Traditions in Conflict: The Internationalization of Confrontation

Kweku Vanderpuye†

This article considers international norms concerning the right to adversarial confrontation in positing a normative analytical standard of admissibility with respect to the “right to examine” guaranteed under Article 67(1)(e) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It considers the notion of confrontation in the context of both the Continental European tradition, as well as the Anglo-American Common Law conception of the right, focusing on U.S. constitutional doctrine and relatively recent developments in English jurisprudence. It also surveys the scope of the right to examine as defined by the U.N. Human Rights Committee relative to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and by the European Court with regard to the European Convention. The article further evaluates the procedural regime concerning the admission of written evidence not subjected to cross-examination under the Rome Statute and the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence and argues that the broad judicial discretion it affords is insufficient to fully and predictably guarantee the core right to adversarial examination of witnesses intended under Article 67(1)(e). Ultimately, the article concludes that a bright-line rule of admissibility is not only a viable international standard, but also the one that best protects the hybridized right to examine as a core due process tenet of the Rome Statute.

Introduction ..................................................... 514
I. The Civil Law Paradigm ........................................ 517
   A. Mode of Criminal Proceedings ........................ 518
   B. Confrontation ........................................ 521
II. The Adversarial Framework ................................ 523
   A. The Common Law Perspective ........................ 523
   B. The Constitutional Confrontation Model of the United States ........................................ 525
   C. Confrontation in England ............................... 530
      1. Hearsay Developments .... 530
      2. Witness Anonymity .......................... 533

† Trial Attorney, United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; Adjunct Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; former Supervising Attorney, Legal Aid Society, Criminal Defense Division, New York, NY and Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School. J.D. 1991, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 1988, Vassar College. The views expressed herein are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Tribunal or the United Nations in general. I dedicate this article to my wife, Maria Cardelli.

Introduction

The principle of confrontation is an ancient one, dating back to at least Roman times. Today, it is a prevalent feature of the world’s major
2010 Traditions in Conflict: The Internationalization of Confrontation

Criminal justice systems and an integral component of international fair trial standards. Derived from national constitutionalism and international human rights, together with other long-established fair trial guarantees, the right to examine one's accusers is universally reflected in regional and multilateral treaties the world over.

While there are complex reasons for the proliferation and, importantly, the observation of fair trial rights as a whole within the international human rights legal framework, the fact that such rights generally lack an established hierarchy in terms of either their development or enforcement is contributive. Further, the “increased recognition that a number of nations share many fundamental legal values and expectations,”—including both criminal trial and civil rights intimately connected

FRONTATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: ABSENT, ANONYMOUS AND VULNERABLE WITNESSES 13 (2006) (observing that confrontation dates as far back as Hebrew writings).


5. Id. at 235.
with democracy\(^6\)—may account for this phenomenon. However, even given the broad democratic consensus reflected in customary international law,\(^7\) the re-interpretation and refinement of fair trial rights standards as a whole, and particularly the right to examine, should remain a focal point of international criminal justice.

Modern fair trial rights are chiefly derived from elements drawn from two of the world’s dominant legal traditions—the Common Law rooted in England (“Adversarial”) and the Civil Law of continental Europe (“Continental”).\(^8\) The procedural disparities in these traditions may have a potentially profound impact not only upon due process considerations, but also on the very conception of a fair trial.\(^9\) Although the transplantation and merging of discrete elements of these systems have greatly contributed to the expansion of rights-based criminal procedure and are intended to strengthen international fair trial standards,\(^10\) some commentators argue that the resultant hybrid system may be substantively impaired.\(^11\) Others

---

6. Id. at 253 (recognizing that “[t]he link between individual human rights, which are most susceptible to abuse during the criminal process, and democracy is beyond question.”). See also David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 42 Depauw L. Rev. 1183, 1186 (1993) (observing that the ICCPR guarantees civil and political rights which “limit the power of the State to impose its will on the people under its jurisdiction.”); Makau Wa Muuta, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 589, 606 (1996) (“[Close] examination of the rights listed in both the UDHR and the [ICCPR] leaves no doubt that both documents . . . are attempts to universalize civil and political rights accepted or aspired to in Western liberal democracies.”).


8. While Adversarial and Continental modalities predominate, the world’s major legal traditions also include Marxist-Socialist and Islamic (Sharia). See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 244.

9. See, e.g., Justice Robert H. Jackson, Preface to International Conference on Military Trials (U.S. Department of State 1945) (observing that “a procedure that is acceptable as a fair trial in countries accustomed to the Continental system of law may not be regarded as a fair trial in common-law countries.”); see also Salvatore Zappala, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings 16 (Oxford University Press 2003) (“These models historically reflect different conceptions of ‘judicial truth’ . . . this differentiation reflects two opposing epistemological beliefs: while for the inquisitorial paradigm there is an objective truth that the ‘inquisitor’ must ascertain, for the accusatorial approach the truth is the natural and logical result of a pre-determined process.”).


11. See Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 839, 851-52 (1997) (observing that the “transplantation of factfinding arrangements between common law and civil law systems would give rise to serious strains in the recipient justice system . . . a legal pastiche [can] produce far less satisfactory factfinding result in practice than under either continental or Anglo-American evidentiary arrangements in their unadulterated form.”); Henri Astier, Rights of the Despised, The American Prospect, Aug. 14, 2000, at 31 (observing that “the root of the problem is the hybrid nature of war crimes tribunals.”); see also Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the Public Interest, 49 SMU L. Rev. 567, 568 (1996) (noting that borrowing across
argue that this hybridization may considerably attenuate due process. What, then, of an internationalized right to confrontation?

This article considers the “right to examine” within the Adversarial and Continental legal traditions, as well as in the context of the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights (the “European Court”), and posits a normative analytical approach to Article 67(1)(e) of the Rome Statute. Part I reviews the right to confront within the broad context of the Continental mode of procedure. Part II considers the Anglo-American notion of confrontation, focusing on U.S. constitutional doctrine and recent developments in English law. Parts III and IV consider the right to examine, as interpreted by the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) and by the European Court, respectively. Part V examines the ICC’s procedures regarding the admissibility of written evidence in view of the right to examine under the Rome Statute. In conclusion, this article proposes a bright-line analytical framework as a normative and viable alternative to the exceedingly broad judicial discretion the Rome Statute and the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence currently afford in determining the scope of admissibility of uncross-examined statements.

I. The Civil Law Paradigm

Although some commentators contend that the gap between the Adversarial and Continental modes of criminal procedure is wide, a focus on the operation of Continental procedure suggests otherwise. The view that the modern convergence of the two traditions has reduced their differences, leading to the relative dominance of certain characteristics of one over the other, seems more apt. No matter how the dichotomy national and systemic lines risks importing stereotypes “without appreciating the distinctive relation of the borrowed practice to the premises of the system in which it has evolved and the living context in which it has taken its form. Indeed, it is commonly assumed that such borrowings are, at best, risky and, at worst, calamitous.”

12. See Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 642–43 (2007) (observing that some have criticized the Nuremberg Charter as fundamentally unfair, and attributing this to the dilution of due process resulting from the “blending and balancing elements of the Continental European inquisitorial system and the Anglo-American adversarial system.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Lee A. Casey, The Case Against The International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 840, 868–69 (2002) (observing that the Adversarial and Continental systems “do not mix well together” and that “[i]n the ICTY, hearsay evidence is admitted virtually without limitation. . . . Neither the critical importance of vindicating the accused’s right to confront the witnesses against him, nor the basic human fallibility even of professional judges is acknowledged.”); Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and Continental Law at the ICTY and its Progeny, Due Process Deficit, 4 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 243, 265 (2004).


16. Wayne R. LaFave et al., 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 1.4(c), n.105, at 175 (2d ed. 1999) (“Just as Anglo-American procedure is not purely adversarial neither is European
is characterized, however, fundamental differences have clearly survived the intermixing of the two traditions, particularly those concerning the organization of the investigation phase and its correlative structures.

A. Mode of Criminal Proceedings

Principally, three distinct but integrated stages define Continental criminal proceedings: the investigation stage, the examination stage, and the trial stage. Within this framework, the judiciary is responsible for controlling the conduct of trial and plays a very active role. At trial, for example, judges decide which witnesses should be called and may directly conduct their examination on substantive matters. Such witnesses are traditionally questioned in contemplation of, and based upon, a dossier which documents evidence gathered during the investigative phase. The judiciary is thus chiefly responsible for eliciting the evidence to be relied upon to adjudicate the guilt of the accused.

During the early investigation stage, several formative operations are procedure purely inquisitorial. Thus, commentators often prefer to describe the European process as providing a ‘mixed system’ in which the inquisitorial characteristics are dominant. (internal citations omitted).

17. See Gideon Boas, A Code of Evidence and Procedure for International Criminal Law? The Rules of the ICTY, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE ICTY 20 (Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas, eds., 2003) (observing that by adhering to the ECHR many Continental countries “have subjected themselves to general standards of procedural fairness” similar to those of the Adversarial system.).


20. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 403, 421–22 (1992) (noting that the French juge d'instruction supervises the investigation of serious cases, while the police conduct the actual investigation, including interviews and interrogations; in Italy, these responsibilities belong to the public magistrate); see also Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 317, 325 (1995) (noting that while the investigatory judge “still dominates pretrial procedure in many other continental systems,” in Germany, the office of the investigatory judge was terminated over thirty years ago and that prosecutors “are responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal offenses.”); Antonia Sherman, Sympathy for the Devil: Examining a Defendant’s Right to Confront Before the International War Crimes Tribunal, 10 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 833, 861–62 (1996) (comparing the roles of judges in Adversarial and Continental systems to those of “impartial referee” and “active inquisitor,” respectively).

21. See Damaska, supra note 15, at 525 (noting with regard to judicial control of the trial inquest that “whatever evidence [the judge] decides to examine becomes his—or, rather, the court’s—evidence.”).

22. See, e.g., Frase & Weigend, supra note 20, at 334 (“German professional judges usually are familiar with the complete file of the investigation before a trial begins.”).
carried out under the direction and authority of an investigating judge who is vested with considerable powers. Amongst other formal devices at his control, he may seek out or identify suspects, have crime scenes processed, or have interrogations conducted. Generally, it is during this stage that most evidence is acquired. As mentioned above, the dossier records this evidence, including police reports, physical evidence, expert reports, and other important documents and materials.

A judicial or prosecutorial official normally compiles the dossier, which further includes information derived from the interrogation of relevant witnesses, among whom may be those proffered by the defense, as well as the accused. Therefore, officials responsible for the preparation of the dossier are typically charged with collecting both incriminating and exculpatory evidence relevant to a given investigation. As the theory goes, the direct and substantial involvement of the judiciary in the investigation phase “permits the court to dispense with many of the witnesses, and the procedural safeguards, required in an Anglo-American forum.”

Although the development of the dossier marks the investigation phase, it also informs the examination phase and subsequent proceedings to varying degrees. In some cases, reliance upon the dossier is so profound that it may virtually obviate the need for trial testimony. However, in other cases its impact is less drastic. Nevertheless, the dossier forms an impor-
tant and characteristic component of traditional Continental systems, substantively influencing all phases of the trial process. During the examination phase, judges actively continue gathering evidence in order to further elaborate the dossier. Although during this phase an accused is afforded “[t]he opportunity to cast doubt on the credibility of witnesses, submit comments on evidence and request further investigations on [his own] behalf,” adversarial cross-examination is functionally unavailable. In practice, the questioning of witnesses typically proceeds substantially unchallenged. Not unlike other witnesses, an accused too may be called upon to give information during the examination phase. While he retains the right against self-incrimination in these circumstances, an accused’s refusal to cooperate may be viewed as damaging to his credibility. Upon the conclusion of the examination phase, the record to be relied upon during the trial phase has generally been fully developed by the investigating judicial or prosecutorial official—at least with that evidence considered by them to be valid and relevant.

[Continental countries . . . the trial usually consists of a discussion of the materials in the dossier in an attempt to determine the issue of guilt and the appropriate punishment.”] (internal citations omitted; see also McKillop & Stretton, supra note 27, § 1.5, at 4 (remarking that “the traditional inquisitorial trial is essentially a process of public confirmation of the results of the investigation.”)).

33. See McKillop & Stretton, supra note 27, §1.2 at 3 (observing that the process of investigation “is the crucial phase as it establishes the dossier which is the basis for the subsequent progression, the backbone of the process.”). This ordinarily occurs upon the transmission of the dossier by the investigative judge to a panel of judges for a probable cause determination. See McClelland, supra note 18, at 15.

34. See McKillop & Stretton, supra note 27, §1.4, at 4 (noting that “the dossier forms the basis for the progression of a criminal case . . . [and] shapes the trial and informs appellate review.”).


37. See Apple & Devling, supra note 19, at 28 (observing that the Continental examination phase provides “no counterpart to common-law cross-examination.”); see also R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, ¶ 60, at 109 (appeal taken from Eng.) (observing that witnesses could be examined during this phase without the presence of the suspect and his lawyer “unless the examining judge chose to arrange a confrontation with the suspect.”).

38. See, e.g., Damaska, supra note 11, at 843–44 (noting that the Continental judge “retains the monopoly of witness’ examination.”).


40. See Casey, supra note 12, at 868.

41. See McClelland, supra note 18, at 18 (noting that while a Continental defendant is placed in the position of having to respond to questions, he may refuse. However, this refusal “may be more damaging to his credibility than a common law defendant’s silent declination to participate.”); see also Nagorcka et al., supra note 26, at 455 (noting that “[t]he right to silence does exist in the French system; however its exercise can give rise to an unfavourable inference against the accused, as he or she is regarded as a necessary source of information in revealing the truth.”).

42. See Casey, supra note 12, at 868.
The trial, which is then carried out on the basis of the dossier, is substantially de-emphasized in Continental criminal proceedings. In contrast to the Adversarial model, which develops facts at the trial phase, the focus of the Continental trial is centered upon the investigation of the facts during the investigation phase. As such, in some cases the trial itself may solely be comprised of arguments advanced by the prosecution and the defense as to their respective interpretations of an essentially pre-established record.43

B. Confrontation

Prior to the twentieth century, the principle of confrontation in Continental Europe was uncommon.44 It had been greatly attenuated during medieval times, during which the procedures of the Inquisition took hold.45 These were dependent upon secret and anonymous evidence in order to preserve social order and uproot dissidence.46 Evidence in criminal cases was thus received “under a ‘veil of secrecy’ and the door was left ‘wide open to mendacity, falsehood, and partiality.’”47 Suspects were not afforded an opportunity to confront such evidence.48 Given these historical underpinnings, it is hardly surprising that the role of the parties in modern Continental trials is relatively reduced and subsidiary to that of the judge.49

Indeed at trial, “[t]he involvement of the public prosecutor and defense attorney is generally limited to asking occasional follow-up questions or suggesting other lines of inquiry” to the presiding judge.50 Concomitantly, cross-examination by counsel is relatively infrequent.51 Likewise, even though the participation of an accused is active,52 his role as far as exercising his rights in his own defense (such as the right to silence) tends to be lesser than that typically observed in Adversarial pro-

43. Id.
44. See Maffei, supra note 1, at 15–16.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Apple & Deylings, supra note 19, at 37 (noting that, as the principle inquisitors, the elevated status of judges in Continental systems “result[s] in a concomitant derogation of the role of lawyers during the trial.”); cf. Frase & Weigend, supra note 20, at 342 (observing that although the parties within the German system “may play a fairly active role,” the court controls the proceedings).
52. See Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 50, at 14 (noting that “[t]he defendant traditionally plays an active role in a civil law trial.”).
ceedings.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed, an accused’s involvement in Continental proceedings, even from the early stage of being a mere suspect, generally entails a continuing “dialogue with investigatory and judicial authorities throughout the pre-trial and trial phases.”\textsuperscript{54}

The principle of the procedure contradictoire—a feature that provides that “all parties in a criminal proceeding must be allowed full opportunity to be informed of and to contest evidence, in order that a fair and just verdict ensues”\textsuperscript{55}—is integral to equality of arms—the notion that the prosecution and defense should have equal access to the court. However, it does not implicitly subsume the right to confrontation within the Continental tradition. Rather, it connotes that “the defence must be informed of all the evidence and arguments that are to be deployed against the defendant, and be given a chance to answer them.”\textsuperscript{56} It is thus fundamentally a question of fair notice. Nonetheless, until as recently as 2000, Austrian criminal procedure, for example, permitted the ex parte filing of Public Prosecutors’ observations (“croquis”) that could later be relied upon in rendering judgments at both the trial and appeal levels without any provision or notice to the defense.\textsuperscript{57}

As such, the principle of a procedure contradictoire is not a true confrontation right, but instead one fully steeped in Continental trial procedures, which are “notable for [their] lack of exclusionary rules”\textsuperscript{58} and broad standards of admissibility. Because the Continental system “erects few evidentiary barriers that restrict the information the judge can consider in determining guilt,”\textsuperscript{59} the practical implementation of an effective right to confront or to examine witnesses at trial has generally been

\textsuperscript{53} See McClelland, supra note 18, at 14; cf. Mark Findlay, Synthesis in Trial Procedures? The Experience of International Criminal Tribunals, 50 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 26, 35 (2001) (noting that “while the presumption of innocence may be accepted, it is expected that the accused will be an initial witness in his/her defence and that his/her testimony will answer the inquisition.”); Damaska, supra note 15, at 529 (noting that the Continental system regards an accused “as an evidentiary source before any other evidence has been examined at the trial.”).

\textsuperscript{54} See McClelland, supra note 18, at 14.

\textsuperscript{55} Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L. J. 809, 838 (2000); see also Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany], § IX, art. 103(1), English translation available at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf (providing that “[i]n the courts every person shall be entitled to a hearing in accordance with law.”).

\textsuperscript{56} James R. Spencer, Introduction to EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 45 (Mirielle Delmas-Marty & John R. Spencer eds., 2002) (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{57} See Brandstetter v. Austria, 211 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 67–69, at 27–28 (1993) (noting that a lower court’s judgment “reproduced almost literally the text of [the croquis]” and stating that “[a]n indirect and purely hypothetical possibility for an accused to comment on prosecution arguments included in the text of a judgment can scarcely be regarded as a proper substitute for the right to examine and reply directly to submissions made by the prosecution.”) (internal quotations omitted).

\textsuperscript{58} McClelland, supra note 18, at 19 (stating further that “[r]elevancy and best evidence standards are the main tests of admissibility at civilian trials.”) (internal citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{59} See Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 50, at 7.
regarded as a somewhat secondary consideration in terms of the fairness of trials. Indeed, although the right to examine exists in The Netherlands, for example, a judge has discretion to deny a request to examine a witness if his absence “cannot reasonably be considered prejudicial.”

Traditional Continental systems are thus well-known to allow convictions on the basis of evidence from witnesses that an accused had not been afforded any prior opportunity to challenge. However, as discussed in Part IV, the influence of the European Convention has significantly affected these issues and spurred progressive changes in many national jurisdictions.

II. The Adversarial Framework
A. The Common Law Perspective

Adversarial systems generally regard the right of confrontation as an indispensable component of the fair administration of trials. Within the Anglo-American tradition, the right to confront exists at common law and is considered integral to the truth-finding function of the courts. An accused is thus afforded a corresponding right to examine adverse witnesses, which “ordinarily includes the accused’s right to have those wit-

60. See A. Beijer & A. M. van Hoorn, Report on Anonymous Witnesses in the Netherlands, in NETHERLANDS REPORT TO THE FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 523, 524 (E. H. Hondius ed., 1998) (noting that “[t]he idea that a personal confrontation between the accused and the witness is an essential requirement to a fair trial traditionally plays a secondary role in the Dutch criminal justice system” and that “out-of-court statements can be used in evidence regardless of whether the witness is available to be called,” including the use of “written statements. . . even if they emanate from a person who could have been called.”).

61. Id. at 524.

62. See R v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, [2008] 1 A.C. 1128, ¶ 24, at 1147 (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting that “much of the impact of article 6(3)(d) [which provides the right to examine under the ECHR] has been on the procedures of continental systems which previously allowed [convictions] on the basis of evidence from witnesses whom he had not had an opportunity to challenge.”) (internal citations omitted).

63. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (“The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses. . . have long been recognized as essential to due process.”); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (describing confrontation as a “fundamental [guarantee] of life and liberty”); see also Sherman, supra note 20, at 856 (noting “[t]hirty-three countries explicitly provide for . . . direct confrontation in their constitutions.”) (internal citations omitted).

64. See R v. Hilton, [1971] 1 Q.B. 421, 423 (C.A.) (observing that British common law provides that a defendant may cross-examine any witness, including a co-defendant).

65. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (noting that the purpose of confrontation is “to augment accuracy in the factfinding process.”).

66. See Jones v. National Coal Board, [1957] 2 Q.B. 55, 65 (C.A.) (stating that “[i]t is only by cross-examination that a witness’s evidence can be properly tested . . . .”; Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987) (noting that cross-examination is “a functional right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (noting that “[t]he central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence . . . by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding.”).
nesses brought ‘face-to-face,’ in the time-honored phrase.”

Normatively, the “right to confront assumes the right to cross-examine . . . by the respective parties.” Its substantive import therefore, is to require the appearance of an accuser at trial and in the presence of the accused. This type of confrontation similarly provides the court with an opportunity to evaluate the credibility of testimonial evidence. In this respect, the notion of Adversarial confrontation means more than that an accused person know what witnesses are saying or have said about him [and] even more than that the accused be able to hear them saying it . . . There must be a confrontation: he must see them as they depose against him so that he can observe their demeanour. And they for their part must give their evidence in the face of a present accused . . . . [Not doing so] amounts to a per se failure of justice . . . .

At common law, the admissibility of statements against an accused in lieu of viva voce evidence was, and still is, principally dealt with within the framework of evidentiary rules. The common law has long-recognized limitations on the right to confrontation, typically grounded in exceptions to the rules against hearsay evidence. Ordinarily these rules impose certain predicate conditions on admissibility, including the (un)availability of the declarant or the demonstration of some indicia of reliability in balancing competing interests against the rights of the accused.


68. Sherman, supra note 20, at 857 (emphasis added). ICCPR art. 14(3)(e), however, implicitly permits the contravention of a defendant’s individual right to examine by providing the arguably lesser alternative that he “have [witnesses] examined” by someone other than his counsel, such as a judge or investigative magistrate. Some commentators subscribe to this thesis, particularly with respect to cases involving vulnerable witnesses or warranting witness anonymity. See, e.g., Sylvia Pieslak, Comment, The International Criminal Court’s Quest to Protect Rape Victims of Armed Conflict: Anonymity as the Solution, 2 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 138, 175 (2004) (arguing that the prejudice to the defense as a result of permitting accusatory witness to testify in full anonymity can be overcome by “employ[ing] the Judges of the Trial Chambers . . . as a substitute for the defense counsel by cross-examining the victim with the questions formulated by the defense counsel[sic] and then relay[ing] the answers back.”) (internal citations omitted).


71. S. v. Motlatla 1975 (1) SA 814 (Transvaal Provincial Div.) at 815 (S. Afr.).


B. The Constitutional Confrontation Model of the United States

In the U.S., the right of confrontation is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall “enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him”—the so-called Confrontation Clause.\(^\text{74}\) In the U.S., confrontation is considered central to society’s “core notion of procedural fairness,”\(^\text{75}\) and takes aim at Continental procedure and “particularly its use of \textit{ex parte} examinations as evidence against the accused.”\(^\text{76}\)

Considering the importance of the Confrontation Clause and the analysis to be applied in determining constitutional limits of the right, the 1980 case of \textit{Ohio v. Roberts}\(^\text{77}\) effectively struck a balance that was recognized in U.S. courts for some twenty-four years. In \textit{Roberts}, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by a witness who failed to testify at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause “if it [bore] adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”\(^\text{78}\) \textit{Roberts} held that the requisite degree of reliability sufficient for the admissibility of evidence (without confrontation) was met where a given statement “[f]ell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or “a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” had otherwise been made.\(^\text{79}\) \textit{Roberts} thus reduced the constitutional standard of admissibility of evidence not subjected to cross-examination to that contemplated by ordinary rules of evidence.\(^\text{80}\)

The fundamental nature of the right to confrontation has, as a procedural norm, remained consistent in U.S. jurisprudence. However, the limitations it imposes on the admissibility of evidence not subjected to cross-examination has decidedly not, either procedurally or substantively. Sharply abrogating \textit{Roberts}’ doctrinal precedent, the 2004 Supreme Court case of \textit{Crawford v. Washington} ushered in an entirely new analytical model, drawing for the first time a key distinction with respect to the constitutional admissibility of the statements of unavailable witnesses based upon their ‘testimonial’ quality.\(^\text{81}\)

\textit{Crawford} eschewed the nebulous analytical framework of \textit{Roberts},\(^\text{82}\)

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Roberts}: Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
  \item U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
  \item See id. at 66.
  \item See id. at 62 (criticizing \textit{Roberts}’ reliability-based framework and noting that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”); see also Won Shin, \textit{Crawford v. Washington: Confrontation Clause Forbids Admission of Testimonial Out-of-Court Statements Without Prior Opportunity To Cross-Examine}, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 225 (2005).
\end{itemize}
centering instead on the nature of the out-of-court statement, which ultimately determined whether it could be fairly admitted in the absence of confrontation. Establishing a bright-line rule, Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause bars the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”

Crawford determined that ‘testimonial’ statements were those that either paradigmatically or at their core comprise, inter alia, the following: prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; statements that are the result of structured police questioning; an allocution, guilty plea, or other formal statement admitting guilt; letters to the police or government accusing another of wrongdoing, or statements made under circumstances demonstrating “the declarant’s awareness or expectation that [they] may later be used at a trial.” The Court reasoned that for these types of hearsay statements that “bear testimony” in a way specifically contemplated by the original framers of the constitution, “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”

In 2006, the Supreme Court revisited these issues in Davis v. Washington and its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana. In Davis, the accused was convicted primarily based on an emergency call placed by a victim, who later did not testify at trial. The content of the call was admitted for the purpose of connecting the accused to the commission of the crime, and was principally relied upon to establish his identity as the perpetrator. On appeal, the accused argued that the conviction had been obtained in violation of his confrontation rights because he had not been afforded any opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at trial. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a statement made to government officials concerning a continuing emergency that is not intended to be preserved as evidence at trial, is non-testimonial. Conversely, a post-emergency statement that narrates past events relevant to later criminal prosecution is

83. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54 (emphasis added). The 6th Amendment, like the common law, demands the presence of both conditions as a predicate to admissibility of testimonial hearsay evidence. Id. at 68.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 53 n.4.
86. Id. at 65.
87. United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting Crawford’s suggestion that a declarant’s awareness or expectation that their statement may be used at trial is “the determinative factor” of whether a statement bears testimony).
88. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
89. Id. at 69.
91. Id. at 819.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 822.
testimonial and therefore inadmissible.\textsuperscript{95} In these circumstances, the Court concluded that the victim was not acting as a witness when she made the emergency call, nor was her call ‘testimony’ within the contemplation of the Sixth Amendment.\textsuperscript{96}

In drawing this distinction, \textit{Davis} makes clear that the right of confrontation does not apply to non-testimonial statements at all,\textsuperscript{97} leading one commentator to observe that while “the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay [becomes] clearer . . . the right to confront declarants of nontestimonial hearsay has perished entirely.”\textsuperscript{98} Ultimately, this renders the question of the constitutional admissibility of evidence not subjected to cross-examination one that is principally fact-based, unfortunately providing the courts with “the flexibility to reach varying outcomes based on notions of expediency rather than doctrinal consistency.”\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Davis} thus underscores the unpredictability of constitutional confrontation analysis for which \textit{Roberts} was roundly criticized—showing that that uncertainty of outcomes remains, if only having transposed the issues from one concerning the inherent problems in defining ‘reliability’ to one recast as a question of what it means to be ‘testimonial’.\textsuperscript{100}

In \textit{Hammon}, the Court considered the nature of statements made to an investigating officer at the scene of a crime. Unlike \textit{Davis}, which involved an emergency call, in \textit{Hammon} the police went to the accused’s home in response to a domestic disturbance in which the accused’s wife reported that she had been beaten by her husband.\textsuperscript{101} Mrs. Hammon also filled out and signed a battery affidavit describing the assault.\textsuperscript{102} However, although subpoenaed, Mrs. Hammon did not to testify at trial.\textsuperscript{103} Instead, the police officer who took her pre-trial statements was nevertheless permitted to testify about what she told him at the scene pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay.\textsuperscript{104} The written affidavit was also introduced at trial as a present sense impression.\textsuperscript{105}

The Court found Mrs. Hammon’s oral statement to be testimonial under \textit{Crawford}. The facts revealed that it had been made under sufficiently formal circumstances,\textsuperscript{106} and concerned neither an emergency in
progress, nor an immediate physical threat to her person. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the only purpose for which Mrs. Hammon was questioned by the police was as part of an investigation into past criminal conduct in order to investigate an alleged crime. Hammon’s confrontation rights therefore defeated the introduction of his wife’s statement against him because he was never afforded a prior opportunity for cross-examination.

Crawford’s bright-line analysis was developed, in part, to avoid uncertainty in the limitations imposed on the admissibility of out-of-court testimonial statements introduced against an accused—to effectively insulate constitutional analysis from “the vagaries of the rules of evidence, [and] amorphous notions of reliability.” However, while Crawford was intended to preserve those constitutional rights drafted by the framers in absolute terms, “through strict enforcement of categorical guarantees,”

Davis and Hammon—along with Crawford’s progeny in the lower courts—show that this is far more easily achieved in theory than it will ever be in practice.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts presents a recent application of the Crawford analysis. In Melendez-Diaz the accused was arrested for a street sale of cocaine. At his trial, bags allegedly possessed and sold by the accused were admitted into evidence, together with three ‘certificates of analysis’ prepared by a laboratory technician attesting to the fact that the substance identified was cocaine. Massachusetts law permitted the admission of such drug analysis certificates without requiring the cross-examination of the technician who actually conducted the scientific test. Melendez-Diaz, was convicted of distributing and trafficking cocaine, which he appealed without success to the Massachusetts Court of Appeal. On appeal, he argued, inter alia, that the admission of the drug analysis certificates violated his confrontation rights. However, the
Massachusetts Court of Appeal determined that their introduction did not violate the Confrontation Clause, relying on Massachusetts precedent holding that such certificates were non-testimonial business records.\textsuperscript{118}

The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, finding the certificates to be testimonial\textsuperscript{119} and their admission in the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination a clear violation of the Confrontation Clause.\textsuperscript{120} Even this relatively straightforward application of \textit{Crawford} however, drew strong criticism in a dissenting opinion, which described the Court’s analysis as heralding “a body of formalistic and wooden rules, divorced from precedent, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the [Confrontation] Clause.”\textsuperscript{121}

Although \textit{Melendez-Diaz} was considered a welcomed application of \textit{Crawford}'s confrontation analysis by the Supreme Court,\textsuperscript{122} it also underscored the fact that \textit{Crawford}'s promise of finally clarifying the scope of the constitutional admissibility of evidence not subjected to cross-examination has fallen well shy of achieving the predictable analytical framework toward which it was expressly aimed. Instead, it has become mired in semantic complexities and fact-intensive \textit{ad hoc} determinations\textsuperscript{123} that have vexed prosecutors, defendants, and courts alike, and continue to do so.\textsuperscript{124} Nevertheless, much of this uncertainty has far less to do with the viability of a bright-line standard of admissibility as such than it has to do with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705–06 (2005)).
\item \textsuperscript{119} Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (noting the certificates were “quite plainly affidavits” and “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct examination.”) (internal citations omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{120} Id. at 2531 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).
\item \textsuperscript{121} Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{122} See Steven N. Yermish, \textit{Melendez-Diaz and the Application of Crawford in the Lab}, The \textsc{Champion}, Aug. 2009, at 28 (observing that \textit{Melendez-Diaz}, in a straightforward application of \textit{Crawford}, “further clarified the elusive definitional parameters of ‘testimonial statement.’”).
\item \textsuperscript{123} See Geetanjli Malhotra, \textit{Resolving The Ambiguity Behind The Bright-Line Rule: The Effect of Crawford v. Washington on the Admissibility of 911 Calls in Evidence-Based Domestic Violence Prosecutions}, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 205, 218 (noting three positions taken by courts and scholars: first, a narrow construction of ‘testimonial’ such that, admitting statements made in the course of emergency calls does not violate the Confrontation Clause; second, a broad construction of ‘testimonial’, such that emergency calls reporting crimes are per se testimonial; and third, advocating that a determination of the testimonial nature of such calls be made on an \textit{ad hoc} basis); see also Neil R. Javulewicz, \textit{Constitutional Law—Allowing Excited Utterances to Affect Characterizing Accusatory Statements as Testimonial Statements Contradicts Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence—United States v. Brito}, 427 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005), 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 559, 562–63 (2007) (noting that courts have applied varying tests of ‘testimonial’: first, a test “characterizing only formalized statements to government authorities as testimonial,” and second, “a reasonableness test, characterizing all statements a reasonable speaker would foresee that the government would use in a future investigation or prosecution as testimonial.”). Furthermore, other courts handle the effect of hearsay exceptions concerning such statements disparately.
\end{itemize}
with Crawford having simply failed to establish a sufficiently precise framework to do so effectively. 125

C. Confrontation in England

1. Hearsay Developments

While both U.S. courts and the European Court have increasingly tended towards narrowing the scope and substantive admissibility of hearsay not subjected to cross-examination, English courts seem to have gone the other way. 126 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 ("CJA 2003") 127 expands the ability of English courts to receive precisely such evidence, 128 albeit on a regulated basis. 129 Although the right of confrontation is not absolute, 130 and may be curtailed in very limited circumstances—for example, where it is forfeited 131—CJA 2003 § 114 is something quite apart, providing that an out-of-court statement "is admissible as evidence of any matter stated" under three specific conditions and a surprisingly broad catchall. 132

The first three conditions permitting the admission of evidence not subjected to cross-examination under section 114 comprise other statutory provisions of the CJA 2003, the common law, and the agreement of the

125. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (refusing to precisely define testimonial statements); see id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (remarking that the majority opinion leaves a "mantle of uncertainty.").
126. Lorraine Wolhuter, et al., Victimology, Victimisation and Victims' Rights, 134 (Routledge Cavendish 2008) (observing the recent tendency of English courts to "give weight to victims' interests/rights in the proportionality element of the defendant's right to a fair trial in article 6 ECHR").
127. See Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (Eng.) [hereinafter CJA 2003].
129. R. v. T (D), [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1213, [2009] 173 J.P. 425 (U.K.), ¶ 34 (noting that "evidence was wrongly admitted [where there] was no evidence to establish that such steps as were reasonably practicable to find [the declarants] had been taken."). The court also observed that "the right to confrontation is a longstanding requirement of the common law and recognized in Article 6(3)(d). It is only to be departed from in the limited circumstances and under the conditions set out in the CJA 2003. The witness must be given all possible support, but also made to understand the importance of the citizen's duty." Id. ¶ 25 (internal citation omitted).
131. See R. v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, [2008] 1 A.C. 1128, ¶ 68, at 1161 (noting that the judicial maxim that justice "will not permit a party to take advantage of his own wrong" applies to the right of confrontation) (internal citations omitted); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1878); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (noting that "forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.").
132. CJA 2003, supra note 127, § 114(1).
parties. The fourth and most troubling, prescribes a residual “interests of justice” ground for admissibility. These provisions fundamentally impact the common law rules, greatly expanding the potential for the erosion of traditional tenets of adversarial confrontation, which have been long-recognized in England. In fairness, the CJA 2003 also provides compensatory measures designed to counter-balance the prejudicial effect of these newly expanded grounds of hearsay admissibility on the rights of an accused. These are set out in §§ 124, 125 and 126 of the Act.

§ 124 of the CJA 2003 allows the admission of evidence to discredit a non-testifying declarant to the same extent as if the witness had testified at trial. Similarly, § 125 authorizes the court to direct an acquittal or to discharge a jury where a given case is based upon hearsay that would render a conviction unsafe. As such, it is calculated to ensure the reliability of such evidence. Additionally, § 126 affords the court the discretion to exclude hearsay where, on balance, its exclusion substantially outweighs the factors supporting its admission. § 126 further preserves the courts’ discretion to exclude unfair prosecution hearsay evidence under § 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

Despite a carefully undertaken legislative process prior to its enactment, as applied, the CJA 2003 may be at odds with the current jurisprudence of the European Court concerning the right to examine.

133. Id. § 114(1)(a)-(c) (providing for the admission of hearsay evidence “if, but only if— (a) any [statute] makes it admissible, (b) any [common law rule] makes it admissible, (c) all parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible.”).

134. Id. § 114(1)(d) (providing for the admissibility of hearsay evidence where “the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible.”).


136. See R. v. Taylor, [2006] All ER (D) 32, 32 (Jul) (noting that CJA 2003 § 124 permits a judge to strike a fair balance between the interests of the parties in cases where a key witness is not available to testify and submit to cross-examination as to his credibility). This principle is embraced by other national acts regulating the admissibility of anonymous statements. See, e.g., Evidence Act 1843, § 31J(1)(b)-(c) (Jam.) (relevant portions amended 1995), available at http://www.moj.gov.jm/laws/statutes/The%20Evidence%20Act.pdf.

137. CJA 2003, supra note 127, § 125(1) (providing that “if . . . the court is satisfied . . . after the close of [the prosecution’s case] that— (a) the case against the defendant is based wholly or partly on a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings, and (b) the evidence provided by the statement is so unconvincing that, considering its importance to the case against the defendant, his conviction of the offence would be unsafe, the court must either direct the jury to acquit the defendant of the offence or [dismiss the jury and order a retrial.]”) (emphasis added).

138. Id. § 126.

139. See id. § 126(2)(a). The latter act provides that a court may exclude prosecution evidence “if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse affect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.” Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 c. 60 § 78 (Eng.).

140. See infra Part IV.E; see also Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26766/05, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶¶ 41-43, at 17 (2009) (finding the reading of depositions into the trial record under the CJA 2003, when there has been no opportunity for cross-examination, violates Article 6(3)(d) in the absence of sufficient counter-balancing measures).
However, recently, in *R. v. Horncastle*\(^\text{141}\) it was held that application of the CJA 2003 did not violate the ECHR in the circumstances of that case.

*Horncastle* involved joint appeals concerning the admission of statements of absent witnesses pursuant to the CJA 2003.\(^\text{142}\) In one instance, a statement was provided to the police by a declarant who subsequently died before trial. In the second, a statement was provided to the police by a declarant who later refused to testify out of fear for her life.

In dismissing the appeals, the Court held that insofar as the provisions of the CJA 2003 were concerned, Article 6(3)(d) of the ECHR is satisfied, even where a conviction rests solely or to a decisive degree on hearsay evidence.\(^\text{143}\) The decision, which examined the CJA 2003 in view of the recently decided European Court case of *Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom*,\(^\text{144}\) effectively defended the legislative propriety of restricting confrontation rights in certain circumstances.

The Court in *Horncastle* found no justification in the jurisprudence of the European Court for limiting the scope of hearsay otherwise admissible under the CJA 2003.\(^\text{145}\) Analyzing the European Court’s jurisprudence, it concluded that “[w]here the hearsay evidence is demonstrably reliable, or its reliability can properly be tested and assessed, the rights of the defence are respected, there are in the language of the [European Court] sufficient counterbalancing measures, and the trial is fair.”\(^\text{146}\) The Court assessed Article 6 as requiring that a trial be fair but also noted that despite its content, “[Article] 6(3)(d) does not create any absolute right in an accused to have every witness against him present to be examined.”\(^\text{147}\) The Court thus found that the statements admitted pursuant to CJA 2003, as applied, were consistent with the rights provided for under the Convention.\(^\text{148}\)

Accordingly, the U.K. Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeals from the judgment of the Court of Appeals on December 9, 2009.\(^\text{149}\) In particular, the Court noted that the provisions of the CJA 2003 “strike the right balance between the imperative that a trial must be fair and the interests of victims . . . and society . . . that a criminal should not

---


\(^{142}\) Id. ¶ 2, at 15.

\(^{143}\) Id. ¶ 79, at 42; but see *Al-Khawaja*, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶¶ 41–43, at 17 (finding a breach of ECHR, art. 6(3)(d) in respect of statements admitted pursuant to CJA 2003).


\(^{146}\) Id.

\(^{147}\) Id. ¶ 80, at 42.

\(^{148}\) Id. ¶ 81, at 42.

\(^{149}\) See generally *R. v. Horncastle*, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, ¶ 14, at 97 (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting, *inter alia*, that “[t]he regime enacted by Parliament [i.e., CJA 2003] contains safeguards that render the sole or decisive rule unnecessary . . . [the European Court’s] jurisprudence lacks clarity . . . [and] was introduced into the Strasbourg jurisprudence without discussion of the principle underlying it or full consideration of whether there was justification for imposing the rule as an overriding principle applicable equally to the continental and common law jurisdictions . . . Al-Khawaja does not establish that it is necessary to apply the sole or decisive rule in this jurisdiction.”).
be immune from conviction where a witness . . . dies or cannot be called to give evidence for some other reason.”

2. Witness Anonymity

The use of anonymous evidence at trial was squarely addressed by the House of Lords in R. v. Davis, a 2008 decision. The Court in Davis acknowledged long-standing exceptions to the right of confrontation and, importantly, reaffirmed the well-recognized historical underpinnings of confrontation at common law, which, in England, traditionally held that a conviction based upon the testimony of an anonymous witness is fundamentally unfair.

In Davis, the accused’s conviction for a double murder was overturned on appeal. The trial evidence consisted of seven witnesses who expressed concerns for their physical safety. They were each allowed to testify with protective measures that concealed information that might have revealed their identities from the accused and his attorneys. These measures included the use of pseudonyms; withholding from both counsel and the accused certain identifying particulars or pedigree information, including the witnesses’ names and addresses; restricting the scope of cross-examination such that questions on any matter which might bear on the witnesses’ identification were not permitted; the concealment of the witnesses’ physical appearance through the use of screens; and the use of mechanical voice distortion devices.

Of the seven witnesses against the accused, three identified him as the shooter. The accused contended that compelling grounds existed to question the veracity of the identifying witnesses and that their credibility was in fact central to the case. He further argued that the restrictions imposed by the trial court completely deprived him of the ability to challenge their evidence and, consequently, his right to a fair trial. In agreeing with this position, Lord Justice Mance observed that “[i]n many cases, particularly cases where credibility is in issue, identification will be essential to effective cross-examination.”

Although the Davis Court noted that the jurisprudence of the European Court did not recognize an absolute rule prohibiting anonymous wit-

150. Id. ¶ 108, at 124.
152. See id. ¶ 5, at 1137–38 (recognizing several authorities supporting the notion of the right to confrontation as of at least the 18th century).
153. See id. ¶ 25, at 1147.
154. Id. ¶ 35, at 1150.
155. Id. ¶ 3 at 1137.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. ¶ 4, at 1137.
159. Id. ¶ 32 at 1148–49 (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting the accused’s assertion that the protective measures gravely impeded him from pursuing the suggestion that certain evidence had been procured by a former girlfriend).
160. Id. ¶ 72, at 1162 (emphasis added).
nesses, it also observed that fair trial rights—specifically the right to examine—may be violated if there are no counterbalancing procedures, or if a conviction is based wholly or to a decisive extent on anonymous evidence. Similarly, the court found that in circumstances where the appellant could not have been convicted but for the anonymously received evidence, the trial is rendered unfair and, therefore, unlawful. The court declined to expand the authority of English courts to allow the use of anonymous evidence in criminal trials beyond the extremely limited circumstances provided for at common law, particularly in the absence of a regulatory regime. The Court thus deferred to Parliament to act to “devise an appropriate system which still ensures a fair trial.”

This invitation was met with almost instantaneous legislative reform “to put on a statutory footing a power for the courts to grant witnesses anonymity orders in criminal proceedings where this is consistent with the right of a defendant to a fair trial.” The resultant Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act of 2008—modeled on the New Zealand Evidence Act of 2006—now authorizes English courts to issue witness anonymity orders under relatively narrowly defined conditions, abolishing the common law limitations on the power of courts to do so. Of course, to the extent that Davis did not altogether rule out the admissibility of anonymous testimony in English courts, the Witness Anonymity Act can be viewed as a mere codification of the case.

162. Id. ¶¶ 77–80, at 1164–66 (discussing Doorson v. The Netherlands, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 446, ¶ 70, at 470 (providing that the accused’s interests are also to be balanced “against those of witnesses or victims called to testify.”)); see also Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 691, ¶ 53, at 711 (quoting Doorson) (requiring the application of counter-balancing procedures).
164. Id. ¶ 98, at 1172–73 (stating that “any further relaxation of the basic common law rule, requiring witnesses on issues in dispute to be identified and cross-examined with knowledge of their identity and permitting the defence to know and put to witnesses otherwise admissible and relevant questions about their identity, is one for Parliament to endorse and delimit and not for the courts to create.”).
165. Id. ¶ 45, at 1153.
Nevertheless, the Act aspires to provide courts with a structured analytical and practical framework in which to determine the propriety and administration of anonymity orders. As mentioned above, § 1 of the Witness Anonymity Act supplants the common law limitations in respect of ordering witness anonymity. § 2 authorizes the court to employ appropriate and “specified measures” against the disclosure of witnesses’ identities such as, withholding names and other details; the use of pseudonyms; interdicting the scope of examination so as to prohibit questions that might lead to the identification of a witness; using screens to obscure witness’ physical identification; and the use of voice modulation. § 3 addresses the implementation of the procedures to be followed upon application of either the prosecution or defense for an anonymity order. Further, § 4 establishes three predicate conditions for the issuance of these orders. Finally, § 5 requires that the court take account of several non-exhaustive “relevant considerations,” principally concerning the administration of a fair trial, as follows:

a) the general right of a defendant in criminal proceedings to know the identity of a witness in the proceedings;

b) the extent to which the credibility of the witness concerned would be a relevant factor when the weight of his or her evidence comes to be assessed;

c) whether evidence given by the witness might be the sole or decisive evidence implicating the defendant;

d) whether the witness’s evidence could be properly tested (whether on grounds of credibility or otherwise) without his or her identity being disclosed;

e) whether there is any reason to believe that the witness—
   i. has a tendency to be dishonest, or
   ii. has any motive to be dishonest in the circumstances of the case, having regard (in particular) to any previous convictions of the witness and to any relationship between the witness and the defendant or any associates of the defendant;

f) whether it would be reasonably practicable to protect the witness’s identity by any means other than by making a witness anonymity order specifying the measures that are under consideration by the court.

Similarly to the CJA 2003, these factors do not necessarily curtail the courts’ authority to issue anonymity orders even if the resulting conviction would rest on anonymous evidence to a ‘decisive’ extent. Thus, it is

170. See Witness Anonymity Act, supra note 167, § 1(2).
171. Id. § 2(2)(a)–(c).
172. See id. § 3(1).
173. See id. § 4(1)–(5) (providing that (a) the measures specified in a witness anonymity order be necessary to protect the safety of the witness or another person or to prevent serious damage to property, or harm to the public interest; (b) that the court take into account the impact of such an order upon the fairness of the trial proceedings; and (c) that the court must find the order necessary to secure the testimony of the witness, which it must also find to be necessary to the proceedings).
174. Id. § 5(1)–(2).
175. See, e.g., R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, ¶ 56, at 680 (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting that there is no mandatory rule against the use of
quite likely that a conflict with the EHCR will arise at some point concerning its application.

D. Diversity in the Common Law Approach to Confrontation

English law does not share the U.S. view that confrontation is a virtually categorical imperative and thus admits of no equivalent protection of the right. The CJA 2003, Witness Anonymity Act, and most recently the Horncastle case underscore this divide in the Anglo-American tradition. Indeed, the principally deontological approach taken in the United States—one in which confrontation is intrinsically valued, even where a fair trial is otherwise obtainable—is arguably sui generis. Conversely, to the extent the current English statutory framework more directly defines the right of confrontation and cross-examination relative to other competing factors affecting the overarching fairness of trial proceedings (including those that do not necessarily involve the conduct of the accused) it is consonant with a broad-based teleological perspective, which has been adopted to varying degrees by other Adversarial jurisdictions and the European Court.

As mentioned above, New Zealand’s 2006 Evidence Act informs current English legislation concerning witness anonymity. Thus, although New Zealand considers the right to confrontation “basic to any civilized notion of a fair trial,” that right has also been regularly limited in view of competing social interests and is not generally perceived of as unqualified, as it is in the U.S.

Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which does not expressly provide for the right of confrontation, similarly qualifies it. Although § 7 of the Charter implicitly guarantees confrontation as part of anonymous evidence to form the basis of a conviction, whether solely or to a decisive extent); see also J.R. Spencer, Hearsay Reform: The Train Hits the Buffers at Strasbourg, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 258, 259 (2009) (observing that “the 2003 reform works on the premise that if a piece of hearsay evidence is admissible it has the same potential weight as a piece of oral evidence, and it is open to the court to convict on it, even if it stands alone.”).


177. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.


the overall fairness of trial proceedings, “the right to confront unavailable witnesses at trial is neither an established nor a basic principle of fundamental justice.” In this respect, Canadian jurisprudence recognizes the right to confrontation as one qualified “in the interests of justice.” Thus, while Adversarial systems may hold certain positions fundamentally diverse from those espoused in the Continental tradition, the substantive application of the right of confrontation is not necessarily one of them.

Both the UNHRC and European Court take a similarly broad teleological approach to confrontation—that is, the relative right of the defense to participate in the examination of witnesses is balanced against the rights of witnesses and alleged victims, including their privacy rights. However, this approach has drawn pointed criticism from some commentators who argue that it has “little predictive value.” Nevertheless, the notional requirement of ‘corroboration,’ which is manifested in the prohibition of courts from giving “considerable weight” to or basing a decision to convict to a “decisive extent” on the out-of-court statements of unavailable witnesses—especially in the absence of an adequate opportunity for cross-examination—represents a critical step toward an international recogni-


182. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 542 (noting that the right asserted by the appellant to confront an unavailable witness before the trier of fact at trial cannot be said to be a traditional or basic tenet of our justice system.) (emphasis added); see also R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, 459–60 (confirming that, “contemporaneous cross-examination [is] not protected by the Charter.”).

183. See R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475, 491 (internal citations omitted); cf. R. v. Tran, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951, 1003 (stating that “[i]t is axiomatic that an accused has the right to confront all witnesses and to be meaningfully present while evidence is being adduced, be it for or against the accused.”) (emphasis added).

184. See generally R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, ¶ 41, at 104 (appeal taken from Eng.) (recognizing the teleological approach to confrontation taken by a number of Common Law States to confrontation and noting that “under the common law and statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule recognized in [Canada, Australia and New Zealand] there is no rigid rule excluding evidence if it is or would be either the ‘sole’ or ‘decisive’ evidence, however those words may be understood or applied. Instead, the common law and legislature in these countries have, on a principled basis, carefully developed and defined conditions under which hearsay evidence may be admitted, in the interests of justice and on a basis ensuring that defendants receive a fair trial.”) (emphasis added).

185. See generally Grant v. The Queen, [2006] UKPC 2, [2007] 1 A.C. 1, ¶ 17, at 13 (internal citations omitted) (observing that the European Court “has recognized the need for a fair balance between the general interest of the community and the personal rights of the individual, and has described the search for that balance as inherent in the whole Convention . . . [and that] the rights of the individual must be safeguarded, but the interests of the community and the victims of crime must also be respected.”).


tion of the intrinsic and independent value of the right to examine. As discussed below, however, international recognition of the right in substantive terms does not yet go far enough.

III. Confrontation under the ICCPR

A. Background

With near universal acceptance,189 the ICCPR—one of the archetypal international instruments articulating fair trial standards—continues to influence the development of modern international criminal law and procedure as it has done for more than 30 years since its entry into force.190 Together with its two Optional Protocols, the ICCPR firmly establishes not only minimum procedural guarantees to which an accused is entitled as a matter of international human rights law, but also the binding, individually enforceable nature of those guarantees relative to member States.191

The ICCPR emerged as a product of the failure of United Nations member states to reach a consensus on making the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) binding.192 The original text of the UDHR incorporated both first generation civil and political rights (supported predominantly by western and westernized states) as well as second-generation economic and social rights (favored by communist-bloc nations).193 The complexities involved in reaching agreement on implementation and enforceability led to the creation of two covenants194—the ICCPR on one


192. See Thomas G. Weiss, What's Wrong with the United Nations (And How to Fix It) 63, (Polity Press 2008); see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810, (Dec. 12, 1948). As a declaration, the UDHR is not legally binding. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context 151 (2d ed. 2000). However, because many of the rights in the UDHR have become so widely observed as binding law, they have become recognized part of customary international law.


194. See Christian Tomuschat, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law 2008), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/iccpr/iccpr_e.pdf (noting that by resolution 543 (VI) of 4 February 1952, the General Assembly directed the Commission on Human Rights to prepare, instead of just one Covenant, two draft treaties; a Covenant setting forth civil and political rights and a parallel Covenant providing for economic, social and cultural rights.”). For an excellent discussion of the reasons underpinning resolution 543 (VI), the so-called “separation” resolution see Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeabil-
hand, and on the other the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).\textsuperscript{195} While the ICESCR attends, \textit{inter alia}, to working conditions, adequate living standards (including shelter and food), health, and education,\textsuperscript{196} the ICCPR “guarantees a broad spectrum of civil and political rights,”\textsuperscript{197} including the right to self-determination, the right to life, freedom of religion and speech, and equal protection under the law.\textsuperscript{198}

B. Fair Trial Provisions

The ICCPR also broadly defines a number of customary and treaty-based rights, setting out core principles universally attendant to the fair administration of criminal proceedings.\textsuperscript{199} Article 14 requires that in every phase of the trial process the parties should be considered procedurally equal and thus be placed in an equal position to advance their respective cases.\textsuperscript{200} The Covenant therefore recognizes the principle of ‘equality of arms’ as an essential tenet in the administration of fair trials.\textsuperscript{201} In criminal cases, this denotes a state of procedural parity between the prosecution and the defense,\textsuperscript{202} often loosely analogized to the common law notion of due process.\textsuperscript{203}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{196} ICESCR, \textit{supra} note 195, arts. 7, 11–13.
\bibitem{197} Senate ICCPR Report, \textit{supra} note 190.
\bibitem{198} ICCPR, \textit{supra} note 3, arts. 1, 6, 18, and 26.
\bibitem{200} \textit{See} Ofner and Hopfinger v. Austria, 1963 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 680, 696 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.); \textit{see also} Bulut v. Austria, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 346, ¶ 47, at 359 (explaining equality of arms as “one of the features of the wider concept of a fair trial” under which “each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-`a-vis his opponent.”).
\bibitem{203} Bassiouni, \textit{supra} note 4, at 278.
\end{thebibliography}
This widely accepted principle informs Article 14’s fair trial provisions, which include the right to equality before the courts as well as the right to a fair and public hearing, the presumption of innocence, the right to be informed of charges, the right to have adequate time to prepare a defense and to communicate with counsel, the right to be tried without undue delay, the right to counsel, and free legal assistance if necessary, the right to the assistance of an interpreter, the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt, and of course, the right to examine the witnesses.

As international human rights instruments have increasingly tended towards a preference for adversarial criminal procedures, the right to equality of arms within the framework of the common law due process model has gained correlative favor and importance, in particular within Continental systems. The result is an increasing convergence of the pro-

---

204. Id. at 277 (noting “the right to equality of arms is guaranteed in . . . the ICCPR, the ACHR, and the Fundamental Freedoms.”). It is also substantively protected in the ACHR and the ACHPR Resolution; see Avocats Sans Frontieres (on behalf of Bwampamye) v. Burundi, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No. 231/99 (2000), ¶¶ 26-27, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/231-99.html.

205. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 277.


207. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 14(1).

208. Id. art. 14(2), 14(3), 14(b)-(d), 14(f)-(g).

209. Id. art. 14(3)(e).

210. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 277; see also Jarinde Temminck Tuinstra, Assisting an Accused to Represent Himself: Appointment of Amici Curiae as the Most Appropriate Option, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 47, 49 (2006) (observing that “[i]nternational criminal procedure can be perceived as a mixture of common law and civil law concepts, in which common law elements prevail.”).

211. For example, in 1989 and 2001 Italy underwent a near total reform of its criminal procedure, and substantially adopted several adversarial features. See Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 50, at 3-6 (observing that Italy’s decision to adopt an adversarial trial system reflects in part “a way to ‘open up’ its criminal justice system, both to reflect its status as a modern democratic society and to make a dramatic break with past reliance on closed pretrial hearings.”); see also Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 32, at 431 (noting that the 2001 reformation of the Italian code of criminal procedure extends greater adversarial rights to defendants, pursuant to a 1999 Parliamentary reform of the Italian Constitution, “to mandate an adversarial trial system by strengthening the rights of defendants, especially the rights that guarantee defendants the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against them,” which itself followed several judicial decisions undercutting basic principles ushered in with the 1989 transformation). Although not nearly as radical a reform of continental procedure as the Italian initiative, French criminal procedure underwent similar changes in 2000, strengthening the defense right to request a juge d’instruction to examine witnesses and to seek additional evidence. These reforms allowed a right of appeal where the refusal of the judge to carry out such requests was unjustified. See generally Stewart Field & Andrew West, Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition: French Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial Criminal Process, 14 CRM. L. F. 261 (2003). German criminal procedure provides for the right of the defense to “make oral requests of proof which generally oblige the court to hear additional evidence as suggested by the party. The court can refuse a request of proof only for one of several fairly limited reasons.” See Frase & Weigend, supra note 20, at 342 (internal citations omitted).
cederal and substantive conceptions of a fair trial across the two systems.

C. The Right to Examine Adverse Witnesses

The UNHRC is responsible for monitoring and interpreting the ICCPR.\textsuperscript{212} It is authorized to consider allegations from individuals in member States with regard to violations of their civil and political rights under the first of its two Optional Protocols.\textsuperscript{213} Although it has not definitively interpreted the right to examine witnesses as being inclusive of the right to direct confrontation,\textsuperscript{214} the UNHRC has observed that Article 14(3)(e) was “designed to guarantee the accused the same legal powers of . . . examining or cross-examining any witnesses as are available to the prosecution.”\textsuperscript{215} Although the right of direct confrontation is not expressly provided for under the ICCPR, the characterization of the principle of equality of arms internationally could in theory support such a view.\textsuperscript{216}

The fact that Article 14 confers only a general right to examine rather than a more explicit right to adversarial confrontation likely owes to its universalistic underpinnings in taking into consideration broadly divergent national legal systems.\textsuperscript{217} As a minimum guarantee however, a general

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[214.] See generally Sherman, supra note 20, at 855 (arguing that one of the reasons the ICCPR is silent on the issue of direct confrontation is its intended establishment of minimum core rights to applied to a broad spectrum of legal systems).
\item[217.] See Amnesty International, Fair Trials Manual, 129 (Amnesty International 1998) (noting that “[t]he wording of international standards, which use the phrase ‘to examine or have examined’, takes into account different legal systems, including systems based on adversarial trials and systems where the judicial authorities examine witnesses.”) (internal citation omitted), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/international_justice/fair_trials/manual/22.html.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
right to examine may not preserve the fairness of the proceedings.\textsuperscript{218} Thus, where it is necessary to achieve the overarching substantive fairness contemplated under the ICCPR, it seems obvious that the Covenant’s text may, indeed should, be construed to require additional procedural safeguards and guarantees. While member states may not deviate from the minimal protections provided under the ICCPR, they are always free to exceed them. As such, the absence of a textual reference to a right of adversarial confrontation \textit{per se} cannot be read to deny the extension of such a right as necessary to secure a fair trial.\textsuperscript{219} Indeed, respect for the principle of adversarial proceedings is central to the notion of a fair trial, as interpreted by the UNHRC.\textsuperscript{220}

D. The Jurisprudence (Views) of the UN Human Rights Committee

Notwithstanding the definition of ‘examine’ as might be required under Article 14(3)(e), it is clear that it at least requires “that the parties participate . . . in an adversarial procedure and that . . . defence counsel ha[s] the opportunity to interrogate [adverse witnesses].”\textsuperscript{221} The UNHRC has observed that, to preserve the rights conferred by Article 14(3)(e), criminal proceedings “must provide the person charged with the criminal offence the right to an oral hearing, at which he or she may appear in person or be represented by counsel, and may bring evidence and examine the witnesses.”\textsuperscript{222} Moreover, this right may encompasses preliminary proceedings at which witness testimony is received where the witness is subsequently unavailable at trial.\textsuperscript{223}

Perhaps the most transparent violations of the right to examine have been found in the context of proceedings before so-called faceless courts.\textsuperscript{224} These proceedings are marked by the concealment of the iden-

\textsuperscript{218} See General Comment 13, \textit{supra} note 215, ¶ 5 (noting that “the requirements of paragraph 3 are minimum guarantees, the observance of which is not always sufficient to ensure the fairness of a hearing as required by paragraph 1.”).

\textsuperscript{219} See Sherman, \textit{supra} note 20, at 856 (noting that the ICCPR’s silence on the question of a right to confront “cannot be the basis for any argument that defendants need not, or should not, be accorded [such a] right.”).

\textsuperscript{220} Morael v. France, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 207/1986, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at 210 (1989) (observing that “the concept of a fair hearing in the context of article 14 (1) of the Covenant should be interpreted as requiring a number of conditions, such as equality of arms, respect for the principle of adversary proceedings. . .”).


tity of the judges and the inability of the defense to challenge them.\textsuperscript{225} They are typically conducted in a manner that systematically deprives the defense of any ability to examine adversarial witnesses,\textsuperscript{226} and in some instances of the right to be present at the proceedings or the right to a public trial.\textsuperscript{227} Similarly, the UNHRC has determined that in the absence of due notice, trials \textit{in absentia} also violate the right of the accused not only to be present but also of the right to examine witnesses altogether.\textsuperscript{228}

1. \textit{Fairness in the Examination of Witnesses}

UNHRC jurisprudence suggests that the right to examine arguably requires a component of effectiveness. For example, in \textit{Peart v. Jamaica},\textsuperscript{229} a murder trial, it became known during the cross-examination of the principal eye-witness that he had made a prior written statement to the police on the night of the incident. The accused requested a copy of the prior statement, which was refused by the prosecution and denied by the trial

\textsuperscript{226} See, e.g., Vargas Mas, Communication No. 1058/2002, ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1058/2002 (noting that Article 14 is violated in the absence of an opportunity to question witnesses, where the attorney for the accused received threats and the proceedings were conducted by faceless judges); \textit{Quispe Roque}, Communication No. 1125/2002, ¶ 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1125/2002 (finding an Article 14 violation where the “court [was] composed of faceless judges[,] the interrogation of witnesses was not permitted and [defense attorney] had only 30 minutes to examine the case file.”); \textit{Carranza Alegre}, Communication No. 1126/2002, ¶ 7.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1126/2002, para. 7.5 (determining that defense counsel’s inability “to challenge witnesses who had made statements during the police investigation” contributed to the denial of a fair trial as a whole).
As it turned out, however, the accused finally received a copy of the statement following their conviction and appeal. The statement named another individual as having shot the decedent. In holding that Article 14(3)(e) had been violated, the UNHRC determined that the “failure to make the police statement of the witness available to the defence seriously obstructed the defence in its cross-examination of the witness, thereby precluding a fair trial of the defendant.” The decision is significant in this respect because it is not limited to the mere provision of an ‘opportunity’ to cross-examine as a means to achieve procedural fairness, but seems to require that the opportunity so afforded be fundamentally fair.

2. Absence of Counsel

In *Brown v. Jamaica*, the UNHRC determined that an accused must be provided an opportunity to “ensure the presence of his lawyer” at a preliminary hearing involving the deposition of witnesses. At issue was the propriety of allowing a preliminary hearing involving the deposition of two prosecution witnesses to continue in the absence of the accused’s attorney. Initially, when the accused indicated that he preferred not to cross-examine the witnesses himself, the magistrate adjourned the matter for cross-examination. Following a second adjournment due to the absence of counsel, new counsel was appointed for the accused who, having never been present for the direct testimony, declined to cross-examine the witnesses. While the UNHRC concluded that the proceedings violated Article 14(3)(d) in this instance, the absence of counsel at preliminary proceedings has been separately determined to be violative of Article 14(3)(e). Not surprisingly, the absence of an accusatory witness from the proceedings altogether may yield precisely the same result.

230. Id. ¶ 11.4.
231. Id. ¶ 3.1.
232. Id. ¶ 11.5.

234. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 775/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/775/1997 (1999). Here, the UNHRC found that the magistrate judge’s conduct in proceeding with preliminary depositions “aware of the absence of the author’s defence counsel” violated the rights of the accused, under Article 14(3)(d), “to defend himself in person or through legal assistance.” Id. ¶ 6.6. The UNHRC’s view, however, has manifest implications concerning the conferral of rights under Article 14(e) in these circumstances.

235. Id. ¶ 6.6.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
3. Absence of Accusatory Witness

In Dugin v. Russian Federation\(^{240}\) the accused and his accomplice were charged with murder in a beating death. The decedent and his companion confronted the accused and his accomplice, resulting in a fight.\(^{241}\) Based upon the testimony of several eyewitnesses and that of the surviving victim, the accused was convicted of premeditated murder.\(^{242}\) The surviving victim, however, never appeared during trial and his absence thus precluded cross-examination.\(^{243}\) Nonetheless, the trial court considered the pretrial statements made by the surviving victim during the course of the initial investigation.\(^{244}\) Concluding that the rights of the accused under Article 14 had been violated, the UNHRC questioned the circumstances concerning the victim’s unavailability, noting that the reasons for his absence at trial had not been adequately explained; moreover, the UNHRC observed that the trial court had given “very considerable weight . . . to his statement, although the author was unable to cross-examine this witness.”\(^{245}\)

Similarly, in Rouse v. The Philippines\(^{246}\), the basis of the witness’s unavailability was stressed in determining whether there was a violation of the right to examine witnesses. In Rouse, having been charged with violating a child abuse statute, the accused asserted that he had been framed by the police.\(^{247}\) His trial and subsequent conviction were primarily based upon the signed and sworn statement of the 15-year-old victim, which was witnessed by his parents.\(^{248}\) The statement alleged that the accused had prompted the victim to engage in sexual acts.\(^{249}\) On the facts of the case, the UNHRC found a violation of Article 14(3)(e).\(^{250}\) First, although the alleged victim had been subpoenaed to testify, neither he nor his parents could be located.\(^{251}\) Secondly, “considerable weight was given to that witness’ out of court statement” as the sole eyewitness to the alleged crime which the accused had not been able to cross-examine.\(^{252}\)

Determining the fairness of trial proceedings in the face of statements not subjected to cross-examination, in terms of the degree of reliance placed upon such evidence in sustaining a conviction, has gained favor in

---

14(3)(e) is satisfied where the parties participated in an adversarial procedure and defense counsel had an opportunity to interrogate the declarant).

241. Id. ¶ 2.1.
242. Id. ¶ 2.2.
243. Id. ¶ 3.1.
244. Id.
245. Id. ¶ 9.3 (emphasis added). A “considerable weight" standard affords broader protection of the right to examine than the “decisive extent" standard, applied under the ECHR. See infra, Part IV.
247. Id. ¶ 2.2.
248. Id. ¶ 2.4
249. Id.
250. Id. ¶ 7.5.
251. Id.
252. Id. (emphasis added).
international criminal procedure. As can be seen in the development of the jurisprudence of the European Court discussed below, it has become a threshold consideration to adjudicating the safety of trial proceedings and in securing the right of examination and/or confrontation.

IV. The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950

A. Background

Based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ECHR was drawn up in 1949 by the Council of Europe. It was opened for signature on November 4, 1950, and entered into force on September 3, 1953. Like the ICCPR, the European Convention provides several fundamental civil and political rights and freedoms including, inter alia, the right to a fair trial.

As a regional treaty, the ECHR created international human rights enforcement mechanisms in its member states, permitting both the adjudication of alleged violations as well the acceptance and implementation of

253. See Prosecutor v. Prliæ et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Admission of a Written Statement Pursuant to Rule 92quater of the Rules (Hasa Rizvia), ¶ 22 (Jan. 14, 2008) (noting that under ICTY jurisprudence "a Chamber cannot base a conviction solely or to a decisive extent on evidence which has not been subject to examination by both parties.") (citing Prosecutor v. Martia, Case No. IT-95-11-AR73.2, Decision on Appeal against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Evidence of Witness Milan Babic, ¶ 20 (Sept. 14 2006)); Prosecutor v. Prliæ et al IT-04-74-AR73.6, Decision on the Appeals Against the Decision to Admit the Trial Transcript of the Examination of Jadranko Prliæ, ¶ 53 (Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Prliæ Appeal]; see generally Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision On Prosecution’s Motion to Add One Exhibit to its Rule 65ter List and for Admission of Evidence of Witness Matija Boskovic Pursuant to Rule 92quater, ¶ 19, (Mar. 9, 2009); see also Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. No. STL/BD/2009/01/Rev. 1, Rule 159 (June 10, 2009) [hereinafter STL RPE] (expressly providing, “[a] conviction may not be based solely, or to a decisive extent, on the statement of a witness made pursuant to Rule 93.”).


255. Id.

the decisions rendered.\textsuperscript{257} Although the Convention has always allowed individuals to bring complaints directly against member states, a private right of enforcement was originally recognized only at a State’s option and acceptance.\textsuperscript{258} However, as of 1998 the recognition of a private right of enforcement has been compulsory among member states.\textsuperscript{259} As such, “individuals now enjoy at the international level a real right of action to assert the rights and freedoms to which they are directly entitled under the Convention.”\textsuperscript{260}

Over the years, responsibility for enforcing the European Convention has fallen to three institutions—the European Commission of Human Rights; the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which supervises the enforcement of decisions;\textsuperscript{261} and the European Court.\textsuperscript{262} The Convention’s role among national jurisdictions has been to harmonize rights protection by establishing a minimum standard—“a floor below which a national legal protection may not fall.”\textsuperscript{263} While this clearly implies a differing impact upon diverse national systems, the Convention, in essence, constitutes an obligatory norm derived from an “emerging consensus among the Contracting States.”\textsuperscript{264} In this sense, the jurisprudence of the European Court has been markedly influential in developing rights-based norms and particularly, in fostering basic consistency among the criminal procedures of its diverse members.


\textsuperscript{258.} See Information Document, supra note 254, ¶ 10-11; see also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 25, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Old European Convention] (providing that “[t]he Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe from any person . . . provided that the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions.”) (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{259.} Information Document, supra note 254, ¶ 4; see also Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 1, 1998, Eur. T.S. 155 (replacing Article 25 of the Old Convention with Article 34 and providing that “[t]he Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”).


\textsuperscript{261.} See ECHR, supra note 3, art. 46(2) (providing that “[t]he final judgment of the court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers which shall supervise its execution.”).


\textsuperscript{264.} Id.
B. Confrontation under the European Convention

The right of confrontation within the context of the principle of equality of arms was somewhat dubious in earlier traditional Continental systems; for example, as noted above, “in earlier inquisitorial systems, defense counsel often was not allowed to participate in the actual trial.”265

In stark contrast, Article 6 of the ECHR “is intended above all to secure the interests of the defence and those of the proper administration of justice.”266 Moreover, the European Court has recognized that “[t]he right to a fair trial holds so prominent a place in democratic society that there can be no justification for interpreting Article 6 of the Convention restrictively.”267 In this context, the ECHR has greatly expanded the conception of the right to examine as a fundamental tenet of procedural fairness in criminal proceedings across Europe and has had an appreciable impact upon the right, particularly as administered in Continental systems.268 Nevertheless, “there is little consensus as to whether the right to examine in fact constitutes a fundamental procedural norm that cannot be derogated from in any circumstances.”269

Although generally worded, the application of Article 6(3)’s right to examine has been substantially refined under the European Court’s case law in two principal areas—anonymous witnesses270 and absent witnesses,271 including cases that have clearly involved both of these condi-

265. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 277.
269. Kelly Buchanan, Freedom of Expression and International Criminal Law: An Analysis of the Decision to Create a Testimonial Privilege for Journalists, 35 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 609, 639 (2004); see also Grant v. The Queen, [2006] UKPC 2, [2007] 1 A.C. 1, ¶ 17, at 13 (observing that the European Court “has been astute to avoid treating the specific rights set out in article 6 as laying down rules from which no derogation or deviation is possible in any circumstances.”). For a full treatment of derogation under Article 15 and European Court jurisprudence, see Ralph Beddard, Human Rights and Europe, 188–92 (3d ed. 1993).
While anonymous and absent witnesses are dealt with below, to the extent that vulnerable witnesses comprise a somewhat specialized class of cases involving unique public policy issues, they are, for comparative purposes, beyond the limited scope of this article.

1. The Right to Examine Generally

Although Article 6, like ICCPR Article 14, protects the right to a fair hearing, it does not provide for rules on the admissibility of evidence. Article 6(3) provides as follows:

3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
   a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
   b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence;
   c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
   d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
   e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

In applying Article 6(3)(d), the Court’s primary focus is not upon the proper application of often idiosyncratic and divergent evidentiary rules among member states as a supranational court of review, but on the fundamental fairness of the trial proceedings overall. National proceedings are thus accorded a great deal of deference in respect of the regulation and application of evidentiary rules. Indeed, national courts have been accorded such great deference in determining whether or not to require the appearance of witnesses for trial that, in the view of some commentators, Article 6(3)(d) was of little practical impact. In this context, Unterpertinger v. Austria arose as one of the early hearsay confrontation-type cases, etching out the contours of the right to examine under the ECHR.

In Unterpertinger, the accused was convicted of domestic assault.
The accused’s wife and step-daughter, the alleged victims in the case, refused to testify against him at trial. Consequently, the prosecution introduced and relied on certain police reports containing their incriminatory accounts of the incidents. In reviewing the proceedings, the European Court determined that the convictions had been obtained in contravention of the accused’s rights to the extent that he was deprived of any opportunity to cross-examine either witness concerning their statements to the police. Significantly, the Court noted that the statements had been used as “proof of the truth of the accusations made by the women at the time,” and clearly formed the basis upon which the conviction principally rested.

In *Bricmont v. Belgium* the European Court established limits on the standing policy of according deference towards the determinations of domestic courts in respect of requiring the hearing of witnesses. In *Bricmont*, the trial court excused the key witness from testifying due to his health and age. In review, the Court found that the accused’s conviction for forgery and misappropriation violated Article 6. Considering the relationship of the principle evidence relied upon in support of a conviction to the question of trial fairness, the Court nonetheless recognized that “[t]here are exceptional circumstances which could prompt the Court to conclude that the failure to hear a person as a witness was incompatible with Article 6.” The Court thus held that Article 6 is violated where the evidence upon which a conviction is predicated is adduced at trial “without [the accused] ever having had an opportunity, afforded by an examination or a confrontation, to have evidence taken from the complainant in his presence.”

Similarly, in *Barberà v. Spain*, a murder case that involved the prosecution’s use of a confession by a former accomplice of the accused, the Court determined that the admission of a former accomplice’s statements at trial violated the accused’s fair trial rights. The accused were never afforded an opportunity to examine the absent declarant. The Court held that Article 6(3)’s guarantee of the right to examine “means that the hearing of witnesses must in general be adversarial.” In principle therefore, all evidence must be produced in the presence of the accused with a

---

278. *Id.* ¶ 30, at 14.
279. *Id.* ¶ 31, at 14–15.
280. *Id.* ¶ 33, at 15.
281. *Id.*
283. *Id.* ¶ 46, at 46.
288. *Id.* ¶ 86, at 36–37.
view to adversarial argument, and the accused “is entitled to take part in
the hearing and to have his case heard.” In noting that “the applicants
never had an opportunity to examine a person whose evidence - which was
vital, as is clear from the Supreme Court’s judgment,” the Court deter-
mined that the requirements of a fair and public hearing had been
infringed.

The assessment of the degree of centrality of statements not subjected
to cross-examination to a given conviction has become a main pillar of the
European Court’s analysis of the right to examine, and one that has gained
considerable favor among other international institutions.

2. Anonymity

The European Court has posited that the use of anonymous testimony
may work unmitigated prejudice against the right of the accused to
examine the witnesses against him. In Kostovski v. The Netherlands, the
Court responded to the question of whether a conviction based upon the
unexamined statements of anonymous witnesses stood in contravention an
accused’s right to a fair trial under Article 6. In that case, the accused
was convicted of armed robbery upon the use of statements given by two
witnesses who failed to appear at trial. The statements were received in
evidence in conformity with the established practice of The Netherlands at
the time, which permitted their use at trial upon the condition that they
had been recorded as part of the official investigative report and later read
into the trial record. Though permitted to submit questions to the
examining magistrate to pose to the witness during the pretrial examina-
tion, counsel for the defendant was nevertheless excluded from the pro-
ceeding. Further, of the questions submitted on behalf of the accused,
only two were answered, as the remaining inquiries would allegedly have

291. Id. ¶ 86, at 36–37.
292. See Prliæ Appeal, supra note 253. ¶ 53; see also STL RPE, supra note 253, Rule
159 (expressly providing that “a conviction may not be based solely or to a decisive
extent on a statement [of an anonymous witness].”); Dugin v. Russian Federation, U.N.
D/815/1998 (2004) (applying a “considerable weight” standard); see also Rouse v. Philip-
293. See Kostovski v. The Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 44–45, at 21
(1989) (holding that a conviction based to a decisive extent on a statement in the
absence of an opportunity to challenge violates Article 6(3)(d)); see also Unterpertinger v.
3 (ser. A) ¶ 36, at 16 (1993) (holding that the opportunity to examine and to protect his
interests must be given to an accused either when a witness gives a statement to be
introduced against him, or in a later proceeding).
295. Id. ¶ 18, at 12.
297. Id. ¶ 30, at 16.
compromised the witnesses’ identity. 298

On these facts, the European Court found that the Convention was breached because there had been no prior opportunity to examine the witness’ evidence and the conviction was based to a decisive extent on the anonymous statements. 299 The Court reiterated that the Convention mandates that “all evidence should be produced in the presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument.” 300 Accordingly, it held that Article 6(3)(d) requires that an accused “be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either at the time the witness was making his statement or at some later stage of the proceedings.” 301 The process of withholding the identity of the witnesses violated the rights of the accused, under Article 6 insofar as it:

[deprived the defense] of the very particulars enabling it to demonstrate that [the witness] is prejudiced, hostile or unreliable. Testimony or other declarations inculpating an accused may well be designedly untruthful or simply erroneous and the defence will scarcely be able to bring this to light if it lacks the information permitting it to test the author’s reliability or cast doubt on his credibility. 302

The Court thus determined that the accused had not received a fair trial. Not only had he had not been afforded an opportunity to examine the witnesses at any stage in the proceedings directly, but the anonymity procedures used in the pretrial and trial phases, rather than respecting defense rights, 303 further prejudiced them by restricting even indirect examination of testimonial witnesses.

Similarly, in Windisch v. Austria, 304 neither the trial court nor the defendant was ever provided with an opportunity to examine or hear from the two anonymous witnesses, upon whose statements the defendant was ultimately convicted of burglary. 305 The witnesses both claimed to have seen the defendant near the scene of a burglary under a street lamp, with his face obscured in part by a handkerchief. 306 At trial, the police officers who took these statements offered their assessment of the witnesses’ reliability, as well as the content of statements in chief. 307 In the absence of any eyewitness placing the defendant at the scene of the crime, it was clear that the main evidence relied upon by the trial court to sustain the conviction rested solely upon the out-of-court declarations of the anonymous wit-

298. Id. ¶ 16, at 11.
299. Id. ¶ 44, at 21.
300. Id. ¶ 41, at 20.
302. Id. ¶ 42, at 20.
303. Id. ¶ 41, at 20 (conditioning the use of unexamined statements upon “the rights of the defence hav[ing] been respected.”).
305. Id. ¶¶ 12–13, at 7.
306. Id. ¶ 10, at 6.
307. Id. ¶ 12, at 7.
nesses. As such, the Court determined that the accused had not received a fair trial, noting in particular that the witnesses’ anonymity during the investigation and subsequent trial impermissibly restricted the defendant’s Article 6 rights.

3. Absence, Unavailability, and Hearsay

In Delta v. France, the Court determined that the right to confront, to be present, and to examine adversarial witnesses requires the provision of an opportunity for an accused to challenge and question the witness against him, upon the making of the statement or later in the proceedings. Unlike Kostovski, Delta did not involve anonymous witnesses but rather witnesses whose identities were known and who failed to appear at the defendant’s trial. Finding a breach of Article 6, the Court observed the fact that the accused had not been present during the investigatory phase of the proceedings when the two witnesses gave statements to the police. Further, he was never afforded a subsequent opportunity to examine the witnesses. To the extent that the statements constituted most of the material evidence against the accused, they essentially formed the basis of his conviction. The failure to afford the defendant an opportunity to question the witnesses under these circumstances impermissibly restricted his Article 6 rights.

In Saïdi v. France, the Court found a violation of Article 6(3)(d) in similar circumstances. In that case, the accused was convicted of involuntary homicide in connection with two drug-related deaths without ever having been given the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him during either the course of the investigation or the trial itself. In its decision, the Court reasoned that while the use of statements obtained at the stage of the police inquiry or the judicial investigation is not in itself inconsistent with Article 6(3)(d), since evidence must be produced with a view to adversarial argument, the “lack of any confrontation” deprived the

308. Id. ¶ 31, at 11.
309. Id. ¶¶ 27–28, at 11; see Mayali v. France, App. No. 69116/01, ¶¶ 36–38, June 14, 2005 (available only in French), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=776754&portal=bhkmsource=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (sexual offence case in which consent was at issue wherein the Court found a violation of a Article 6(3)(d) where an unavailable witness’s statements to the police and report of an expert who had examined both the accused and the victim were decisive); see also F. v. Finland, App. No. 22508/02, ¶¶ 56–61, July 17, 2007, http://www.bailii.org/eur/cases/ECHR/2007/620.html (noting that the right to examine was violated where the accused’s conviction rested on unpreserved statements given by his absent daughter to a psychologist).
311. See id. ¶ 36, at 16.
312. Id. ¶ 37, at 16.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
317. Id. ¶ 44, at 57.
accused of a fair trial. The Court again observed that these statements “constituted the sole basis for the applicant’s conviction.”

Distinguishing the holding in Unterpertinger, the case of Asch v. Austria demonstrated that the inability to examine a witness does not necessarily result in the violation of Article 6(3)(d). Asch involved a victim of domestic violence who refused to testify at a subsequent trial as she was entitled to under Austrian law. However, much like Hammon, a prior statement that she gave the police about the incident was read into record at trial, despite her absence. The accused complained that he had not been afforded an opportunity to examine the declarant. Conditioning the use of the out-of-court statements on “the rights of the defence [having] been respected,” the European Court held that under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the accused had not been deprived of a fair trial. Significantly, the Court noted that the statements at issue were not the only evidence upon which the conviction was predicated insofar as the trial court had before it corroborative evidence of the crime. This case thus makes clear that Article 6 does not confer an unqualified right of direct confrontation or examination, but instead comprises a mechanism permitting the introduction of testimonial hearsay under controlled conditions. As seen in some of the cases that follow, the parameters of these conditions are, at least according to some commentators, unpredictable.

C. Refinements under the ECHR
1. Corroboration

In Bracci v. Italy, the defendant was convicted of several charges, including theft and sexual abuse against two prostitutes. At trial, the prosecution placed particular reliance upon the pretrial statements of the two
prostitutes given to police earlier in the investigation. The two women did not appear at trial. The accused appealed his conviction on the ground that he was denied a fair trial in two respects: first, that he was unable to examine either witness and second, that he was unable to obtain a DNA test of an article of clothing bearing trace evidence. The European Court observed that although the pretrial statements were read aloud at trial in compliance with Italian criminal procedure, “at no stage in the proceedings was counsel for the defence able to examine or have examined the individuals who were accusing the applicant in connection with the two incidents in question.” However, the Court found that to the extent one witness’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence, there was no breach of the convention, even in the absence of affording the accused a right of examination. With respect to the remaining witness, the Court did find a violation of Article 6(1) and 3(d) of the Convention because of the Italian court’s “exclusive” reliance upon the pretrial statements in the absence of corroboration and without having afforded the accused “an adequate and sufficient opportunity to contest the statements upon which his conviction [for crimes against that witness] was founded.”

The European Court unanimously held in Taal v. Estonia, that Article 6(3)(d) had been violated where the trial court convicted the accused of threatening to detonate an explosive in a supermarket, relying primarily upon the testimony of witnesses identifying the defendant that had been obtained during the preliminary investigation. Despite the accused’s requests, none of the witnesses appeared at trial. The Court confirmed the grounds of the accused’s complaint—namely, the denial of any opportunity to examine or have examined the witnesses against him at any stage of the proceedings. Moreover, the Court pointed out the failure of the national courts to examine any of the witnesses.

2. Basis of Unavailability

Bocos-Cuesta v. The Netherlands involved a conviction for sexual assault among other offenses committed against four children from which the accused subsequently appealed. In part, the conviction rested upon the children’s statements to the police. However, none testified at trial, as

329. Id. ¶¶ 17, 20.
330. Id. ¶ 56.
331. Id. ¶ 28.
332. Id. ¶ 56.
333. Id. ¶¶ 57–58.
334. Id. ¶¶ 59–61.
336. Id. ¶ 29.
337. Id. ¶ 35–36.
338. Id. ¶ 32.
340. Id. ¶ 39.
the trial court determined this might cause them undue trauma.\textsuperscript{341} The European Court disagreed and found that the reason provided concerning the denial of the defendant’s request to “hear the victims [was] insufficiently substantiated and, to a certain extent, speculative.”\textsuperscript{342} Accordingly, the trial was found to be in violation of the accused rights under Article 6.\textsuperscript{343} The Court noted for example, that no accommodation was provided to the accused to review the manner in which the children provided statements to the police, for example, by watching in another room via closed circuit video.\textsuperscript{344} Moreover, the accused had no opportunity to have questions put to these non-testifying witnesses at any time.\textsuperscript{345} To the extent that the police did not record the statements provided, neither the applicant nor the trial judges were able to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and thereby assess the reliability of the testimony.\textsuperscript{346} As such, the Court found that the trial proceedings denied the accused a proper and adequate opportunity to challenge the witnesses’ statements, as well as personally to observe their giving of oral evidence.\textsuperscript{347} Bocos-Cuesta is thus significant because it inherently recognizes an intrinsic broader confrontational right under Article 6(1), taken together with Article 6(3)(d).

\textit{Zentar v. France}\textsuperscript{348} further confirms a broader confrontational view of the right to examine. In \textit{Zentar}, the accused was convicted based “largely” on the out-of-court statements of witnesses who offered testimony against the accused at the investigative phase of the proceedings.\textsuperscript{349} While the witnesses implicating the accused were unavailable at trial, no effort had been made to secure their appearance.\textsuperscript{350} Based upon this failure, and considering the particular importance of safeguarding the rights of the accused, the Court determined that the opportunity for the accused to challenge the witness statements on which his conviction was based had not been sufficient.\textsuperscript{351}

Likewise, in \textit{Vaturi v. France},\textsuperscript{352} where the accused alleged that he had

\textsuperscript{341}. Id. ¶ 40.
\textsuperscript{342}. Id. ¶ 72.
\textsuperscript{343}. Id. ¶ 73–74.
\textsuperscript{344}. Id. ¶ 71.
\textsuperscript{345}. Id. ¶ 59.
\textsuperscript{346}. Id. ¶ 71.
\textsuperscript{347}. Id. ¶¶ 71–74.
\textsuperscript{349}. Id. ¶ 29.
\textsuperscript{350}. Id. ¶ 30; see also Makeyev v. Russia, App. No. 13769/04, ¶ 43, Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/207.html (finding a violation of Article 6 where, \textit{inter alia}, “the authorities failed to make a reasonable effort to secure [the witnesses’] presence in court.”).
\textsuperscript{351}. \textit{Zentar}, App. No. 17902/02, ¶ 31.
\textsuperscript{352}. App. No. 75699/01, July 13, 2006 (available only in French), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=794314&portal=hbkm&source=externallybydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (recognizing the obligation of the state to safeguard the rights of the accused as inclusive of the right to examine and confront).
been given no opportunity to examine witnesses or to have them examined at any stage of the proceedings, the Court unanimously found a violation of Article 6.\textsuperscript{353} Significantly, the Court noted that the question of whether the examination of the witnesses might have proven fruitful was unnecessary to determine whether a breach of Article 6 had occurred, although such examination would have contributed to the equal balance needed to be struck throughout the proceedings between the prosecution and the defense.\textsuperscript{354}

In \textit{Ferrantelli v. Italy},\textsuperscript{355} the accused were implicated by a co-accused who had been arrested in possession of the murder weapon.\textsuperscript{356} The accused later confessed to the crime, providing an account inconsistent with that of the co-accused. Subsequently, the co-accused recanted his earlier implication of the accused, and the accused also recanted their confessions.\textsuperscript{357} The co-accused was later found dead, before either the accused or his attorneys had a chance to question him.\textsuperscript{358}

In 1991, the Italian Court of Cassation sentenced the accused based, \textit{inter alia}, on the statements of the deceased co-accused, the accused’s confessions, and other evidence.\textsuperscript{359} On review before the European Court, the accused contended that they had been convicted based on confessions obtained by investigators using physical and psychological pressure.\textsuperscript{360} They further argued the impossibility of examining or having examined the co-accused (as a prosecution witness) prior to his death.\textsuperscript{361} Although the use of statements obtained at the pre-trial stage was not inconsistent with paragraphs (3)(d) and (1) of Article 6, the Court held that these provisions required that the accused be afforded an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question witnesses either when the statements were being made or at a later stage of the proceedings.\textsuperscript{362} While a substantial period had elapsed prior to the death of the co-accused during which the authorities could have arranged for this opportunity, the Court found that the State could not be held responsible for the intervening death and as such Article 6(1) and (3)(d) had not been violated.\textsuperscript{363}

In \textit{Gossa v. Poland},\textsuperscript{364} the Court similarly held that the fact that an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{353} Id. ¶¶ 58–59; see also Mild and Virtanen v. Finland, App. Nos. 39481/98 and 40227/98, ¶¶ 47–48, July 26, 2005, http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2005/541.html (finding a violation of Article 6(3)(d) where “every reasonable effort to obtain [witnesses’] attendance was not made and the fact that there was no provision of law on the basis of which they could have been brought to court made it impossible for the applicants to examine them.”).
\item \textsuperscript{354} \textit{Vaturi}, App. No. 75699/01, ¶ 58.
\item \textsuperscript{355} 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 937.
\item \textsuperscript{356} Id. ¶ 9, at 942.
\item \textsuperscript{357} See id. ¶¶10–14, at 942–43.
\item \textsuperscript{358} See id. ¶¶ 15–16, at 943.
\item \textsuperscript{359} See id. ¶ 52, at 950–51.
\item \textsuperscript{360} Id. ¶ 44, at 949.
\item \textsuperscript{362} Id. ¶ 51, at 950.
\item \textsuperscript{363} Id. ¶¶ 52–33, at 950–51.
\end{itemize}
accused may have been unable to examine a witness whose statements may have been involved in securing his conviction does not necessarily constitute a violation of Article 6(3)(d). In Gossa, the accused alleged that he had not been provided any opportunity to challenge the inculpatory statements of one of the witnesses against him and upon which his conviction was predicated. In determining that the lack of any opportunity to cross-examine the declarant did not abridge the accused’s Article 6 rights, the Court found it significant that the authorities had made an appropriate effort to secure this witness’ attendance. In addition, the Court determined that the conviction had not been based solely or to a decisive degree on that particular witness’ statements.

3. Impact of Unexamined Statements

The European Court has greatly circumscribed the use of anonymous testimony as well as hearsay evidence in contravention of an accused’s Article 6 rights. However, the Court’s jurisprudence has held with reasonable consistency that a fair trial can be achieved even where the accused has not been accorded a right to examine witnesses, as was the case in Asch v. Austria. Accordingly, there is no absolute procedural bar against the receipt of pretrial statements of adversarial witnesses against an accused in the absence of oral testimony. With respect to anonymous testimony however, the Court has taken a more conservative tack in limiting consideration of these types of statements to situations bearing substantial corroboration or in extenuating circumstances. Hence, a trial will be found fundamentally unfair where a conviction is based to a decisive extent upon the testimony of an anonymous witness in the absence of any appreciable opportunity of the defense to examine the witness at any stage of the proceedings.

Although the European Court does not consider the right to cross-examination absolute, limitations imposed on the rights of an accused under Article 6 must nevertheless be considered restrictively. In Doorson v. The Netherlands for example, although the evidence against the accused

365. Id. ¶ 40.
366. Id. ¶ 46.
367. See id. ¶ 49 (internal citations omitted).
368. See id. ¶ 46.
included testimony from anonymous witnesses, the Court found that the opportunity provided to the accused’s counsel to examine these witnesses outside the presence of the accused constituted an acceptable safeguard under the circumstances, even taking into account the limitation it imposed on the accused’s right of examination. To the contrary, in Visser v. The Netherlands, the Court found that the trial court’s attempt to accommodate the accused’s right of examination by affording his counsel an opportunity to hear the anonymous witness’ statement before an investigating judge and to submit written questions to be posed was unacceptable. Although the Court did not reach the question of the sufficiency of the protective procedures put in place, it appears that no justification for the limitations imposed upon the rights of the accused had ever been established; the Court thus concluded that the trial court failed to examine the seriousness and legitimacy of the reasons advanced for the anonymity of the witness whose statement was introduced against the accused. Importantly however, Visser, like Doorson, confirmed that a conviction based solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous statements violates Article 6.

In Krasniki v. the Czech Republic the European Court also found that when the trial court had no reason to receive the testimony of witnesses outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel, and based the conviction to a decisive extent on anonymous testimony, Article 6(1) of the Convention had been violated. Krasniki involved a conviction for possessing and dealing in illicit substances. At trial, the accused was not permitted to examine a witness whose testimony was taken outside his presence by the trial judge. A second witness could not be located and her pretrial statement was read out in court in her absence. To make

374. Id. ¶¶ 69–73, at 470–71 (stating that while the “the Convention does not preclude reliance, at the investigation stage, on sources such as anonymous informants, the subsequent use of their statements by the trial court to found a conviction . . . is not under all circumstances incompatible with the Convention.” And “Counsel was not only present, but he was put in a position to ask the witnesses whatever questions he considered to be in the interests of the defence except in so far as they might lead to the disclosure of their identity.”).


376. Id. ¶ 48 (holding that in the absence of an inquiry as to the seriousness and basis for the anonymity “the interest of the witness in remaining anonymous could [not] justify limiting the rights of the defence to the extent that they were limited’’); cf. Doorson v. The Netherlands, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 446, ¶ 74, at 471 (holding that “while it would clearly have been preferable for the applicant to have attended the questioning of the witnesses” on balance the domestic court was “entitled to consider that the interests of the applicant were outweighed in this respect by the need to ensure the safety of witnesses.”).

377. Visser, App. No. 26668/95, ¶ 47.

378. Id. ¶ 46.


380. Id. ¶¶ 78, 80–83.

381. Id. ¶ 22.

382. See id. ¶ 25.
matters worse, both witnesses testified against the accused anonymously.\footnote{10–12.} Under these circumstances, the Court unanimously determined that the proceedings had unfairly breached Krasniki’s rights.\footnote{86.}

4. Statements of Co-Accused

In \textit{Isgrò v. Italy},\footnote{194 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3 (1991).} the Court determined that the admission at trial of an accomplice’s hearsay statements against the accused was not unfair. Distinguishing this case from existing jurisprudence at the time, the European Court found first, that the statement in question was clearly not anonymous; second, that the accused was able to and did put questions to his accomplice at a hearing before the investigating judge and discussed the statements;\footnote{35; but see id. ¶ 36 (noting the absence of a defense lawyer during the confrontation).} and third, that the statements of the accomplice were not the sole evidence upon which the court relied.\footnote{35.} The Court acknowledged that the defense counsel had been excluded from the accused’s confrontation of the witness; however, it also found that this did not affect fair trial rights because the public prosecutor had also been absent, and because the accused was allowed and able to put questions to the witness himself, thus mitigating the absence of defense counsel.\footnote{36.} As dubious an argument as these grounds present, the Court nevertheless went on to find that the restrictions placed on the accused did not contravene Article 6(3)(d).\footnote{37.}

However, in \textit{Lucà v. Italy}\footnote{2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 167.} the European Court did find that reliance on the untested statements of a co-accused, unavailable through his assertion of his right against self-incrimination, violated Article 6. The court found the fact that the statement at issue was made by a co-accused immaterial (as a matter of reliability), and instead held a blanket proposition that “where a deposition may serve to a material degree as the basis for a conviction, then, irrespective of whether it was made by a witness in the strict sense or by a co-accused, it constitutes evidence for the prosecution to
which the guarantees provided by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(d) of the Convention apply.”391 Although the relevant law at the time permitted the domestic courts to admit the statement of a co-accused, the European Court held that this could not operate to the detriment of the accused in violation of the Convention.392

D. The Ground Rules

The foregoing cases establish that the Court will generally defer questions concerning the admissibility of statements or depositions used at trial to the primary consideration of national authorities as a matter of domestic law.393 However, all evidence must generally be produced in the presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument. While there are exceptions, the rights of the defense must not be infringed.394 Witness anonymity must be based on sufficient reasons,395 and measures must be undertaken to counterbalance the resultant prejudice to the accused.396 Although the use of statements from an unavailable witness in the absence of an opportunity for the accused to question the witness at any stage of the proceedings does not automatically result in exclusion, where the rights of the defense cannot otherwise be secured, as normally prescribed under the Convention, such statements must be used with great care.397 Thus, a conviction based solely or to a decisive degree upon depositions in the absence of an opportunity to examine or to have a declarant examined at any phase of the proceedings is incompatible with Article 6.398

391. Id. ¶ 41, at 179.
392. Id. ¶ 42, at 179.
E. A New Shift in the European Court’s Confrontation Doctrine

On January 20, 2009, the European Court handed down its decision in *Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom.* The case involved the national courts’ admission of statements not subjected to cross-examination against the two accused under section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 (since repealed) and section 116 of the CJA 2003, respectively. As mentioned above, the CJA 2003 sets out specific criteria for the admissibility of the statements of absent witnesses, and includes certain safeguards concerning the rights of the accused pursuant to sections 124 through 126. Although these provisions ostensibly balance the interests of the defense, the Law Commission of England and Wales recommended against the Act’s incorporation of the European Court’s requirement under the ECHR that core hearsay evidence be corroborated. Despite the obligation of the national courts to consider the judgments of the European Court, the Act does not require corroboration of hearsay statements relied upon to a decisive extent in securing a conviction. Thus, despite the finding of the Court of Appeal that the lower courts’ admissibility determinations were proper and the convictions safe, the European Court held that Article 6(3)(d) of the Convention had been breached to the extent the respective convictions were based solely or decisively on statements which the accused had no opportunity to challenge.

*Al-Khawaja* does not depart from prior European Court’s decisions insofar as it maintains that convictions founded decisively or solely on

---

401. See supra notes 126–50, and accompanying text.
402. See R. v. Horncastle, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 964, [2009] 2 Crim. App. 15, ¶ 10, at 21 (appeal taken from Eng.), aff’d [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47 (noting that “[the CJA 2003] was . . . informed by experience accumulated over generations and represents the product of concentrated consideration by experts of how the balance should be struck between the many competing interests affected. It also represents democratically enacted legislation substantially endorsing the conclusions of the expert consideration.”); see also CJA 2003, supra note 127, § 125(1)(a)-(b) (imposing upon courts a duty to direct an acquittal or retrial where it is satisfied that “the case against the defendant is based wholly or partly on a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings, and the evidence provided by the statement is so unconvincing that, considering its importance to the case against the defendant, his conviction of the offence would be unsafe.”).
404. Human Rights Act 1998, § 2(1), (c. 42) (U.K.) (providing that “[a] court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights.”).
depositions without cross-examination violate Article 6. In this respect, it
will not likely have much impact on the general admissibility of un-con-
fronted hearsay that is neither dispositive of guilt nor otherwise corrobo-
rated. However, the decision presages a significant reorientation in the
Court’s analytical doctrine, clearly shifting the emphasis of the extant tele-
ological approach to the right to examine. In particular, the decision artic-
ulates a strengthened position in favor of defense rights, providing that
even where Article 6(3) minimum guarantees have been met the court must
nevertheless ascertain whether the trial as a whole has been fair. In this
sense, the European Court emphasizes that the provisions of Article 6(3)
do not simply comprise factors or illustrations of fair trial rights, but com-
prise tangible minimum guarantees, requiring extension to anyone charged
with a criminal offense. In the event an accused is denied the right to
examine, the trial court must undertake counterbalancing measures.
The Court reiterated that “[e]ven when ‘counterbalancing’ procedures are
found to compensate sufficiently the handicaps under which the defence
labours, a conviction should not be based either solely or to a decisive
extent on anonymous statements.”

Furthermore, the Court significantly observed that, absent special cir-
cumstances—for example, witness absence due to fear or unavailability
attributable to the accused’s conduct—”[i]t doubts whether any counterbal-
cancing factors would be sufficient to justify the introduction in evidence of
an untested statement which was the sole or decisive basis for the convic-
tion of an applicant.”

Prior to Al-Khawaja, however, European Court jurisprudence had
clearly accepted that in exceptional cases the failure to comply with Article
6(3)(d) does not per se invalidate the fairness of a trial. Al-Khawaja now
challenges this conception and portends the closing of the door to the
notion that trial courts may analyze the deprivation of the right to examine
decisive evidence under what amounts to a harmless error analysis if
proper counterbalancing measures are shown. The decision further makes
clear that no distinction concerning the right to examine anonymous wit-
tesses—rather than those merely absent—is required under the Court’s
analysis.

Because of the far-reaching implications for the English regulatory
scheme under the CJA 2003, which relies on counterbalancing measures,
Al-Khawaja was appealed to the European Court’s Grand Chamber, which heard argument on the case on May 19, 2010.413 What remains to be seen is whether the Court will hold its ground in the face of this fierce contest. If it does, the impact of this decision will significantly strengthen the right of examination under the Convention and indeed, internationally. However, the debate is likely to be as highly spirited as hard fought.

V. The Case for a Bright-line Standard in ICC Proceedings

Although not absolute,414 the right to examine embodies normative objectives that are intrinsically valuable to the truth-finding function of the trial process. In certain respects, this subsumes adversarial confrontation, which preserves an accused’s opportunity not only to test a witness’ recollection of the events at issue, but in essence, to challenge his conscience as well. A trier of fact is thus provided an opportunity to objectively evaluate the credibility of accusatory witnesses by observing their demeanor and the manner in which they present evidence.415 The value of these elements of the trial process cannot be understated, and their impact cannot be properly evaluated solely by resorting, after the fact, to an uncertain record of the proceedings.

Given that “[a] teleological reading of the [Rome] Statute indicates that the trial . . . will be the centrepiece of the Court’s proceedings in terms of acquiring evidence upon which to determine a person’s criminal responsibility,”416 the importance of securing a reliable and veritable right to examine trial evidence that is consistent with its core objectives is critical to the fairness of international criminal proceedings.

While there has been some encouraging movement in this direction by the European Court,417 the standard of analysis employed internationally...
2010  Traditions in Conflict: The Internationalization of Confrontation

is neither definite enough nor sufficient to import wholesale to the ICC with respect to interpretation and application of Article 67(e). Indeed, “in an area of law so politicised, culturally freighted and passionately punitive as war crimes there is a need for even greater protections for the accused.”

A. The Admissibility of Written Evidence in ICC Proceedings

The Rome Statute and the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE) provide for the receipt of testimonial statements and written transcripts in lieu of *viva voce* testimony;\(^\text{419}\) such testimony is similarly considered in the *ad hoc* tribunals.\(^\text{420}\) However, unlike its *ad hoc* counterparts, the ICC’s procedural framework presents a substantial improvement in terms of the protection expressly afforded the right to examine.

The general authority to receive documentary evidence and written documents is subject to the ordinary admissibility requirements provided under Article 69(4), affording the Court virtually unfettered discretion.\(^\text{421}\) Although the Rome Statute fundamentally rejects the formalistic evidentiary constraints of common law procedure in favor of the more open matters to be taken into account when considering whether a fair trial has been held.”). This perhaps portends an eventual departure from what has until now been a decidedly teleological approach to confrontation taken by the European Court.


\(^{421}\) See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(4) (providing, “[t]he Court may rule on the relevance or admissibility of any evidence, taking into account, *inter alia*, the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”). Other rules of admissibility are limited to rules prohibiting admissibility in particular circumstances. These include Rule 71, which concerns “the prior or subsequent sexual conduct of a victim or witness;” Rules 70 and 72, which limit the admissibility of evidence concerning to a victim’s consent in sexual offences; and Rules 74 and 75, which relate to privileged attorney-client communications and the right against self-incrimination and familial incrimination, respectively.
admissibility standards of Continental systems, it is nevertheless clear that probativity and prejudice are at least relevant factors considered by the Court in assessing the admissibility of all evidence. However, unlike the ad hoc tribunals, Article 69(4) of the Rome Statute neither invites nor requires the exclusion of evidence where its prejudice exceeds its probative value. Thus, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber observed that

under article 69(4) of the Statute the Chamber may exercise its discretion when determining the relevance and/or admissibility of any item of evidence. According to article 69(4) of the Statute, probative value is one of the factors to be taken into consideration when assessing the admissibility of a piece of evidence. In the view of the Chamber, this means that the Chamber must look at the intrinsic coherence of any item of evidence, and to declare inadmissible those items of evidence of which probative value is deemed prima facie absent after such an analysis.

Article 69(2) further provides that

the testimony of a witness at trial shall be given in person, except to the extent provided by the measures set forth in article 68 or in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Court may also permit the giving of viva voce (oral) or recorded testimony of a witness by means of video or audio technology, as well as the introduction of documents or written transcripts, subject to this Statute and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused.

Thus, unless the admission of documents and written transcripts would contravene the Rome Statute or the ICC RPE, the Court has broad discretion to admit them. Concomitantly, where no specific rule bars the admission of such evidence—or at least, where this functionally discretionary determination has been made in the absence of an express provision—a Chamber may admit any such written testimony in its general search for the truth.

Rule 68 of the ICC RPE also regulates evidence of written testimony and transcripts as follows:

When the Pre-Trial Chamber has not taken measures under article 56, the Trial Chamber may, in accordance with article 69, paragraph 2, allow the introduction of previously recorded audio or video testimony of a witness, or the transcript or other documented evidence of such testimony, provided that:

---

423. ICTY RPE, supra note 420 Rule 89(D) (expressly permitting the Court to exclude evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial).
425. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(2).
426. See id.
427. See id. (providing that "[t]he Court shall have the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth.").
2010 Traditions in Conflict: The Internationalization of Confrontation

a) If the witness who gave the previously recorded testimony is not present before the Trial Chamber, both the Prosecutor and the defence had the opportunity to examine the witness during the recording; or

b) If the witness who gave the previously recorded testimony is present before the Trial Chamber, he or she does not object to the submission of the previously recorded testimony and the Prosecutor, the defence and the Chamber have the opportunity to examine the witness during the proceedings.428

The ICC’s Trial Chamber has interpreted these provisions, observing that a Trial Chamber has the discretion to order that written statements (viz. “the transcript or other documented evidence of[. . .] the testimony”) are to replace “live” evidence if, but only if, one of the two following conditions are met: either that the defence and the prosecution have had the opportunity to question the witness if he or she is not present before the Court, or, for a witness before the Court, the witness—who gives consent to the introduction of the evidence—is available for examination by the prosecution and the defence.429

As mentioned above, this presents a marked improvement over the protections afforded pursuant to the ad hoc tribunals’ rules of procedure, which limitedly acknowledge that the lack of a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant of a written statement proposed for admission may be one of many factors in determining admissibility, and not a necessary precondition thereto.430

While the safeguards provided under Rule 68 are consistent with international minimum requirements concerning the right to examine as established in the jurisprudence of the European Court and in agreement with the views of the UNHRC, in some respects its provisions go farther. Specifically, it is not limited to transcripts or other written evidence that may be relied upon to a decisive or considerable extent in sustaining a conviction. On the other hand, Rule 68 also raises significant issues of concern regarding the adequacy of the right to examine as it may be applied.

First, Rule 68 is indicated only where the Pre-Trial Chamber has not taken measures pursuant to Article 56 of the Rome Statute.431 It does not require that the accused be accorded an opportunity to examine a witness in circumstances where the prosecutor considers an investigation to present a unique opportunity to take testimony or a statement from a wit-

---

428. ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule 68.
429. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for the Admission of the Prior Recorded Statements of Two Witnesses, ¶ 19 (Jan. 15, 2009).
430. See, e.g., STL RPE, supra note 253, Rule 155(A)(i)(g) (providing that the ability to cross-examine upon the making of the statement is a factor favorable to its admissibility). Notably, neither the ICTR RPE nor the ICTY RPE contain equivalent provisions. However, in respect of the admission of written evidence pursuant to the ICTY RPE, Rule 92quater, the lack of cross-examination does not bar admissibility. Instead, it is a factor in deciding the weight of such evidence. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, et al., Case No. IT-06-90-T Decision on the Admission of Four Witnesses pursuant to Rule 92quater, ¶ 7 (July 24, 2008).
431. See ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule 68.
ness. Instead, Article 56 requires the prosecutor to advise the Pre-Trial Chamber which may “upon request of the Prosecutor, take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings and, in particular, to protect the rights of the defence.” Alternatively, where the prosecutor fails to request such measures, the Trial Chamber may take appropriate measures upon its own initiative; these, however, are subject to a right of appeal by the prosecutor. Although Article 56 lays out specific measures to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings and to protect the rights of the defense, the right to examine is not expressly mentioned. As such, the extension of the right to examine in these circumstances rests solely within the discretion of the Chamber. Testimony and statements obtained pursuant to Article 56 may thus be admitted at trial without the defense ever having been afforded a right to examine, as long as the Pre-Trial Chamber did not consider it necessary at the time, the Prosecution successfully appealed the imposition of any such measure, or the Trial Chamber deemed its admission fully consistent with a fair trial or necessary for the determination of the truth.

Second, Rule 68 concerns the admissibility of “previously recorded audio or video testimony of a witness, or the transcript or other documented evidence of such testimony.” Although this has been held to include written statements, there is some question as to whether this interpretation is supportable as a matter of statutory construction. For example, Article

---

432. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 56; cf. ICTR RPE, supra note 420, Rule 71(C) (providing for a “right to attend the taking of the deposition and cross-examine the witness” where an application for taking a deposition for use at trial is granted); ICTY RPE, supra note 420, Rule 71(C) (same).

433. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 56(1)(b).

434. Id. 56(3).

435. Id. 56(1)(c) (stating that “[t]he measures referred to in paragraph 1(b) may include: (a) Making recommendations or orders regarding procedures to be followed; (b) Directing that a record be made of the proceedings; (c) Appointing an expert to assist; (d) Authorizing counsel for a person who has been arrested, or appeared before the Court in response to a summons, to participate, or where there has not yet been such an arrest or appearance or counsel has not been designated, appointing another counsel to attend and represent the interests of the defense; (e) Naming one of its members or, if necessary, another available judge of the Pre-Trial or Trial Division to observe and make recommendations or orders regarding the collection and preservation of evidence and the questioning of persons; (f) Taking such other action as may be necessary to collect or preserve evidence.”)

436. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(3); see also ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule 47(2) (providing that “when the Prosecutor considers that there is a serious risk that it might not be possible for the testimony to be taken subsequently, he or she may request the Pre-Trial Chamber to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings and, in particular, to appoint a counsel or a judge from the Pre-Trial Chamber to be present during the taking of the testimony in order to protect the rights of the defence. If the testimony is subsequently presented in the proceedings, its admissibility shall be governed by article 69, paragraph 4, and given such weight as determined by the relevant Chamber.”).

437. ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule 68 (emphasis added).

438. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for the Admission of the Prior Recorded Statements of Two Witnesses, ¶ 18, (Jan. 15, 2009).
56—to which Rule 68 expressly refers—concerns the taking of “testimony or a statement” by the prosecution. These two terms are substantively distinct. Taken to its logical end, this might suggest that the admissibility of a statement, as distinct from testimony, is governed solely by the general discretionary criteria for admissibility under Article 69(4), which does not explicitly implicate the right of examination.

On the other hand, accepting that Rule 68 encompasses ‘statements,’ as a broad interpretation of the term ‘testimony’ suggests, one could reasonably conclude that its text extends only to statements that have been formalized in some way. Documents—including reports, analysis, or informal hearsay statements—would not fall under the requirements of Rule 68, but under the general admissibility provisions of Article 69(4). This is in part because of the sheer volume of material likely to come before the court in any given case and because, to the extent that the application of Rule 68 to such material effectively would create a hearsay rule, it would be contrary to the established procedural framework. Functionally however, there is no intrinsic reason why informal statements, reports, or other hearsay evidence should not give rise to the same considerations which underlie the protections provided by Rule 68 concerning formal testimony or statements—that is, an opportunity to examine the declarant during the making of the statement, or during the trial proceedings.

Regardless of their form, these statements can nevertheless be ‘testimonial’ within the meaning of Crawford, particularly in the sense that they may provide evidence material to the culpability of the accused for the crimes with which he has been charged. However, as Article 67(e) is not a rule of admissibility per se, the only practical limitation on the admissibility of informal testimonial hearsay not subject to Rule 56, or otherwise subject to Rule 68, rests exclusively in the broad discretion of the Court under Article 69. A bright-line standard of admissibility would necessarily limit this discretion in a predictable and uniform way so as to strengthen the core guarantees embodied in Article 67(e). Of course, the question of where to draw the line will be a matter of considerable debate and, necessarily, one of policy. Nonetheless, this debate must also consider the procedural regime of the given institution, as more fully discussed below.

The ICTY and ICTR, for example, draw the line with respect to the admissibility of written evidence at statements going to the acts or conduct of an accused, as provided for under Rule 92bis of their respective rules of

---

439. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 56(1)(a).

440. Id. art. 69(4).

441. ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule 68 (allowing the introduction of “other documented evidence of [a witness] testimony.”).

442. See generally Lubanga Dyilo, ¶ 23 (noting the advantages of having evidence read into the record, as opposed to live testimony).

procedure. Given the length of trials and the amount and complexity of the evidence involved, the ICTY, for example, has been constrained to develop expeditious means of presenting evidence. As such, Rule 92bis is “designed to expedite the proceedings on matters that are not pivotal to the case, by avoiding the need to call and examine the witness and admitting his or her written statement as substantive evidence in lieu of his or her oral evidence.”

In the United States, the question turns on the ‘testimonial’ character of the statement, while in England, like several other Common Law jurisdictions, the question is framed as one that is fundamentally evidentiary, and thus governed by statutory rules of admissibility aimed at achieving fairness. In this sense, the line will be determined by many interests, among which the interests of the defense must compete.

As noted in Part IV, the ECHR and ICCPR do not define rules of admissibility. Thus, answers to evidentiary questions arising under these treaties depend primarily upon the degree to which evidence never subjected to cross-examination figures in support of a judgment of conviction; in essence, this is a retrospective standard of review, rather than a

444. See ICTR RPE, supra note 420, Rule 92bis; ICTY RPE, supra note 420, Rule 92bis; see generally Prosecutor v. Galiæ, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Rule 92bis(C), ¶ 10, June 7, 2002 (noting that Rule 92bis(A) excludes written statements which goes to prove that the accused: (a) personally perpetrated any of the charged crimes, (b) planned, instigated or ordered them, (c) aided and abetted those who committed the crimes in the planning, preparation or execution, (d) was a superior to those who committed the crimes, (e) knew or had reason to know such crimes were about to be or had been committed by his subordinates, and (f) failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or punish those acts) [hereinafter Galiæ Interlocutory Appeal]; see also Prosecutor v. Basogora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for the Admission of Written Witness Statements Under Rule 92bis, ¶ 13, Mar. 9, 2004 (noting that “Rule 92bis was primarily intended for ‘crime-base’ evidence.”). The admissibility of written statements relevant only to sentencing and the character of an accused under the ICTR’s procedure however, are considered factors favorable their admission. See ICTR RPE, supra note 420, Rule 92bis (e)– (f).

445. See generally Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T (T. Ch.), Decision on Prosecution Motion for the Admission of Transcripts in lieu of viva voce Testimony Pursuant to 92bis(D) - Foca Transcripts, ¶ 25, June 30, 2003.

446. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motions to Admit Prior Statements as Substantive Evidence, ¶ 15, Apr. 25, 2005; but see Galiæ Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 444, ¶¶ 14–15 (acknowledging that statements otherwise admissible under Rule 92bis may be so “proximate to the accused” that the Chamber may, in the exercise of its discretion, disallow it); see also Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Order Relating to Prosecution’s Applications to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92bis, ¶ 15, at 2, July 19, 2004 (noting that Rule 92bis is designed to expedite the presentation of evidence within the constraints of a fair trial).


448. See R. v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47, ¶ 36, at 102 (appeal taken from Eng.) (observing that the “CJA 2003 contains a crafted code intended to ensure that evidence is admitted only when it is fair that it should be.”).

449. See id. ¶ 108, at 124 (remarking that the provisions of CJA 2003 permitting uncross-examined evidence “strike[s] the right balance between the imperative that a trial must be fair and the interests of victims in particular and society in general. . . .”).

450. See supra Part IV.
2010 Traditions in Conflict: The Internationalization of Confrontation

prospective one.\footnote{In this author’s estimation, a reasonable position on the admissibility of testimonial hearsay in view of the ICC’s procedural framework would be to require the strict application of Article 67(e) and the protections afforded under Rule 68(a) and (b) as a predicate condition of admissibility where any statement, whether formal or informal, comprises a material element of responsibility for the crimes charged, or where such a statement goes to the proof of the acts or conduct of the accused. This effectively would fill the lacunae left by ICTY/ICTR procedure,\footnote{See Galiæ Interlocutory Appeal, supra note \textasciitilde{4}44, ¶ 9 (noting that Rule 92bis(A) differentiates “between (a) the acts and conduct of those others who commit the crimes for which the indictment alleges that the accused is individually responsible, and (b) the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment which establish his responsibility for the acts and conduct of others. It is only a written statement which goes to proof of the latter acts and conduct which Rule 92bis(A) excludes. . . .”)} address the core considerations of the right to examine—the receipt of inculpatory statements not subjected to cross-examination—and provide the accused with a meaningful ability to challenge crime-base evidence within a definite and predictable analytical framework. At the same time, this would allow for the receipt of relevant background evidence and evidence not materially in dispute, saving considerable time and resources in otherwise extremely lengthy and complex court proceedings.

The desirability of a clear bright-line standard of admissibility in international war crimes trials is further warranted when one considers several salient factors and their potential effect on the fairness of such trials. The most important of these factors are institutional inequality and the application of inapposite international standards.

1. Institutionalised Inequality

As set out in Part III, the principle of equality of arms frames the right to examine as conferred by virtually all modern regional and multilateral treaties subscribing to fair trial rights.\footnote{See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 14(3); ECHR, supra note 3, art. 6(3); ACHR, supra note 3, art. 8(2); ACHPR Resolution, supra note 3, art. 2(E); ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 21(4); ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(4); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 17(4), 2178 U.N.T.S. 138, [hereinafter SCSL Statute]; Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 16(4), S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter, STL Statute]; Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 67(1).} Article 67 of the Rome Statute imports the language of these instruments wholesale, providing in relevant part that:

1) In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, having regard to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair
hearing conducted impartially, and to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality . . .

e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her.454

Although this language is borrowed, the manner of its application under the procedural regime of the Rome Statute certainly need not be.

Practice, particularly at the ad hoc tribunals, has taught that the reality of international trials, like their domestic counterparts, do not always live up to normative notions of equality. In fact, great institutional disparity between an accused and the prosecution is inherent in the distribution of power contemplated by the respective organic statutes of international courts. For this reason, several of these institutions provide dedicated offices designed to safeguard defense rights during the course of criminal proceedings.455 Nevertheless, at least one commentator has observed, “the lack of strong defence institutions in the Rome Statute (following the texts of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals in this respect) makes the inequality of arms between prosecution and defense more striking.”456

The ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation and application of the principle of equality of arms as a procedural mechanism further underscores certain practical weaknesses that affect the fairness of trials.457 Indeed, little attention has been paid to the very real question of the substantive inequal-

454. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 67(1)(e).
455. See SCSL RPE, supra note 420, Rule 45 (creating the Office of the Principal Defender); International Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04, Reg. 77 (May 26, 2004) (providing for an “Office of Public Counsel for the Defence.”).
456. See Kenneth S. Gallant, Politics, Theory and Institutions: Three Reasons Why International Criminal Defence is Hard, and What Might Be Done About One of Them, 14 CRIM. L.F. 317, 327 (2003); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003 231-32 (2003) (observing that “[w]hile prosecutors included experienced international criminal lawyers from the [Serious Crimes Investigation Unit], the defense was provided by staff members from East Timor’s drastically under-resourced and inexperienced Public Defenders’ Office . . . [n]either the East Timorese nor the international defenders had any previous experience in crimes against humanity trials.”) (emphasis added).
457. See Masha Fedorova et al., Safeguarding the Rights of Suspects and Accused Persons in International Criminal Proceedings 15 (Institute for International Law Working Paper No. 27, 2009); see also Prosecutor v. Tadiæ, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 48–49, July 15, 1999 (noting that “there is nothing in the ECHR case law that suggests that the principle is applicable to conditions, outside the control of a court, that prevented a party from securing the attendance of certain witnesses.”). Although Tadiæ implied that the obligation of the Trial Chamber should be liberally construed, the true procedural underpinnings in the practical application of the principle of equality of arms were interpreted and followed in Prosecutor v. Nahimana, which noted that the defense “had ample opportunity and resources to defend the Accused under the same procedural conditions and with the same procedural rights as were accorded to the Prosecution.” Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Decision on the Motion to Stay the Proceedings in the Trial of Ferdinand Nahimana, ¶ 16, June 3, 2003 (emphasis added); see also Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-99-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 69, June 1, 2001 (observing that equality of arms does not require an equality of resources among the parties).
2010 Traditions in Conflict: The Internationalization of Confrontation

ity that exists between parties. As such, some commentators reasonably question whether it is ever possible to put the defense on equal footing with the prosecution in terms of means and resources. Unsurprisingly, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber “I” observed that it is “impossible to create a situation of absolute equality of arms.” Thus, at least in a normative sense, it would seem clear that the procedural and substantive guarantees available to a given accused must not only be interpreted broadly, but applied as robustly as possible in international criminal tribunals since, after all, “[the right of an accused to a fair hearing in full equality] is a right specifically attributed to the defendant and not to any party to the proceedings.” Further, the ICC’s Trial Chamber “I” has acknowledged that ICC cases will present infinitely variable circumstances in which the court will be asked to consider evidence, which will not infrequently have come into existence, or have been compiled or retrieved, in difficult circumstances, such as during particularly egregious instances of armed conflict, when those involved will have been killed or wounded, and the survivors or those affected may be untraceable or unwilling—for credible reasons—to give evidence.

Such cases will thus require a genuine right of confrontation.

Substantive disadvantages to an accused further obtain as the result of certain constraints concerning material aspects of trial preparation. The investigation and compulsion of evidence are particularly problematic areas, which require a vital compensatory right of examination. For instance, the prosecution may secure a substantial advantage over an accused in being able to obtain the cooperation of states and the use of sensitive material that a state would simply never make available to a given accused for any number of perfectly valid reasons. This may substantially compromise an accused’s ability to materially rebut or refute incriminatory evidence. Clearly, therefore, the fact that the principle of equality in human rights law may have to be balanced against these types of competing interests means that the procedural mechanisms designed to protect an accused’s substantive rights must also seriously take them into account.

---

461. Zappala, supra note 9, at 113.
462. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1399, Decision on the Admissibility of Four Documents, ¶ 24, (June 13, 2008).
463. See ICTY RPE, supra note 420, Rule 70; ICTR RPE, supra note 420, Rule 70; SCSL RPE, supra note 420, Rule 70; Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 54; ICC RPE, supra note 419, Rule 82.
464. Fedorova et al., supra note 457, at 17 (observing that disclosure obligations may be “counterbalanced by fundamental competing individual or public interests.”).
ICC judges have acknowledged that the principle of equality of arms requires that minimum guarantees “must be generously interpreted” in order to safeguard the right to a fair trial.\footnote{Lubanga Decision of Dec. 13, supra note 460, ¶ 18.} However, built in to a procedural conception of the principle is the inherent danger that competing interests—even those bearing no relation to the accused’s conduct—can all too easily compromise the right to examine.\footnote{Lubanga Decision of Dec. 13, supra note 460, ¶ 18.} The broad participatory right of victims in ICC proceedings is precisely such an area.\footnote{Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 68(3) (allowing victims whose “personal interests” are affected to present “their views and concerns”); see also Charles P. Trumbull IV, The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings, 29 Mich. J. Int’l L. 777, 796 (2008) (observing that victims have “the same right as the Defence and Prosecution to introduce evidence in ICC proceedings.”).} Commentators have thus cautioned that the incorporation of the ICC victim’s bill of rights as a core procedural tenet “may adulterate, and ultimately dilute, basic structural due process protections of ICC defendants.”\footnote{Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44 (Dec. 16, 2009) (amending ICTY RPE in order to provide for the admissibility of written statements of witnesses subject to interference). While this amendment covers culpable behavior by an accused resulting in the unavailability of evidence, it does not exclude from its ambit interference with witnesses caused by sources unrelated to the accused.}

This may overstate the case somewhat; nonetheless, due process protections are necessarily put at risk where the rights of victims and accused are placed in competition.\footnote{Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 68(3).} The question is whether, in light of the procedural guarantees provided for under Article 67, the right to examine will normatively be accorded priority in view of the nature and gravity of the crimes charged.

2. *Inapposite International Standards*

a. Victim participation

As mentioned above, the extent of victim participation raises genuine questions concerning the substantive equality afforded an accused in ICC proceedings. The Appeals Chamber has confirmed that Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute affords victims the right to participate, *inter alia*, in the trial phase of the proceedings.\footnote{Trumbull, supra note 467, at 796–97.} While the right of victims to introduce evidence during confirmation hearings is restricted,\footnote{The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-474, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of a Case, ¶¶ 101–03, 110–12, May 13, 2008.} the evidence that may be led and examined in relation to material aspects of the charges against an accused at trial is quite broad. For example, although the right to present substantive evidence primarily belongs to the defense and prosecution,\footnote{Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(3).} the Appeals Chamber has acknowledged that there is no provi-
sion in the Rome Statute or ICC RPE that “preclude[s] the possibility for victims to lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused and to challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence during the trial proceedings.” The Appeals Chamber has observed that “if victims were generally and under all circumstances precluded from tendering evidence relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused and from challenging the admissibility or relevance of evidence, their right to participate in the trial would potentially become ineffectual.” The extension of such rights at trial thus provides victims with a meaningful right of participation as intended by Article 68(3).

While the extension of victim participatory rights does not necessarily entail a correlative reduction in the protection afforded an accused, it clearly raises the possibility. Insofar as the guarantees provided under Article 67(e) emerge from an Adversarial modality, there is a serious question as to whether, as applied, it can adequately accommodate victims’ participatory interests without substantively undermining those of the defense. ICC Appeals Chamber Judge Pikis observes that the participation of victims envisioned under Article 68(3)

has no immediate parallel to or association with the participation of victims in either the common law system of justice as evolved in England and Wales, where no role is acknowledged to victims in criminal proceedings except for the right to initiate a private prosecution, or the Romano-Germanic system of justice, where victims in the role of civil parties or auxiliary prosecutors have a wide-ranging right to participate in criminal proceedings.

In this sense, the right to examine does not contemplate the substantial participation of victims. Indeed, as a precursor of Article 67(e), Article 6 of the European Convention reflects this position as well, particularly insofar as it contains no explicit requirement that the interests of victims be taken into consideration. As such, the emergent rules are calculated to safeguard these interests within a procedural paradigm which subsumes an adversarial right to examine within the broader context of the burden of proof which limits confrontation to the evidence adduced by the prosecution. As an element of fundamental fairness, the principle of equality of arms in view of the burden of proof further requires that an accused cannot be compelled to confront more than one accuser—”[h]olding the scales

---

473. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-925 OA9 OA10, Judgment on the Appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, ¶ 94 (July 11, 2008) [hereinafter Appeals Judgment on Victims’ Participation].
474. Id. ¶ 97.
475. Id. ¶ 97.
476. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-925 OA8 (Appeals Chamber), Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the “Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber” of 2 February 2007, Separate Opinion of Judge Georgios M. Pikis, ¶ 11 (June 13, 2007) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Pikis Separate Opinion].
even between the parties with the burden of proof cast upon the Prosecutor rules out a second accuser. 479

Given that the ICC’s procedural framework leaves both the substance and scope of a victim’s participation exclusively within the discretion of the Court, 480 the adequacy of the protection afforded an accused’s right to examine is at best uncertain, as it is determined on a case-by-case basis. Further, requiring “[vigilance] in safeguarding the rights of the accused . . . [taking] into account, inter alia, whether the hearing of such evidence would be appropriate, timely or for other reasons should not be ordered,” 481 is hardly a concrete analytical mechanism by which core fair trial rights may be reliably safeguarded.

It is difficult to imagine how the broad participatory rights of victims—which will likely run contrary to the interests of an accused—can avoid having a significant impact on the balance of equities between the prosecution and defense, such that the extant due process mechanisms that support the ICC’s procedural framework can be applied, as they would be in the absence of any such third-party intervention.

b. Incongruity of the teleological approach

The two principle considerations that underlie the teleological approach taken by the UNHRC and European Court concerning the scope of the right to examine are dictated by necessity: first, the establishment of a flexible analytical framework capable of accommodating divergent cultural and legal systems and second, the establishment of an international consensus on minimal standards of fairness. 482 However, both of these considerations are extraneous to the fundamental objectives of the Rome Statute.

As set out above, the European Court (similarly to the UNHRC) considers that:

the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law and as a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them. The Court’s task under the Convention is not to give a ruling as to whether statements of witnesses were properly admitted as evidence, but rather to ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in

479. Id. ¶ 19.
480. Appeals Judgment on Victims’ Participation, supra note 473, ¶ 86 (noting that “victims participating in the proceedings may be permitted to tender and examine evidence if in the view of the Chamber it will assist in the determination of the truth, and if in this sense the Court has ‘requested’ the evidence.”) (quoting Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on Victims’ Participation, Jan. 18, 2008, ¶ 108); see also id. ¶ 95 (providing for the exercise of participatory right “at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court.”).
481. Appeals Judgment on Victims’ Participation, supra note 473, ¶ 100.
Unlikely the European Court, the ICC is neither designed, nor bound, to defer to the evidentiary rules and standards of any other jurisdiction. Contrary to the ICCPR and ECHR, the ICC is expressly required to interpret and apply its own statute and procedural rules pursuant to a uniquely established hierarchy. Although in many respects these rules mirror those of other international jurisdictions, they are nevertheless distinct within the Court’s homogenous framework. Moreover, they are at least presumably calculated to achieve the highest standards of procedural and substantive fairness—as opposed to the merely minimum consensus-led safeguards that are designed to embrace widely-divergent systems under the ICCPR and European Convention. Thus, although a broad-based teleological approach to the right to examine may be explainable, and indeed justifiable, in crafting a manageable approach to assess diverse legal traditions, the rationale for following this approach and its derivative rules in a unitary system does not hold.

Furthermore, the ICC’s unique procedure supports the adoption of an admissibility analysis that focuses specifically on the values and standards expressed in the ICC RPE and the Rome Statute as normative deontological objectives. Article 21 of the Rome Statute establishes an arguably sui generis hierarchy concerning the law applied by the Court, providing amongst other things for the application of the “Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence” and requiring that “the application and interpretation of law . . . must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights.” This, of course, does not mean that the implementation of these rights must be co-extensive with the minimum safeguards established under the ICCPR and European Convention. Rather, the Court’s authority to interpret its own statute and procedure readily distinguishes its purpose from that of the UNHRC and European Court, and affords the Court the ability to depart from the dogma underlying these minimal protections and to more fully protect the adversarial examination of witnesses as a core right of its own importance.

c. The nebulous ‘decisive extent’/‘considerable weight’ standard

As set out above, the doctrine of the European Court regarding the right to examine permits a court to take full account of evidence subjected to neither confrontation nor cross-examination, provided a conviction is not based solely or to a decisive extent thereupon.\(^{487}\) Similarly, the UNHRC proscribes convictions in which statements not subjected to cross-examination are given “considerable weight.”\(^{488}\) As there has yet to be a conviction before the ICC, it remains unclear whether the Court will adopt either of these of standards. Nevertheless, both present at least two fundamental problems. First, there is a definitional issue: how extensive must reliance be to qualify as a ‘decisive’? Or how much weight amounts to ‘considerable weight’?\(^{489}\) Second, these standards are necessarily retrospective and thus more suitable for a standard of review, rather than service as a standard of prospective admissibility at trial.

The European Court has captured the notion of decisive evidence in a variety of ways, such as, evidence having “decisive importance for the legal characterization of the offence;”\(^{490}\) evidence upon which a conviction is “based mainly;”\(^{491}\) or evidence which has “played a part establishing the facts which led to the conviction.”\(^{492}\) Still other cases have found violations of Article 6 where a conviction is “solely or to a decisive degree” based on statements not subjected to cross-examination.\(^{493}\) This shows that the Court’s jurisprudence does not establish any clear threshold beyond which a conviction becomes impermissibly based on testimony not subjected to cross-examination, excepting the rare situation where such evidence is indeed the sole evidence supporting a conviction. Relatively, to this author’s knowledge, the Court has never found trial proceedings to be fair when the accused has been unable to test, however defined, the ‘sole’ or ‘decisive’ evidence underpinning a conviction. Nevertheless, while this ambiguity may reflect the Court’s need to further define minimum standards of fairness applicable across diverse procedural systems, the current standard plainly suffers from the same substantive shortcomings as those

\(^{487}\) See Law Comm’n for Eng. & Wales, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topic, Law Com. No. 245, ¶ 5.24, at 64 (1997) (observing that “although Article 6(3)(d) puts limits on the extent to which the prosecution may make use of hearsay evidence, nothing in Article 6 restricts the use of hearsay evidence by the defence.”).


\(^{489}\) For a similarly malleable standard in the American context, see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (articulating the famous “I know it when I see it” standard of review in respect of determining the scope of an obscenity statute).

\(^{490}\) Makeyev, App. No. 13769/04, ¶ 43.


\(^{492}\) Lüdi v. Switzerland, 238 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 47, at 21 (1992); see also Taxquet v. Belgium, App. No. 926/05, ¶65, Jan. 13, 2009, (articulating Lüdi’s corroboration requirement, conversely as “whether the conviction is based to a significant extent on other evidence not derived from anonymous sources.”) (emphasis added).

recognized in Crawford’s criticism of Ohio v. Roberts; namely that a framework based upon amorphous criteria that is unpredictable fails to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations.\footnote{494. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).}

The fact that the European Court will not permit a conviction to stand where uncross-examined or untested hearsay is ‘decisive’ to a given conviction is of little assurance to an accused insofar as “the court will not find that a trial was unfair simply because hearsay evidence was most likely a major factor in the defendant’s conviction.”\footnote{495. Conor Mulcahy, Unfair Consequences: How the Reforms to the Rule Against Hearsay in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Violate a Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 28 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 405, 423 (2005) (citing Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the European Court of Human Rights, 21 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 777, 791 (2003)).} Indeed, it is not a stretch to conclude that the mere fact that a court may take account of testimony not subjected to cross-examination “will always be because the court considers it a ‘decisive’ part of that evidence.”\footnote{496. Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 691, ¶ 10, at 724 (Van Dijk, J., dissenting).} In this sense, the standard is at best extremely difficult and impractical to apply and assess. As a prospective standard of admissibility, it would imply that every piece of hearsay evidence would have to be evaluated to determine if it could be dispositive (whether decisively or solely)—a clearly difficult, impractical and unpredictable endeavor.\footnote{497. See R. v. Horncastle, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 964, [2009] 2 Crim. App. 15, ¶ 69, at 39 (observing that identifying which hearsay evidence is the sole evidence in a case in advance may not be initially clear, as proffered corroborative evidence may successfully be challenged, and that conversely, evidence that stands alone may come to be supported by evidence during trial).} On the other hand, as a standard of review, it may very well be impossible to determine whether a particular statement was truly decisive or given considerable weight in establishing a conviction in the face of a well-reasoned decision claiming precisely the opposite.

d. Devaluation of the impact of crime-base and background evidence

The decisive extent rule, like that of the ad hoc tribunals prohibiting acts or conduct evidence, undervalues the impact of crime-base evidence in international war crimes trials. While as a general proposition, the more crucial evidence is to the guilt of an accused, the more carefully a court must account for its reliability and its fair adduction at trial, crime-base or background evidence—even that necessary to establish liability—tends to be an exception. Hearsay is regularly admitted to establish fundamental elements of international crimes, while so-called linkage evidence establishing the responsibility of the accused tends to be more carefully scrutinized.\footnote{498. See generally Jackson, supra note 459, at 28–33 (2009) (discussing the admissibility of evidence in international criminal tribunals, including the “crime base” and “conduct of the accused” evidence).} However, inasmuch as considerable or decisive evidence may carry a risk of unreliability and thus require testing through confrontation, there is no particular reason why evidence that is not decisive or considera-
ble is any less risky, or why testing through confrontation is any less necessary. The importance that a statement not subjected to cross-examination has to a conviction is distinct from its reliability, and it is reliability to which the right of examination essentially attends.

e. The corroboration requirement

Although the decisive extent standard requires the corroboration of dispositive evidence that has not been subjected to cross-examination in order to sustain a conviction, this too is insufficiently defined. Similarly to the European Court, the ICTY holds that convictions cannot be based solely or in a “decisive manner” on witness depositions concerning the accused’s acts or conduct in the absence of an opportunity to examine or have examined such witnesses during the investigation or at trial, unless such depositions are otherwise corroborated.

In the contempt case of Haraqija and Morina, the accused and another were convicted of contempt of court for intimidating a witness in another case. Haraqija’s conviction was based upon the statements of his co-accused, who claimed, inter alia, that Haraqija had directed him to prevail upon a witness not to testify against Haraqija. To the extent that Haraqija’s conduct was found to be an integral part of the conduct of his co-accused in intimidating the witness, the Trial Chamber found Haraqija guilty of contempt.

On appeal, Haraqija argued that the dispositive evidence against him—a statement given by his co-accused to the office of the prosecutor implicating Haraqija in the conduct subject to the contempt proceeding—should not have been admitted. The statement was admitted at trial even though his co-accused refused to testify. In its judgment, the Trial Chamber found the co-accused’s statement to be sufficiently corroborated by an intercepted conversation involving the co-accused, in which the co-accused told the witness that he had been sent by Haraqija. The defense challenged this evidence, arguing that the corroboration relied upon by the Trial Chamber was in fact derived from the same source—a source not subjected to cross-examination—and thus could not legally support the conviction consistently with Haraqija’s right to

---

499. See Kirst, supra note 257, at 796-97.  
502. Id. ¶ 6.  
503. Id. ¶¶ 60, 100, 102.  
505. Id. ¶¶ 17-19.  
506. Id.  
Indeed, the Trial Chamber determined that corroborating evidence in this context “may include pieces of evidence that, although originating from the same source, arose under different circumstances, or at different times and for different purposes.”

While the Appeals Chamber determined that the Trial Chamber erred in placing decisive weight on the testimony of Haraqija’s co-accused, it held so not because it considered that corroboration sufficient to sustain a conviction may not be derived from other evidence not subject to cross-examination; instead, it held as it did because of the Trial Chamber’s failure to ascribe the appropriate weight to certain ambiguities and deficiencies found in the account of the co-accused.

In the Haraqija case, the Appeals Chamber appears to have reached the right result. However, in applying the prescribed ICTY standard to ICC proceedings, the inherent danger to the right to examine is plain. Moreover, it speaks directly to the difficulties inherent in an essentially adopted international standard, in this case resulting in the suggestion that a declarant’s prior statements which had not been subjected to cross-examination can be used as corroboration of later statements that are similarly uncontested, even if such later statements substantially underlie or decisively determine a given conviction.

Even if uniformly applied, the requirement of corroboration as it stands is still deficient in as much as the presence of corroborating evidence does not necessarily mean that a conviction is not, or indeed could not be, based to a decisive extent on the untested evidence. In this sense, the scope of the right to examine ultimately turns upon an impractical and difficult fact-intensive ad hoc review of the evidence which, although arguably appropriate as a minimum standard of review of the fairness of trials among diverse legal systems, should have no plausible application to ICC trials.

**Conclusion**

Transplanted legal concepts such as the right to examine cannot be expected to carry the same import or to achieve the same goals as those contemplated within their original procedural framework. The character of a given legal culture manifests a blend of procedure and substance which, although not simple equivalents, are “ultimately . . . inseparable, and will be misunderstood if analyzed as distinct.”

---

508. *Id.* ¶¶ 21–22.

509. *Id.* ¶ 41 (emphasis added); cf. Spencer, supra note 175, at 259 (observing that Article 6 of the ECHR precludes dispositive hearsay evidence “unless it was corroborated by some other significant piece of evidence, to which the same objection cannot be made.”).


Because the right to confront or examine generally proceeds from a matrix of complementary procedural and substantive considerations primarily within the Adversarial tradition, its hybridization into the procedures of the ICC warrants careful consideration of the constituent elements necessary to maintain its purpose and effectiveness. Safeguarding the right in such circumstances necessarily entails a reliable and consistent approach to the interpretation of relevant procedural rules. Nebulous analytical standards that circumscribe the right to examine render it all the more susceptible to the weaknesses which attend hybridization, particularly in the absence of an equivalent complement of procedural safeguards normally present in the original legal setting thereof.\footnote{513. Examples of such nebulous standards include the American “sufficient indicia of reliability” test, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 (1980), and the European Court’s “decisive extent” test, Doorson v. The Netherlands, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 446 ¶ 76, at 272.}

As an institution, the ICC must share in the broad expectation that it “fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of an accused at all stages of its proceedings.”\footnote{514. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 106, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (referring to the establishment of the ICTY).} It should command no less esteem than that hoped for in the creation of other international tribunals, namely to “establish itself as the preeminent defender of human rights and particularly the right of every accused to a fair trial according to the most exacting standards of due process required by contemporary international law.”\footnote{515. Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 235, 237 (1996).} So far as “[t]he provisions of the Rome Statute and the practice of the international tribunals require [international] courts to aspire to the highest standards set by international human rights treaties, customary international law, and general principles of law,”\footnote{516. Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 117 (2002).} the rights of the accused to a fair trial should never be regarded as either ancillary or mediate.

Like the Rome Statute, the London Charter—which established the International Military Tribunal in Europe after World War II—also provided for a right of examination.\footnote{517. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, § IV, art. 16(e), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (providing that “[a] Defendant shall have the right through himself, or through his Counsel to present evidence at the trial in support of his defence, and to cross-examine any witness called by the prosecution.”); cf. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, § III, art. 9(d), Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (providing that the right to a fair trial is subject to “such reasonable restrictions as the Tribunal may determine.”).} However, the International Military Tribunal’s application of this right was pointedly criticized because of the extensive use of ex parte affidavits in contravention of an accused’s ability to effectively confront witnesses and evidence.\footnote{518. See Amann, supra note 55, at 819–20 (2000) (noting that the London Charter’s protections were minimal and that contrary to Article IV, defendants did not receive fair
view of the fact that “[t]he Rome Statute does not contain any categorical prohibitions or restrictions on the introduction of affidavit testimony.” 519 It is extremely important that ICC proceedings infuse the right to examine with real substance. Indeed, its application must be more than a nod in the right direction wholly dependent upon the best intentions of international judges.

Because the use of affidavit and transcript evidence is, and will remain, a fundamental part of international criminal procedure, Article 67(1)(e) cannot merely aspire to the acceptable minimal international standards. Instead, it must reliably ensure a meaningful and predictable opportunity for an accused to adversarially examine trial witnesses. If we proceed upon the premise that the process of determining the guilt or innocence of an accused is no less important than its result, it is easy to see why a well-defined right to confrontation best approximates fairness within the context of the ICC’s hybridized procedure, and provides the most effective way to fulfill the normative objective of testing the reliability of evidence before the court. A bright-line standard of admissibility provides the clarity, predictability, and regularity needed for international proceedings to live up to the adage that “[a] vigorous, unintimidated, knowledgeable defense is the sine qua non of a fair trial.” 520

519. DeFrancia, supra note 469, at 1430.