A Jury for Israel?: Determining When a Lay Jury System is Ideal in a Heterogeneous Country

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47 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 121 (2014)
Introduction

Is a jury system necessary or even ideal in a country? From an American perspective, the answer would appear to be "yes." For example, in American jurisprudence, the right to a trial by a lay jury in serious criminal cases and many civil cases is a fundamental constitutional right.¹ A lay jury is also common in many Western countries, particularly those countries with Anglo-Saxon roots.² However, a jury system may not be ideal in many countries, particularly those with heterogeneous populations, due in part to both discrimination and to difficulties in reaching a consensus on a common set of applicable laws.³ With numerous countries having already instituted a lay jury system,⁴ it is important to determine when a lay jury system is preferable.

Israel is a heterogeneous democracy that does not have a lay jury system.⁵ In this Note, Israel is used as a case study to determine the appropriate framework for deciding when a heterogeneous country should institute a lay jury system.

This Note argues that there are two important prerequisites to the use of a lay jury system in a heterogeneous country. First, the vast majority of citizens should have a common national identity. Second, the society must agree on a common set of laws to be employed. In Part I, this Note gives background information on jury systems both in the United States and around the world in order to provide a foundation to compare Israel to the countries that use a jury system. In Part II, this Note discusses both the Israeli legal system and the currently-existing internal social cleavages within Israel. In Part III, this Note argues that Israel should not move toward a lay jury system because such a system would not be fair, particularly to minority groups. In Part IV, this Note develops a concise test for whether and when a heterogeneous country should institute a lay jury system.

I. Background on the Spread of the Anglo-Saxon Jury System Around the World

A. Principles of the American Jury System

In the United States, the right to a trial by jury is synonymous with American democracy.⁶ In fact, three of the Amendments in the Bill of Rights pertain specifically to the trial by jury right.⁷ In criminal cases, the Fifth Amendment protects criminal defendants by requiring that they be

¹. See infra notes 6–20 and accompanying text.
². See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
³. See infra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
⁴. See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
⁵. See infra notes 47, 87, 92–93 and accompanying text.
⁶. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 31 (1986) (“The right to a trial by jury is deeply embedded in the American democratic ethos.”).
⁷. See id.
indicted by a Grand Jury for any “capital, or otherwise infamous crime.”

The Sixth Amendment specifies that criminal defendants are entitled to a "public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." The Seventh Amendment extends the trial by jury right to civil cases.

The United States, along with many other Western countries, adopted the British common law jury system. However, the American legal system utilizes juries more than the legal systems of Great Britain and Canada. While the right to a jury in the United States is a constitutional right, William Blackstone, a leading eighteenth century scholar of law, argued that a trial by jury is a privilege, and is not a right within English law.

Currently, one basic feature of the American jury system is the right to a jury venire that represents a fair cross-section of the community. Initially, the American jury system included some discriminatory features inherited from the British jury system. Women and African-Americans were excluded from American juries for much of American history. Those discriminatory practices, however, are now unconstitutional in the United States. Currently, parties are entitled to a jury embodying a “fair

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8. U.S. Const. amend. V.
9. Id. amend. VI.
10. Id. amend. VII.
12. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 6, at 31 (“In contrast, England, Scotland, Wales, and Canada do not have as liberal a standard concerning trial by jury. In those countries, persons accused of nondictable crimes—less serious crimes for which the prescribed punishment is less than two years in prison—do not have the right to trial by jury.”).
13. Id.
14. A “venire” is the pool of prospective jurors from which the final jury is selected. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
15. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 6, at 51 (“The outright exclusion of women from juries in the United States was an inheritance of the English common law system. In England, women were excluded from juries until 1919. Indeed, the famous legal scholar Blackstone wrote in the 18th century that women were rightfully prohibited from jury service because of what he labeled the defect of sex, which made them incapable of the intelligent decision-making required for jury duty.”) (emphasis in original).
16. See, e.g., Lucy Fowler, Gender and Jury Deliberations: The Contributions of Social Science, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 931, 935 (2011) (“Women were not permitted to serve on juries for most of United States history. As recently as 1961, the United States Supreme Court upheld a state jury selection scheme that permitted women to serve on juries only if they filed a written declaration expressing their desire to be eligible for service.”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 931, 935 (2011) (“During the antebellum period, blacks were excluded from jury service in all southern and most northern states. . . . While some African Americans apparently were permitted to serve on juries just prior to the Civil War, for the most part the systematic exclusion of African Americans continued through the years immediately following the Civil War.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527, 533–34 (holding that defendants are entitled to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community and holding that women
cross section of the community.”19 However, likely due in part to jury pool selection procedures, minorities continue to be underrepresented in many American jury pools.20

The American judicial system values ensuring fair and diverse community representation at the jury selection stages beyond simply the venire stage. Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Batson v. Kentucky*,21 attorneys are constitutionally forbidden from using peremptory challenges based on race or gender.22 Despite the general consensus that challenges to jurors should be race-neutral and gender-neutral, many scholars argue that *Batson* and its progeny are ineffective in combating the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.23

**B. Lay Juries Around the World**

Various countries around the world use some form of a lay jury system.24 This includes numerous non-Anglo-Saxon countries, which have instituted lay jury systems more recently.25 Notably, in most countries, the use of lay juries to decide guilt and innocence in criminal cases is much more frequent than the use of lay juries to determine fault and damages in

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22. See, e.g., *id.* at 79–80 (“Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise peremptory challenges for any reason, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case . . . .”); *J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.*, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that “gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.”); *Georgia v. McCollum*, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that “the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges.”).
23. See, e.g., Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, *A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials*, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1557 (2012) (arguing that “North Carolina trial courts have not been especially willing to sustain *Batson* objections, and reviewing courts have shown almost complete deference to those rulings.”); Nancy S. Marder, *Batson Revisited*, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1588, 1607–10 (2012) (arguing that peremptory strikes limit the effectiveness of *Batson* and should be eliminated).
25. *Id.* These countries include Argentina, Korea, Russia, and Spain. See *id.*
Countries differ both on questions of whether to have a lay jury system and, if so, how to implement one. Examples of countries without a lay jury system include Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, and South Africa. Both Poland and Germany have a mixed system where professional judges and lay assessors serve together. Australia, Brazil, Canada, England, Ireland, Scotland, and Spain, are countries where jurors deliberate and issue verdicts apart from the judgment of professional judges. In Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, and Portugal, laypersons and professional judges deliberate together. As British colonialism spread, elements of the British jury system reached Africa, the Mediterranean, Asia, the Caribbean, South America, and the South Pacific.

Given the fact that countries differ on whether or not to utilize lay jury system, what are the advantages to adopting such a system in some countries but not in others? Neil Vidmar noted in his survey of various jury systems that “experience seems to indicate that jury systems often do not operate well in multi-racial societies, particularly when the racial cleavages are deep.” In his study of African jury systems published in the early 1960s, J.H. Jearey argued that implementation of a jury system may not be fair to all citizens. Jearey found that the “system of trial by jury as developed in England can only work properly if three conditions are satisfied.” First, the society must be mostly homogeneous with respect to race, culture, language, and religion. Second, members of society must be sufficiently educated to set aside private prejudices in issuing a judgment. Third, members of society must generally agree on what the law is that they are enforcing. A fourth factor to consider is societal support for citizen participation in the legal system and any historical use of a jury.

27. Id. at 631–32. The Czech and South African legal systems include some lay participation, but not lay juries. See id. at 631 n.8, 632 n.14.
28. Id. at 633. Additionally, Japan and Venezuela both have mixed systems where professional judges serve alongside lay assessors. See Hiroshi Fukurai & Valerie P. Hans, The Future of Lay Adjudication in Korea and Japan, 3 YONSEI L.J. 1, 3, 8 (2012).
30. Id. at 638–41.
32. Id. at 40–41.
33. See J.H. Jearey, Trial by Jury and Trial with the Aid of Assessors in the Superior Courts of British African Territories: I, 4 J. AFR. L. 133, 133 (1960) (“The existence of trial by jury in [Africa] can be ascribed to one or other of two reasons. It is either a relic of the enthusiasm for the jury which prevailed during the nineteenth century, or it is the result of demands by European minorities in those territories where these minorities are politically important.”).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
within that society. 38

Issues of internal conflict are not typically present in homogeneous societies, and therefore, a good argument can be made that a jury is ideal in most homogeneous societies. 39 Richard Lempert cautions, however, that because diversity of viewpoints in homogeneous societies is limited, an American-style jury system may not be ideal in a homogeneous country such as Japan. 40 Therefore, any test looking at the necessity of a lay jury in a heterogeneous society should probably be limited in application to only heterogeneous societies.

II. Israeli Legal System and its Social Cleavages

A. Formation of the Israeli Court System

Similar to the American legal system, the Israeli legal system is based on the British legal system. Between World War I and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Great Britain controlled the British Mandate of Palestine. 41 As Justice Aharon Barak, former President of the Israeli Supreme Court noted, “[t]he system of public law in Israel is based on the foundations of English law, incorporated into the law of [Israel] during the thirty years of the British mandate.” 42 Israel has maintained the three-tiered legal system established by Great Britain. 43 The Magistrate Court is the lowest court, the District Court is the intermediate court, and the Supreme Court is the court of last resort. 44 In Israel, there are currently twenty-nine Magistrate Courts, five District Courts, and one Supreme Court. 45

The Israeli legal system departs from the legal systems in many other democratic countries in a few respects. First, Israel does not have a written constitution to serve as a basis for its legal system. 46 Second, the Israeli

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38. See Lester W. Kiss, Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261, 280 (Spring 1999) (“A fourth factor that Jearey does not mention that could affect the success of a jury system is the degree to which a society has allowed or is willing to allow citizen participation in the system.”).
39. See, e.g., id. at 283 (arguing that from a societal point of view, Japan, a homogeneous country, “is ripe for the reintroduction of the jury system.”).
40. See Richard Lempert, A Jury for Japan?, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 42 (1992) (noting that Japan is much more ethnically homogenous than the United States, and arguing that “in order to achieve the strengths which the jury system brings to the system of justice in the United States, Japan may have to deviate somewhat from the structural features of the United States’ jury system.”).
42. Aharon Barak, Foreword to Public Law in Israel, at vii (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996).
43. See Orenshtein & Cohen, supra note 41, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
legal system lacks a lay jury. Instead, professional judges, appointed by a judicial appointments committee, make determinations of both law and fact. While one judge tries most cases, three-judge panels try serious criminal cases. Additionally, three-judge panels preside over both criminal and civil appeals.

B. Israeli Religious Courts

A unique aspect of the Israeli legal system is the presence of religious courts. In fact, religious law plays a major role in the legal system. In Israel and in several other Middle Eastern countries emerging from Ottoman rule, religious courts have exclusive jurisdiction over family law. The Israeli religious courts emerged in the nineteenth century under Ottoman rule and gained official recognition during the British Mandate. The Israeli government recognizes many religious communities: Jewish, Muslim, Baha’i, and ten Christian denominations. The Knesset, the Israeli national legislative body, has also recognized the Druze religious community and has passed legislation to create Druze religious courts.

After the establishment of Israel, religious courts continued to maintain complete authority over family law. Muslim religious courts maintain jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody, and religious identity. The Muslim courts follow Sharia law and have broader jurisdiction over Israeli Muslims’ personal status issues than the Rabbinical courts.

48. Id. Straschnov offers two reasons to explain why Israel does not have a lay jury. Id. (“Initially it is believed impossible to find twelve people who do not know each other, or the grandmother of the prosecutor, or the son-in-law of one of the witnesses. Such familiarity among potential jurors makes the creation of an unbiased jury equally impossible. Additionally, and most importantly, one would be hard pressed to find twelve Israelis who agree unanimously on a certain fact or point, let alone an entire case.”).
49. Id.
51. The Judiciary, supra note 46.
53. Id. “The basic source for the application of the personal status law and the jurisdiction of the various religious courts is found in the Palestine Order in Council (1922).” The Judiciary, supra note 46.
56. See Woods, supra note 52, at 36.
57. Id. at 33.
have over the personal status issues of Jews.\textsuperscript{58} Israeli Muslims can appeal their cases to the Sharia Court of Appeals in Jerusalem, where a three-judge panel hears the appeals.\textsuperscript{59} Rabbinical courts maintain control over marriage and divorce.\textsuperscript{60} The Chief Rabbinical Council selects rabbis, called dayyanim, to serve as judges in the Rabbinical courts.\textsuperscript{61} Despite a large Jewish secular population, all Jewish citizens of Israel are subject to Halacha, meaning Jewish law, regarding issues of marriage and divorce.\textsuperscript{62}

C. Israeli Labour Courts

The major exception to the absence of lay participation in Israeli courts is found in Israeli labour courts.\textsuperscript{63} In Israeli labour courts, lay persons act as public representatives by serving on panels alongside professional judges.\textsuperscript{64} Regional Labour Court panels are composed of one professional judge, one lay judge with experience in the labour sector, and one lay judge with management experience.\textsuperscript{65} Generally, appeals are heard by a panel of assessors at the National Labour Court in Jerusalem, with panels composed of three professional judges, one lay judge from the labour side, and one from the management side.\textsuperscript{66} Lay judges are appointed by the Minister of Justice and Minister of Labour for three-year terms, and the appointed lay judges have equal voting rights on the panel to those of the professional assessors.\textsuperscript{67}

D. Israeli Military Courts

In addition to Israeli religious courts and labour courts, Israel also has separate military courts, which have been maintained in the West Bank since 1967 and existed in the Gaza Strip from 1967 until 2005.\textsuperscript{68} As part

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} Martin Edelman, \textit{Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel} 77 (Kermitt Hall & David O'Brien eds., 1994).
\item \textsuperscript{59} Id. at 78.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Id. at 53. Orthodox Judaism is the only State-recognized Jewish community in Israel. Id. at 51. By agreement with the state, Orthodox leadership has control over kosher dietary laws, Sabbath observance, and the possibility for Jewish religious schools. Id.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Id. at 53.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, \textit{Women in Israel: A State of Their Own} 151 (Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. ed., 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{65} Clark & Adler, supra note 63, at 2.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Id. at 1.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Id. at 2–3.
of an interim peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), signed in September 1995, Israel transferred certain governmental and legal powers over the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority (PA), the organization that today governs much of the West Bank. In Area A of the West Bank, the PA has control over civil governance and security matters; in Area B of the West Bank, the PA maintains civil governance while the Israeli army is responsible for security matters; and in Area C of the West Bank, which consists of Israeli civilian settlements and Israeli military bases, the Israeli army maintains complete authority.

While Palestinian courts have jurisdiction over Palestinian civil and criminal matters in the West Bank, Palestinians in the West Bank are subject to Israeli military courts for security-related matters. However, West Bank Israeli settlers charged in security-related matters are typically tried in Israeli civil courts. Israeli law enables authorities to deny detained individuals access to counsel for up to fifteen days, although detainees must be permitted to meet an attorney “once [an] interrogation is over.” Criminal defendants are entitled to defense counsel and may petition the Israeli Supreme Court for appellate review.


70. Id. at 402.

71. This includes those Palestinians who live in Area A. See id.

72. EDelman, supra note 58, at 102. Israeli military courts also have what amounts to de facto concurrent jurisdiction over all criminal matters in the West Bank. See id.

73. Id. “Israeli citizens in the Administered Areas, like those residing in the State, are also subject to the military courts for certain offenses, but in practice Israeli citizens not on active military duty are rarely tried by the military courts.” Id. After extremist West Bank Israeli settlers attacked an Israeli military base, the Israeli Prime Minister announced that Israeli extremists would be subject to military courts. See Ethan Bronner, Israel Leader Sets Curbs on Settlers for Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/middleeast/netanyahu-sets-new-curbs-on-violent-settlers-in-israel.html. However, despite the Prime Minister’s announcement, the alleged attackers were not indicted in a military court, but rather were indicted in an Israeli civil court in Jerusalem. See Isabel Kershner, Israel Charges 5 Settlers in West Bank Army Base Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/world/middleeast/israel-charges-5-settlers-in-clash-at-army-base.html.

74. EDelman, supra note 58, at 106.

75. See id. at 103, 108.
E. Liberal Tendencies of the Israeli Judiciary

The Israeli judiciary better protects the civil rights and liberties of minorities than a lay jury would. The Israeli Supreme Court has the authority to review the actions of other Israeli courts, including the military courts,76 and has garnered significant international prestige for its active form of judicial review.77 During the term of Supreme Court President Justice Aharon Barak, the Israeli Supreme Court drew praise for protecting the civil rights and liberties of the disadvantaged in the areas of torture and religious freedom, and for protecting the rights of Israeli-Arabs to live in Jewish towns.78 For example, Justice Barak ordered that the Israeli government hand out gas masks to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.79 The Israeli Supreme Court’s liberal use of its powers, despite Israel’s numerous security chal-

76. Id. at 102–03.
77. See, e.g., DAVID KREITZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1–2 (Russell Stone ed., 2002); but see Jonathan Cook, The Myth of Israel’s Liberal Supreme Court Exposed, MIDDLE EAST RES. AND INFO. PROJECT (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022312?ip_login_no_cache=7a3540719c0534b3c77a0c9b685458 (arguing that the Israeli Supreme Court, particularly recently, has not taken liberal positions with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).

Additional empirical research would be helpful in determining how successful the Israeli judiciary is at protecting the civil rights and liberties of minority defendants, particularly at the trial court level. There are older studies suggesting some sentencing discrepancies between minority and non-minority defendants, but these studies are a few decades old and do not indicate the degree to which sentencing disparities are based on judicial decision-making. See ARIE RATTNER & GIDEON FISHMAN, JUSTICE FOR ALL? JEWS AND ARABS IN THE ISRAELI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9, 14–21 (Simon Hakim ed., 1998). Additionally, non-discriminatory sentencing could reflect that judges are more concerned with civil rights and liberties than is the Israeli public at-large. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.

Empirical evidence in American criminal cases suggests that trial court judges are more likely to acquit than juries. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 152 (2005) (“Between 1989 and 2002, the average conviction rate for federal criminal defendants was 84% in jury trials, but a mere 55% in bench trials.”).


An independent and liberal Israeli judicial system is necessary for several reasons. First, unlike the United States and many other Western democracies, Israel does not have a written constitution to ensure all of the protections and liberties that constitutions provide. Second, Israel is governed by a unicameral legislature, the Knesset, and Israel’s government lacks the checks and balances present in the United States. Third, Israel’s executive branch is embedded in the Knesset; typically, the leader of the largest party in the Knesset forms a governing coalition and serves as Prime Minister. Given the structure of Israel’s government, the Israeli judiciary serves as the only independent check on the Israeli governing coalition.

There are several reasons why the Israeli Supreme Court has maintained its judicial independence and has been able to champion civil rights and civil liberties. First, the Israeli Bar Association and the Israeli judiciary are disproportionately left-leaning. Second, the Judicial Selection Committee, responsible for appointing judges, is somewhat insulated from the Knesset. Even when the Knesset is majority conservative, representation from the Israel Bar Association and the Israeli Supreme Court on the

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81. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

82. See Elise Garofalo, Israeli Election Primer — What You Should Know, PBS (Jan. 21, 2013, 5:50 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/01/israel-election-primer.html. The United States has more checks and balances in its national government than does Israel in its national government because the United States has a President who is elected separately from the legislature, as well as a bicameral legislature. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.

83. See Garofalo, supra note 82. In 2009, Tzipi Livni, the leader of the largest party, was unable to form a governing coalition. See id.

84. See, e.g., Anshel Pfeffer, Netanyahu Against Vetting of Supreme Court Judges, Jewish Chron. (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.thejc.com/news/israel-news/58423/netanyahu-against-vetting-supreme-court-judges (noting that a “left-wing faction” currently controls the Israeli Bar Association); Gil Ronen, Supreme Court “Gang” Heading Out, Says Leading Journalist, Arutz Sheva (June 11, 2011, 10:34 PM), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/14857#UVIs0jn3A1g (noting that many of the Israeli Supreme Court Justices are known as the “Rehavia Gang,” because they are left-leaning and live in the upscale Jerusalem neighborhood of Rehavia); see also Bazelon, supra note 78 (“In contrast to politics, the institutions of the law—the courts, the major law schools, the Israel Bar Association—remain in the hands of the Ashkenazi elite, descended from the group that founded Israel. The most powerful group is identified with the secular, upper-middle-class neighborhood of Rehavia in West Jerusalem . . . “).

85. See David Nachmias, National Government Institutions, Jewish Virtual Lib. (Apr. 2009), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/isdl/text/nachmias.html (noting that the Judicial Selection Committee is composed of nine members: the Minister of Justice, an additional government minister, the president of the Supreme Court, two other justices of the Supreme Court, two Knesset members, and two representatives of the Israel Bar Association).
Judicial Selection Committee has given left-leaning figures significant control over the selection of judges. This results in a Supreme Court protected from the political pressure of the Knesset.

F. Israel: A Deeply Divided Society

Different religious identities divide Israel’s population, and it is unlikely that jury service would mitigate these cleavages. While Israel identifies as a Jewish State, Israeli-Arab citizens enjoy the same political rights, including the right to vote, and the same social welfare benefits granted to Israel’s Jewish citizens. Although jury service has been shown to increase civic engagement among minorities in the United States, it may not have as positive an impact among Israeli-Arabs. While overall voter turnout dropped from 78.7% in the 1999 Knesset elections to 64.7% in the 2009 Knesset elections, Israeli-Arab voter turnout has shown a sharper decline, from 75% to 53.4%, over the same period. In addition to voter turnout, Arab enlistment in the Israeli army is low and is evidence of competing national identities. Druze and Jewish Israeli citizens face compulsory service in the Israeli army or national service, but Israeli-Arabs participate voluntarily and at a much lower rate.

Although Israel’s Declaration of Independence grants Israeli-Arabs equal rights, Israeli-Arabs face discrimination within Israeli society. A majority of Jewish Israeli citizens—68%—view democracy to be at least as important as the Jewishness of Israel. However, only 29% of Israeli Jews and 20% of Israeli-Arabs believe there is full equality between Arab and Jewish citizens.

86. See, e.g., Pfeffer, supra note 84.
87. See, e.g., Samuel Thrope, How Israel’s Arab Citizens Vote, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 27, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/27/how-israel-s-arab-citizens-vote.html (noting that Israeli-Arabs account for approximately 20% of Israel’s population and discussing voting trends among Israeli-Arab citizens in local and national Israeli elections); Legal Status of East Jerusalem and its Residents, B’TSELEM (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/legal_status (noting that Palestinians living in Israel are considered “permanent residents” who are granted social benefits and may vote in local elections but may not vote in Knesset elections).
88. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
91. Thrope, supra note 87.
93. See id.
94. See Michael Mertes & Christiane Reves, Israel As A Jewish And Democratic State: An Old Issue becomes a New Challenge, KAS Int’l Reps., 21, 21 (March 2012), http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_30496-1522-2-30.pdf?120326140543 (“[Israel’s] charter specifies that ‘complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex.’ It also appeals to the ‘Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.’”).
95. See Shibley Telhami & Steven Kull, Israeli Public Opinion after the November 2012 Gaza War, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/
Jewish citizens. Additionally, 56% of Israeli Jews and 43% of Israeli-Arabs believe that while there is legal equality, institutional and societal discrimination remains against Israeli-Arabs. In fact, a survey, conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute in 2010, found that 46% of Israeli Jews would not want to have Arabs as neighbors. In terms of identification, many more Israeli-Arabs identify as Arab or Palestinian than identify as Israeli.

G. The Conflict Between Secular & Religious Jews

Even Israeli Jews are bitterly divided in terms of identity. Disagreements over the governing law are particularly strong between groups within the Israeli Jewish population, and these disagreements undermine attempts at uniform acceptance of the law. In the late 1940s, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion agreed to allow the small Ultra-Orthodox (“Haredi”) Jewish population to be exempt from compulsory army service in order to study traditional Jewish texts, but this decision has enflamed legal, policy, and religious debates in recent years. The Haredim, once a small population, now compose about 10% of Israel’s population. Haredi political parties have historically used their political power as coalition partners to prevent their constituents from being drafted. Many Israelis look down upon the Haredim for not “sharing the burden” of national defense and for

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96. Id.
97. Id.
99. Shibley Telhami, Israeli Arab/Palestinian Public Opinion Survey, BROOKINGS INST. (2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2010/12/09%20israel%20public%20opinion%20telhami/israeli_arab_powerpoint.pdf (noting that of 600 surveyed Israeli Arabs and Palestinians, 36% identify as Arab, 22% identify as Palestinian, 19% identify as Muslim, and only 12% identify as Israeli).
101. Jon Frosch, supra note 100.
prioritizing Torah study over the country’s security. In fact, 23% of Jewish Israelis believe that a member of the Haredi community would make the worst neighbor.

Many within the Haredi community believe that Jewish religious law, or Halacha, should govern Israel. While 83.6% of young traditional, secular Israeli Jews believe that Halacha should not prevail over democratic principles, 85.4% of young Haredi and Orthodox Israelis believe that Halacha should prevail over democratic principles. Haredi Israelis are not alone in their willingness to follow messianic dogma at the expense of democratic decision-making. Many non-Haredi, Orthodox Jews support disobeying government orders to evacuate settlements. More significantly, many Haredim despise the Israeli secular courts and wish to have them replaced with Halacha courts with jurisdiction over all matters.

III. Why Israel Should Not Move Toward a Lay Jury System

A. Israeli Minorities’ Resistance to Civic Engagement

Israel is not suited to implement a lay jury system in part because Israel’s minorities would likely be resistant to jury service. A fundamental aspect of the American jury system is the fair cross-section requirement, which is aimed at achieving a diverse jury. In the United States, some major reasons for empaneling a large and diverse jury are “to ensure a diversity of viewpoints, to increase the likelihood that the jury will represent all elements of the community, to promote group deliberation, and to enhance the public’s acceptance of grand jury rulings.” There are also civic benefits to jury service: studies of jurors in the United States have found that jurors who reached a verdict in criminal trials were more likely to participate in future United States elections.

However, the deep divides among Israeli ethnic and religious groups have made Israeli minorities resistant to civic engagement. Theoretically,
minority groups in Israel might become more civically engaged after participating in jury service. A jury requirement, however, is unlikely to be successful in any effort to increase civic engagement among Israeli-Arabs or the Haredim because both groups have not taken advantage of alternative opportunities for civic engagement through voluntary army service or national civilian service, and because Israeli minority groups do not identify strongly with their country.\textsuperscript{112} Despite the fact that army or national service is mandatory for most Israelis, Israeli-Arabs and Haredi Israelis have not agreed to compulsory army or national service.\textsuperscript{113} Such service would be an opportunity for Israeli-Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews to more fully participate in Israeli society. Additionally, the rate of Israeli-Arab participation in national elections is decreasing. Roughly 22\% fewer Israeli-Arabs voted in the 2009 Knesset elections than voted in the 1999 Knesset elections.\textsuperscript{114}

The problems causing a lack of Israeli-Arab participation in Israeli civic life run much deeper than a lack of opportunity for participation. Much of the decrease in Israeli-Arab voting follows the Second Intifada, the 2000 uprising of Palestinians against Israel.\textsuperscript{115} Discrimination and a lack of identification with the Jewish state negatively impact Israeli-Arab enthusiasm for Israel.\textsuperscript{116} The lack of identification with Israel among Israeli-Arabs\textsuperscript{117} contrasts with the relatively stronger sense of American identity felt amongst minority and immigrant groups in America.\textsuperscript{118}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See supra notes 92–93, 99 and accompanying text.
\item See supra notes 92–93, 100, 103 and accompanying text.
\item See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
\item See Rouhana et al., supra note 115; see also supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
\item See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
\item See, e.g., David Seminara, New Poll: Latino Voters Identify as Americans First and Don’t Vote on the Immigration Issue, \textit{Center for Immigr. Stud.} (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.cis.org/seminara/new-poll-latino-voters-identify-americans-first-and-dont-vote-immigration-issue (“74 percent of Latinos told pollsters that they identified as being American, with only 19 percent stating that they identified themselves as both American and Latino, and 4 percent claiming that they identified more with their country of origin than the United States.”); \textit{Second-Generation Americans: A Portrait of the Adult Children of Immigrants}, \textit{Pew Res. Center} (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/07/second-generation-americans (“Roughly six-in-ten adults in the second generation consider themselves to be ‘typical American,’ about double the share of immigrants who say the same. . . . About half of second-generation Latinos (52\%) and about two-thirds of Asian Americans (64\%) say their group gets along well with all other major racial and ethnic groups in America; smaller shares of Latino (26\%) and Asian-American (49\%) immigrants say the same.”); \textit{Proud Patriots – and Harsh Critics of Government}, \textit{Pew Res. Center} (July 1, 2010), http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/07/01/pride-patriots-and-harsh-critics-of-government (noting that 36\% of African-Americans are “extremely proud” to be Americans and 45\% are “very proud”).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
while both the United States and Israel are heterogeneous countries, minorities in the United States identify much more strongly with the United States than Israeli-Arabs identify with Israel. Given Israeli-Arabs’ lack of identity with Israel, Israeli-Arabs would likely resist a jury service requirement.

There are also concerns regarding the practicability of a jury service requirement among Haredi Israelis. For many Haredim, Torah study and adherence to Halacha law are more important than service to the State of Israel. Haredim believe in separation between women and men and hold many misogynistic views. Given their use of religion to avoid military service and disdain for the Israeli secular courts, it is unlikely that Haredim would be willing to serve on a jury. And given their views on women, it is even less likely that a court could obtain unbiased Haredi jurors. Additionally, even if selected, Haredi jurors might be unwilling to agree to adhere to Israeli law over religious law.

B. Israeli Bias Against Minorities Would Cause Unfairness

Discrimination against minorities makes selecting an unbiased jury in Israel almost unfeasible. Engagement in armed conflict has caused bias in many democracies, including the United States. Examples include the political repression of those associated with Communism during the Red Scare and McCarthyism and the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.

119. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.


121. See supra notes 103, 108 and accompanying text.

122. It is possible that some Haredi men would outright refuse to sit on a jury with women, particularly if forced to sit adjacent to a female juror. See, e.g., Mordechai I. Twersky, Ultra-Orthodox Jews Increasingly Refuse to Sit Near women on El Al flights, HAARETZ (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:07 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/anglo-file/ultra-orthodox-jews-increasingly-refuse-to-sit-near-women-on-el-al-flights-1.420298 (discussing trend of Haredi male airplane passengers asking female passengers to switch seats so that men can sit near men, and women near women).

123. See supra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text.

124. See, e.g., REGIN SCHMIDT, RED SCARE: FBI AND THE ORIGINS OF ANTICOMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1919-1943 30 (2000) (noting that works written about the Red Scare during the era of McCarthyism were colored by views held during the era of McCarthyism).
The Israeli Jewish population is also biased against the Haredim. In fact, the battle over the future of Israel between the secular Jewish population and the Haredi population has been likened to a “civil war.” Given these realities, members of the secular Jewish population selected for jury service are likely to be biased against the Israeli-Arab and Haredi populations.

C. Adherence to What Law?

It is unclear whether all Israelis would adhere to one set of laws. Israel does not have a written constitution, though the Israeli Supreme Court applies the Basic Laws to provide some protection of civil liberties. More importantly, it is unclear what law Israeli jurors would follow. Although Israel has a written Criminal Code, would jurors follow Halacha, common law, or some combination? This question would need to be answered before instituting a jury system.

There is also a risk of juries discriminatorily nullifying criminal activity. According to Professor Doug Linder, “[j]ury nullification occurs when a jury returns a verdict of ‘Not Guilty’ despite its belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged. The jury in effect nullifies a law that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied . . . .” Nullifications may be particularly concerning if caused by discrimination, especially against minority groups. Given the negative views many Israelis have of Israeli-

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126. See Glickman supra note 98 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 103, 104 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
133. Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 304 (1996) ("The second erroneous assumption, and by far the most troubling, is that when juries nullify they do so out of compassion or a desire to be lenient, rather than for illegitimate reasons. For every case where the jury extends mercy to a deserving defendant, there may well be another (or two, or five others) where the verdict is based on improper
Arabs and Haredim, it is quite possible that discriminatory nullification would take place in cases where there is an Israeli-Arab or Haredi party involved. For example, an Israeli jury hearing a case regarding a “price tag” vandalism attack against an Israeli-Arab or a Haredi Israeli could be biased, and could use such bias to nullify what would otherwise be a guilty verdict against the perpetrator. Such a result would be contrary to the goal of a legal system that protects minorities and other vulnerable populations.

Nullification based on religious belief is an additional concern. Materials published by religious groups in the United States reveal reason to suspect that religious beliefs could factor into verdicts arrived at by religiously ardent jurors. The same danger could be present in Israel, where jurors could nullify a verdict for violation of a law where the law conflicts with a religious belief.

D. The Current System is Preferable

Israel’s minorities are currently protected in Israel’s judicial system, even though Israel does not have a lay jury system. The Israeli judiciary has a reputation for protecting civil liberties, despite the Israeli-Arab conflict, and despite the discriminatory views held by many Israelis. The Israeli judiciary has been able to maintain this reputation, even though considerations. The archetypical case occurs when the acquittal is based on race or ethnicity: either the jury is prejudiced against a victim (e.g., the victim was African American, and jurors considered the harm done by the crime less than if the victim were white) or biased in favor of a defendant because of race."

134. A “price tag” attack is a retaliatory act carried out by right-wing Israeli Jewish activists against Israeli-Arabs or Haredim. See, e.g., Michael Omer-Man, “88% of Jewish Israelis Oppose Price Tag Attacks”, JERUSALEM POST, http://www.jpost.com/National-News/88-percent-of-Jewish-Israelis-oppose-price-tag-attacks (last updated Nov. 10, 2011, 7:45 PM) Polls on what percentage of Jewish Israelis support “price tag” attacks are mixed. See id. (finding that 88% of Jewish Israelis oppose “price tag” attacks); Poll: 46% in Favor of ‘Price Tag’, YNETNEWS (Mar. 28, 2011, 2:19 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4048459,00.html (finding that 46% of Jewish Israelis believed “price tag” attacks were somewhat justified following the murder of a family in the Israeli settlement of Itamar).

135. See supra notes 129–130 and accompanying text.


138. See supra notes 78–80, 84–86 and accompanying text.
minorities are relatively under-represented in the Israeli bar and in the Israeli judiciary. At the end of 2008, 15.5% of Israeli lawyers, and 7% of Israeli judges were Arab. In 2004, Salim Joubran became the first Israeli-Arab to be appointed to the Israeli Supreme Court. There is little data available on Haredi-Israeli membership of the Israeli bar and the Israeli judiciary, but given the general disdain for the secular courts held by the Haredim, Haredi-Israelis are likely under-represented in both the Israeli bar and among the Israeli judiciary.

While minorities are underrepresented within the Israeli judicial system, the liberal-leaning nature of the Israeli Bar Association provides better protection against discrimination for Israel’s minority populations in criminal matters than would instituting a lay jury system. This is particularly true given the difficulties faced in assembling an unbiased jury that fairly represents Israel’s diverse population and that agrees as to the content of the law that should be applied. Additionally, Israel’s minorities are protected from discrimination in personal and family matters through the vast jurisdiction of the religious courts.

Additionally, though a jury system is beneficial for many countries, a jury system is not likely to be beneficial for Israel. A jury system is beneficial because it can add to the perceived legitimacy of a legal framework. Additionally, a jury system can promote civic engagement and political participation. Further, a jury system is likely to promote the perception that the legal framework is fair. At present, a jury in Israel is unlikely to promote civic engagement and political participation and is unlikely to promote fairness. However, a jury system could ultimately help legitimate the legal framework by increasing the inclusion of minority groups in the deliberation process.

140. Id. The number of Israeli-Arab lawyers and judges in the Israeli judiciary is not proportionate to the number of Israeli-Arabs in the Israeli population. Id.
142. See BEN-YEHUDA supra note 108.
143. See supra Part III.A-C.
144. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., John Gastil et al., Deliberation and Global Criminal Justice: Juries in the International Criminal Court, 24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 69, 70 (2010) (“Arguing that under certain circumstances, a jury in the International Criminal Court’s cases “could contribute significantly to the perceived legitimacy of the Court’s decisions and to its function as a legal institution.”)
147. See, e.g., Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty Within Jury Systems, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 513, 513 (2012) (“Many characterize the American jury system as maximizing fairness, urging that it allows a group of representative citizens to adjudicate disputes rather than allowing the state to run rampant.”).
148. See supra Part III.A.
149. See supra Part III.B.
IV. Juries in Heterogeneous Societies

A. A Test to Determine the Feasibility of a Jury System in Israel

In Section I, this Note discussed a four-factor test for determining whether a lay jury is desirable in a particular society.\(^{150}\) Israel likely fails the first factor: having a population that is mostly racially, culturally, linguistically, and religiously homogeneous.\(^{151}\) Most Israelis are Jewish\(^\text{152}\) and speak Hebrew.\(^\text{153}\) However, there is a significant Arab population that speaks Arabic and is mostly either religiously Muslim or Christian.\(^\text{154}\) Israel likely fails the second factor as well, which requires having a population sufficiently educated to set aside prejudices prior to reaching a judgment.\(^\text{155}\) While Israelis are relatively highly educated,\(^\text{156}\) a substantial number of Israelis still maintain discriminatory views.\(^\text{157}\) For the third factor—juror agreement on the type of law that society ought to enforce\(^\text{158}\)—Israelis do not have a constitution, have not agreed on what type of law the country should be enforcing, and it is unclear how much impact religion would have on juror decision-making.\(^\text{159}\) With regard to the fourth factor of societal support for a lay jury and the historical use of a lay jury,\(^\text{160}\) there is no history in Israel of a jury system, and there is no evidence to suggest societal support for a shift toward a lay jury system.\(^\text{161}\) Israel, therefore, fails all four factors of the test proposed in Section I.

While the previously discussed four-factor test may be a useful starting point for judging the feasibility of a jury system in homogenous countries\(^\text{162}\) a condensed and simplified version of the test is more appropriate for application in heterogeneous countries. It is argued that before a heterogeneous country institutes a lay jury system, two factors must be present: (1) The vast majority of citizens must have a common national identity; and (2) the society must agree on a common set of laws to be employed. This new test combines many of the aspects of the previously discussed four-factor test, but with some significant modifications.

\(^{150}\) See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.

\(^{151}\) See supra note 35 and accompanying text.


\(^{154}\) Id.

\(^{155}\) See supra note 36 and accompanying text.


\(^{157}\) See supra notes 94–98, 103–104, 126–128 and accompanying text.

\(^{158}\) See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

\(^{159}\) See supra Part III.C.

\(^{160}\) See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

\(^{161}\) See Straschnov, supra note 47 and accompanying text.

\(^{162}\) See supra notes 35, 38–39 and accompanying text.
In terms of the first factor in the new test, having a common national identity is far more important than the other sorts of cleavages that can divide a society. There are countries, such as the United States, that maintain respected jury systems despite not being racially, culturally, linguistically, and religiously homogeneous.\textsuperscript{163} However, differing national identities in other heterogeneous countries, such as Israel, prevent a lay jury system from being viable. Currently, Israel is divided not only by differences in national identity between the Jewish majority and Arab minority, but also by differences within the Jewish majority between secular Jews and the Haredim.\textsuperscript{164}

With regard to the second factor in the test, having an agreed upon source of law solves many of the concerns addressed in the previously discussed four-factor test. Having an agreed upon a source of law would encourage education about legal rights and liberties. Additionally, having a societal consensus on the source of law could boost societal support for lay participation in the legal system.\textsuperscript{165}

The United States passes this new test because even despite some racial and cultural differences, United States citizens have a common national identity,\textsuperscript{166} and because the United States has a written constitution granting all citizens equal rights.\textsuperscript{167} In the United States, the Constitution is the law of the land,\textsuperscript{168} and in fact, new American citizens must take an oath of allegiance to the United States of America and to the United States Constitution.\textsuperscript{169}

Israel, however, would fail both factors of this test. There is a significant minority of Israelis who do not identify as Israelis,\textsuperscript{170} and many Haredim want Israel to become a Halachic state.\textsuperscript{171} Furthermore, Israel does not have a universally recognized constitution to serve as the central source of law and protection for all Israelis.\textsuperscript{172}

B. Further Complications to the Potential for a Jury in Israel

Before Israel can add a jury, Israelis must agree on what law should be employed.\textsuperscript{173} It is impractical for Israel to have secular criminal law if much of the population will ignore it based on religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{174} A writ-

\footnotesize{163. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.  
165. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
166. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.  
168. Id. art. VI.  
169. See Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f6141176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=facd6db8d7c37210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=dd7f89d4aa3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).  
170. See Telhami, supra note 99 and accompanying text.  
171. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text.  
172. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
173. See supra Part III.C.  
174. See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.}
ten constitution defining what it means to be a Jewish state could go a long way toward solving this problem. Would such a state simply be a secular state with a Jewish majority, or would Judaism play a substantial role in Israeli jurisprudence? Such a decision should be specified in Israel’s constitution. It is also important for any Israeli constitution to address how Israel can define itself as a state with a Jewish majority, but still protect the rights of minority groups. Addressing this concern could help Israeli minorities identify more with Israel.

The Israel-Arab conflict likely undermines Israel’s ability to have a jury system by making it especially difficult to create a common national identity. Israel’s inability to determine its borders threatens its future as a Jewish, democratic state. While Palestinians in the West Bank are governed by and vote in Palestinian Authority elections,175 Israeli settlers who live in the West Bank are governed by and vote in Israeli elections.176 If Palestinians were to abandon calls for the creation of a Palestinian state encompassing the West Bank (and Gaza), and were instead to demand the right to vote in Israel, Israel would soon cease to be a majority-Jewish state.177 Such a situation would further complicate any attempt at achieving a common national identity among Israelis.

Currently, the existence of a Palestinian state would be beneficial for Israel. In addition to any security and demographic benefits that a Palestinian state would bring, it could also provide Israeli-Arabs who do not identify with Israel a homeland with which to identify.178 If the people who are currently considered Israeli-Arabs had two homelands to choose from, it is quite possible that tensions between Israelis and Israeli-Arabs would be mitigated and a unifying Israeli identity could be formed that includes Israeli minority groups.

C. A Jury in the Future?

Israel’s lack of a jury is not ideal. Without a jury system, Israel is prone to criticisms that its judicial system lacks legitimacy.179 However, without major changes, the current absence of a lay jury is preferable to the addition of a lay jury.180

179. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Part III.D.
Under the right circumstances, however, a jury system would be preferable to the status quo. If Israelis were able to unite around a common national identity and a common source of law, a lay jury system would add legitimacy to Israel’s legal system and could increase civic engagement. Such a system would have to involve a fair cross-section of the population, including Israel’s Arab and Haredi populations. If Israel can integrate minority groups sufficiently to create a common national identity, Israel would pass the first part of the two-part test suggested in Section A of Part IV of this Note.181 If Israel can reach a consensus among all Israelis on the source of law, Israel could accomplish better protection of minorities’ rights, and could also pass the second prong of the test.182 If Israel is able to pass both parts of the test, lay participation in jury service could also add to the legitimacy of the Israeli legal system, as well as increase civic engagement.183

Conclusion

In the United States, the right to a trial by jury in serious criminal cases and in many civil cases is a fundamental right. The trial by jury is also common in many Western countries, particularly those with Anglo-Saxon roots. More and more countries have added lay juries in recent years. However, Israel, a country with Anglo and Ottoman roots, has not yet added a jury system. An important question is whether and under what circumstances a heterogeneous society such as Israel should have a lay jury.

This Note argued that Israel should not presently institute a lay jury system. This Note analyzed an existing four-factor test for determining whether a society should have a lay jury. This pre-existing test is useful, but should be modified and condensed into a two-part test for application to heterogeneous societies: First, in order to institute a jury, the vast majority of citizens must have a common national identity. Second, there must be an agreed upon source of law.

At present, Israel fails both parts of this new test. First, Israeli society is sharply divided between the majority who identify with Israel, and a significant minority who either identify as Palestinian Arabs, or identify as followers of Halachic Judaism. Second, not all Israelis have agreed upon a common source of law. However, a lay jury system may be ideal once Israel meets these two conditions. In addition to its application to Israel, the two-part test can be applied to other heterogeneous countries to determine the feasibility of a lay jury system.

181. The first part of the test is that the vast majority of citizens must have a common national identity.
182. The second part of the test is that society must agree on a common set of laws to be employed.
183. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.