Cutting the Gordian Knot: How and Why the United Nations Should Vest the International Court of Justice with Referral Jurisdiction

Andrew Strauss†

Abstract ......................................................... 604
Introduction ..................................................... 605
Part One: The International Court of Justice and the Problem of the Gordian Knot ................................................ 608
  I. The International Court of Justice, Its Importance, and Jurisdictional Limitations ................................. 608
     A. The Court and Its Unique Importance .................... 608
     B. A Potential Unrealized: The Court and Its Jurisdictional Limits ................................................ 611
  II. Overcoming the Court’s Limited Jurisdiction: The Difficulty of Cutting the Gordian Knot ...................... 613
     A. The League of Nations and the Creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice ...................... 613
        1. The Creation of the Permanent Court ................. 613
        2. The Soviet Union and the United States ............... 616
     B. The United Nations and the Creation of the International Court of Justice.................................. 618
     C. The International Court of Justice and the Failure of Past Jurisdictional Reform Initiatives ............... 619
  III. Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Proposal for Referral Jurisdiction ..................................................... 623
Part Two: The Case for Referral Jurisdiction ....................... 627
  I. The Doctrinal Case for Referral Jurisdiction ............... 627

† Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development and Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. I wish to express my appreciation to Dame Rosalyn Higgins for her very thoughtful comments on a previous draft of this article. I would also like to thank Professor Jeffrey Dunoff for our conversations about this article, which were of great help to me. By my expressions of appreciation, I do not wish to imply that either necessarily agrees with the ideas or themes I develop in the pages that follow. Additional thanks to my Research Assistants, Maria Janoski, Daniel Lang, Allison Segal, and Sunny Yang for their enthusiasm, diligence, and, finally, invaluable contribution to bringing this project to fruition. I am also very grateful to Janet Lindenmuth whose great skill as a reference librarian has proven itself over and over again. Finally, my thanks to the editors and staff of the Cornell International Law Journal for their excellent editorial work. I alone am responsible for any errors or omissions.

44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603 (2011)
A. The Propriety of the Judicial Commission Under Article 22 and Article 96 of the United Nations Charter


B. The Legality of the Court Opining on the Behavior of States Without Their Consent

1. The Court’s Jurisdiction to Render Opinions in Quasi-Contentious Cases
   a) There is no Requirement of Consent to Advisory Proceedings
   b) States Have Consented to the Court’s Advisory Jurisdiction by Virtue of their Accession to the United Nations Charter and the Court Statute.

2. The Court’s Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Quasi-Contentious Advisory Cases
   a) That an Advisory Opinion be Intended for the Internal Use of the Requesting Organ Has Been a Relevant Factor in the Court’s Exercise of Discretion
   b) The Court Should Exercise Its Discretion in Favor of Accepting Referrals from the Judicial Commission

II. The Case that the Introduction of Referral Jurisdiction Will Improve Compliance with International Law

A. Transnational Legal Process Theory and the Culture of Global Law Compliance

B. Thomas Franck’s Legitimacy Theory and the Role of Indeterminacy in Undermining Law Compliance

C. Rationalist Compliance Theory and the Costs of Noncompliance

III. The Case that the Introduction of Referral Jurisdiction Will Strengthen Rather than Weaken the International Court of Justice

A. The Court’s Soft Power

B. The Power of Soft Power

C. The International Community and the Court

Conclusion

Abstract

The International Court of Justice—the global system’s oldest and most venerable tribunal—has failed to meet its full potential. This is in large measure due to the requirement that the Court may only assert jurisdiction over states with their consent, which is often withheld. To help
correct for this failure, this article proposes that the Court be given a referral jurisdiction. Referral jurisdiction would empower the Court to issue advisory opinions on interstate disputes without the requirement of state consent. Standing in the way of nonconsent-based jurisdiction, however, is the problem of the Gordian Knot: The world’s most powerful countries who are best able to lead or block expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction have historically perceived their advantage to lie more with political muscle than expanded judicial process. Today, their power to block is manifest in the ability of each of the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council to veto amendments to the treaty creating the Court. This article, however, suggests that there is a solution to the Gordian Knot problem. It proposes a legal strategy that would allow the United Nations General Assembly to establish referral jurisdiction without a treaty amendment. Having cut the Gordian Knot, this article goes on to make the case for referral jurisdiction. Specifically, it argues that (1) the proposal for referral jurisdiction is legal under the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and other general principles of international law; (2) referral jurisdiction would further compliance with international law; and (3) its implementation would institutionally strengthen the Court. This article concludes by suggesting that the rise of many newly industrializing countries that may be willing to spearhead jurisdictional expansion portends new possibilities for cutting the Gordian Knot and, in the process, unleashing a promising era of global rule of law reform.

Alexander [the Great] . . . requested to see the [Gordian Knot], and, when it was shown him, not being able to find the ends of the cords, which were hidden within the knots, he put a forced interpretation on the oracle, and cut the cords with his sword; and thus, when the involutions were opened out, discovered the ends concealed in them.

— Justin

Introduction

Despite widespread agreement that reform of the global institutional architecture is desirable, attaining it has been elusive. Typical of the unfortunate demise of past reform efforts was Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s largely stymied project to spearhead a post-millennial transformation of the United Nations.2 Similar recent defeats of initiatives to strengthen the specialized regimes established to meet the apocalyptic threats of global warming and nuclear weapons also stand as ominous reminders of the difficulties of reform.3 A key reason for the nonemergence of a more func-

tional global system of governance has been ambivalence, or even hostility, from the most powerful countries of the world, particularly the five permanent members on the United Nations Security Council. While it would be an oversimplification to lay complete responsibility for the general inertia regarding reform at their feet, the reality is that powerful countries are generally best positioned to lead or block initiatives.

That the global powers-that-be would have a desultory record in leading the world toward a more functional system of global governance might not have been apparent to an observer caught up in the inaugural optimism of the post-World War II order. In the war’s immediate aftermath, the United States led the way toward the creation of a rule-based international system. If biased in favor of the powerful, the new global institutions—the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and the GATT—also held the promise of potential evolution toward an effective law-based international system. While powerful countries in the period since the dawn of the Cold War have led certain global rule of law advances, mostly in the area of trade, their commitment to the promise has not been sustained. The one great exception was the creation of the International Criminal Court. Even this innovation, however, despite being promoted by leading members of the global community, had to overcome both passive and active opposition from three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.4

The reasons why powerful countries have tended not to support efforts to make the international legal system more effective are complex. The weight of historical habit, the interests of elites, mistrust born of specific conflicts, and insular and other cultural attitudes have all played a role. Of greatest importance, however, is the fact that the powerful dominate the present global system and, consequently, do not tend to perceive replacing that system with one that is more rule-based to be in their interest.

This is the Gordian Knot of global rule of law reform. Those who could most easily lead a transition to a more law-based international system often see themselves as having the biggest stake in the current configuration of power. Developing strategies for cutting this Gordian Knot calls for the attention of those who think about advancing international rule of law. In this Article I will answer this call with a study of the International Court of Justice, the international system’s most venerable standing court and the only one with a pedigree dating back to the League of Nations.

This Article is divided into two parts. Part One explains how the problem of the Gordian Knot has worked to frustrate the expansion of the impediments to reform of the global climate change and nuclear weapons proliferation regimes).

Court’s jurisdiction and concludes by proposing how the General Assembly can cut that Knot to initiate what I call referral jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction would allow aggrieved states to seek the Court’s advisory opinion regarding their allegations against other states without the jurisdictional consent of those states. Part Two of this Article shifts gears to make the supporting legal and political case for referral jurisdiction. Because available theory does not offer a distinct model for explaining how an incremental expansion of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction would further compliance with international law and strengthen the Court, this Part presents such customized theory.

To develop these themes, in Section I of Part One, I describe the extent to which the Court’s jurisdiction is limited by the requirement of state consent and how this limitation prevents the Court from living up to a judicial potential unique among the international system’s tribunals. In Section II, I apply the Gordian Knot thesis to the problem of expanding the Court’s jurisdiction with a recounting of how the great powers have historically thwarted the universalization of the Court’s jurisdiction. As I will detail, the great powers at the time of the Permanent Court of International Justice’s founding after World War I opposed universalizing its jurisdiction, just as they did the jurisdiction of its successor, the International Court of Justice, after World War II. In both instances, the less powerful countries, unable to cut the Gordian Knot, were forced to accede to the great powers. During the Court’s formative years, however, the great powers were not challenged by the less powerful countries to acquiesce to jurisdictional reform, as those from the developing world perceived the Court to be neither adequately representative of their societies nor sensitive to their perspectives.

Today, the Court again enjoys broad-based support among the less powerful countries of the world. The timing is therefore opportune for expanding its jurisdiction. To take advantage of this opportunity, a way must be found to cut the Gordian Knot of what history suggests will be opposition from the great powers. In Section III, I propose a way this can be done. Namely, I will explain how the Knot, as currently configured, ties up jurisdictional reform because each of the five permanent powers on the United Nations Security Council may veto an amendment of the Court’s statute expanding its jurisdiction. There is a viable way, however, for the United Nations General Assembly to bypass the Security Council and create referral jurisdiction. As I will detail, the General Assembly can create a Judicial Commission under Article 22 of the Charter, and under Article 96 it can empower that Commission to refer to the Court requests of aggrieved states for advisory opinions.

In Section I of Part Two, I make the doctrinal case that my proposal for referral jurisdiction is legal under the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and other general principles of international law. In Section II, I make the case that referral jurisdiction would improve compliance generally with international law. To support this contention, I employ three of the predominate descriptive theories of
international law compliance (transnational legal process theory, Thomas Franck’s legitimacy theory, and rationalist compliance theory) to predict the salutary effect that referral jurisdiction would have on international law compliance. Finally, in Section III, I make the case that the response of states to the Court’s foray beyond the realm of consensual jurisdiction would institutionally strengthen, rather than weaken, the Court.

Part One: The International Court of Justice and the Problem of the Gordian Knot

I. The International Court of Justice, Its Importance, and Jurisdictional Limitations

A. The Court and Its Unique Importance

In terms of status and hold on the public imagination, the International Court of Justice is the closest institution that the international community has to a high court. With its membership universal and its competence not limited to a particular subject area, the Court today hears disputes involving both developed and developing countries from East and West, North and South. The subject matter of its judgments transcends conflicts traditionally deemed suitable for judicial settlement and includes some of the global community’s most contentious issues, such as the use of force and self-defense, the legality of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing, self-determination of peoples, environmental liability, human rights, and genocide.

Yet the Court does not stand alone on the international judicial landscape. It now shares that panorama with a proliferation of specialized international tribunals. For instance, Europe, the Americas, and Africa, all have human rights courts, which have been complimented by a plethora of war crimes tribunals, the most important of which is the International Criminal Court. Various international tribunals have also come to play a major role in resolving international trade disputes. The capstone of the international trading system is the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Set-
tlement Body with its panels and Appellate Body. In addition, several regional trade courts are active. The jurisdiction of the European Union’s European Court of Justice extends to trade disputes and much more. The North American Free Trade Agreement establishes a range of tribunals to deal with specific trade and other matters. ASEAN, the African Union, and MERCOSUR all have institutional machinery to settle trade disputes. This machinery, at least to some extent, relies on adjudication, as do many of the numerous bilateral free trade agreements between states. Other international regimes, such as The Law of the Sea Treaty, have established international tribunals to adjudicate disputes within their subject matter areas.

While these specialized tribunals have an important place in the international judicial system, they are no substitute for the unique role played by the International Court of Justice. Except within Europe, the specialized tribunals are largely limited to adjudicating either trade or human rights/criminal matters, and there is little prospect for the creation of courts with alternative mandates. Thus, for the foreseeable future, specialized international tribunals are unlikely to contribute to resolving conflicts in such vital areas of global concern as security and the environment.

Moreover, the International Court of Justice is uniquely positioned to bring coherence to what has developed into an ad hoc system of overlapping tribunals. One reason jurisdictional boundaries of tribunals overlap is that the mandates of the regimes they serve overlap. For example, the United States, Mexico, and Canada are members of both NAFTA and the


World Trade Organization, each of which independently oversees the regulation of trade relations and has its own trade tribunals.

Lines of authority among tribunals of regimes with seemingly unrelated mandates can also overlap because the facts and law presented by cases in the real world do not always conform to jurisdictional boundaries. For example, the Dispute Resolution Body of the World Trade Organization would have jurisdiction to hold that international trade law either allows or disallows bans on the importation of foreign products manufactured in ways that contribute disproportionally to global warming. Though promulgated by a trade tribunal, such a decision would obviously have significant environmental implications.

Such jurisdictional overlap threatens the coherence of the international judicial system because, as Cesare Romano has pointed out, it makes it more likely that tribunals will inconsistently interpret the same international norms. To the extent that specialized tribunals are to proliferate, this incoherence will be aggravated. As the only court of general jurisdiction, universal membership, and pedigree, and whose decisions are already regarded as deserving of special deference by specialized tribunals, the International Court of Justice is best positioned to settle the law in the face of divergence among tribunals.

---


B. A Potential Unrealized: The Court and Its Jurisdictional Limits

Despite the Court’s unique importance, it is not reaching its full potential to contribute to improving the international legal system that we will explore in Part II. The most significant barrier to the Court fulfilling this potential is its relatively limited availability. Notwithstanding a significant increase in the Court’s popularity over the past two decades, more often than not a state with a grievance against another state cannot get a hearing before the Court because of restrictions on the Court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction.

The Court can only exercise binding jurisdiction over states that have consented to jurisdiction. Under the “optional clause” of Article 36(2) of its Statute, the Court can exercise so-called compulsory jurisdiction over a respondent in a particular case only if that state has prospectively consented to this jurisdiction. To manifest such consent the state must have submitted a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for the kind of dispute being litigated. In addition, the applicant state must also have accepted in its own declaration that, in accordance with the rule of reciprocity, it would itself be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction were it to be sued in a case of a similar nature. In theory, the Article 36(2) optional clause imbues the Court with the ability to exercise universal jurisdiction, but in practice, roughly two-thirds of the world’s countries do not currently accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.

Lacking the ability to assert compulsory jurisdiction, the Court can exercise binding jurisdiction if the disputing parties agree ad hoc to refer a matter to it, or if the parties have a dispute under a treaty that provides for dispute resolution by the Court. While countries do at times agree ad hoc to submit to the Court’s jurisdiction (particularly with regard to border disputes) and a number of treaties, especially older ones, contain provi-
sions providing for dispute resolution by the Court.\textsuperscript{30} Most disputing countries do not go to the Court, and most treaties do not have provisions for dispute resolution before the Court.\textsuperscript{31}

Finally, despite the absence of explicit authority in the Court’s Statute, the Court has accepted jurisdiction under the doctrine of \textit{forum prorogatum}. This doctrine holds that states can imply their consent to jurisdiction by responsively pleading to claims against them without contesting jurisdiction. \textit{Forum prorogatum}, however, has only been the basis for jurisdiction on rare occasions.\textsuperscript{32}

Absent state consent, the only alternative for calling the Court into service is by recourse to its advisory (i.e., nonbinding) jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{33} States, however, cannot request advisory opinions. Only the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, or other organs of the United Nations or specialized agencies empowered by the General Assembly to request advisory opinions have that ability.\textsuperscript{34} In theory, the General Assembly or Security Council could request that the Court weigh in on interstate disputes (often referred to by commentators as \textit{quasi-contentious} cases). In practice, however, because the internal political barriers to Assembly or Council approval of such requests are formidable,\textsuperscript{35} the General Assembly has only asked the Court to weigh in on interstate disputes.

\begin{enumerate}
    \item Presently 268 treaties provide for dispute resolution by the Court. The subject matter prescribed by those treaties is varied, but among the most common kinds of treaties are those related to friendship, commerce and navigation, air transport, and consular relations. Many of these 268 treaties have so-called compromissory clauses mandating dispute resolution by the Court; but the trend is towards providing that parties may, as one among other alternatives, opt into having their treaty disputes resolved by the Court. For a comprehensive listing of treaties that provide for dispute resolution by the Court, see International Court of Justice, \textit{List of Treaties with Clauses Relating to the Jurisdiction of the Court}, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&ep2=1&ep3=4 (last visited May 22, 2011).
    \item The relatively limited number of treaties with compromissory clauses providing for dispute resolution by the Court (see id.) is but a fraction of the tens of thousands of treaties in force. See \textit{Mark Weston Janis, International Law} 12, n.4 (5th ed. 2008) (reporting that 44,499 treaties were registered with the United Nations as of 2007).
    \item See, e.g., Haya de la Torre Case, 1951 I.C.J. 71, 78 (June 13).
    \item ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 65.
    \item Article 96, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter provides that “[t]he General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.” Article 96, paragraph 2 provides that “[o]ther organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.” U.N. Charter art. 96, paras. 1–2. Nineteen bodies are currently authorized by the General Assembly to request advisory opinions. See International Court of Justice, \textit{Organs and Agencies of the United Nations Authorized to Request Advisory Opinions}, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&ep2=2&ep3=1 (last visited May 22, 2011).
    \item See, e.g., \textit{Terry D. Gill, Rosenne’s The World Court: What It Is and How It Works} 235 (6th ed. 2003) (“It is quite clear that the modern political organs encounter great difficulties in mustering the majority to support a request for an advisory opinion, especially as an incident in the settlement of a political dispute of which they are seised.”).
\end{enumerate}
on four occasions, and the Security Council has only made one such request. Instead, the advisory process has primarily been used to clarify matters of internal United Nations governance.

II. Overcoming the Court’s Limited Jurisdiction: The Difficulty of Cutting the Gordian Knot

The limitations on the Court’s jurisdiction did not come about by accident. Rather, they are an example of the Gordian Knot phenomenon at work. To understand the importance of this phenomenon for jurisdictional reform, I will now turn to chronicling the great powers’ history of successfully thwarting efforts to universalize the Court’s jurisdiction. Drawing from this history, I conclude that the great powers will likely be similarly predisposed to thwart such initiatives in the future.

A. The League of Nations and the Creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice

I. The Creation of the Permanent Court

The International Court of Justice’s history begins with the founding of its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, as part of the grand attempt to create a new global order following the horrors of World War I. Five of the six great powers of the day—Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and most importantly, the United States (represented personally by President Woodrow Wilson)—took the lead in negotiations at Versailles over the shape of this order. Only the newly communist Russia was left out of the planning. To be sure, significant differences of opinion emerged within and between the powers over how to advance their ambitious project, including the extent to which they should cede national autonomy to the cause of effective governance. At the end of the day, however, notwithstanding the high-mindedness of individual statesmen, tradi-

36. See infra notes 149, 151–153 and accompanying text (identifying quasi-contentious cases referred to the Court by the General Assembly). See infra notes 150, 152–153 (qualifying cases that do not technically involve two “states”).

37. See infra note 150 (identifying the quasi-contentious case referred to the Court by the Security Council and explaining why that case technically does not involve two states).

38. See MICHA POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE LEAGUE AND U.N. ERAS 172 (1973) [hereinafter POMERANCE, ADVISORY FUNCTION] (observing that interstate disputes have constituted a large proportion of the proposed matters that the General Assembly has decided not to refer to the Court for advisory opinions).


41. See id. at 82.
tional raison d’État won out over any meaningful sacrifice of national power.

For example, while the political heart of the new order, the League of Nations, allowed every member a vote in an Assembly, a Council that required unanimity on almost all matters of importance dominated as the preserve of the great powers. In a similar vein, the League oversaw a mandate system to provide a path toward self-determination for the colonial territories of the war-defeated powers. The victorious powers, however, maintained their empires, and, in some cases, expanded them at the expense of the vanquished. For our purposes, the most important example of the great powers’ reluctance to cede national autonomy was their refusal to accept a Permanent Court of International Justice that could exercise nonconsent-based compulsory jurisdiction.

The story of the negotiations over this new court begins with the mandate in Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations that the League Council formulate plans for a permanent international court. In February of 1920, the League Council assigned an independent committee of legal experts, the Advisory Committee of Jurists, the task of drafting a treaty for the Permanent Court. Perhaps taking its internationalist mandate too much at face value, the Committee included compulsory jurisdiction in its scheme for the Permanent Court.

42. League of Nations Covenant arts. 3–5, 15. For further discussion, see generally CHARLES HOWARD-ELLIS, THE ORIGIN, STRUCTURE & WORKING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 122–63 (1929).
43. See generally MACMILLAN, supra note 40, at 98–109.
44. Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided that “[t]he Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.” League of Nations Covenant art. 14. For a more detailed account of the negotiations for the Permanent Court, see HUDSON, supra note 39, at 93–129. See also MICHAEL DUNNE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT, 1920–1935, at 17–46 (1988) (detailing the role played by the United States in the negotiations for the Permanent Court); Lorna Lloyd, “A Springboard for the Future”: A Historical Examination of Britain’s Role in Shaping the Optional Clause of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 79 Am. J. Int’l L. 28 (1985) (focusing especially on Britain’s role in the negotiations over compulsory jurisdiction); Maria Vogiatzi, The Historical Evolution of the Optional Clause, 2 Non-St. Actors & Int’l L. 41, 46–72 (2002) (recounting the dynamics of the Permanent Court negotiations specifically over compulsory jurisdiction).
46. Before the final vote on the draft statute as a whole, one member of the Committee, Mineichiro Adatci of Japan, stated for the record his opposition to compulsory jurisdiction, yet he joined with his colleagues in unanimously approving the draft statute. See PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS, 31st Meeting (Private), Held at the Peace Palace, the Hague, on July 22nd, 1920, in PROCES-
Upon receiving the Committee’s draft Statute for the Permanent Court, the four great powers holding permanent seats on the League Council—Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—all opposed its provisions for compulsory jurisdiction. They were firm in their determination to maintain the autonomy that had been associated with the traditional voluntary nature of arbitration. Under their sway, the Council oversaw the substitution of amendments that eliminated compulsory jurisdiction and then referred the amended draft to the League Assembly for consideration in its first session.

The stage was set for a confrontation in the Assembly between many of the less powerful countries who perceived compulsory jurisdiction as a legal counterweight to military and economic might and the great powers unwilling to circumscribe an arena of advantage. The Assembly delegated consideration of the draft Statute to the Third (Legal and Constitutional) Committee, which, in turn, charged a small subcommittee with working out a recommendation to be considered by the Assembly plenary. Steadfast in their opposition to compulsory jurisdiction and willing to hold ratification of the Statute hostage to its defeat, the powers, in subcommittee deliberations, would agree only to the Optional Clause allowing for countries to submit to compulsory jurisdiction voluntarily.

In December 1920, the debate moved to the Assembly plenary, where the less powerful countries made clear in speech after speech their strong support for compulsory jurisdiction. The powers’ refusal to yield and the need for their agreement forced the less powerful countries to reluctantly accept that the fight for compulsory jurisdiction was lost. Henri Lafontaine of Belgium expressed the frustrations of many when he declared resentfully that “a minority of delegations has once more paralysed the will

VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE, JUNE 16TH–JULY 24TH 1920, WITH ANNEXES 645, 651–52 (1920) (documenting the Committee vote approving the Permanent Court draft statute).

47. See Lloyd, supra note 44, at 37–38 (discussing the opposition of Britain, Italy, and Japan to compulsory jurisdiction); Vogiatzi, supra note 44, at 60–63 (discussing French opposition to compulsory jurisdiction).


52. Id. at 232; LEAGUE OF NATIONS, First Assembly, Twenty-First Plenary Meeting, Monday, December 13th, 1920, at 4 p.m., in DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 240–66 (1921).
of the majority.”53 The Statute, without compulsory jurisdiction, was then
opened for state signature on December 16, 1920, and went into force on
September 1, 1921.54

A system allowing states to petition the Court for advisory opinions
without the consent of respondent states (similar to what this article will
propose) might have been promoted as a more generally acceptable alterna-
tive to compulsory jurisdiction. Such a proposal, however, did not receive
any serious consideration at the time.55 In fact, while the Covenant’s Arti-
cle 14 mandate specifically provided that the Permanent Court be able to
“give an advisory opinion on any dispute or question referred to it by the
Council or the Assembly,”56 the Third Committee excised implementing
language in the Advisory Committee’s draft before referring it to the
League Assembly.57 Consequently, until the parties amended the Statute
in 1939, the Permanent Court was forced to improvise a mechanism in its
own rules for implementing Article 14’s advisory mandate.58

2. The Soviet Union and the United States

Even this great power-driven voluntarist system of jurisdiction was
ultimately considered too much of an infringement upon autonomy for the
two powers that never acceded to the Permanent Court Statute: the Soviet
Union and the United States. As the newly communist odd-person-out
among the powers, the Soviet Union did not join the League of Nations
until 193459 and never considered joining the Permanent Court.

For its part, the United States Senate famously rejected membership in
the League of Nations in 1920. This rejection was mainly over concerns
about sovereignty and that American power was inadequately reflected in
the League structure.60 Encouraged on by both Democratic and Republi-

53. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, First Assembly, Twentieth Plenary Meeting, Monday, December
13th, 1920, at 10 a.m., in Documents Concerning the Action Taken by the Coun-
cil, supra note 45, at 232.
54. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 13, 1920, 1926
55. But see Mahasen M. Allaghour, The Advisory Function of the International
Court of Justice 1946–2005, at 32 n.140 (2006) (reporting that Argentina and the
International Labour Organization made proposals providing for states to agree mutually
to submit their disputes to the advisory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court).
56. League of Nations Covenant art. 14. For the full text of Article 14, see supra note
44.
57. See Pomerance, Advisory Function, supra note 38, at 10–14 (discussing the cir-
cumstances surrounding the elimination of the Advisory Committee of Jurists’ draft
provisions regarding advisory jurisdiction).
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_D/D_01_4e_edition.pdf (containing the
addition of Chapter IV governing Advisory Opinions).
59. The Soviet Union was subsequently expelled from the League in 1939 in
response to its invasion of Finland. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 107th Session of the Council,
Second Meeting, Held on Thursday, December 14th, 1939, at 4 p.m., in 20 League of
60. See generally Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the
Quest for a New World Order 246–70 (1992) (detailing the history of the Senate
battle for ratification of the League Covenant).
can pro-court forces, however, the United States long considered separately joining the Permanent Court. Since the United States did not intend to accept optional clause jurisdiction, it would only be subject to binding judgments that it consented to. Thus, the long and acrimonious debate over Senate ratification came to center on advisory opinions, which could be triggered by international referral of the League Council or Assembly. To eliminate the potential that such advisory opinions might be rendered over U.S. objections, the Senate added the so-called fifth reservation to its January 1926 resolution of accession.

By providing in part that the Permanent Court could not "without the consent of the United States entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest," the U.S. was asserting a unilateral right to veto any request for an advisory opinion that in its own judgment might impact upon its interests. When the Conference of Signatories to the Statute met in September 1926, the Conference decided that the United States should be offered the same rights to vote on advisory requests as members of the Council or the Assembly but that it should not be granted exceptional powers. In November, President Coolidge responded to the Conference decision by refusing to send the treaty back to the Senate with a request for modification. Despite then elder statesman Elihu Root's admirable efforts beginning in 1929 to work out a compromise, ascendant America's great power impulses were simply too strong. Accession to the Permanent Court died its final death in the Senate in 1935.

61. See Michla Pomerance, The United States and the World Court as a 'Supreme Court of the Nations': Dreams, Illusions and Disillusion 84 (1996) [hereinafter Supreme Court of the Nations].
62. See id. at 80–81 (recounting U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes's decision to rule out acceptance of optional clause jurisdiction).
63. See Supreme Court of the Nations, supra note 61, at 101–02. The fifth reservation was in addition to four fairly unnoteworthy reservations that Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes had previously drafted and submitted to the Senate. See id. at 80.
64. 67 Cong. Rec. 2,656–57 (1926). The full text of the fifth reservation required as conditions of U.S. accession, "[t]hat the Court shall not render any advisory opinion except publicly after due notice to all States adhering to the Court and to all interested states and after public hearing or opportunity for hearing given to any State concerned; nor shall it, without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest." Id.
65. Minutes of the Conference of States Signatories of the Protocol of Signature of the Permanent Court of International Justice, League of Nations Doc. V. Legal 1926. V. 26, at 77. The Assembly never requested an advisory opinion of the Permanent Court. By the time of the Conference, the Council had requested thirteen opinions, always doing so by a unanimous vote. To the extent that the Permanent Court would not render an advisory opinion absent such unanimity, the Conference's offer of equal treatment gave the United States its sought-for ability to veto a request for an advisory opinion. The problem from the United States' point of view was that the practice of unanimity was not clearly the result of a legal requirement and could possibly be dispensed with. For further related discussion, see infra notes 145–191 and accompanying text.
66. Supreme Court of the Nations, supra note 61, at 107.
67. For a description of Root's efforts and the final defeat of accession in the U.S. Senate, see id. at 108–32.
B. The United Nations and the Creation of the International Court of Justice

Following the ruins of the Second World War, the United States came of age as the world’s undisputed superpower, and the Soviet Union emerged as a geopolitical colossus in its own right. The jurisdictional Gordian Knot problem played out again in the desire of each to ensure that visionary plans for a new world order did not materially impinge upon its national powers. In particular, internationalist presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman promoted the United Nations as a more muscular version of the League of Nations. But in doing so, these men and their fellow American post-war planners were careful not to compromise the United States’ own prerogatives as a great power. For example, the Security Council of the new United Nations was to have a much greater ability than the League Council to enforce the law against countries endangering international peace and security, but the United States would have a veto on that Council.

That this was non-negotiable was made graphically clear at the final U.N. negotiating conference in San Francisco. There, delegate and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Tom Connally responded to representatives of less powerful nations opposing the veto by tearing up the draft United Nations Charter and proclaiming, “[y]ou may go home from San Francisco, if you wish, and report that you have defeated the veto. . . . But you can also say, ‘We tore up the charter.’” The Soviet Union, as the other emerging superpower, also made clear that the nonexistence of a veto was a deal breaker.

In negotiations over the institution that would succeed the Permanent Court, the issue of compulsory jurisdiction again emerged as a major source of contention. The four attending powers at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China) agreed that a Committee of Jurists would prepare a draft statute for what was to become the International Court of Justice. Unlike the autonomous Committee of Jurists that had self-confidently proffered a court with compulsory jurisdiction in 1920, the new Committee of Jurists was to be a more closely controlled panel of government representatives. And the United States, as the most powerful country, ensured its own spe-


69. Pursuant to Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, the five permanent members of the Security Council may veto non-procedural matters. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.


71. In fact, the Soviet Union took the ultimately unsuccessful position that even the determination of whether to place a dispute on the Security Council’s agenda for discussion should be subject to the veto. See id. at 10–18.


73. Id.
cial influence over the Committee by securing the chairmanship for the American representative, State Department Legal Advisor Green Hackworth.\textsuperscript{74} All of the countries intended to be original signatories to the United Nations Charter and Court Statute were represented on the Committee. The diplomatic battles within the Committee largely picked up where they had left off in the 1920s, with the less powerful states again advocating for compulsory jurisdiction. This time, it was the two most powerful post-war countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, who saw themselves as having the greatest stake in staving off a transition to universal compulsory jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{75}

Faced in the Committee with the unyielding demands of the less powerful countries, Hackworth tried to persuade them to relent by proclaiming with a pretense of disinterest that the opposition of the Soviet Union could imperil the success of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{76} Unable to derail compulsory jurisdiction then and there, he maneuvered to defer the issue to the potentially more congenial San Francisco Conference where draft language allowing alternatively for compulsory jurisdiction or a continuation of the optional clause would be presented.\textsuperscript{77} At San Francisco, the United States and the Soviet Union ultimately prevailed. They did so, however, only by taking full responsibility for their positions and warning that the Court project depended upon rejection of compulsory jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{78}

The United States and the Soviet Union were more conciliatory on the issue of advisory jurisdiction. Although the United States in particular had initially argued for denying the General Assembly the power possessed by the League Assembly to request advisory opinions, it eventually relented and even reluctantly agreed\textsuperscript{79} to empower the General Assembly to authorize other organs of the United Nations to request such opinions.\textsuperscript{80}

C. The International Court of Justice and the Failure of Past Jurisdictional Reform Initiatives

The vision of a Court with expanded jurisdiction did not disappear with its inception. Rather, jurisdictional proposals and initiatives continued for many years after. In particular, various Secretaries-General made the case repeatedly that the General Assembly should use its Article 96(2)

\textsuperscript{74} See id.
\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 120.
\textsuperscript{76} See Supreme Court of the Nations, supra note 61, at 157.
\textsuperscript{77} Id. at 156.
\textsuperscript{78} Id. at 158–65.
\textsuperscript{79} See Al-Jaghour, supra note 55, at 29–30. The United States did, however, manage to derail an additional proposal to allow disputing states to agree to request advisory opinions. Fifteenth Meeting of Committee IV/1, Doc. 701, 13 U.N. Conf. Doc. 235 (1945); see also Al-Jaghour, supra note 55, at 32 (reporting on Britain’s suggestion at the San Francisco conference that disputing states be allowed to jointly request advisory opinions and Belgium’s proposal that states be able to unilaterally request advisory opinions with the support of the Security Council).
\textsuperscript{80} See supra note 34 and accompanying text discussing the authority to request advisory opinions under Article 96 of the United Nations Charter.
powers to authorize the Secretary-General to request advisory opinions. 81 States, non-governmental organizations, and scholars proposed other ideas for expanding the advisory jurisdiction of the Court by way of either amending the Court’s Statute, expanding Article 96(2) authorizations, promulgating new dispute resolution treaties, or establishing a committee of the General Assembly similar to the Judicial Commission that will be proposed in the next section of this Article. 82 For example, some suggested that public international and regional organizations (in addition to the specialized U.N. agencies authorized pursuant to Article 96 paragraph 2) 83 be empowered to request advisory opinions. 84 Proposals that states


82. See, e.g., CLARENCE WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 160–61 (1964); Lucius C. Caffisch, Reference Procedures and the International Court of Justice, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 572 (Leo Gross ed., 1976); Paul Szasz, Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra, at 499, 524–28. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the General Assembly’s Article 96(2) authority to empower organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies to request advisory opinions).

83. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the General Assembly’s Article 96(2) authority to empower organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies to request advisory opinions).

84. Distinguished associations of international lawyers proposed that such organizations be empowered to request advisory opinions. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH CONFERENCE HELD AT DUBROVNIK, at viii (1956); Resolution of the Institute of International Law, reprinted in Manley O. Hudson, The Thirty-Third Year of the World Court, 49 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 14–16 (1955); see also Report on Steps that Might be Taken by the General Assembly to Enhance the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice, in REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 142, 156–58 (1971–72). The United States Senate also approved a resolution on the Court that included a provision endorsing the empowerment of regional organizations to request advisory opinions. See S. Res. 76, 93d Cong. (1974) [hereinafter Senate Resolution 76]. Several countries also voiced support for the idea in response to a 1970 General Assembly Resolution inviting states to submit their views of the role of the Court. See The Secretary-General, Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice, ¶¶ 90–101, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/8382 (Sept. 15, 1971) [hereinafter Secretary-General’s Report]; see also Special Comm. on the Charter of the U.N. and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/32/33 (1977). For further discussion by commentators, see Heribert Golsong, Role and Functioning of the International Court of Justice: Proposals Recently Made on the Subject, in 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖlkERRECHT 673, 681–82 (1971); Leo Gross, The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing Its Role in the Interna-
with disputes be given the option to jointly submit their disputes to the Court for advisory opinions and proposals that national courts and other international tribunals be allowed to submit questions of international law to the Court for advisory opinions also gained a measure of currency. So did two proposals by Professor Louis Sohn for expanding the ability of the Court to exercise compulsory jurisdiction. The first of Professor Sohn’s proposals was that willing countries enter into special dispute resolution treaties. These treaties would oblige them to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for agreed upon classes of disputes. The second was that willing countries enter into a treaty accepting as binding Security Council and General Assembly recommendations to adjudicate specific classes of cases before the Court.

Despite their abundance and variety, all of these jurisdictional initiatives were doomed to failure during the Court’s formative period as a result of a political dynamic more nuanced than the previous great power diktats. Resistance from the western powers was, in fact, tempered by their perception that the Court was a useful Cold War ally. While it seems unlikely that the most powerful of the western countries could have actually
brought themselves to acquiesce to jurisdictional reform, we will never know definitively because the question was never forced by the less powerful countries.

This is largely because many in the developing world felt that the Court’s composition did not adequately represent the planet’s non-western social systems and that much of the law applied by the Court was a relic of the colonial past. These perceptions were powerfully reinforced in the minds of many by the Court’s 1966 South West Africa, Second Phase decision. Having been years in the offing and the subject of unusual attention, the Court’s decision that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have proper standing to challenge South Africa’s racist rule of what is today Namibia was regarded by many as symbolic of the Court’s lack of regard for the non-western world.

The composition of the Court’s judges, however, gradually came to more accurately reflect the diversity of the world’s peoples. This led to corresponding changes in style, jurisprudence, and ultimately perceptions of the Court. The culmination was the 1984 Nicaragua decision that, in holding the United States liable for illegally using force, signaled the passing of an era that in the words of Thomas Franck was “mourned by some, celebrated by others, but doubted by none.”

Today, most of the world’s countries have come to perceive themselves as having a stake in a Court that is now truly planetary, and if the history of the founding of the two courts is a guide, many of these countries will be predisposed to look with favor upon a proposal to universalize the Court’s advisory jurisdiction. Broken out in detail, a core of sixty-six countries over one-third of the total, already accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and would likely see themselves as standing mostly to gain from extending the Court’s advisory jurisdiction to all countries. But tressing this base, approximately seventy-two percent of the countries of

---

91. Such perceptions were revealed, for example, in the General Assembly’s 1972 Special Committee on Friendly Relations’ deliberations over whether to recommend expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction. See generally Gross, supra note 84, at 22–23; see also Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 84, ¶¶ 42–68 (summarizing the views of states on the reasons for their disinclination to resort to the Court).


95. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. For further discussion of the Nicaragua case and its implications for the Court, see infra notes 238–246 and accompanying text.


97. See Gall, supra note 35, at 236–37 (describing the extent to which countries around the world have been participating in litigation before the Court).

98. See supra note 26.
the world are small-to-midsized developing countries with a tendency to perceive themselves as vulnerable to the political caprice of the powerful.99

Finally, many small and midsized developed countries also feel a similar vulnerability and, as at the founding of the two courts, they would likely again view an expansion of the Court’s realm of law as consistent with their interests.

Paradoxically, now that the political potential for reform is present, the initiatives are not. Ironically, the very popularity of the Court and its corresponding increase in caseload has made its supporters less concerned with manufacturing business for it.100 Instead, the imagination of the international community has been captured by what had previously seemed the more attainable alternative of establishing specialized tribunals.101 As the historical review suggests, however, the present is an opportune time to redirect our attention to defining a proposal that can cut the Gordian Knot, and it is to that task that I will now turn.

III. Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Proposal for Referral Jurisdiction

On first blush, even with the support of the less powerful countries, the same Gordian Knot problem that worked to defeat the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court after World War I and the International Court of Justice after World War II would appear to doom present day efforts to grant states universal access to the Court’s jurisdiction. Certainly, the rules for amending the Court Statute do not give cause for optimism. Article 69 of that Statute incorporates by reference the amendment provisions of Articles 108 and 109 of the United Nations Charter.102 In addition to requiring approval by two-thirds of the United Nations General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations,103 these articles provide that a proposed amendment can be vetoed by any one of the permanent five members on the Security Council.104 As with the powers in the past, most of the permanent members of


100. See, e.g., Treves, supra note 21, at 219 (observing that because the Court has recently been particularly busy, “[t]he need for more cases does not seem to be as vital anymore,” and that “[t]his explains why proposals for entrusting to the Court a task in solving problems in international law arising before domestic courts have been almost forgotten.”).

101. See, e.g., supra notes 7–17 and accompanying text (identifying a number of the specialized international tribunals that now exist).

102. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 69.


104. Id.
the Council are unlikely to support expanding the Court’s jurisdiction, and almost certainly at least one would cast a dissenting veto. Any hope that proclivities might now be different is tempered by the fact that presently all of the permanent members (except for Great Britain) are declining to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the optional clause.105

Once again, it would seem that those powerful countries most predisposed to perceive their prerogatives of power as circumscribed by the universalization of the Court’s jurisdiction are also best positioned to block a universalization initiative. But what if there was a legally valid way for the General Assembly to universalize the Court’s advisory jurisdiction without the need to amend the Court’s statute? In the General Assembly today, after all, each of the 193 United Nations members have an equal vote.106 Consequently, the overwhelming majority of countries that are not among the power elite predominate. A discerning reading of the United Nations Charter reveals that the General Assembly by either a majority or two-thirds vote107 does, in fact, have the power to vest the Court with what I am calling referral jurisdiction over interstate disputes. The Assembly has the authority to establish a Judicial Commission, which could request advisory opinions on behalf of aggrieved states.108 That authority derives from the combined force of two articles of the United Nations Charter. The first is Article 22, which authorizes the Assembly to establish subsidiary organs “as it deems necessary for the performance of


107. The requisite vote depends upon whether, under Article 18 of the United Nations Charter, establishment of the to-be-proposed Judicial Commission should be regarded as an “important question” requiring a two-thirds vote, as opposed to a majority vote, of the Assembly. While Article 18 identifies certain voting matters as important questions, the Assembly can also decide (by majority vote) to consider other questions to be important questions. See U.N. Charter art. 18, paras. 2–3. There is, however, little precedent as to which other questions generally qualify. In particular, the requisite vote required to establish Article 22 subsidiary organs is unclear since most have been approved by consensus. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 429 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Simma].

108. For past works discussing the establishment of a committee as a vehicle for referring cases to the Court, see supra note 82.
its functions.” 109 The second is Article 96(2), which, as previously discussed, provides that the Assembly may empower organs of the United Nations to “request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions that arise within the scope of their activities.” 110 The Court has held that Article 96 limits the questions organs can ask of it to those clearly within their programmatic mandates. 111 However, as will be discussed in detail in Part Two, Section I.A, if the programmatic mandate of the organ created under Article 22 is precisely to request advisory opinions on behalf of states, the organ may request opinions on questions put to it by states on any otherwise justiciable legal disputes without a subject matter limitation.

In creating the Judicial Commission, the Assembly should provide that it be carefully tailored to accomplish its referral mission. The Assembly should make the Judicial Commission structurally independent and prescribe that it be staffed by international law experts. In cases where Article 36 jurisdiction exists, 112 states would have the ability to choose between initiating a contentious action, which would be binding, or a referral action, which would be advisory. Any state wishing to pursue a referral action would petition the Judicial Commission, and, upon criteria of justiciability and standing established by the General Assembly, the Judicial Commission would refer the action to the Court for an advisory opinion. 113 So as not to overtax its political or material resources, the Court could establish its own additional criteria for hearing disputes. Further, the Court could exercise its discretion under Article 65 of its Statute not to hear a dispute that it felt would challenge its institutional capacity to play a constructive role. 114 In particular, so as to respond to the greatest needs and promote coherence in the international system, the Court could accept

109. U.N. Charter art. 22 (“The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.”).
110. See supra note 34.
111. See Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, 76–77 (July 8) (finding that the World Health Organization was not authorized to request an advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons because the subject matter was not “within the scope of [the] activities” of the organization).
112. See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text.
114. Article 65 of the Court’s Statute provides that “[t]he Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.” ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 65. The first reference to the word “may” in Article 65 has always been interpreted to mean that the Court has the discretion not to comply with a request for an advisory opinion. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1931 I.C.J 15, 19 (May 28): Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 71–72 (Mar. 30) [hereinafter Peace Treaties].
cases specifically for which either no other international forum was available or multiple forums had come to inconsistent conclusions.

In order to coherently integrate this expansion of the Court’s ambit into the structure of the international system, the Security Council could play a gatekeeper role. The Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security under the United Nations Charter. As such, it could be permitted to intercede to secure a deferral of the Judicial Commission’s referral. This would help fulfill the U.N. Charter’s vision of the Security Council and Court working in tandem as provided, for example, in the Article 36(3) exhortation that when recommending dispute resolution methods, the Security Council should as a general rule refer disputing parties to the International Court of Justice, and the Article 94(2) provision for the Security Council to enforce opinions of the Court.

This scheme, on the one hand, gives the Council the flexibility to defer cases when their going forward would be unhelpful to its own efforts or might otherwise interfere with the political resolution of a conflict. On the other hand, this plan also gives the Council the ability to use the Court’s opinions to buttress its legally principled positions or, if necessary, to seek institutional cover by deferring to the rulings of the more politically insulated Court. While allowing for political interference in the international judicial system does not accord with our accepted understanding of blind justice, it does accord with the practical realities of an international system that is not yet capable of wholly grounding the judicial process in the independent application of law.

This scheme giving the Security Council the ability to delay cases is analogous to the Security Council deferral mechanism created by the parties to the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. Of critical importance to the integrity of this system is that the procedure does not allow permanent members to suspend cases, including those involving review of their own actions, without the requisite supermajority vote of nine of the fifteen members of the Council. This is because a resolution of the Council would be necessary to delay a case, and a veto can only block a resolution, not affirmatively secure its passage.

116. U.N. Charter art. 36, para. 3.
117. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.
118. Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides that “[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under the Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.” Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 16. For further discussion, see Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 95, 103 (2006) (considering the extent to which the Security Council under Article 16 of the Rome Statute has the authority to immunize defendants from prosecution by the International Criminal Court).
119. U.N. Charter art. 27.
120. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. The Security Council has the authority under the Charter to request an advisory opinion (see supra note 34 and accompanying text), but such a request is most likely subject to a veto as a non-procedural matter under Article

R
Part Two: The Case for Referral Jurisdiction

I. The Doctrinal Case for Referral Jurisdiction

Before all else, the case for referral jurisdiction depends upon its legality, and, in fact, for the referral initiative to be realized, it would have to pass legal muster with the Court itself. In particular, the Court would be presented with two questions regarding authority that I will discuss in order: (1) does the United Nations General Assembly have the authority under Articles 22 and 96 to create a subsidiary organ capable of requesting advisory opinions; and (2) does the Court in its own right have the authority to render advisory opinions on disputes between states without their consent?

A. The Propriety of the Judicial Commission Under Article 22 and Article 96 of the United Nations Charter

The Court’s precedent supports the proposition that the General Assembly has the authority to create a subsidiary organ, the primary purpose of which is to request advisory opinions of the Court. In 1950, the General Assembly created an internal United Nations court—the United Nations Administrative Tribunal—to adjudicate the United Nations’ disputes with its staff. In an attempt to enhance the legitimacy of the Administrative Tribunal process, the General Assembly in 1955 established an additional organ, the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments, to refer judgments of the Administrative Tribunal to the International Court of Justice for review under the Court’s advisory powers. Under G.A. Resolution 957(X), a staff member party to the dispute, the Secretary-General, or a member state could request that the Committee ask the Court for an advisory opinion. If, upon review, the Committee found a substantial basis for objecting to the Tribunal’s judgment, it was to refer the matter to the Court. In certain respects, the Committee review system established by G.A. Resolution 957(X) pushed the legal envelop further than would the proposed Judicial Commission, as it provided that the Court’s advisory judgments be accepted as binding by the United Nations, and it allowed non-states (U.N. staff members) access to the Court as litigants. In more than forty years in existence, the Committee referred three cases to the Court.
In the first of these cases, Application for the Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, the Court validated the legality of the Committee under Articles 22 and 96. At the time of its creation, some states had contended that the Committee’s mandate to play a role in the process of adjudicating United Nations staff conflicts was not related to a function of the General Assembly. This, according to those states, meant that under Article 22 the Committee was not a subsidiary organ “necessary for the performance of [the General Assembly’s] functions” and, therefore, that it should not be entitled to request advisory opinions under Article 96. In a similar vein, state opponents of establishing the Committee had contended that the Committee would not have activities of its own (separate from requesting advisory opinions) that might qualify it as an organ authorized under Article 96 “to request advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of its activities.”


Responding to the first contention, the Court found that pursuant to Article 101, staff relations were, in fact, within the purview of the General Assembly, but that the legality of the Committee did not hinge on such a finding of explicit institutional mandate. Because Article 22 specifically bestows broad discretion upon the General Assembly to establish subsidiary organs as it deems necessary to the performance of its functions, the Court reasoned that “to place a restrictive interpretation on the power of the General Assembly to establish subsidiary organs would run contrary to the clear intention of the Charter.”

Consistent with this reasoning, the General Assembly has the discretion to create the Judicial Commission to exercise a referral function similar to that of the Committee. In fact, the subject matter of the Judicial Commission’s referrals would be more clearly within the purview of the General Assembly than are staff disputes—a subject about which the U.N. Charter is silent. Under Chapters IV and VI of the Charter, the General Assembly has the discretion to establish such organs.

---

129. Id. at 173–75.
130. Id. at 172. See supra note 109 for the text of Article 22.
132. Judgment No. 158, supra note 128, at 173. Article 101 provides that “[t]he staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.” U.N. Charter art. 101, para. 1.
Assembly is authorized to discuss and make recommendations regarding disputes between countries.\textsuperscript{134} Accordingly, the Court has affirmed the Assembly’s authority to request advisory opinions related to such interstate disputes on four occasions.\textsuperscript{135} While the General Assembly is prohibited by Article 12 from making recommendations regarding disputes the Security Council is involved with (unless invited to do so by the Council),\textsuperscript{136} the Court has found Article 12 not to be so broad as to prohibit the Assembly from requesting advisory opinions regarding such disputes.\textsuperscript{137} Thus, the Judicial Commission’s delegated function of requesting advisory opinions regarding disputes between countries would not run afoul of Article 12, even if the Security Council was involved with the dispute. In fact, the referral jurisdiction proposal’s provision for Security Council deferrals of advisory requests makes the workings of the Judicial Commission even more deferential of the Security Council’s Article 12 prerogatives than required.\textsuperscript{138}


The Court similarly disagreed with the second contention: that because the Committee lacked an activity other than requesting advisory opinions, it was incapable under Article 96 of requesting opinions “on legal questions arising within the scope of [its] activities.” The Court reiterated that the Charter does not limit the General Assembly’s discretion over the nature of the subsidiary organs it establishes.\textsuperscript{139} It emphasized, however, that its conclusion was not dependent upon this discretion because the Committee’s purpose of screening requests for advisory opinions gave it a function, though “admittedly a narrow one,” beyond that of requesting advisory opinions.\textsuperscript{140}

As with the Committee, the proposed Judicial Commission has a

\textsuperscript{134} U.N. Charter arts. 10–15, 35.

\textsuperscript{135} See \textit{infra} notes 149, 151–179 and accompanying text (identifying and discussing quasi-contentious cases referred to the Court by the General Assembly.)

\textsuperscript{136} Article 12 of the United Nations Charter provides that “[w]hile the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.” U.N. Charter art. 12, para. 1.

\textsuperscript{137} Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 148–50 (July 9) [hereinafter Israeli Wall] (holding that a request for an advisory opinion is not a recommendation under Article 12 and affirming the practice of “the General Assembly and the Security Council to deal in parallel with the same matter concerning the maintenance of international peace and security”); \textit{accord} Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, at 16–17 (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/13987.pdf [hereinafter Kosovo].

\textsuperscript{138} For the description of the Security Council deferral mechanism, see \textit{supra} notes 115–120 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{139} Judgment No. 158, \textit{supra} note 128, at 172–75.

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Id.} at 174.
screening purpose beyond that of only requesting advisory opinions, but the Commission’s legality does not depend upon its exercise of this screening function. As the Court made clear in Review of Judgment No. 158, the General Assembly has the discretion to establish the Judicial Commission to request advisory opinions regardless of the narrowness of its mandate.

The plain language of the Charter and the Court’s decision in Review of Judgment No. 158 leave little doubt as to the legality of the Judicial Commission. In light, however, of the Security Council’s successful assertion of its own expansive powers to establish judicial organs, to the extent that any doubt does persist, it would have to be resolved in favor of such a prerogative for the General Assembly. The Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to try individuals for war crimes without any explicit charter-based authority to establish courts generally, much less novel war crimes tribunals. The General Assembly’s establishment of a commission to refer cases to the existing principal judicial organ of the United Nations would be quite modest by comparison.

B. The Legality of the Court Opining on the Behavior of States Without Their Consent

The major legal concern that a proposal to universalize the Court’s advisory jurisdiction raises does not relate to the validity of the Judicial Commission under Articles 22 and 96. Rather, it relates to the more fundamental question of the legality of the Court opining on the behavior of states without their consent. In 1923, the Council of the League of Nations asked the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion regarding a Soviet-

141. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.

142. In addition to the scope of their activities requirement, Article 96 also specifies that the questions referred to the Court for advisory opinions be “legal matters.” The propriety of the Court rendering advisory judgments in quasi-contentious cases has been challenged as raising political rather than legal questions, as have cases arising under Article 36(2), which gives the Court jurisdiction “in all legal disputes.” Finding it impossible to distinguish in practice between political and legal matters, the Court has never refused to accept a case on the bases that it was political in nature. See, e.g., Kosovo, supra note 137, at 12 (“A question which expressly asks the Court whether or not a particular action is compatible with international law certainly appears to be a legal question.”).


144. U.N. Charter art. 92 (“The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.”). For reference to Court decisions interpreting the implications of the Court’s status as the principal judicial organ, see infra note 183 and accompanying text.
Finnish dispute over the legal status of Eastern Carelia. The Soviet Union vociferously objected to the Permanent Court issuing such an opinion, in part, on the grounds that to do so without its consent would violate its independence. The Permanent Court agreed. Ever since, countries opposing the issuing of advisory opinions regarding their disputes with other countries have relied on the Eastern Carelia opinion. They cite the opinion as authority for the proposition that affected states must specifically consent to any judicial proceeding, including even those of an advisory nature.

The Permanent Court holding, however, is not so broad as to require consent generally today in advisory cases implicating disputes between countries. Beginning in 1950, as previously mentioned, on five occasions (regarding human rights in Eastern Europe, the South African occupation of Namibia, self-determination in the Western Sahara, the Israeli construction of a wall in the Palestinian territories, and the Kosovar declaration of independence) either the General Assembly or the Security Council has requested that the Court render quasi-contentious advisory opinions. In not one of these cases did the Court interpret the Eastern Carelia precedent to preclude it from rendering an advisory opinion. The Court always found that it had jurisdiction regardless of state consent, or

147. See, e.g., infra notes 149–173 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 28 (Oct. 16) [hereinafter Western Sahara].
149. See Peace Treaties, supra note 114.
150. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 24 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia]. The Namibia opinion was one of four advisory opinions that the Court issued regarding South Africa's exercise of political control over Namibia between 1950 and 1971. The opinion referenced here is the only one that raises the relevant issue of quasi-contentious advisory jurisdiction. Because Namibia, one of the interested parties impacted by the decision, was considered a territory rather than a state at the time of the decision, the case is not technically quasi-contentious, but I have included it, as the Court's analysis is directly relevant. For a discussion of a related contentious case involving Namibia, see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
151. See Western Sahara, supra note 148.
152. See Israeli Wall, supra note 137. Because one of the interested parties impacted by the Israeli Wall decision, the entity of Palestine, was not as of the time of the decision generally recognized as a state, Israeli Wall does not technically qualify as a quasi-contentious dispute between two states. I have, nevertheless, included the decision in my discussion, as the Court's analysis is directly relevant.
153. See Kosovo, supra note 137. As with Namibia and Israeli Wall (discussed supra note 150 and supra note 152), one of the parties impacted by the Kosovo decision, in this case the entity of Kosovo, was not generally recognized as a state. In fact, whether it should be recognized as such was potentially at stake in the decision itself. As with Namibia and Israeli Wall, I have included the decision in the discussion because the Court's analysis is directly relevant.
lack thereof, and in then considering whether as a matter of discretion it should render an advisory opinion, the Court consistently decided that it should (except for the Namibia case in which it ended its analysis with acceptance of jurisdiction).

I will now proceed to explain the Court’s rationale for finding that it had jurisdiction in these cases, and how that rationale supports the validity of the Court’s exercising of referral jurisdiction regardless of state consent. I will then conclude this Subsection with an explanation of why the Court has chosen to exercise its discretion in favor of rendering decisions in the above cases and why it should likewise exercise its discretion to accept referrals from the proposed Judicial Commission regardless of state consent.

1. The Court’s Jurisdiction to Render Opinions in Quasi-Contentious Cases

The reasoning behind the Court’s consistent determination that it has had jurisdiction to render opinions in quasi-contentious advisory cases is grounded in two lines of analysis. The first is that international law’s requirement of consent to judicial process does not apply to proceedings that result in advisory, as opposed to binding, opinions. The second is that, even were the requirement of consent to apply to advisory opinions, states have effectively consented to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court by virtue of their all but universal accession to the United Nations Charter and Statute of the Court.

a) There is no Requirement of Consent to Advisory Proceedings

The first line of analysis, articulated initially in the Peace Treaties case, is that “the well established principle of international law” requiring consent to contentious judicial proceedings does not apply to opinions that are merely advisory.154 The Court does not explain how this conclusion is consistent with the Eastern Carelia holding requiring consent to an advisory opinion. Nevertheless, because the context of the two cases is quite different, their seemingly divergent holdings are, in fact, reconcilable. The League Covenant was the centerpiece of a grand plan to establish an integrated system of peaceful dispute resolution. In joining the League, countries agreed to submit their disputes either to arbitration, judicial settlement (including settlement by the Permanent Court), or to an enquiry by the League Council (of which advisory opinions came to be a component part).155 For Russia to stand outside of the League system, therefore, was to definitively stand outside a voluntary system, which included in its scheme that disputes be subject to advisory opinions.

155. League of Nations Covenant arts. 12–16. The Covenant provided that countries would not go to war against any country complying with the League’s dispute resolution provisions, and any country not doing so will “be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League.” Id. art. 16. For further discussion, see Francis Paul Walters, A History of the League of Nations 41–61 (1952).
International law, however, has evolved. The United Nations processes today are not fully voluntary. Instead of focusing on dispute resolution mechanisms for members, the Charter creates more muscular political organs, especially the Security Council with its legal authority to impose settlements.156 Advisory opinions are now only one of a variety of options for maintaining international peace and security at the disposal of a more legally powerful organization. By having not joined the United Nations at the time of the Peace Treaties decision in 1950,157 Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania had, therefore, only avoided incurring any obligation of their own to cooperate with the organization. They had no basis for interfering with the organization’s independent authority under its charter to request advisory opinions.

Although the Peace Treaties decision clearly establishes the power of the Court to render duly requested advisory opinions over the objections of states, there is one complication. The decision leaves ambiguous the issue of whether or not there are jurisdictional limits as to whom those opinions must be directed and the ends they must serve. The Court begins the sentence that creates the ambiguity by broadly proclaiming that “[i]t follows [from advisory opinions not having binding force] that no state . . . can prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion.”158 It concludes, however, with the qualifying clause, “which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take.”159 What happens if the opinion is not for the United Nations’ own internal use? Can the Court’s advisory opinion also be sought if not for the specific ends of informing the United Nations?

This is a key question for our purposes because providing a mechanism for the Court to issue quasi-contentious advisory opinions at the instigation of complaining countries rather than the United Nations is at the core of this Article’s proposal for referral jurisdiction. Fortunately, the Court in subsequent cases moves away from language implying that its advisory jurisdiction in quasi-contentious cases is solely limited to answering requests for opinions by United Nations organs as to the course of action they should take. While the Namibia decision also associated the Court’s jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions regarding country disputes with a United Nations organ seeking the opinion “with reference to its own

156. See infra notes 224–226 (referencing the Security Council’s power to impose settlements). Under the League Covenant, settlement by reference to the Council of the League was only one of the dispute resolution options available at the discretion of the parties. See League of Nations Covenant arts. 12, 15. The League Council, unlike the United Nations Security Council, only had authority to recommend enforcement measures to other members of the League of Nations. See League of Nations Covenant art. 16.
158. Peace Treaties, supra note 114, at 27.
159. Id. The court continues in a similar vein in the succeeding sentence: “The Court’s Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ which is entitled to request it.” Id.
decisions,”160 this is in contrast to the more recent Western Sahara, Israeli Wall, and Kosovo decisions.

In Western Sahara the Court quoted the ambiguous sentence referred to above from Peace Treaties. It then, however, implied its understanding of the sentence’s meaning by concluding without reference to any jurisdictional restrictions that “[t]he Court . . . affirmed in this pronouncement that its competence to give an opinion did not depend on the consent of the interested States, even when the case concerned a legal question actually pending between them.”161 Similarly, in the Israeli Wall opinion, the Court quoted the ambiguous sentence from Peace Treaties as support for its categorical observation that “the lack of consent to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction by interested States has no bearing on the Court’s jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion” (emphasis added).162 Finally, Kosovo provides the Court’s clearest indication that jurisdiction in quasi-contentious cases has no relationship to the purpose of the requested opinion. In accepting jurisdiction in that case, the Court did not mention the ambiguous sentence in Peace Treaties nor even, for that matter, the Eastern Carelia decision itself.163

The most plausible reading of the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the Court supports this understanding that the Court’s exercise of advisory jurisdiction in quasi-contentious cases is not restricted to rendering opinions advising United Nations organs on their own course of action. Nowhere in either document is there a requirement that an advisory opinion must be for the internal use of the organ requesting the opinion. Article 96 of the Charter specifies the circumstances under which advisory opinions may be requested. The only limitations that it places are that if requested by the General Assembly or the Security Council, the request be “on any legal question.” If requested by another organ or specialized agency, the organ or agency must be “so authorized by the General Assembly,” and the request must be “on a legal question arising within the scope of [the organ’s or agency’s] activities.”164 Only a very expansive interpretation of these provisions could see in them a requirement that advisory opinions may only be requested by the requesting body for its internal use. Likewise, Article 65 of the Court’s Statute, which authorizes it to give advisory opinions, does not restrict the purposes to which those decisions may be put. Its only restrictions are that the opinion must be on a “legal question” and at the request of those so “authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”165

162. Israeli Wall, supra note 137, at 157–58.
163. See Kosovo, supra note 137.
164. U.N. Charter art. 96. For the full text of Article 96, see supra note 34.
165. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 65. For the full text of Article 65, paragraph 1, see supra note 114.
b) States Have Consented to the Court’s Advisory Jurisdiction by Virtue of their Accession to the United Nations Charter and the Court Statute

In the end, it may not matter whether the Court can issue non-binding opinions regarding interstate disputes without state consent. This is because unlike Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania at the time of Peace Treaties in 1950, states today have given their consent by virtually universally acceding to the United Nations Charter and the Court Statute. As previously discussed, states have specifically granted the General Assembly and the Security Council the right to request advisory opinions in Article 96(1) of the United Nations Charter, and they have specifically granted the Court the power to render such opinions in Article 65 of the Court’s Statute.

The argument that states have consented to the Court’s advisory jurisdiction is its central justification for accepting jurisdiction in both Namibia and Western Sahara. The Eastern Carelia decision itself gives the argument particular force because the Permanent Court maintained that if Russia had consented to the Court’s advisory jurisdiction “once and for all” by joining the League, the results in the case would likely have been different.

---

166. Today, all internationally recognized states (except for the state of the Vatican City) are full members of the United Nations. Only state-like entities whose statehood is for some reason contested have been denied full membership in the organization. For example, because the People’s Republic of China, with its capital in Beijing, and the Republic of China, with its capital in Taipei, have each traditionally maintained that there is only one state of China, only the Beijing regime is currently accredited to represent China.

167. U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1. For the full text of Article 96, see supra note 34.

168. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 65. For the full text of Article 65, paragraph 1, see supra note 114.

169. Namibia, supra note 150, at 23–24. “However, [Eastern Carelia] is not relevant, as it differs from the present [case]. For instance, one of the states concerned was not at the time a Member of the League of Nations and did not appear before the Permanent Court. South Africa, as a Member of the United Nations, is bound by Article 96 of the Charter, which empowers the Security Council to request advisory opinions on any legal question.” Id. at 23.

170. Western Sahara, supra note 148, at 23–24. “In [Eastern Carelia] one of the States concerned was neither a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court nor, at the time, a Member of the League of Nations, and lack of competence of the League to deal with a dispute involving non-member states which refused its intervention was a decisive reason for the Court’s declining to give an answer. In the present case, Spain is a Member of the United Nations and has accepted the provisions of the Charter and Statute; it has thereby given in general its consent to the exercise by the Court of its advisory jurisdiction.” Id.

171. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing Russian/Soviet membership in the League of Nations).

172. Eastern Carelia, supra note 146, at 27. The Court in Peace Treaties does not rely upon consent by virtue of acceding to the United Nations Charter, presumably because the states objecting to the Court’s jurisdiction (Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania) were not yet members of the United Nations in 1950. The Court also avoids the argument in the Israeli Wall case, probably because an interested, though non-objecting party, Palestine, was not generally considered a state and was not a member of the United Nations. Similarly, in the Kosovo case, Kosovo, whose declaration of independence was at issue,
Thus, states, in acceding to the Charter, have not only consented to allow the Security Council and the General Assembly to seek advisory opinions under Article 96(1). They have also consented to Article 96(2), which would allow the Judicial Commission as an “other organ of the United Nations so authorized by the General Assembly” to similarly request advisory opinions of the Court.173

2. The Court’s Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Quasi-Contentious Advisory Cases

While the Court may have jurisdiction to render advisory opinions upon referral of the proposed Judicial Commission, the Court could refuse to exercise this jurisdiction. Article 65 of the Court’s Statute provides that the Court “may” give advisory opinions, and, as previously noted, the Court has repeatedly held that the word “may” in Article 65 means that it has discretion to decline to give an advisory opinion.174 How then should the Court exercise its discretion to answer the Judicial Commission’s advisory referrals of cases involving disputes between states?

a) That an Advisory Opinion be Intended for the Internal Use of the Requesting Organ Has Been a Relevant Factor in the Court’s Exercise of Discretion

Although there may be no jurisdictional requirement that advisory opinions be intended for the internal use of the organ requesting the opinion, that they be for that purpose has been a clear factor in the Court’s exercise of its discretion. Though the Court did not consider the purpose of the request in either Peace Treaties or Namibia,175 its decision to render advisory opinions in the Western Sahara, Israeli Wall, and Kosovo cases turned primarily on the fact that the opinions were to be used internally by the requesting U.N. organ.

In Western Sahara, the Court asserted that “the lack of consent of an interested state may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the Court’s judicial character.”176 However, it agreed to render the opinion in the case because “the object of the request” was “to obtain from the Court an opinion which the General Assembly deem[ed] of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its function.”177 In the Israeli Wall decision,

was not a member of the United Nations. See supra note 166 for a discussion of statehood and its relationship to United Nations membership. 173. U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 2. See supra note 34 for the full text of Article 96. 174. ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 65. See supra note 114 for the text of Article 65 and cases maintaining that the Court has discretion to decline giving advisory opinions. 175. In Peace Treaties, the Court decided to exercise its discretion to render an advisory opinion over the objections of interested states because the matter at issue was procedural and did not go to the merits of the dispute. Peace Treaties, supra note 114, at 70. In Namibia, once the Court determined that it had jurisdiction, it did not consider using its discretion to refuse to give the advisory opinion. Namibia, supra note 130, at 27. 176. Western Sahara, supra note 148, at 25. 177. Id. at 25, 27.
the Court, reiterating that the purpose of the request is relevant to the Court’s discretion rather than its jurisdiction, concluded that “[g]iven the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations in questions relating to international peace and security, it is the Court’s view that the construction of the wall must be deemed to be directly of concern to the United Nations.”¹⁷⁸ Finally, in the Kosovo decision, the Court made clear as part of its discretionary analysis that advisory opinions are “not a form of judicial recourse for States but the means by which [requesting organs] may obtain the Court’s opinion in order to assist them in their activities.”¹⁷⁹

b) The Court Should Exercise Its Discretion in Favor of Accepting Referrals from the Judicial Commission

Because determining what constitutes a proper purpose is within the Court’s discretion, the Court is free to depart from its position that the purpose of an advisory opinion should be to inform the United Nations. The establishment of the Judicial Commission by the General Assembly would be a change in circumstances that would give the Court very strong process and substantive reasons to answer the call of the Commission to deliver advisory opinions.

Regarding process, while there is not yet a well-settled doctrine of separation of powers in the international system,¹⁸⁰ the General Assembly, as the closest equivalent to a popular branch of international governance, is entitled to a certain deference by the Court. Surely, if the Assembly’s almost-universal country membership¹⁸¹ were to decide intra vires upon a process whereby that same membership could secure advisory rulings on interstate disputes, then that decision should be accorded significant weight. And closer to home, the Court should be influenced as well by its own constitutional role as the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations.”¹⁸² As the Court itself has repeatedly acknowledged, this status under the Charter implies an obligation to cooperate with the General Assembly and the Security Council such that only compelling reasons should lead it to refuse to render opinions.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁸. Israeli Wall, supra note 137, at 159.
¹⁷⁹. Kosovo, supra note 137, at 14.
¹⁸⁰. Attempting to conceptualize the nature and extent of separation of powers in the international system has, nevertheless, been a subject of keen interest to academic commentators. For a recent and very interesting edited volume whose authors explore this and related topics in global constitutionalism, see RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009).
¹⁸¹. See supra note 166 (discussing the extent of the United Nations’ membership).
¹⁸². See supra note 144.
Regarding substance, the Court has never explicitly connected the dots as to why an opinion on a dispute between countries addressed to a United Nations organ should be consistent with *judicial propriety* while an opinion offered for the purpose of directly furthering dispute resolution should not. The Court’s implicit rationale, drawn from the original concerns in *Eastern Carelia*, however, is that to engage directly in dispute resolution without explicit consent—even in an advisory capacity—improperly impinges upon state sovereignty, while merely giving advice to a U.N. organ does not. The sovereignty concern, however, at least when applied to accepting referrals from the proposed Judicial Commission, is ill-founded.

First, the rendering of an advisory opinion to states, even without their consent, does not impinge upon the realm of protected sovereignty as that realm is understood today.184 One must draw a distinction between binding decisions, which encroach upon states’ autonomy by requiring them to act in accordance with the decisions, and mere advisory opinions, which do not. If advisory opinions are to be considered an improper infringement on state sovereignty, then so should commentary on state behavior rendered by other agencies of international officialdom, such as the United Nations Human Rights Council185 and the United Nations Secretary-General.186 That state behavior is subject to international scrutiny has gradually become accepted in international law.187 For the Court to imply a contrary notion in its exercise of discretion would unnecessarily cast doubt

---

184. In fact, even in its own time, the *Eastern Carelia* decision’s extreme deference to sovereignty was highly contested. The opinion was decided by only a seven to four majority. It was strongly criticized in the League Council, see League of Nations, Twenty-Sixth Session of the Council, Nineteenth Meeting, held at Geneva on Thursday, September 27, 1923, at 3:30 p.m., in 4 League of Nations O.J. 1335–37, and by commentators of the day, see, for example, ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE, THE WORLD COURT 278–79 (Elizabeth F. Read, trans.1925) and KARL STRUPP, LA QUESTION CABELIENNE ET LE DROIT DES GENS (1924).


186. The Secretary-General routinely expresses opinions on matters of global concern, including the conduct of states. See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, U.S. Pressures North Korea After Sinking Of South’s Ship, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2010, at A4 (discussing the Secretary-General’s criticism of North Korea over alleged attack on South Korean warship). The Secretary-General’s authority to comment is derived from his intrinsic powers as the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations under Charter Article 97 and, more specifically, from his Article 99 authority to bring matters to the attention of the Security Council. See Simma, supra note 107, at 1195–96, 1217–30; see also Stephen Schwabell, The Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Political Powers and Practice 24–26 (1952).

on the normative foundations of a promising new class of international compliance mechanisms.

Even if advisory opinions were not deemed safely outside the conceptual boundaries of what remains of sovereignty in today’s world, the Court has good reason to push those boundaries when exercising its discretion. The late Jonathan Charney, writing in the *American Journal of International Law*, captured the essence of why sovereignty is problematic and contested today:

Complete autonomy may have been acceptable in the past when no state could take actions that would threaten the international community as a whole. Today, the enormous destructive potential of some activities and the precarious condition of some objects of international concern make full autonomy undesirable, if not potentially catastrophic.188

To the extent that Charney’s perspective is correct, then by conceptually sheltering sovereignty, the Court would be doing no service to the global order. Even to the extent, however, that sovereignty may retain some normative validity, its future as a practical matter is imperiled by autonomous social and economic forces larger than the issue of whether the Court were to accept referrals from the Judicial Commission. In a concession to the practical realities of an interdependent world, sovereignty today is by necessity honored in the breach in many areas of global social life,189 including specifically the area of dispute resolution.190

As we have seen, even the Court itself has agreed, over the protests of affected states, to all five of the General Assembly and Security Council requests for quasi-contentious advisory opinions. The Court’s rationale that the opinions are to U.N. organs for their own use rather than to the


189. Since the time of Charney’s writing, the acceleration of economic and social globalization has, if anything, expanded the institutional spheres in which states no longer exercise many of the traditional prerogatives of sovereignty. A great deal of academic effort has gone into attempting to both assess and critique the areas in which sovereignty is in decline. For some of the most important works, see Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (1999) (arguing that differences in power and interests rather than respect for sovereignty best explain state behavior); Re-Envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? (Trudy Jacobsen et al. eds., 2008) (analyzing the challenges to traditional sovereignty emerging from use of force to protect human rights, norms relating to governance, the war on terror, economic globalization, the natural environment, and changes in strategic thinking); State Sovereignty and International Governance (Gerald Kreijen et al. eds., 2002) (presenting a variety of contexts in which the traditional prerogatives of states are being challenged by contemporary problems); Benn Steil & Manuel Hinds, *Money, Markets, and Sovereignty* (2009) (discussing the tension between globalization and sovereign control of monetary and financial policy); Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (1996) (exploring the challenge posed by non-state actors to economic sovereignty); The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics (Karen T. Lifitn ed., 1998) (discussing the tension between traditional notions of sovereignty and the need for international cooperation to protect the global environment).

190. See infra notes 250–251 and accompanying text (explaining that lack of consent is no longer a bar to the jurisdiction of many of the international system’s specialized tribunals).
disputing parties is a distinction without a practical difference, as the legal and political implications of an advisory opinion are the same regardless of the origins of the request. If anything, an advisory process open to all countries would be, if not more respectful of state autonomy, then at least equally respectful of state autonomy. As matters now stand, the General Assembly and Security Council determinations of which conflicts get hearings before the Court are clearly political.191 As a tribunal dedicated to equal justice, the Court would have good reason to exercise its discretion in favor of hearing referrals from a Judicial Commission that is staffed by independent international civil servants whose decision-making is based on clear legal criteria.

II. The Case that the Introduction of Referral Jurisdiction Will Improve Compliance with International Law

I have suggested in Part One that referral jurisdiction would improve the functioning of the international legal system, but how exactly would it do so, and are there persuasive arguments against universalizing the Court’s advisory jurisdiction? In this Section II of Part Two, I will make the case that referral jurisdiction would improve state compliance with international law. Following in Section III, I will rebut what I believe to be the most important objection to the practical functioning of referral jurisdiction, namely that states will disregard and ultimately discard international tribunals that exercise their powers without state consent.

One of the principle performance criteria by which any legal system should be judged is the extent to which it promotes compliance with the law. Achieving compliance is a particular challenge in the international system where there is no sovereign authority capable of enforcing its law directly on states. In the 19th century, the legal philosopher John Austin, best known for criticizing international law’s lack of enforceability,192 nevertheless offered what has, over time, been the most general and widely accepted description of how international law compliance is achieved. Austin’s characterization of compliance, which I will refer to as the court of international opinion model,193 depicts a state system of peer pressure analogous to the systems that emerge in human societies that lack formal insti-


192. Austin argued that because international law is not enforceable in the same way as domestic law, it is not really law, but rather a system of “positive morality.” JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 208 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1954) (1832).

193. In his own original presentation of the model, Austin described the duties that international law imposes as being enforced “by fear on the part of sovereigns of provoking general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally received and respected.” Id.
tutions of law.194 The phenomenon of states collectively passing informal judgment on the behavior of other states has been variously described by many post-Austinian commentators, but all share in common the idea that if a state violates international law, the other states will take notice and initiate various individual or collective actions to punish that state.195 While the 20th century saw the rudiments of a supernational political structure begin to emerge, mostly in the form of subject-specific international regimes such as the World Trade Organization and the World Health Organization,196 Austin’s court of international opinion model is still a generally accurate description of the dynamics of compliance among states who, even today, answer to no supreme authority.

Our question is whether, in this still largely Austinian international system, referral jurisdiction would improve law compliance. For those who draw their primary understanding of law by analogy to domestic systems, it might seem intuitive that substituting access to a real court for the ersatz court of international opinion would promote legal compliance. The international system, however, is deceptively different from national law systems, and domestic institutions cannot be simply transplanted to the international order with the expectation that they will function in the same way. Even the binding opinions of international courts cannot be enforced as straightforwardly as those of domestic courts that operate as adjuncts of states with centralized enforcement systems. Because of the unique political constraints of the international system, however, we can only cut the Gordian Knot so far as to expand the advisory jurisdiction of the Court, and we are limited to doing so in an ad hoc way, rather than as part of a comprehensive scheme to rationalize the global justice system.

To answer then what turns out to be the complex question of whether the Court’s exercise of referral jurisdiction is likely to improve international compliance, the analytical tools of modern compliance theory are helpful. While such theory is primarily intended to be descriptive of how the present international system secures compliance, we can employ it for our speculative purpose of predicting whether compliance would be

194. See Michael Barkum, Law Without Sanctions: Order in Primitive Societies and the World Community (1968) (analogizing the processes of the international legal system to those of societies with no system of centralized governance).

195. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really Law?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1984) (arguing that international law is still law despite its lack of centralized enforcement because in the international system “the social-disapproval factor operates as a sanction.”); Richard Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order, 32 TEMP. L. Q. 295 (1959) (distinguishing between enforcement in vertical legal systems of domestic orders that have the ability to compel obedience to their commands and enforcement in the horizontal international legal system in which there is no centralized authority to enforce commands); Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 26, 52–56 (2d ed. 1979) (characterizing international law’s horizontal enforcement mechanism as being “in the reactions of other nations”).

196. See supra notes 7–17 and accompanying text and infra notes 250–251 for a partial listing of subject-specific regimes and the dispute resolution bodies associated with them.
improved by the International Court of Justice substituting more often for the court of international opinion.

Three branches of compliance theory are particularly useful for this purpose. The first, transnational legal process theory, helps explain why reliance on the court of international opinion serves to frustrate the emergence of a global culture of law compliance and why substituting reliance on the International Court of Justice would serve to nurture such a culture. The second, Thomas Franck’s specific application of legitimacy theory to the international system, is helpful for understanding why the indeterminacy of international law undermines compliance and why supplanting the judgments of the court of international opinion with those of the International Court of Justice would help make international law less indeterminate. Finally, rationalist, or instrumentalist, compliance theory is most helpful in explaining why the inability of the court of international opinion to reliably identify law breakers diminishes the incentive of countries to obey international law and why increased reliance on the more reliable International Court of Justice would strengthen countries’ incentive to obey the law.

A. Transnational Legal Process Theory and the Culture of Global Law Compliance

Transnational legal process theorists attempt to explain obedience to international law by looking to how international norms become internalized within nations so that they comply voluntarily. Harold Koh, one of the most influential transnational legal process theorists, distinguishes between legal internalization, whereby international norms become officially binding and enforceable within a country’s domestic legal system, and social and political internalization, whereby a country’s political elite as well as its general public respectively come to believe that international


198. In addition to Koh’s scholarship, several works of other theorists have contributed to the development of the transnational legal process school. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Legal Process: Materials for an Introductory Course (1968) (laying the theoretical foundation for the development of the transnational legal process school); Roger Fisher, Improving Compliance with International Law 141–62 (1981) (discussing the process whereby the internalization of international law within national bureaucracies leads states to comply with international law); Johanna van Sambeek & Mireille Hector, Disseminating of IHL at the Domestic Level: The Experiences of the Netherlands Red Cross, in Making the Voice of Humanity Heard 385–97 (L. Lijnzaad et al. eds., 2004) (attempting to demonstrate a correlation between the domestic dissemination of knowledge about international humanitarian law and enhanced compliance); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002) (evaluating the “liberal” claim that domestic interest groups can successfully pressure their governments to conform to treaty-created international human rights obligations). For a concise but highly informative study of the transnational legal process movement, see Mary Ellen O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 334 (1999).
norms should be followed as a matter of right. 199
To the extent that international law generally becomes socially and
politically internalized within a state, that state’s general compliance is
likely to improve. How much this internalization process occurs within
any given state is heavily influenced by global social forces. Just as some-
one is likely to develop very different personal predilections toward follow-
ing traffic laws depending upon whether her driving ethos was shaped by
life in Rome or Singapore, so too participants in the international commu-
nity are influenced by that community’s general compliance culture.200 At
present, the global culture of compliance leaves considerable room for
improvement. An important move in the direction of this improvement
would be to reduce reliance on the court of international opinion in favor
of the International Court of Justice.

That countries in their role as judges of the court of international
opinion are observably biased toward their own political interests and
those of their allies undermines the development of a healthy culture of law
compliance. After all, individuals will not internalize an ethos of respect
for an international legal system that they perceive is not deserving of such
respect. To the extent then that the institutionally independent Interna-
tional Court of Justice201 more often substitutes for the court of interna-
tional opinion, the reputation of the international system for dispensing
impartial justice would likely improve and along with it the necessary pre-
conditions for a culture of global law compliance.

B. Thomas Franck’s Legitimacy Theory and the Role of Indeterminacy
in Undermining Law Compliance

Thomas Franck, blending positivist and normative methodological tra-
ditions, examined compliance with international law through the lens of
legitimacy theory.202 Franck argued that to the extent that nations accept
international rules as legitimate or normatively valid, they will be more
likely to obey them, or in his terms, the rules will have more compliance
pull.203 Franck described four barometers of a norm’s legitimacy.204 Of

200. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 49–51 (1995) (discussing the various forces that mold the “international culture of compliance”).
201. Judicial independence is one of the core principles to which the Court’s Statute is dedicated. See ICJ Statute, supra note 23, arts. 4–20.
202. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990). Drawing on what he generally categorizes as the three main branches of domes-
tic legitimacy theory (Weberian, Habermasian, and Marxist), Franck offers a working
definition of legitimacy adapted to the international system as “a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.”
Id. at 24; see also id. at 17–18.
203. Id. at 24–26.
particular relevance for our purposes is its rule clarity, or determinacy. Franck explained that the more indeterminate or ambiguous a rule, “the less compliance pull it is likely to exert” because “obviously a rule that cannot be understood is unlikely to be obeyed.” Even if a rule is understandable in a general sense, to the extent that countries can plausibly justify behavior in accordance with inconsistent interpretations of it, the rule will lose its ability to influence them.

One of the great deficiencies of the court of international opinion is that it promotes such indeterminacy. This is because, in addition to their bias discussed above, the court of international opinion’s country members have a tendency to remain inscrutably silent in the face of a legal dispute. Alternatively, if they do happen to find their magisterial voices, they are likely to contradict one another, and often with political statements that lack legal character.

Even in the domestic context, relying on the vagaries of public opinion to determine judicial outcomes unsettles legal norms. This was, for example, the case in ancient Athens during the classical period, when popular juries that could number in the hundreds, or sometimes even thousands, confused standards of social conduct by capriciously applying the Athenian Legal Code. At least in Athens, however, jurors had a defined legal code to work from. In the international system, the law to be applied is itself often ill-defined.

Treaties and customary international law are generally considered the two primary sources of international law. While treaties, like all written documents, can be construed in different ways, their settled text, like the Athenian Legal Code, provides some level of constraint on plausible interpretations. Customary international law, on the other hand, is famously amorphous. According to traditional doctrine, customary

204. See id. Franck’s four barometers of a norm’s legitimacy are: its rule clarity or determinacy (Chapters 4, 5 & 6); its symbolic validation by rituals and pedigree (Chapters 7 & 8); its validation by coherence (Chapters 9 & 10); and its conformity with the normative hierarchy of secondary rules that define the international system’s right process (Chapter 11).

205. Id. at chs. 4–6.


208. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 38(1)(a)–(b) (listing international conventions (treaties) as first and customary international law as second among the sources of international law that the Court’s Statute authorizes the Court to apply).

209. For example, in a well-known article J. Patrick Kelly concludes:

[Cust]omary international law (“CIL”) survives only because nations and theorists mean radically different things when they use the term. For some scholars, CIL is consent-based, for others it is consensus-based. Some scholars argue that CIL is an unconscious, slow process that generates a shared conviction of obligation. Other scholars and nations see custom as a dynamic process that can change rapidly or even instantly. CIL serves and can be manipulated by many masters because its elements, state practice and opinio juris, have no ascertainable meaning and are routinely ignored.
international law is created when states act (state practice) out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). This simple formula belies uncertainty over exactly which normative standards should be given the status of customary international law. To take just one example of the considerable doctrinal disorder that exists regarding state practice, there is no clear agreement on how many states need to engage in what sort of practice and for how long for that practice to qualify as a custom. Similar doctrinal confusion complicates the determination of what constitutes opinio juris. There is even basic disagreement over the extent to which traditional state practice and opinio juris remain the elements of custom.

The result of filtering normative rays that are obscure at inception through the court of international opinion’s interpretive fog is to produce only a dim silhouette of law. And as Franck’s explanation of the relationship between determinacy and compliance makes clear, such legal opacity is a formula for frustrating the good intentions of those who wish to ascertain and abide by the law and facilitating the bad intentions of those who wish to obfuscate and disregard it.

In contrast, enhanced reliance on the International Court of Justice could help settle customary international law as well as international law in general. Because the International Court of Justice issues formal written opinions that elaborate with specificity upon its understanding of the law, it can help to flesh out the meaning of vague and indeterminate laws. Of course, the specialized tribunals of the international system can also


212. Compare, e.g., I.C. MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 31 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 143, 145–46 (1954) (arguing that a state’s failure to protest arguably illegal actions of other states indicates acceptance of the actions as legal) with D’Amato, supra note 211, at 68–70 (arguing that a state’s failure to protest another state’s act does not indicate acceptance of the act as legal).

213. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions in Outer Space: “Instant” Customary Law, 5 Indian J. Int’l L. 23 (1965) (arguing that United Nations General Assembly resolutions should be considered the equivalent of state practice and opinio juris and, therefore, constitute binding customary law).

214. Professor Franck provides, by way of illustration, two instances of the Court performing this law-settling role with regard to treaty interpretation:

[The International Court of Justice, in interpreting Article 83(1) of the [Law of the Sea Convention . . . , has taken a highly indeterminate text—one that calls for “an equitable solution” in apportioning an undersea coastal shelf among neighboring states—and has rendered it increasingly determinate. So, too, as a result of litigation between Finland and Denmark currently before the Court, will we “discover” whether a tall, self-propelled oil rig constitutes a “vessel” under the right of unimpeded passage through straits as established by the Law of the Sea Convention.
help settle the law.\textsuperscript{215} As discussed in Part One, Section I,\textsuperscript{216} however, in many cases no tribunal has authority to exercise jurisdiction. Also, when conflicting judgments of specialized tribunals fail to settle the law, the International Court of Justice is best positioned to assume the role of settler of last resort.\textsuperscript{217}

C. Rationalist Compliance Theory and the Costs of Noncompliance

In the tradition of Thomas Hobbes, who argued that nations, inhabiting a state of nature, only follow the law of nations when it serves their self-interest,\textsuperscript{218} rationalist (or instrumentalist) compliance theorists\textsuperscript{219} employ the tools of cost-benefit analysis\textsuperscript{220} and other related implements of economics\textsuperscript{221} to explain obedience to international law. Unlike the transnational legal process school and the Franckian legitimacy theory, both of which emphasize normativity, rationalist compliance theorists attempt to demonstrate theoretically and empirically that nations follow international rules based on calculated, if complex, perceptions that the benefits of compliance outweigh the costs of noncompliance.

\textsuperscript{215} In addition to tribunals, organizations that help settle customary international law by precisely codifying its content in written documents are also part of the international system. The most important of these organizations is the International Law Commission, a committee of experts established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947. See International Law Commission, \textit{Introduction}, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ (last visited May 30, 2011). While the International Law Commission and other codification organizations have contributed to defining customary international law, because the scope of their work and status potential is limited, they are no substitute for expanding the jurisdiction of the Court.

\textsuperscript{216} See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{217} Even acting in an advisory capacity, the Court is capable of playing the role of settler of last resort. As is fairly typical of international tribunals, the Court’s Statute provides that even its decisions in contentious cases are only binding between the parties to the dispute. \textit{ICJ Statute}, supra note 23, art. 59. Rather than being technically binding, therefore, all Court opinions—both advisory and contentious—are highly influential as to what the law is, and, therefore, how it should be interpreted by tribunals in subsequent cases.

\textsuperscript{218} See generally \textit{THOMAS HOBBES}, \textit{LEVIATHAN} 94–110 (Oxford University Press 1965) (1651).


\textsuperscript{220} See, \textit{e.g.}, Andrew T. Guzman, \textit{A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law}, 90 \textit{CAL. L. REV.} 1823 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, \textit{Compliance-Based Theory}] (employing cost-benefit analysis to explain compliance with international law).

\textsuperscript{221} Primary among these is game theory, which uses applied mathematics to attempt to explain the strategic choices that actors make in an environment where outcomes are dependent upon decisions made by others. See generally \textit{JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW} (2008) (applying principles of game theory to international law).
The international community can only impose costs for noncompliance with international law—either through moral censure and the concomitant loss of reputation or through the imposition of formal sanctions—to the extent it can identify wrongdoers. From the point of view of potential wrongdoers, the lower the likelihood that the international community will impose those costs, the lower the incentive to comply with the law. Here again, the court of international opinion falls short. The same institutional deficiencies (countries as judges remaining silent, contradicting one another, and issuing non-legal and politically biased statements) that hinder that court’s ability to speak clearly as to the content of international law also hinder its ability to render verdicts that unequivocally convict the guilty and exonerate the innocent. Because advisory judgments of the International Court of Justice could identify more clearly the extent to which parties are in the legal right as well as the nature and extent of the remedy owed, their greater availability has the potential to deter the illegal behavior of rationally self-interested states.

Of course, such states, rationally calculating the benefits to be gained versus the costs to be incurred by flouting international law, will factor as costless an advisory opinion that carries with it no enforcement, no matter how clear that opinion may be. Thus, the unique way in which the international system, lacking sovereign means of enforcement, would give effect to a Court judgment that is by its own terms merely advisory requires some explanation.

An advisory opinion vindicating a state’s position would stand above the maelstrom of conflicting partisan claims. As an authoritative statement of law by the international system’s most venerable tribunal, the opinion would serve as a normative polestar for the international community. In the subsequent dynamics of dispute disposition between the parties, the opinion’s moral weight and diplomatic impact would advantage the winner. Even the implicit or explicit threat that a wronged state may seek out an opinion of the Court could encourage law-breaking states to settle on favorable terms, or at least terms where the law’s role relative to diplomatic or military power is enhanced.

The universalization of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction could have a particular impact in the area of international peace and security where the proliferation of advisory opinions could complement the work of the Security Council. In coming to inform the Council with some regularity as to the law in peace and security related disputes, the Court would put normative pressure on the Council to take measures consistent with that law.

222. See Guzman, Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 220, at 1847–51 (discussing the nature and compliance implications of the reputational costs that can be imposed on states for violating international law).

223. As discussed in Part I, Section I, the Charter authorizes the Security Council to request quasi-contentious advisory opinions of the Court (see supra note 34 and accompanying text), but it has done so on only one occasion (see supra note 150). By replacing General Assembly or Security Council politics (including the veto) with regularized legal procedures for initiating quasi-contentious advisory opinions, my proposal would ensure that such opinions play a more regular role in Security Council decision-making.
In taking such measures, the moral force of the Court's authority would buttress the legitimacy of the Council's actions. Additionally, if the Council went so far as to formally adopt the Court’s judgments as its own Article 39 determinations, they would be binding on the parties pursuant to Article 25 and Article 48. Once so adopted, the Council would have the legal authority under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter to take measures to enforce the Court's opinions.

III. The Case that the Introduction of Referral Jurisdiction Will Strengthen Rather than Weaken the International Court of Justice

If advancing the rule of international law is referral jurisdiction’s great benefit to the global legal system, are there also ways its introduction could harm that system or the Court specifically? Many who support the international law project would answer in the affirmative. To their minds, states in a weak international system with limited enforcement powers will disregard and ultimately discard international institutions that exercise powers without state acquiescence. With regard specifically to the International Court of Justice, they worry that expanding its jurisdiction outside the realm of consent would cause its delicately maintained influence to collapse under the weight of political opposition. The Court’s formal authority, they believe, must be conservatively aligned with the realities of a global system in which sovereign states continue to hold the

As detailed in Part I, Section III (see supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text) under the proposal, the requisite nine member majority of the Security Council could secure a deferral of the Judicial Commission's referral if a case going forward would interfere with the Council's own efforts or might otherwise be unhelpful to the political resolution of a conflict.

224. Article 39 of the United Nations Charter provides that “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain and restore international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 39.

225. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter provides that “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” U.N. Charter art. 25. Article 48, paragraph 1 provides that “[t]he action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all of the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.” U.N. Charter art. 91 para. 1.

226. Article 41 provides that “[t]he Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions.” U.N. Charter art. 41. Article 42 provides that the Security Council may use armed force to “maintain or restore international peace and security” should it consider that the “measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate.” U.N. Charter art. 42.

ultimate power. But would states actually have the motivation and the ability to undermine the Court in response to the expansion of the Court’s advisory powers? This is an important question because it goes to the capability of the international system to develop beyond power politics. The General Assembly may cut the Gordian Knot to create referral jurisdiction, but would that lead the Court to ruin?

A. The Court’s Soft Power

In terms of motivation, at least some states will be unhappy, at least some of the time, with the Court’s exercise of referral jurisdiction. Typically, states do not appreciate adverse decisions. This is all the more true when those decisions impact upon matters that states perceive to involve vital national interests that they have not consented to being adjudicated in the first place. States, however, have notoriously short memories when it comes to imperatives of interests. In fact, history tells us that unhappy subjects of adverse decisions will overcome their hard feelings when they themselves find it advantageous to resort to the Court.

Of course, individual states or even a group of states might find themselves more enduringly opposed to a more jurisdictionally ubiquitous Court that they view as implacably antagonistic to their interests. Pariah states, whose behavior is fundamentally outside of global norms, would fit this bill, but so would powerful states who, as the Gordian Knot discussion suggests, might perceive their advantage to lie more with political muscle

---

228. Thus, for example, shortly after the Court decided the highly contentious Nicaragua case over a strongly voiced American protest that it had not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction (see supra note 95 and infra notes 238–246 and accompanying text), Jonathan Charney lamented that the Court was not “strong enough to entertain this type of case,” and that the decision “would threaten its institutional underpinnings.” Jonathan Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance, in The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, supra note 25, at 305; see also Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for Closing the Clause, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 66 (1987) (asserting that “United States prestige may suffer somewhat” from its behavior in the Nicaragua case, but the Court “is far more vulnerable to the effects of defiance of its compulsory jurisdiction and of its judgments.”); cf. GILL, supra note 35, at 142 (discussing South Africa’s reaction to the Namibia case—see supra notes 150, 160, 169, and 175 and accompanying text—and concluding that it “demonstrates the inherent limitations of the judicial process . . . in the absence of the real consent of the parties concerned”).

229. For example, despite considerable anger over its loss in the Nicaragua case, (see infra notes 238–243 and accompanying text) the United States sought the Court’s relief in an action against Italy only four years later. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20). This principle of what might be called strategic exigency holds true generally across international institutions. For example, the George W. Bush administration, stung by the impending refusal of the Security Council to authorize its invasion of Iraq, vowed to make the United Nations irrelevant. Less than nine months later, however, it returned to the Security Council seeking support for Resolution 1511 legitimizing its post-invasion occupation. See John F. Burns & Thom Shanker, U.S. Officials Fashion Legal Basis to Keep Force in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004, at A10. If the US could now secure a diplomatically helpful advisory judgment of the Court regarding Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology, its temptation to do so despite any misgiving about referral jurisdiction would likewise be extremely strong.
than judicial process.\textsuperscript{230}

Understandably, the potential for the Court to garner such powerful enemies can be intimidating to those concerned with its future well-being. Despite powerful states’ outsized influence in global economic, military, and diplomatic affairs, they cannot, however, single-handedly or even jointly cripple the Court. The reason why lies in the nature of the Court’s power, which can be most easily understood with the help of Joseph Nye’s useful application of legitimacy theory.\textsuperscript{231} For Nye, political power can either be based upon legitimacy factors such as the attractiveness of values, which he calls soft power,\textsuperscript{232} or upon military and economic might, which he calls hard power.\textsuperscript{233} An institution that employs soft power relies upon its ability to voluntarily encourage rather than coerce behavior. For example, unlike military dictators who may use the threat of violence to enforce their rule, the power today of most spiritual authorities lies primarily in a belief among followers in their virtue and the virtue of their message.

The Court’s power is soft power. It has no army—not even an army of bureaucrats—to enforce its decisions, and it has no economic resources beyond its own small budget. Its only power comes from the international community’s willingness to respect its judgments out of a belief in its moral authority as a fair and independent tribunal\textsuperscript{234} of United Nations-appointed judges of high moral character and recognized competence in international law\textsuperscript{235} representing the main forms of civilization.\textsuperscript{236}

\textbf{B. The Power of Soft Power}

To undermine the Court’s soft power, its foes must somehow reduce the international community’s general acceptance of its moral authority. As it turns out, hard power tools of military and economic might are not well adapted to accomplishing this objective.

The use of military force against the Court would be so counter-productive to state efforts to neutralize the Court’s soft power that it is very difficult even to imagine such an attempt. Such force would actually increase the visibility and probably the standing of the Court, while doing...
more than any adverse advisory opinion to damage the legitimacy of an attacking state’s legal position and general reputation. The use of economic coercion is a similar non-starter. A country cannot sever economic relations with, or use trade sanctions against, a judicial body. Countries could refuse to contribute financially to the Court, but this would be difficult as its funding comes through the United Nations general budget237 and other countries, if committed, could always make up the difference.

Antagonistic countries might more plausibly attempt to employ their soft power to counter the Court. They could refuse to appear before the Court, disregard its decisions, and wage a propaganda assault on the Court’s legitimacy. If history is any guide, however, these three tactics, as with use of force, are likely to backfire and enhance the credibility of the Court at the expense of such countries and the legitimacy of their legal position.

Illustrative of the deficiency of this soft power strategy is the 1986 Nicaragua case238 in which the Court ruled that the United States had violated international law by supporting and engaging in military action against Nicaragua.239 Unhappy that the Court had taken the case, and even more unhappy with its eventual holding, the United States employed all three soft power tactics. First, following acceptance of jurisdiction, the United States refused to participate in the merits phase of the proceeding240 and even revoked its longstanding agreement to be subject to the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.241 Then, after the Court proceeded to rule against it, the United States refused to comply with the Court’s judgment.242 Finally, the U.S. waged a propaganda assault on the Court’s credibility, indicative of which were the comments of then-United States United

237. Id. at art. 33.
238. Nicaragua, supra note 95.
239. Id.
240. The United States is not alone in refusing to participate in various phases of contentious Court cases. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24) (Iran refusing to participate in the case); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19) (Turkey refusing to participate in the interim measures and jurisdiction phases of the case); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Icel.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25) (Iceland refusing to participate in the case); Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Icel.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (July 25) (Iceland refusing to participate in the case); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20) (France refusing to participate in the case); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (Preliminary Objection), 1953 I.C.J. 111 (Nov. 18) (Guatemala refusing to participate in the preliminary objection phase of the case); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Order (Interim Measures of Protection), 1951 I.C.J. 89 (July 5) (Iran refusing to participate in the provisional measures phase of the case); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) (Albania refusing to participate in the case).
241. For further discussion, see supra note 105.
Nations Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick: “The court, quite frankly, is not what its name suggests, an international court of justice. It’s a semi-legal, semi-juridical, semi-political body which nations sometimes accept and sometimes don’t.”

Many commentators at the time predicted that the Court would be significantly harmed by the soft power plays of the world’s mightiest country. Instead, the tribunal’s own prominence rose considerably. Most tellingly, a court that adjudicated fifty-three contentious cases in the forty-one years prior to delivering the *Nicaragua* opinion has adjudicated sixty-eight such cases in the only twenty-four years since that opinion. In contrast, indicative of the damage that the Reagan administration’s actions against the Court did to the reputation of the United States and the legitimacy of its legal position, in 1986 the United Nations General Assembly voted 94 to 3 to rebuke the U.S. for its failure to comply with the Court’s decision.

Soft power strategies are no more likely to be successfully employed by countries who would today attempt to counter referral jurisdiction. In fact, because states are neither legally obliged to appear in advisory cases nor to comply with advisory judgments, the spurning of the Court’s advisory processes is not a direct challenge to the Court’s authority.

C. The International Community and the Court

If states, even powerful states, acting on their own cannot defeat the Court’s soft power, and it is only the international community of states generally that can withdraw the support that empowers the Court, the question becomes whether the international community would withdraw that support in response to referral jurisdiction. Because the Court serves

---


244. See supra note 228.

245. This represents an increase in average contentious cases per year from 1.3 prior to the *Nicaragua* case to 2.8 after that case. See International Court of Justice, *List of Cases Referred to the Court Since 1946 by Date of Introduction*, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&sp2=2 (last visited August 1, 2010).

246. G.A. Res. 41/31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/53 (Nov. 3, 1986). The U.S. refusal to participate in the merits phase of the case may also have been counterproductive to its interest in influencing the Court’s final opinion. See Charney, supra note 228, at 291 (“While the Court did take into account unofficial communications from the United States on the facts and the law, it did so in limited ways. The result appears to be that the United States view of the case was not adequately considered by the Court and the resulting adverse findings appear to be an unfortunate product, at least in part, of the non-participation of the United States in the merits phase of the case.”).


248. See, e.g., Peace Treaties, supra note 114, at 71 (affirming that because the Court’s reply is of an advisory character, “it has no binding force”).
the international community’s interests by promoting law compliance and contributing to dispute resolution, the community will be predisposed to continue its support so long as the Court does not offend against its sensibilities.

What then would so offend? To start with, states generally would not be offended by the mere exercise of non-consensual referral jurisdiction (as fearful supporters of the Court might assume). After all, the requisite majority of states that voted for referral jurisdiction in the General Assembly presumably would not turn against the Court for doing what they authorized it to do, and even many states that voted in the opposition would accept the appropriateness of the Court exercising jurisdiction in accord with the Assembly’s mandate. More fundamentally, the exercise of nonconsensual jurisdiction no longer goes against the grain of states’ embedded sense of right order. Of course no state wants to be the unwilling subject of a critical opinion, but in the interest of building a functional legal system, states in more and more institutional contexts have come to accept that lack of consent should not be a bar to international jurisdiction. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights employs a system of advisory jurisdiction almost identical to the one being proposed in this Article, and even compulsory binding jurisdiction is the order of the day at many of the international system’s specialized tribunals.

Though states generally will not be inclined to turn against the Court just for exercising referral jurisdiction, they will have expectations that the Court will have to meet to maintain its good standing. Those expectations are the same ones that all communities have for all courts. As institutions

249. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

250. Pursuant to the American Convention on Human Rights, a state member of the Organization of American States may request an advisory opinion regarding any treaty that concerns the protection of human rights in the Americas. American Convention on Human Rights art. 64, supra note 8. While in theory the Inter-American Court renders advisory opinions only on abstract questions of law, in practice it reviews state conduct. For example, upon the application of Mexico, the Inter-American Court rendered two advisory judgments concerning practices of the United States (a member of the Organization of American States but not a party to the American Convention). The first concerned the rights of undocumented workers in foreign countries. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003). The second concerned requirements of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations that states inform foreign nationals of their right to contact their national consulate upon arrest. See The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16 (Oct. 1, 1999).

251. The systems of dispute resolution of both the World Trade Organization (formerly, the GATT) (see supra note 11) and the European Court of Human Rights (see supra note 7) evolved from consent-based to compulsory. Other present day compulsory systems include: the European Union’s European Court of Justice (see supra note 12), the Caribbean Court of Justice, the Court of the European Free Trade Agreement, the Court of Justice for the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West Africa, the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, the MERCOSUR Permanent Review Tribunal (see supra note 16), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court (see supra note 10). For further discussion, see Romano, supra note 20, at 803–34.
designed to apply systematically abstract legal concepts to concrete cases, courts are expected to justify their decisions with persuasive legal reasoning, be judicially independent and impartial, and not to stray from the normative and political center of gravity. Whether the Court will competently justify its legal conclusions and maintain its independence depends upon an unknown: the future performance of its judges. Certainly, fulfilling such expectations is well within the capability of the Court’s highly competent bench. That the Court not stray from the normative and political center of gravity, however, requires some additional explanation.

While international law reflects the norms of the community of states that prescribes it, in everyday practice that community’s identification with those norms varies with political considerations. There is, however, a range of legitimate interpretations of the law as well as acceptable options for adjusting the scope of rulings that allow the Court to avoid issuing opinions that put it in danger of alienating itself from a critical mass of the international community. Because of the still common misperception of law as an exact science, it is important to point out that such strategic agility does not imply a lack of judicial integrity. Rather, it is a practice generally understood among sophisticated legal observers as necessary to maintain core political support.\(^{252}\) As is the case with expectations regarding the quality of the Court’s legal reasoning and its independence and impartiality, the future performance of the Court’s judges cannot be predicted with any certainty. Still, in the past the Court has shown itself quite adept at maintaining its balance within the normative and political center of gravity.

If referral jurisdiction is unlikely to cause the community of states to withdraw its support, the advent of such jurisdiction actually holds the promise that the Court’s supporting constituency can be expanded to include the broader global community of citizens. Presently, the Court is largely a diplomats’ court, with most non-foreign policy professionals unaware of its existence, much less its jurisprudence. Thrust into the limelight with greater frequency by a more regular disposition of high profile cases, the Court could come, as Richard Falk has advocated, to “persuade a non-professional audience of individuals about global policy that in the Court’s

\(^{252}\) That courts do not apply the law in a strictly mechanical way is well accepted today and has been the focus of a tremendous amount of theoretical scholarship. While a full discussion of this topic is well beyond the subject matter of this article, for two classic works of the legal realism school maintaining that there exists a range of legitimate interpretations of the law, see John Dewey, \textit{My Philosophy of Law: Creeds of Sixteen American Scholars} (1941), and Oliver Wendell Holmes, \textit{The Path of the Law}, 10 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 457 (1897). For one of the most well-known works contending that courts properly account for the general will of the community in their judicial decision-making, see Alexander M. Bickel, \textit{The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics} (1962). The International Court of Justice itself is experienced and competent in making strategic judicial decisions. See, e.g., W.M. Reisman, \textit{The Enforcement of International Judgments}, 63 \textit{Am. J. Int’l L.} 1, 3–4 (1969) (observing that when states have been likely to impugn its judgments, the Court has formulated issues restrictively, issued final judgments “almost Delphic in ambiguity,” or “not infrequently disseised itself of jurisdiction”).
view deserves respect." The Court would then be institutionally strengthened as governments who might otherwise be inclined to disregard it would have the force of citizen opinion to contend with.

**Conclusion**

In the proceeding pages, I have described how the General Assembly can cut the Gordian Knot to initiate referral jurisdiction. I have also made the case that the Court’s exercise of such jurisdiction would be legal, would further compliance with international law, and would strengthen, rather than weaken, the Court. What I have not discussed are the implementation matters that would need to be addressed if referral jurisdiction is to become reality. While a thorough examination of implementation issues is beyond the subject matter of this article, two concerns are of particular importance and should be briefly mentioned.

The first has to do with the host of issues pertaining to adapting quasi-contentious cases to the advisory process. While the mechanics of such adaptation present some complex issues, the Court has already encountered and developed a template for dealing with them in the five previously discussed quasi-contentious cases it has decided at the request of the General Assembly or Security Council. Based on the Court’s Statute and Rules, which contemplate the Court utilizing contentious procedures to the extent applicable in quasi-contentious advisory cases, the Court has largely assimilated such cases into the contentious process.

The most institutionally challenging adaptation issue raised by referral jurisdiction is what to do in the event that a relevant party chooses not to appear. While non-appearance is probably more likely in referral jurisdiction proceedings where acquiescence to jurisdiction is lacking, states in consent-based contentious cases have at times chosen not to appear. As we have already observed, the United States did this during the merits phase of the *Nicaragua* case. Despite the challenges it presents, non-appear-

---


254. See supra notes 149, 151-153 (identifying quasi-contentious cases referred to the Court by the General Assembly) and supra note 150 (identifying the quasi-contentious case referred to the Court by the Security Council).

255. Article 68 of the Court’s Statute provides that "[i]n the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable." ICJ Statute, supra note 23, art. 68. Article 102, paragraph 2 of the Court’s Rules provides that "[t]he Court shall also be guided by the provisions of the Statute and of these Rules which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable. For this purpose, it shall above all consider whether the request for the advisory opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between two or more States." International Court of Justice, Rules of Court art. 102, para. 2, as amended Sept. 29, 2005, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=3&p3=0.

256. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. refusal to participate in the merits phase of the *Nicaragua* case and identifying other instances of states refusing to participate in proceedings before the Court). See also supra note 247 (documenting that states are not legally obligated to participate in contentious cases).
The second concern regards institutional capacity. Although referral jurisdiction has the potential to significantly increase the Court’s caseload, the Court could likely accommodate this increase as it has accommodated increases in the past. As previously discussed, the Court’s docket has grown significantly in the last quarter century and the Court has adapted by employing judicial clerks and introducing several initiatives to expedite the disposition of cases. If referral jurisdiction made it necessary, a good deal more could be done. To the extent that greater productivity depends in particular upon greater resources, provisions for additional funding could be included in the General Assembly proposal for referral jurisdiction.

Certainly, there is an upper limit beyond which a bench composed of fifteen judges cannot be stretched. Given the number of cases that might plausibly emanate from the Court’s relatively small pool of potential state litigants, referral jurisdiction is unlikely, however, to challenge that limit. A comparison to national high courts makes this clear. The Court currently has seventeen pending cases on its docket. Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court issues formal signed opinions in about 80 cases a year.

257. See generally Gill, supra note 35, at 78–79.

258. Article 53, paragraph 1 provides that “[w]henever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim.” Article 53, paragraph 2 provides that “[t]he Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.” ICJ Statute, supra note 23. The Court has made it clear that it would decline to accept an advisory case in which it believed that a lack of cooperation from relevant states would preclude it from ascertaining the necessary information to make a proper decision. See, e.g., Israeli Wall, supra note 137, at 161–62.

259. See Gill, supra note 35, at 78–79.

260. See supra notes 22, 245 and accompanying text.

261. See generally Gill, supra note 35, at 21–22 (discussing the implementation of recommendations designed to streamline pleadings, oral arguments, and Court deliberations relating to preliminary objections).

262. See generally Report of the Study Group (composed of Professors Bowett and Crawford and Sir Ian Sinclair and Sir Arthur Watts) established by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law as a Contribution to the U.N. Decade of International Law, in The International Court of Justice, Process, Practice and Procedure 27–84 (Derek Bowett et al. eds., 1997) (suggesting ways in which the Court could deal with a larger caseload).

263. United Nations funding of the Court has increased moderately in recent years. Nevertheless, as presidents of the Court have repeatedly emphasized in their annual addresses to the General Assembly the resources available to the Court have been extremely modest compared to national high courts. See generally Gill, supra note 35, at 241.
year, and that number has been far higher in the past. 264 Other national high courts exhibit similar figures for cases heard annually, and the famously overstretched European Court of Human Rights has thousands of cases pending. 265

If the Court did reach its absolute limit, it could use its Article 65 discretion to turn cases away, but the hope would be that the international community would respond with sufficient judicial-capacity building before that became necessary. In the final analysis, Stephen Schwebel most likely got it correct when he wrote as a judge on the Court that “like other human institutions, the Court is responsive to demands made upon it. Should more cases be submitted to it, it is doubtless that the Court would rise to the challenge of dealing with them.” 266

The advent of referral jurisdiction would require working through many other implementation questions. None are without answers, however, and the effort would be well rewarded because expanding the jurisdiction of the Court would be an important advance towards a more law-based international system. The Court, however, is only one component of that system. In the absence of overarching, system-wide reform, achieving a global order where law reigns supreme would require a range of complementary initiatives.

Conceptualizing such initiatives provides an agenda for future academic research. This research should examine how these initiatives could best be accomplished. For example, how can the Gordian Knot be cut to unleash reform? The strategy I suggest of the General Assembly establishing a Judicial Commission only applies to universalizing the Court’s advisory jurisdiction. Other initiatives would require their own particular solutions to the Gordian Knot problem. And, of course, despite the inclination of the powerful to reinforce the status quo, not every barrier to achieving rule of law reform is one of great power opposition. Thus, part of the strategic thinking that needs to be done is to identify strategies that can enjoy the support of the most powerful countries.

Research on complimentary initiatives should also work through the systemic implications of suggested reforms. As we have seen to be the case with referral jurisdiction, independent changes to specific governance institutions can impact the global system as a whole. The nature of this impact is often not straightforward. At this point in history, a global order that is partially based on raw power politics and partially based on rule of

264. See Linda Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/washington/07scotus.html?pagewanted=2. The comparison to national high courts is not perfect. Unlike national high courts, issues of fact do come before the Court, lengthening its proceedings. These proceedings, however, are quite streamlined and should not be confused with the kinds of full trials that would be familiar in national trial courts.


law introduces contradictions and anomalies that must be unraveled. Once unraveled, navigating these contradictions, as we did in giving the Security Council the ability to interfere in the judicial referral process, is necessary to the viability of reform proposals.

All of the above suggests a challenging research agenda. Conceptualizing reform, however, is only the first step towards implementation. To be realized, all reform requires political initiative. The proposal for referral jurisdiction awaits such an initiative, and the changing dynamics of the global system are encouraging that one could be successful. The world today is becoming increasingly multipolar,267 and the emergence of newly industrializing countries such as Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa as able and potentially willing to spearhead such a project268 portends new possibilities for cutting the Gordian Knot and, in the process, unleashing a promising era of global rule of law reform.
