ESSAY

THE CHARACTER OF LEGAL THEORY

Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner†

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INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time—or at least so the conventional story goes—a cohesive methodology united academic lawyers. Langdellian legal science envisioned law as an autonomous discipline governed by three characteristic intellectual moves: classification, induction, and deduction.1 Legal realists discredited this pristine vision of legal theory by demonstrating that the multiplicity of doctrinal sources renders it hopelessly indeterminate.2 One typical response by legal scholars has been abandoning the notion of a legal theory and borrowing a theoretical discipline from the social sciences or from the humanities. Another response has been discarding the idea of legal theory by highlighting the practical wisdom of lawyers and celebrating law as a craft.3

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2 Id. at 611–17.
Both types of responses contributed immensely to the academic analysis of law. But both, explicitly or implicitly, disparaged too quickly the enterprise of a postformalist legal theory, which is irreducible to another discipline. This has resulted in the disciplinary malaise of the legal academy, which is the subject of this Symposium. In academia, disciplinary malaise can quickly evolve into crisis, and an increasing fragmentation of (American) law schools to “minidepartments” of other disciplines cautions that we would be wise to be mindful. But at the same time, tormented soul-searching seems somewhat awkward given the thriving industry of distinctly legal theories of, for example, property, regulation, international relations, and human rights, at least according to our understanding of the concept of legal theory.

Our mission in this Essay is to describe legal theory as an enterprise robust enough to justify separate naming. Legal theory focuses on the work of society’s coercive normative institutions. It studies the traditions of these institutions and the craft typifying their members while at the same time continuously challenging their outputs by demonstrating their contingency and testing their desirability. In performing the latter tasks, legal theory necessarily absorbs lessons from law’s neighboring disciplines. But at its best, legal theory is more than a sophisticated synthesis of relevant insights from these friendly neighbors because of its pointed attention to the classic jurisprudential questions regarding the nature of law, notably the relationship between law’s normativity and its coerciveness and the implications of its institutional and structural characteristics.

Before we turn to elaborate on these features in Part II, we begin in Part I with an outline of the three other important discourses about law. While the first two—law and policy and sociohistorical analysis of law—both represent the three dots after “law and . . . ,” they are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate treatment. The third discourse—craft—is obviously different from the first two. Sketching these three genres of legal scholarship is instrumental for our task because analyzing the ways in which legal theory is different from these other modes helps us characterize legal theory. It is also important because it allows us, in Part III, to offer some remarks concerning the interrelationship between these four members of the family of legal discourses.

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I

A Topology of Discourses About Law

A. Law and Policy

The familiar approach of law and policy begins with Oliver Wendell Holmes’s prescription that legal reasoning should be concerned with providing reasons that refer to the social ends of law—to “considerations of social advantage”—and that “those who make and develop the law should have those ends articulately in their minds.” This focus, Holmes predicted, is bound to extract legal discourse from its solitude: jurists will have to study “the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them” and thus to utilize lessons from bordering disciplines, such as criminology and political economy. This prediction explains, of course, his celebrated dictum that “the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.”

It is in this spirit that Roscoe Pound called for “‘team-work’ between jurisprudence and the other social sciences.” Roscoe Pound insisted that jurists must take account of the “social facts” to which various legal institutions apply, evaluate the “the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines,” and choose among competing alternatives according to the desirability of the actual consequences of their realization. This emphasis on the social effects of law and on the means for producing these effects, Pound argued, needs to be made as the interpretive strategy of courts, as the proper way for preparing legislation within the legislative branch, and as an important focus of legal history. The famous “Brandeis brief” provides an early epitome of this vision, as it recruited social science to legal advocacy by incorporating empirical findings of social scientists in a formal legal presentation.

5 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 184 (1920).
6 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, Address Before the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 17, 1899), in Collected Legal Papers, supra note 5, at 210, 238–39.
8 Holmes, supra note 5, at 187.
10 Id. at 513.
11 Id. at 512–16; see also, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, in Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice 42, 70–73 (1962) (arguing that policy considerations influence judicial interpretations of precedent).
As these early manifestations of law and policy imply, students of these schools view legal rules and other forms of law as “most essentially tools devised to serve practical ends” and thus insist that “rules and other varieties of law, once created, ought to be interpreted, elaborated, and applied in light of the ends they are to serve.” As Felix Cohen succinctly described, law and policy shifts legal discourse “away from the attempt to systematize and compare” or “from concern with the genesis and evolution” and toward “a study of the consequences . . . in terms of human motivation and social structure” and away from the lawyer–craftsman standards of “legal beauty or finesse” towards “concrete human values” and “the effects of law upon human desires and feelings.”

For many legal scholars, this shift is a matter of degree. But at its extreme version, policy swallows law. Thus, as early as 1934, Edward Robinson described law as “an unscientific science” and urged lawyers to become scientific. Robinson claimed that “legal science has imposed a constant drag upon the adventurous spirit of the times.” He described the practice of precedent—the principle that the concurrence of a judge with his predecessors is a direct test of the validity of his decision—as “a habit of mind in which a stupidity may be perpetuated on the grounds that it is well-established.” He vigorously criticized this “conservative logic” and argued that the only way of “attaining an improved set of values as to what courts ought to do” is by “going through a period during which we thoroughly discredit many of the things courts have been thought to do.” In this view, lawyers—especially academic lawyers—should become genuine social engineers; for such engineering to be successful, legal scholarship should apply social scientific methods for the practical solution of sociolegal problems.

At times, it seems that some contemporary branches of law and policy faithfully fulfill Robinson’s legacy. In its extreme manifestation, law and policy takes the methodology of another discipline (typically economics) to explain legal doctrine or to call for its reform with...
no reference, explicit or implicit, to the concept of law or to the possible constraints of law’s constitutive characteristics. It was from this perspective that George Priest claimed that “legal scholarship has become specialized according to the separate social sciences” so that a law school should be structured as “a set of miniature graduate departments in the various disciplines.”20 Given this dominance of such other disciplines, Priest claimed that it is difficult to justify “why law is a subject worthy of study at all,” and he furthermore denied even the utility in “extensive knowledge of the intricacies of legal doctrine and legal argument.”21

B. Sociohistorical Analyses of Law

We call the second grouping in our map of legal discourses sociohistorical analyses of law. The label is consciously unfamiliar as no scholar uses the phrase to describe his or her own work. Sociohistorical analyses have distinctly different characteristics from legal science and from the law and policy approaches discussed above. And despite the wide range of methodologies involved, we believe there are certain common features that justify grouping these types of analyses together.

First, sociohistorical analyses see law as a subject matter or as a field of inquiry distinct from scholarship about law. To the twenty-first century American reader, this point may seem obvious, but one should remember how starkly this distinguishes such analyses from traditional legal science. Recall that at its height, legal science—especially in its most developed (German) version—viewed scholarly production as a crucial aspect of the law itself, whether as a formal source or as a binding guide to interpret posited norms. As John Merryman and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo famously described this vision, “The teacher-scholar is the real protagonist of the civil law tradition. The civil law is a law of the professors.”22 While law and policy approaches do not go so far, they are often framed in terms that blur the boundaries between scholarship and legal practice, leading to what Edward

20 George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 437, 441 (1983).
21 Id. at 438–39. Later, Priest added that interdisciplinarity does not imply the neglect of legal doctrine, but even his later writings testify that by “interdisciplinary research,” Priest in fact meant research that uses a methodology of another discipline. See George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1936 (1993).
22 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 56 (3d ed. 2007); see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE BASICS 36 (2005) (noting that civil law scholars “never suffered a demotion of status to secondary authority”).
Rubin described warily as a "unity of discourse." Sociohistorical analyses, in contrast, constantly (and some might say obsessively) draw attention to a sharp distinction between their own academic discourse—including its language, method, audience, and goals—and the instrumental orientation they associate with practical legal discourse.

A second, related feature of sociohistorical analyses is that they typically eschew any normative or reformist impulse and thus bracket the typical perspective of much legal scholarship that concentrates on solving concrete legal problems or existing social problems through law. For some scholars who use what we call sociohistorical analyses, this distance from a normative perspective requires an apologetic posture. For others, it is a point of pride. The distance from the normative perspective is a matter of degree (and dispute). Thus, some scholars see a total divorce from the normative perspective as a precondition for quality scholarship while others suggest that bracketing direct normative questions will eventually lead back to normative inquiry with new perspectives. But almost all sociohistorical analyses suspend direct normative inquiry in large measure.

The third feature of sociohistorical analyses is a sense of reflexivity. Analyses of this sort are constantly folding back onto themselves, pouring attention on categories like legal consciousness and on the role of the scholar in shaping consciousness. This type of reflexivity may have been born of the jurisprudential conflicts between legal realists and their predecessors—conflicts that forced the actors into self-
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Conscious positions on legal scholarship itself. Generations later, such analyses were part of what gave critical legal studies much of its energy, but the reflexive mode has spread well beyond critical legal studies. Paul Kahn’s voice is indicative: “The only way out of the limitless claims of the hermeneutic circle is self-reflexive. That is, we must be able to take the categories of experience as a subject of reflection even as we deploy them.”

These three features—distinguishing scholarship from practice, suspending normative inquiry, and reflexivity—are not necessarily present in every sociohistorical analysis. Taken together, however, they roughly mark out a style of legal scholarship readily identifiable in today’s academy, and when taken to their logical endpoint, they raise serious doubts about the very possibility of legal theory:

[Legal study unavoidably becomes a program for the reform of law. With this, the line separating the scholar from the object of his or her study disappears. The study of law turns out not to be an intellectual discipline at all; it is a part of the practice that was to be the very object of study. From the very beginning, the study of law is co-opted by legal practice. The independence of the discipline will never be possible unless the understanding deployed in theoretical inquiry can be distinguished from the reason deployed in legal practice. Such a distinction in the forms of reason is neither readily available nor easily achieved.

C. Law as Craft

Alongside policy and sociohistorical studies, a third genre of legal discourse identifies law as neither science nor art, but as craft. Aristotelian in its inspiration, this group of studies focuses attention on

29 For mature versions of critical legal studies analyses that concentrate on what it means for legal academics to develop their particular styles of scholarship and argumentation, see generally Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (1997); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? 63–78 (1996).
31 An additional feature of sociohistorical analyses is that they often concentrate heavily on how law, broadly conceived, impacts subjectivity or identity. A recurrent theme in sociohistorical analyses is the belief that “law is constitutive of group and individual identities and values. . . . Scholars of law and culture focus on the materiality of law, the way in which law simultaneously embodies the interests of particular groups and shapes those interests—and even shapes the identities of those who understand themselves as members of such groups.” Id. at 162. There is nothing logically necessary about a focus on the constitution of subjectivity, but the focus is prevalent and figures as a major aspect of what sociohistorical analysis is about today (possibly varying from such analyses early in the twentieth century).
32 Kahn, supra note 27, at 18.
33 For an extended elaboration, see Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2245, 2274–2322 (2001).
law’s shared professional norms and on what Karl Llewellyn referred to as lawyers’ “ways of doing,” 34 “working knowhow,” 35 “operating technique,” 36 or “craft-conscience.” 37

Two strands of legal scholarship seek to explore and give meaning to this inward-looking focus. 38 One such strand is procedural, studying the institutional structure of (common law) adjudication as the epitome of virtuous legal dispositions and as the core of law’s legitimacy. Thus, Llewellyn claims that the legal ethos—which is epitomized in the adversary process and the judicial opinion and is reinforced by “[t]ime, place, architecture and interior arrangement, supporting officials, garb, [and] ritual”—directs judges to be “[o]pen, truly open, to listen, to get informed, to be persuaded, to respond to good reason.” 39 More recently, Owen Fiss highlighted a number of significant institutional features: the requirement of judicial independence, the concept of a nondiscretionary jurisdiction, the obligation to listen to all affected parties, the tradition of the signed opinion, and the neutral principles requirement. 40

The structural characteristics of the judicial office, Llewellyn and Cohen argued, have a “majestic power” to channel judges into “service of the whole.” 41 They make the legal arena into a forum in which conflicting perspectives constantly challenge the participants’ normative and empirical horizons. They thus encourage lawyers—notably judges—to develop a “synoptic vision” that is “a distinguishing mark of

35 Id. at 214.
37 LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 214; see K.N. Llewellyn, My Philosophy of Law, in My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 183, 185 (1941) (asserting that lawyers “know law as a craft”). For a differently inflected set of references to Llewellyn’s view of the craft of law, see Scharffs, supra note 33, at 2248–49.
38 We will address the third strand, dealing with normative coherence, in Part II.B, infra, because it integrates craft with policy. We did not include coherence of the doctrinal type in our topology because, aside from the more technical aspects of the law, a reference to coherence—like other formalist strategies—is question begging. See Hanoch Dagan, Codification, Coherence, and Priority Conflicts, in THE DRAFT CIVIL CODE FOR ISRAEL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 149, 151–52 (Kurt Siehr & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2008).
39 LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 46–47.
40 See Owen Fiss, The Law As It Could Be 163 (2003); see also id. at 11–12, 14, 54–55, 68 (describing the obligations of judges and the limitations placed on judicial discretion); John Rawls, Political Liberalism 235–36 (1993) (arguing that judges must “appeal to the political values” that they ascribe to “the public conception and its political values of justice and public reason”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365 (1978) (describing judges’ roles in an “institutional framework that is intended to assure to the disputants an opportunity for the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments”).
41 LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 48.
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liberal civilization." Hence, at its best, legal professionalism (and, in this view, legal theory at its best) makes lawyers “experts in that necessary but difficult task of forming judgment without single-phase expertness, but in terms of a Whole, seen whole.”

The second inward-looking strand focuses on the skill of lawyers—judges, practitioners, and legal academics—to capture the factual subtleties of different types of cases and to adjust the legal treatment to the specific characteristics of each of these categories. Herman Oliphant, for example, celebrated the traditional common law strategy of employing narrow legal categories, which help to produce “the discrimination necessary for intimacy of treatment,” holding lawyers close to “the actual transactions before them” and thus encouraging them to shape law “close and contemporary” to the human problems they deal with. This strategy facilitates one distinct comparative advantage of lawyers (as opposed to, say, economists and political philosophers) in producing legal norms: their unmediated access to actual human situations and problems in contemporary life. When law’s categories are in tune with those of life so that an “alert sense of actuality checks our reveries in theory,” lawyers enjoy “the illumination which only immediacy affords and the judiciousness which reality alone can induce.” Of course, Oliphant’s is just one particular (and particularly optimistic) view of thinking like a lawyer. Attention to law as rhetoric or discourse may reach conclusions quite opposed to the view of lawyers as enjoying illumination or unmediated access to human situations.

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42 Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, in The Legal Conscience: Selected Papers of Felix S. Cohen, supra note 14, at 121, 125.
43 Karl N. Llewellyn, American Common Law Tradition, and American Democracy, in Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice, supra note 11, at 282, 310; see also, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 880–87 (1990) (describing the benefits to law of “challenging . . . rules and ideologies” from “particular, self-conscious perspectives”).
46 For a particularly striking example, see Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer,” 4–11, 207–23 (2007). On the basis of a close linguistic analysis of the language employed in teaching first-year contracts, Elizabeth Mertz concludes that thinking like a lawyer requires initiation into a particular tradition of thinking and that the tradition places limits on law’s democratic aspirations. Deciding between the likes of Oliphant and Mertz is not our task here. The point is to show that analyses of the rhetoric of law have a wide range of valence and methodologies. For an additional view of the limitations that legal rhetoric imposes, see Marianne Constable, Just Silences: The Limits and Possibilities of Modern Law 8–44 (2005).
Anthony Kronman, writing in the same inspirational mode as Oli-
phant, argues that instilling attentiveness to context into legal dis-
ourse helps to nourish some of the legal profession’s most significant
qualities. Kronman conceptualizes these qualities in terms of sympa-
thy and detachment: the uneasy combination of a compassion ena-
bling lawyers to imagine themselves in their clients’ position (or, for
judges, in that of the litigants) and independence, coolness, and re-
serve that are prerequisites for the ability to pass judgment on the
situation’s merits. This combination of sympathy and detachment
is, for Kronman, the professional toolkit of lawyers and the crux of
law’s authority and legitimacy.

At times, writers in this mode of discourse seem to argue that
their accounts exhaust what law, properly speaking, is all about. It
follows, they claim, that legal scholarship should focus on studying the
structures (including substantive doctrine and procedure) of law as
well as the character traits that are most conducive to practical wis-
dom. Scholars like Fiss, Brett Scharffs, Ernest Weinrib, and James
Boyd White have developed a perspective that recognizes the content
of law as immanent in practical legal materials while simultaneously
accord legal scholarship an important role. Kronman goes even
further: he contrasts the qualities of sympathy and detachment with
“theoretical extravagance.” He argues that the professional ideal he
articulates is one of practical wisdom—“wisdom about human beings
and their tangled affairs”—that is a human excellence, a disposition
associated with certain temperamental qualities rather than any form
of technical expertise. Therefore, Kronman insists that law’s profes-
sional ideal should be divorced from any instrumental approach to
law and not be “tempted by the false ideal of a legal science.”

II

Characterizing Legal Theory

As we indicated at the outset, we have no quarrel with the investi-
gation of law from the three perspectives outlined above. To the con-
trary, we think that each of these broad camps has produced valuable
insights on law. Moreover, many of these insights are also part and

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48 See id. at 113–21, 223, 360, 362, 375.
50 KRONMAN, supra note 47, at 223–24.
51 Id. at 2.
52 Id. at 225.
parcel of what we conceptualize as legal theory. Furthermore, as we claim below, there are good reasons why, from a legal theory perspective, it is essential to have all of these discourses about law in place even if not necessarily in one institution.\footnote{On the other benefits of such diversity, see Menachem Mautner, Beyond Toleration and Pluralism: The Law School as a Multicultural Institution, 9 Int’l J. Legal Prof. 55, 56–57 (2002).}

None of this however implies “the death of law”\footnote{See Fiss, The Death of Law?, in The Law as It Could Be, supra note 40, at 191; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 245, 245–46 (1989) (observing that the state of legal theory is not as dire as the author previously supposed).} or the end of legal theory. We believe that alongside these helpful contributions—or maybe rather at their juncture—legal theory plays an essential role. In this Part, we describe the added value of legal theory and explain why it deserves a separate naming. There are two interconnected aspects to the distinct character of legal theory: the attention it gives to law as a set of coercive normative institutions and its relentless effort to incorporate and synthesize the lessons of the other discourses about law.

A. Coercive Normative Institutions

Legal theory, as we understand it, is typically structured—explicitly or (much more frequently) implicitly—around the central and persistent questions of jurisprudence, interrogating the law as a set of coercive normative institutions.\footnote{Another important way of looking at law is through its functions. In this context, one may think of law in terms of its role in resolving disputes, channeling and coordinating its subjects’ conduct, distributing entitlements and obligations, and expressing values. Legal theory is obviously interested in all of these functions as well as in their (rather intricate) interplay.} This understanding of law typifies many jurisprudential schools with some (like John Austin) emphasizing law’s coercive dimension and others (like H.L.A. Hart) highlighting its normativity.\footnote{See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 9–33 (Hackett Publishing Co. 1998) (1832); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 55–59 (1961).} Here, we provide a brief summary of the realist conception of law because it offers a powerful articulation of the idea that power and reason are equally essential to law while concurrently appreciating the difficulties of their cohabitation.\footnote{For a more complete account of the realist conception of law, see Dagan, supra note 1, at 622–37. Of course, choosing the realist perspective betrays our particular predilections and our sense that the realist conception lays the groundwork for a wide range of current, familiar legal theory. For a source less familiar for American legal theory but equally adamant about the uneasy cohabitation of power and normativity (or what he calls force and norm), see von Jhering, supra note 7, at 239–62.} Furthermore, the realist account of law carries another important lesson that also informs the title of this Part: in understanding law as a going institution, realists view law as an enterprise that cannot be reduced to its constitut-
ent parts. Consequently, jurisprudence must go beyond adjudication to consider the numerous other arenas that are replete with lawmaking, law-applying, law-interpreting, and law-developing functions.\footnote{58 See Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 3–13 (1994).}

An important clarification is in order before we expand on the realist conception of law. Our main goal in this Essay is to forward an argument for the importance of legal theory as a genus. Legal realism is just one species of that genus, and our description of it is geared less toward convincing the reader that it is a good legal theory than toward explicating through example what a legal theory would look like. As far as this Essay is concerned, we have no stake in creating legal realists, and we believe that legal academia would be impoverished if we were “all legal realists now.”\footnote{59 Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (reviewing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927–1960 (1986)).} For example, while we think that realism’s constant balancing of reason and power recommends it as a legal theory, we have no doubt that other legal theories could have a completely different take on the relationship between reason and power. Kantian legal theories (or natural law theories), for example, take the possibility of coercion as a mandate for reason to be the sole motivator in law (i.e., for there to be law, all coercive power must be subjugated to reason).\footnote{60 For an extended discussion along these lines, see Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy 4–29 (2009).} Some Marxist theories, on the other hand, maintain that while law exhibits an internally consistent and reasoned framework, the entire mode of reason flows from and is dependent on (economic) power (i.e., in actuality, law’s reason serves power).\footnote{61 This is one interpretation of the classic work on Marxist jurisprudence. See Evgeny Bronislavovich Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law & Marxism 63–64 (Barbara Einhorn trans., Transaction Publishers 2002) (1924).} These theories are completely different from the legal realism we describe below, and they are obviously part of legal theory as we refer to it in this Essay. In the end, legal theorists will argue about which legal theories are useful, elegant, thought provoking, true, dangerous, or anything else; as should be clear by now, the very terms of reference for what would make a legal theory good or valuable are quite up for grabs. The following description of legal realism is just an example of what legal theory might offer.

Realists justify their preoccupation with coerciveness in two steps. The first, obvious part of the argument is that unlike other judgments, those that law’s carriers prescribe can recruit the state’s monopolized power to back up their enforcement. But the second, more subtle part of the argument is just as important, and it rests on the institutional and discursive means that downplay some of the dimensions of
law’s power. These built-in features of law—notably, the institutional division of labor between “interpretation specialists” and the actual executors of their judgments together with our tendency as lawyers and even as citizens to “thingify” legal constructs and accord them an aura of naturalness and acceptability—render the danger of obscuring law’s coerciveness particularly troubling. They explain the realists’ wariness of the trap entailed in the blurring of law’s coerciveness.

But realists also reject as reductive an alternative image of law that portrays it as naked power or interest. They insist that law is also a forum of reason and that modes of legal reasoning often function as constraints on the choices of legal decision makers. Law is not only about interest or power politics; it is also an exercise in giving reasons. Furthermore, because so much is at stake in reasoning about law, legal reasoning ought to be urgent and rich, attentive, careful, and serious. The question of how rich legal reasoning will be is often a function of how hard people are willing to work in undermining unreflective understandings of what the law is or must be. Reasons are appeals to a host of values in an attempt to justify law’s coercion—values ranging from barely articulate longings for justice all the way down to a basic desire for security and order (or a fear of chaos) and everything in between. Reasons may be articulated at varying levels of abstraction from the general proposition down to the argument contextually tailored for a particular situation of application. Reasons also range from the wholly substantive (e.g., “this legal arrangement contributes more than its alternatives to human flourishing”) to the technical (e.g., “this rule is administrable by courts with limited information”).

Recognizing this range of registers for reasoned argument, it would appear bizarre to equate normative reasoning with parochial interests or arbitrary power. In legal theory, normative reasoning must aspire to appeal beyond the parochial or the arbitrary even as legal theory invites the analyses that expose some instances of existing argumentation as covers for interest. Analyses that give up on the aspiration to reasoned persuasion are problematic to the extent that they relinquish responsibility: the responsibility of legal theory to offer

62 See Duncan Kennedy, A Left Phenomenological Alternative to the Hart/Kelsen Theory of Legal Interpretation, in Legal Reasoning: Collected Essays 153, 158–61 (2008) (arguing that the felt constraints on decision making are a function of the work of particular interpreters and thus are their responsibility).

63 At times, reasons could devolve to aesthetics as we believe most claims for a rule on the basis of internal coherence do. We think that aesthetic reasons for legal rules are not usually good reasons, but it is clear that they are still reasons, and we would admit that other things being equal, elegant wording is preferable to clumsy wording even assuming no functional difference. Of course, other things are never actually equal.
possibilities of critique of status quo power arrangements and the option of marshalling the law for morally required social change.

Legal theories of institutions, forms of reasoning, or particular doctrines take these lessons seriously. Because reasoning about law entails a host of consequences affecting people’s interests and the distribution of social power, legal theory is frequently suspicious of the reasons given by law’s carriers, and it invites criticism of law’s means, ends, and (particularly distributive) consequences. Legal theorists have this response to the characteristic features of practitioners and judges’ communications as strategic and insincere. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 24, at 571–74. Dan-Cohen claims that the only adequate remedy for this is “that substantive legal theory . . . not participate in a dialogue in which judicial opinions or other official pronouncements count as interlocutors.” Id. at 590. For a convincing response to this provocative claim, see Robert Post, Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 615, 618–25 (1992) (arguing that legal scholars have “almost always situated themselves as internal participants in the practice of law, taking as their task its refinement and improvement”).

This stage often uses insights of sociohistorical analyses of the law. But the critique of legal doctrine often leads legal theory to a reconstructive stage guided by the dynamic understanding of law as a great human laboratory continuously seeking improvement, an “endless process of testing and re-testing,” as part of an interminable quest for more just societies. At this stage in particular, important inputs come into play from various law and policy schools (including, of course, those schools that question the legitimacy of resorting to policy as opposed to considerations of principle).

Furthermore, legal theorists often incorporate an institutional perspective in their analysis. At its best, legal theory overcomes jurisprudential tunnel vision that sees the legal universe through judicial eyes. Instead of an adjudication-centered perspective, legal theory expands its view to the set of institutions through which law is created, applied, or otherwise becomes effective. Some of the institutions upon which legal theory lavishes attention actually enforce norms (e.g., courts, prosecutors, and administrative agencies); some institutions are hierarchical and rule based with readily identifiable agents involved in norm obedience (e.g., corporate counsel and tax advisors); and some are webs of social norms, including the norm of deference to the symbolic power of law. The core of the institutional vision is an image of law as a going enterprise that is not usefully reduced to its constituent parts. Analyses of discrete parts are crucial to institu-

64. Legal theorists have this response to the characteristic features of practitioners and judges’ communications as strategic and insincere. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 24, at 571–74. Dan-Cohen claims that the only adequate remedy for this is “that substantive legal theory . . . not participate in a dialogue in which judicial opinions or other official pronouncements count as interlocutors.” Id. at 590. For a convincing response to this provocative claim, see Robert Post, Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 615, 618–25 (1992) (arguing that legal scholars have “almost always situated themselves as internal participants in the practice of law, taking as their task its refinement and improvement”).

65. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921); see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 400–13 (1986).

66. For a survey of recent institutionalist work, see Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 85–90 (2009).
tional knowledge, but understanding the complete phenomenon requires a nonreductive account.

B. Synthesizing the Other Discourses

Legal theory, as we define it, seeks to shed light—either explanatory, justificatory, or reformist—on society’s coercive normative institutions. To perform these tasks, it often resorts, as we have already mentioned, to insights from the other discourses about law. But as the previous paragraphs explain, the synthetic spirit of legal theory is not just a matter of methodological inclination; rather, the appreciation of the nature of law as a set of coercive normative institutions justifies—or even mandates—it.67

Legal theorists resort to sociohistorical analyses of the law as well as to comparative law (a traditional tool of academic lawyers) because they can offer contextual accounts that help explain the sources and the evolution of the legal terrain. Sociohistorical analyses are also instrumental in opening up the legal imagination by undermining the status quo’s (implicit) claim of necessity and revealing the contingency of the present. At times, they can help unearth competing legal possibilities and provide hints as to the possible ramifications of their adoption.

Law and policy is obviously helpful in figuring out the real life ramifications of current law. This task, which is important both to understand the law and to evaluate it, often relies on social scientific methods (from economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science), both empirical and theoretical. Insofar as this stage of research is aimed at assessing the normative desirability of law, it typically leads to a second stage that looks at law’s goals and thus resorts to guidance from the evaluative neighboring disciplines, notably ethics and political philosophy. And where legal theorists aim at reconstruction—at designing alternatives and comparing their expected performances—they again typically use both social scientific tools and normative ones.68

Law as craft is no less vital for legal theory than the two other discourses about law. As with many human practices, deep understanding of the evolution and dynamics of law requires some inside information that only law as craft can provide. Similarly, a robust acquaintance with law’s institutional, structural, and discursive charac-

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68 This distinction is rough and solely methodical. We do not mean to imply that social science can actually be value free or devoid of normative underpinnings.
teristics is also necessary to appreciate the potential of alternative legal reforms and to caution us against programs that are insufficiently sensitive to law’s typical and recurrent limitations. Thus, more so than their counterparts in the social sciences and the humanities who write about law, legal theorists often synthesize, explicitly or implicitly, these critical dimensions into their accounts. One manifestation of the significance of law and craft for legal theory is legal theory’s tendency to be less abstract than the philosophical, economic, or other theories with which it interacts.

Legal theorists who recognize the possibilities of synthesizing these languages of legal scholarship might not be overly concerned with the dismissal of the legal tradition as unscientific or by the fear of intellectual cooptation by legal practice. The range of starting points for analysis is immense. For example, some legal theorists will begin with existing doctrine or proposals for legal reform, convinced that a starting point in the actual arrangements governing some aspect of life is a recognition of the social basis of the law. Others will begin with a general analytical problem and may not discuss particular doctrines in much detail at all. Others still might begin with an abstract question but extensively use doctrine to illustrate or test their claims. Legal theory comes in many flavors, from the apologetic to the radical, and of course at varying levels of quality. We can allow ourselves to hope that theorists will examine legal doctrines or institutions with both a critical eye and a reconstructive spirit while utilizing the insights of all three discourses about law in the ways we have just described. And we can similarly hope that legal theorists will not shy away from reaching a conclusion that nothing short of radical transformation may be required for law to be acceptable.

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70 See supra text accompanying notes 16–19.

71 See supra text accompanying notes 50–52.


73 For an example complete with a definition of legal theory, see DAN-COHEN, supra note 28.


75 The subset of legal theories that emphasize reconstruction is allied with the Grand Style of the common law, which Llewellyn describes as “a functioning harmonization of vision with tradition, of continuity with growth, of machinery with purpose, of measure with need,” mediating between “the seeming commands of the authorities and the felt demands of justice.” LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 37–38.

76 Indeed, legal theory is not limited to the happy middle; genuine insight often comes from what some perceive as extremes. Although such insights might require domes-
Thus conceived, legal theory combines lessons from interfacing disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities, but we should not reduce it to any of them. By the same token, although legal theory acknowledges the significance of the internal insights of law as craft, it has no aspiration of closure. Rather than seeking to establish law as an autonomous academic discipline, it celebrates its own embeddedness in the social sciences and the humanities. Finally, although the synthetic enterprise of legal theory sounds academically ambitious (and it is indeed), it is—or at least can be—highly relevant to the practice of judges and practicing lawyers at least insofar as they are interested in explaining, justifying, or reforming the law.

III

The Family of Legal Discourses

Legal theory, as we have tried to characterize it, is both inherently self-confident and intrinsically tormented. These seemingly contradictory dispositions may explain why good legal theory does not simply accept the surroundings of the other discourses about law in patient resignation but in fact doggedly seeks out interaction with those surroundings.

The self-confidence of legal theory springs from its internalization of the complexity of law and a belief that only an engagement with complexity can generate useful accounts of legal phenomena. If what typifies law is indeed the institutional cohabitation of power and reason, and if this core feature of law necessitates a synthesis of the type described above, then any one-dimensional account of law—or of any specific legal doctrine or practice—is, by definition, partial and

tication for implementation through law, we would still hope to see the insights themselves arise and develop in legal theory.

77 We realize that this position is, in itself, controversial, and we can certainly imagine legal theory conceived as a subsystem with the kind of autonomy described by autopoiesis. A detailed argument with systems theorists is beyond the scope of our Essay, but we believe the conflict is actually minimal. Systems theorists believe that systems are cognitively open but operatively closed. It suffices from our point of view that since legal theory (as imagined here) does not actually have an operative mode, its cognitive openness is all that is at stake in our formulation of embeddedness. See Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System 76–141 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004).

78 In this sense, legal theory may help to ameliorate the disjunction between legal academia and the legal profession. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 41–42 (1992). For a convincing platform of cooperation between legal academia and the bar, see Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2075, 2098 (1993). For a corresponding vision of legal education, see Llewellyn, The Study of Law as a Liberal Art, in Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice, supra note 11, at 375. Llewellyn insisted that studying law as a liberal art—by combining "[t]echnique, the intellectual side, the spiritual—the true, the beautiful, the good"—is the best practical training since it accords students "vision, range, depth, balance, and rich humanity," which are the key for effective and good practical work. Id. at 376, 394.
deficient. This conviction leads legal theorists to a principled antipurist position. This position is further strengthened for legal theorists of the evaluative (justificatory or reformist) type because the responsibility in potentially affecting people’s lives forces upon them a duty to doubt as well as a duty to decide, and one cannot discharge these obligations from any single perspective on law.

But alongside its self-confidence, an almost constitutive discomfort typifies legal theory. This disposition derives from the fact that in most dimensions of law, legal theory is positioned somewhere midway between the other discourses about law, and it is thus always exposed (albeit to a moderate degree) to the professional hazards of their practitioners. Thus, on the one hand, legal theory typically puts less emphasis on law’s coerciveness and the risks of its collapse to brute politics than do sociohistorical analyses. Therefore, it is subject, at least to some degree, to the risk of lack of critical reflectivity that haunts both law and craft and (to a lesser degree) law and policy (because they rarely pay attention to these dimensions). On the other hand, by distancing itself to some extent (that is, more than law as craft) from legal doctrine and from jurists’ internal point of view, legal theory may be insufficiently attuned to law’s distinctiveness vis-à-vis other social, economic, and cultural institutions. Similarly, although legal theory is more responsive than both sociohistorical analyses and law as craft to the normative dimension of law and to its potential role as an instrument for social change, legal theory is typically less reform minded than law and policy and thus may be subject—at least to an extent—to the risks of either romantic conservatism or ivory-tower playfulness.

The core convictions underlying legal theory, as we have described them, require legal theorists to navigate these unstable middle positions. They imply that legal theory will generally rely on pragmatic judgments as to the optimal degree of suspension from the practice of law and as to the optimal mix of sociohistorical and normative perspectives that should be called in for its analysis. While there is no reason to disparage the enterprise because of the imprecision of such judgments, there is always good reason for not being complacent about them. The environment of the other discourses not only provides legal theory with essential inputs; each of them also serves as a

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79 Cf. McCrudden, supra note 69, at 645 (arguing that the “methodological pluralism” that typifies “current legal scholarship” demonstrates “a mature openness to other disciplines that demonstrates a welcome self-confidence”).

80 See Singer, supra note 69, at 910–11; Eyal Zamir, Towards an Integrative Legal Scholarship, 4 HIFA L. Rev. 131, 142–43 (2008).

81 One exception to this rule is the institutional one, to which legal theory seems to us to be the most sensitive, while law as craft is the least sensitive (with law and policy and sociohistorical analyses taking midway positions).
potential source of critique toward excesses or shortcomings in striking this delicate and sensitive balance. The critiques are obviously different from each other; indeed, at times, they may be diametrically opposed. Legal theorists, whose accounts often serve as bridges among these opposing positions, can rely on the critical attitudes of the other members of the family of legal discourses as checks on what may be the most challenging task of a solid legal theory: properly accommodating the insights of sociohistorical analyses of law, of law and policy, and of law as craft into workable, theoretical frameworks that rely on a robust understanding of law as a set of coercive normative institutions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We will conclude not with any truly conclusive statement but rather with a reflection on three rather loose implications one might draw from our exercise in characterization. We begin by laying out the implications and only then try to tie them together in our reflection. The three implications deal with the relationship between law and other academic disciplines, the institutional structure of the legal academy, and advanced legal education.

After several years of unsystematic gathering of anecdotal evidence, we believe that many people involved in the legal academy experience a certain discomfort about the academic status of legal scholarship. A recurring thought seems to be that there are two alternatives: adopt an external academic discipline (e.g., economics, sociology, psychology, or philosophy) or relinquish academic or scientific pretensions and delve more deeply into practical professionalism. As against this somewhat untheorized (but we think, quite widespread) outlook, we suggest that those alternatives offer a false choice. Legal theory, distinctive in its synthetic openness and its focus on coercive institutional normativity, should be understood as an internal academic alternative. The strong version of this claim is this: legal theory has—just as other academic fields do—generated a language with which the initiated can advance more nuanced arguments than would be available to lay audiences. The language is far from

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82 We refer to the academic status of legal scholarship in the minds of legal academics (i.e., their own self-doubt); we are not talking about how members of other university faculties view law schools or the scholarship produced there. Although that question could be related to our inquiry, for now it is too far afield.

83 Notice that this alternative perceives law schools along the lines of Priest’s analysis—law schools as loose coalitions of distinct and fragmented subdisciplines whose only common denominator is their interest in law. See supra text accompanying notes 20–21. We make no claim as to the descriptive power of this position, but we insist that it involves a real intellectual loss.
impenetrable, but it does require training to gain facility with it, and it does allow for a deepening of inquiry.\textsuperscript{84}

The second implication touches on the structure of the law school as a community of scholarship. Law faculties are collections of people and are prone to combination and division. Sometimes those divisions are generational; at times they may be thematic; often they seem to be methodological; and sometimes they map onto institutional or more general politics. We do not suggest a way to overcome such divisions—indeed, they may be valuable overall to prevent boredom (and boring scholarship). However, the implication of our discussion is that legal theory is a place where those divisions do not simply divide but rather become the focus of discussion. This observation is most pertinent regarding methodological differences: the discussion of legal theory brings the specialist part way out of a form of isolation and forces an engagement with additional perspectives and agendas. In its strongest form, the implication would be that while people in the law school could do anything in the way of scholarship, they would also have to speak legal theory if not with native proficiency then at least as a second language.\textsuperscript{85}

This brings us to the third implication of our mapping dealing with advanced legal education. Here, we will allow ourselves to be blunt. If we are right about legal theory, then the legal academy should not rely too heavily on other disciplines to train its scholars.\textsuperscript{86}

There is certainly room for many philosophers and economists on law

\textsuperscript{84} Why would one want deeper and more nuanced inquiry? Well, part of that desire must be based simply on a will to know and possibly aesthetics that determine that deeper and more nuanced knowledge is more satisfying. However, there are also more instrumental ways to think of the value of depth and nuance. One issue is that depth and nuance are avenues for innovation, for new ways of seeing, or for overcoming the kinds of roadblocks to thinking that often arise from stale polarizations from arguments that have reified into “positions.” This too can be understood as a pragmatic benefit (for better, more convincing results), or an existential benefit of a chance to experience something new, or a political benefit in the sense that self-governance is heightened when choice is better informed. Again, this is only meant to suggest; a serious discussion of the phenomenology of legal academia is way beyond the scope of our Essay.

\textsuperscript{85} Requesting participants in a social practice to command a language that is deemed core for that practice raises a risk of creating a hegemonic discourse that might marginalize unorthodox languages. But given the secure positions of the other discourses about law and their intrinsic significance to legal theory, see discussion, supra Part III, we believe that applying this request to legal theory does not entail such a risk. To the contrary, rather than silencing disputes, we believe that broad recognition of the importance of having legal theory as a common language would trigger a fruitful—and probably quite fierce—debate as to its precise characteristics. This Essay presents our current view on this matter, and readers should view our Essay as an invitation for engagement rather than as a rigid blueprint.

\textsuperscript{86} Cf. Mattias Kumm, On the Past and Future of European Constitutional Scholarship, 7 I-CON 401, 410–12 (2009) (describing contemporary law school culture as “a conception of scholarship that prioritizes law as the object of study from the perspective of another discipline”).
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faculties. However, a reliance on other fields for advanced training may mean that many people who join law faculties will have to learn the language of legal theory on the fly. To the extent that legal theory has content, as we have argued that it does, then legal theory itself should be part of the tool kit imparted to the aspiring legal academic. In other words, legal academics should have a background in legal theory—they should study it as a field. And the way to do that, it seems to us, would be to develop and support PhD (or other research-based advanced degree) programs in law.87

Our reflection on these three implications brings us back to the nature of our project and to the question of what we are doing by generalizing about legal theory. We have been trying to figure out what legal theory is and what it could be. In doing so, we are not involved in a maximization project that calls for an advanced algorithm. Rather, the project is more like an appeal to character, and thus our title has a double meaning. On the one hand, there is a descriptive project of characterizing existing and future legal theory. But on the other hand, we are trying to draw out a type of participant, a character in a particular institutional drama. If you are persuaded, perhaps you already identify with that character.88 If not, we hope the character of legal theory is at least interesting enough for further engagement.

87 The suspicious reader will say this observation sounds particularly self-serving coming from authors who have spent considerable energy supporting such a program. See The Zvi Meitar Center for Advanced Legal Studies, Tel Aviv U. Buchmann Fac. L., http://www.law.tau.ac.il/Eng/?CategoryID=191 (last visited Feb. 17, 2011). We make no claim of im partiality, and this point, like the rest of the Essay, is based much more on reflection about experience than on research. At the same time, we have considered the idea seriously and are willing to argue about and defend it without appealing to the authority of experience.
