Article 32(2) provision indicates that states should cooperate through the indigenous people’s “own representative institutions.” 146 These institutions in customary law, as discussed earlier, involve chiefs, groups of locals, and headmen that consult the chiefs. Article 28 of the resolution further suggests that the provisions would apply to all rural lands operating under African customary law. Specifically, Article 28 defines the scope of the affected lands to those “traditionally owned or otherwise operated.” 147 Traditional ownership extends the principle of free and informed consent to chiefs who have paramount title, while the text regarding “otherwise operated” land likely applies to the land where individuals have usufruct rights.

International treaties also contribute to an international custom of requiring free and informed consent from indigenous populations in land transactions. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), for example, requires state parties to the convention to “respect the principle of free, prior, and informed consent of the affected peoples” concerning a people’s right to participate in cultural life. 148 The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the supervisory body of the ICESCR, interpreted Article 15 of the covenant to include the rights of indigenous peoples to restitution of lands, territories, and resources traditionally used and enjoyed by indigenous communities if taken without the prior, informed consent of the affected peoples.” 149

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) may also indicate an emerging custom for recognizing indigenous populations’ right to property. In fact, ICERD Article 5 explicitly refers to indigenous people’s right to property. 150 Relevant for foreign investors in the mining industry, this ICERD right to property includes the right to land and subsoil resources. 151 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) further finds that international law prohibits parties from making any decision relating directly to indigenous people without their informed consent. 152 When read together, Article 5 and General Comment 21 interpret ICERD to require potential investors to receive the locals’ separate informed consent for both the land and resources such as coal or oil. Thus, as in the Declaration of Rights of Indigenous People, state parties must “ultimately ensure the con-

145. Id.; Ward, supra note 136, at 58.
146. UN DRIP, supra note 144, art. 32(2).
147. Id. at art. 28.
150. ICERD, art. 5.
151. Id. art. 5(d)(v).
152. CESCR, General Comment No. 21.
sent of the indigenous people with regard to the development and resource exploitation within their traditional lands and territories.”

Although these general comments and recommendations on the application of U.N. treaties are not legally binding decisions, they indicate consensus in the international community. This consensus has influenced persuasive regional decisions in African Regional courts.

In the landmark decision of *Endorois v. Kenya*, delivered on February 4, 2010, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirmed a report by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights recognizing the indigenous peoples’ right to property. The court found that the Endorois, a pastoralist community in central Kenya, had customary rights to land from which the Kenyan government had dispossessed them in 1973. To arrive at this conclusion, the court relied upon the African Charter.

The second portion of the African Charter specifically addresses the right to property as a type of egalitarian or positive right that “enhances the power of the government to do something for the person” while “displaying a highly social orientation.” This right under the African Charter accords with the Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where the right to property “may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community.”

The *Endorois* decision also looks to other sections of the Charter to support the indigenous people’s right to land and subsoil resources. Specifically, the court refers to the African Charter’s solidarity rights—rights not vested in the individual, but in the collective groups of individuals.

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153. Ward, supra note 136, at 57.


155. The goal of the African Charter was to “borrow from modernism only what does not misrepresent our civilization and deep nature.” Udombana, supra note 130, at 112 (citing President Leopold Sedar Senghor, Address at Meeting of Experts for the Preparation of the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Dakar, Senegal (Nov. 28, 1979), in REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EMERGING AFRICAN SYSTEM 121, 124 (P. Kunig et al. eds., 1985)).


called “peoples.” One such right, articulated in Article 21, safeguards the “right of peoples to dispose of natural wealth and resources in the interest of the peoples.” The goal is to “promote[] international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable exchange, and the principles of international law.” In Endorois, the court considered the fertile lands and lake “natural wealth and resources.” As the Kenyan government’s decision to move the Endorois did not serve the Endorois interests, the court found that the government had threatened the peoples’ Article 21 rights. In light of this and other provisions, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights held that the Endorois eviction from Lake Bogoria violated the Endorois’s rights under the African Charter as an indigenous people. Specifically, the eviction provided the Endorois with only minimum compensation and violated their right to property (Article 14); culture (Article 17(2) and (3)); religion (Article 8); natural resources (Article 21); and development (Article 22). By consequence, the court ordered the Kenyan Government to restore the Endorois to their ancestral land and to compensate them.

Regional and international practice regarding property rights for indigenous populations extends beyond the domain of existing treaty obligations for states. Thus, the property rights appear to rise to the level of international custom, where there is state practice and opinio juri.

B. Locals Can Invoke International Custom to Protect African Customary Law Land Rights

African customary law can couple with international customary law to provide a stronger system of land rights and prevent land grabs. As Section A illustrates, international treaties, conventions, and a regional court decision support this proposition. Excluding indigenous property regimes from the property protected under the conventions would perpetuate the long history of indigenous peoples’ forced dispossession, which contra-

158. Udombana, supra note 130, at 117.
159. African Charter, supra note 154, art. 21(1).
160. Id. art. 21(3).
162. Id. ¶¶ 265–68.
163. Id. at Recommendation ¶ 1.
The object and purpose of the convention. Some may argue, however, that several conceptual difficulties apply when adapting African customary law to the principles of international custom. This section finds that African customary law can address these concerns.

1. Potential Impediments

One potential concern in applying customary international law and treaties to the African context is defining an “indigenous population.” With African populations’ migratory history, especially during nineteenth century border changes and modern warfare, the “indigenous population” is not well defined. Furthermore, even when an investor dispossesses a particular ethnic group of its land, the group may not have been the original occupants. In that sense, the group is not truly “indigenous” to the area. African courts have already confronted this issue. In *Endorois*, for example, the African Court of Human Rights did not inquire as to whether the Endorois pastoralist community originally occupied its land prior to European colonization. The court used the 1973 government reallocation as a time marker for where to assert ownership. When we look to the legal structure governing rural African communities, African customary law adequately accounts for the issue of defining the community. As discussed in Part II of this Note, the chief’s land allocations reflect community membership. Under African customary law, the chief thus determines the members of the community when he or she allocates land to individuals for use.

A second concern is that domestic law may prevent international custom from applying to indigenous populations. The magnitude of this impediment depends on the individual state’s constitution. Constitutions in a dualist system do not generally consider treaties of international law as self-executing. Consequentially, domestic legislative processes must occur before the treaty can come into force. For example, the text of those constitutions similar to the 1999 constitution of Nigeria may provide that “no treaty between the Federation and any other country should have the force of law except to the extent that any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.”

By contrast, other constitutions call for the direct implementation of international law. For example, the supremacy clause of the Kenyan consti-

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167. *Id.* at 43. Although this refers to rights in the American system, the property rights afforded in the American Convention of Human Rights and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man parallel the rights in the African Charter and ICERD. Thus the authors’ discussion regarding the object and purpose of those treaties is applicable to the present discussion.

168. See Boone, *supra* note 75, at 564-65 (discussing the difficulty of identifying indigenes).

169. The terms “self-executing” and “non-self executing” are typically used in the American context. This Note employs the typology to streamline understanding of the different African systems.

tution mandates the following: “[G]eneral rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya.” Further, Part 6 of the clause continues, “any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under the Constitution.” The analysis above reveals that the free and informed consent of indigenous people with regard to property sales is likely both a treaty obligation and international custom. Consequently, the principle would apply in a state like Kenya, where the state party to the treaty automatically adopts general rules of international law or international custom.

2. Guiding Principle as Overall Solution

States may nevertheless avoid this inquiry altogether under the jus cogens norm of pacta sunt servanda. The Vienna Convention asserts that under pacta sunt servanda, “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Consequently, states must adhere to the provisions—or at least refrain from contravening the treaty’s object and purpose—regardless of the domestic process. Below, this Note will explore how this principle, when coupled with the principle of free and informed consent, could greatly affect the process underlying large-scale land transactions so that such transactions are no longer land grabs.

C. A New Land Deal

As explained in Part II, the way in which private and institutional investors use land acquired in large-scale land deals is alien to African customary law. Thus, if large-scale land deals are to take place, African states need to create (1) a mechanism for obtaining and determining community involvement that reflects the principle of free and informed consent, and (2) a mechanism for land sales.

Part IV, Section A illustrates that the principle of free and informed consent can apply to African states, placing obligations on both foreign investors and government agencies that facilitate the land deals. Here, investors would work with chiefs and local headman who would typically control the land transactions under African customary law. Working through chiefs and headmen likely increases the possibility for the indigenous people to take part in decision-making—as compared to land deals that entirely circumvent local actors. Even so, the people’s participation is not guaranteed because chiefs do not have a pure agency relationship with the indigenous people that they govern. In a pure agency relationship, a fiduciary responsibility arises when a principal manifests assent in an agent that the agent shall act on behalf of the principle and subject to the

172. Id. at 2(6).
174. See supra Part II; see also supra Part IV(A).
principal’s control. Unlike elected officials, chiefs generally do not consult voting schemes and polls to arrive at decisions. Chiefs instead receive advice from local headmen or other influential members of the community. In that regard, chiefs are not purely agents. Despite acting on the people’s behalf, chiefs are not truly subject to the people’s control. Chiefs thus have more autonomy than elected representatives or other “agents of the state.” Given this power imbalance, the resulting issue then involves extending consent to the local people who are apart from indigenous leadership. A potential solution must therefore ensure that individual community members can consent to the large-scale land deals so that they may, albeit within limits, act on their own behalf, subject to their own control to counteract any self-dealing by the chiefs and headmen.

1. Mechanism for Community Involvement

This standard of free and informed consent could serve as the basis for a mechanism to obtain community agreement. Given the community-based nature of customary law societies in Africa, this process for obtaining agreement would likely involve informal gatherings with clans and kinship groups potentially implicated by the land sale. Though a strong policy, this consultation would likely have to include precise steps in order to avoid the pitfalls of other consultations in the African context. For example, land acquisition consultations in Mozambique were not effective because the communities did not receive relevant information prior to the consultation meetings. Further, the meetings primarily consisted of male community leaders rather than ordinary members. This lack of adequate representation exacerbated the fact that the consultations were typically performed in one meeting without complete records. For these reasons, a mechanism for obtaining the people’s free and informed consent would require several meetings to occur at different points in the negotiation process; where chiefs would attend the consultation along with a proportionate representation of interested parties (that includes women and other land users); where a third party would transcribe the record; and where the investor (or representative) would present each interested party with a detailed presentation of material aspects of the project and the parties could provide their comments in an open forum. In accord with African customary law, this consultation would involve community leaders. Yet to adhere to the principle of free and informed consent, the process would allow for free information sharing and meaningful comment from the indigenous peoples. To respect investor aims, the consultations would not disclose commercial information. Further, the information for inter-

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Cotula, supra note 118, at 72.
180. Id.
181. Id.
ested parties and local stakeholders would not in effect include more than the investors would have already provided in their internal due diligence. Thus, these measured consultations may reinforce the legal framework to prevent land grabs.

2. Mechanism for Large-Scale Sales

In terms of new mechanisms for land transactions, some scholars have contemplated institutional measures that implicate more than the negotiation process.182 Such instruments include shareholder and tax requirements. In Sierra Leone for instance, the policy instituted in 2009 requires that Sierra Leonean hold 5% to 20% of shares in biofuel investment.183 In theory, this plan could prove effective given that the managers and directors at the center of the investment would then owe fiduciary duties to those in-country shareholders.184 The problem, however, is that this seems to protect local people after the initial investment has occurred. In that sense, the shareholder requirement may not adequately address the inequitable transfer of land that occurs during the course of the large-scale land deals. Sierra Leone couples this requirement with out-grower schemes in agricultural investment.185 This policy has not yet been successful given the fact that investors prefer to create more robust business models and run the projects themselves.186

An alternative solution could involve instituting a tax on developers to discourage speculative ventures or providing a tax haven for investors that promote economic development. Imposing these measures would increase the likelihood that the land sales that occur reflect terms to which the people would freely consent.

Taxes may introduce an avenue for regulation given that the official land fees seem to play a relatively unimportant role in government land allocations—particularly in rural areas.187 Here, the government either fails to charge the fee or charges a merely nominal rate.188 For instance, in the Northern State in Sudan, the rent for 1.03 acres of land may cost about $2 or $3 USD.189 Possible reasons for the nominal fee include the low land rents and the fact that the government perceives the expected benefits of the deal to exceed the opportunity costs.190 In the Daewoo-Madagascar land deal, for example, the government did not even require rent on account of the focus on job creation and infrastructure development.191 Thus when governments enter land deals with a focus on infrastructure

182. See generally Cotula, supra note 118.  
183. Id. at 84.  
184. See BARDES, supra note 176, at Part III.  
185. Id.  
186. Id.  
187. Cotula, supra note 118, at 78.  
188. Id.  
189. Id. at 79 (comparing rent of 1 fedan of land in the rural area to the rent of about $15 to $20 USD for 1 fedan in the city of Khartoum).  
190. Id. at 78.  
191. Id. at 79.
benefits, they often disregard initial land fees to investors. Although it may be plausible for there to exist higher prices in private-private transactions, where information is typically not disclosed, the generally low prices indicate that imposing a tax on speculative ventures may not be an undue burden.

Some may argue however, that such taxes would discourage all investment—not just investment from the financial sector. True, one motivation for large-scale land investment in Africa is the favorable tax and fiscal incentives. In fact, the Sudanese government exempts agricultural concessions from custom duties, tax on all capital items, and income and profit tax in hopes of building agriculture as a strategic sector. Consequently, tailoring tax to benefit investors that support local economic development could result in a win-win situation. Here, sovereign investors and agribusiness could profit from relatively inexpensive investment and potentially high long-term returns, while the local population could benefit from the capital inflow and potentially mitigate their own food security concerns.

Although these tax measures do not directly implicate the principle of free and informed consent, the principle—as incorporated in African customary law and the common law—can bolster the tax measures. This is particularly true in the initial segment of the typical large-scale land deal, where the government agency interacts with the investor. Importantly, the principle of free and informed consent may in turn obligate the government to ensure that the decision to impose the tax on a particular investor still allows for the indigenous people to give or withhold consent to the sale.

Conclusion

As this Note has illustrated, land grabs take place behind a complex legal framework where the rights of the local populations are uncertain. Media reports and legal scholarship suggest that a laissez-faire perspective will not suffice to rectify the issue. Thus, international law must protect against these land grabs by enforcing real property rights. The idea is that property is "not a primary quality of assets, but the legal expression of an economically meaningful consensus about assets." When rights conflict between African customary law’s communal regime and the common law’s user-rights regime that foreign investors expect, there is little consensus. Typically, investor expectations dominate at the expense of the local population. The challenge for African countries is to integrate these legal conventions in a way that benefits all parties involved.

193. Cotula, supra note 118, at 80.
194. See supra Introduction, Part II.
196. See supra Part III.
In examining sources of law at various levels, this Note revealed that the power of chiefs to allocate land varies vis-à-vis foreign investors, depending on whether the African country’s government operates under the communal regime or user-rights regime. This variation exposes the gap in the bifurcated legal system. Recognizing the devastating evictions and lack of development that local communities face in the wake of land grabs, this Note then explored the potential for international law to reinforce customary law and remedy the issue. The key source of international law is the emerging custom of “free and informed consent” for indigenous people.

The analysis illustrated that it takes more than speaking with the chiefs to garner the “free, prior and informed consent of the affected peoples.” Given the complexity of the bifurcated legal system and high potential for domestic self-dealing, the local population must have a meaningful opportunity to comment on the project before it is implemented. Such opportunity must also adequately account for the nature of African customary law, while complying with international standards for the rights of indigenous populations. International law thus imposes obligations on the state, and by extension the investor, to garner the indigenous people’s free and informed consent. In practice, a mechanism for this consent would require several meetings to occur at different points in the negotiation process; where chiefs would attend the consultation along with a proportionate representation of interested parties (including women and other land users); where a third party would transcribe the record; and where the investor (or representative) would present each interested party with a detailed presentation of material aspects of the project and the parties would provide their comments in an open forum. In adhering to the principle of free and informed consent, the process would allow for free information sharing and meaningful comment from the indigenous peoples. To respect the diverse aims of states, agribusiness, and private equity fund investors, the consultations would also not disclose commercial information.

This conceptualization can change the way in which parties enter the new wave of large-scale land deals in Africa. Instead of a process that sets African customary law aside from the state-made law, land deals can occur through an integrated framework where international law strengthens African customary law. The aim is that this will transform land grabs to development opportunities where African customary law can provide real property rights rather than a mirage.

197. See supra Part IV.