NOTE

"TESTING THE WATERS"—THE SEC'S FEET GO FROM WET TO COLD

Jeffrey A. Brill†

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† The author wishes to thank Professor Richard Painter, Professor Zachary Shulman,
 and Betty Braverman, Esq. for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this Note.
 Steven Scott, Samson Frankel, Nathan Thomas, and Matthew Stewart provided invaluable
 editing assistance. The author is especially indebted to Christine O'REilly for her encour-
agement and support throughout the production process. Susan Pado's word processing
 expertise and continual patience are also much appreciated.

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INTRODUCTION

According to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), its "mission is to administer Federal securities laws that seek to provide protection for investors." In particular, "[t]hese laws were designed to facilitate informed investment analyses and decisions by the investing public, primarily by ensuring adequate disclosure of material (significant) information." However, this goal of protecting investors often conflicts with the SEC's policy objective of promoting capital formation. The Commission has struggled recently to balance these competing policies in its efforts to facilitate initial public offerings ("IPOs").

The SEC has sought to encourage IPOs because they (i) frequently serve as the most effective means for corporate entities to...
raise capital and (ii) benefit the capital markets and the economy. Unfortunately, the costs incurred in undertaking an IPO preclude many companies from pursuing this avenue of capital formation. As a result, the SEC has taken measures to reduce these costs to help companies launch IPOs.

"Testing the waters" represents such a step towards facilitating IPOs. Controversially introduced in 1992 via the Small Business Initiatives (the "SBIs Release" or "SBIs") in the form of Rule 254, the testing-the-waters rule enables small businesses to solicit indications of interest in a potential Regulation A offering before incurring the costs and burdens of preparing an offering statement and filing it with the SEC. The results of this solicitation would play a large role in the calculus that a small business uses in deciding whether to proceed with a Regulation A offering.

In June 1995, the Commission published a release entitled Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering (the "Testing Release"). In the Testing Release, the SEC heralded Rule 254 as a success and proposed new Rule 135d, which would extend the scope of testing the waters beyond Regulation A to registered IPOs. As proposed, Rule 135d would "allow companies [of all sizes] to gauge investor interest before incurring the significant expense required in the preparation of IPO disclosure documents." This proposed extension is controversial because it represents a radical departure from the fundamental policy embodied in section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended ("Securities Act"). Section 5(c) protects investors by requiring, absent an exemption, the filing of a registration statement before an issuer, underwriter, or dealer may make any offer to sell or buy a security. The SEC has been committed to achieving section 5's goal of protecting investors from fraud and misrepresentation. In the Testing Release, the SEC reiterated its commitment "to

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4 See infra Part II.A.
7 See SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,470.
9 See infra note 379 and accompanying text.
10 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887.
11 See 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 6.09, at 6-30 (1996) (opining that "the Commission seems to be testing the waters itself").
13 Id. §§ 77(d)(1), 77(e)(c).
14 See Financing America's Growth, supra note 1, at 82,466 (explaining that "[p]rotecting investors against fraud and manipulation is a task that is deeply ingrained in
assuring that the interests of investors are not compromised."¹⁵ Additionally, the Testing Release invited public comment on numerous provisions of, and issues in connection with, proposed Rule 135d; however, it posed two fundamental questions for commenters:

[First, is] the proposed "test the waters" rule . . . appropriate and in investors' interest in the context of registered IPOs[?] . . . [Second, w]ill the proposed process effectively accomplish the Commission's goal of allowing businesses to assess the capital market's potential interest in their businesses on a cost-effective basis, without causing investors to overlook the full disclosures mandated by the federal securities laws?¹⁶

In short, the SEC is concerned that the testing-the-waters proposal may strain the balance between protecting investors and promoting capital formation.

Although the SEC has been pleased with the results of the testing-the-waters amendment to Regulation A introduced in the SBIs Release,¹⁷ many states, as well as the North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA"),¹⁸ opposed Rule 254 because it inadequately protects small investors.¹⁹ Commentators have explained that the SEC needs the support of the states and NASAA for Rule 254 to succeed.²⁰ Proposed Rule 135d, which would enable businesses contemplating registered IPOs to test the waters, differs only slightly from Rule 254. Therefore, the SEC has tried to address the concerns of the states and NASAA regarding investors' vulnerability to fraud and misrepresentation.

The SEC apparently is struggling to solve the foregoing problems because the comment period for the Testing Release ended on September 8, 1995, and the Commission has yet to revise or adopt the testing-the-waters proposal.²¹ Even the passage by Congress in October 1996 of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of

the traditions of the agency, and it is a mission that is every bit as important today as it was when the nation's federal securities laws were first enacted in the 1930s".

¹⁵ Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,886.
¹⁶ Id. at 86,890 (emphasis added).
¹⁷ See infra text accompanying notes 341-43.
¹⁹ See infra Part III.B.1.
²⁰ See infra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
²¹ Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,885. By contrast, the SEC adopted the SBIs about six weeks after the end of the public comment period. See infra text accompanying notes 155-59. Cf. infra Part IV.D (offering reasons why the SEC has taken more time with proposed Rule 135d than with the SBIs).

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1996\textsuperscript{22} (the "NSMIA"), which (i) exempted certain securities and securities transactions from state securities law registration requirements and (ii) granted the Commission general exemptive authority,\textsuperscript{23} has not yet prompted the Commission to take action with respect to proposed Rule 135d. Nevertheless, the SEC still considers the adoption of the proposal a priority.\textsuperscript{24} In short, after getting its feet wet in the Regulation A waters, the SEC currently has developed cold feet about extending the proposal to the registered IPO market.

This Note discusses the Regulation A testing-the-waters rule the SEC adopted in 1992 and the similar proposed Rule 135d currently under consideration. It focuses on proposed Rule 135d’s likely impact on potential issuers, actual issuers, underwriters, investors, the registration process, and the capital markets.\textsuperscript{25} Part I begins with a brief introduction to the statutory framework that governs public offerings. This historical perspective will set the stage for a discussion of the ways in which testing the waters appears to undermine the equilibrium between protecting investors and encouraging capital formation that section 5 of the Securities Act has maintained thus far.

Part II describes the need for a testing-the-waters rule. It summarizes the advantages of an IPO and the difficulties facing companies that aspire to go public. This Part explains the reasons underlying the SEC’s decision to introduce the testing-the-waters initiative as part of the SBIs Release, thereby enabling only small businesses to benefit from testing the waters.

Part III begins with a detailed analysis of the testing-the-waters rule the SBIs Release introduced in 1992. It then surveys the reactions of scholars, practitioners, the private bar, states, NASAA, and the Commission to the testing-the-waters provisions, many of which also apply to the Rule 135d proposal in the Testing Release. Part III also addresses the problems posed by the lack of coordination between state securities laws and Rule 254. Additionally, this Part assesses the testing-the-waters rule, and discusses its impact since its enunciation in the SBIs Release. It concludes that testing the waters under Rule 254


\textsuperscript{23} See infra Parts III.C.3, V.D; infra notes 226, 541-43.

\textsuperscript{24} See infra text accompanying note 539.

\textsuperscript{25} Many authorities maintain that after the close of trading, the stock of a company that has gone public usually underperforms. See, e.g., Christopher Farrell, Should You join the IPO Stampede?, Bus. Wk., Dec. 18, 1995, at 72; Phillip L. Zweig & Leah Nathans Spiro, Beware the IPO Market: Individual Investors Are at a Big Disadvantage, Bus. Wk., Apr. 4, 1994, at 84, 88. While the performance of an issuer's stock after it has tested the waters and completed an IPO is relevant to an evaluation of a testing-the-waters rule, this Note does not focus in its analysis of proposed Rule 135d on the long-term performance of the stock of a company that has gone public because there are many reasons why a stock may underperform.
poses significant risks for investors, and that the SEC’s declaration of the initiative’s success was too hasty.

Part IV delineates proposed Rule 135d and proposed revisions to Rule 254 which the SEC introduced in the Testing Release. It compares proposed Rule 135d with Rule 254 and with the NASAA model implemented by states that participated in a two-year pilot program. Part IV also reviews the comment letters submitted in response to the Testing Release.

Part V assesses the testing-the-waters proposal currently before the SEC. This Note recognizes the need for testing the waters as well as the advantages of expanding its availability. However, it concludes that proposed Rule 135d is irreconcilable with the language and policy aims of section 5(c) of the Securities Act. Current Rule 254 does not adequately protect investors from making decisions to purchase securities solely or largely on the basis of the testing-the-waters solicitation, that is, without a careful review of an offering circular. Proposed Rule 135d does not go far enough beyond Rule 254 to provide adequate safeguards.

Although this Note finds that the proposal, as drafted, is potentially harmful to investors, Part V praises the Testing Release for increasing the availability of testing the waters. Rule 254 helped neither small businesses that sought to raise more capital than the $5 million that Regulation A permits nor larger businesses whose needs typically prevent them from enjoying shelter under Regulation A. Proposed Rule 135d would enable larger issuers to test the waters prior to a registered IPO of any size. Therefore, proposed Rule 135d corrects the asymmetry the Commission created when it reserved the testing-the-waters rule only for issuers contemplating a Regulation A offering. This Note welcomes the Commission’s effort to restore uniformity. It contends that this uniformity is justified because testing the waters before a registered IPO is actually less likely to expose investors to fraud and misrepresentation than testing the waters before a Regulation A offering.26

Part V argues that as long as testing the waters remains permissible under Regulation A, it should also be available uniformly to issuers considering a registered IPO. But, as proposed, the Commission’s Rule 135d insufficiently protects investors. This Note recommends collapsing Rule 254 and proposed Rule 135d into a single rule that would contain additional safeguards. These safeguards would enable potential issuers of any size to reap the benefits of testing the waters before either a Regulation A or registered IPO, while minimizing the risk that investors will make uninformed investment decisions. In this

26 See infra Part V.E.3.
manner, the SEC could at least reconcile proposed Rule 135d with the policy goals of section 5(c) of the Securities Act.

I

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The Securities Act, enacted four years after the 1929 stock market crash, regulates and oversees securities offerings, including IPOs, with an eye towards protecting investors. The Securities Act protects investors by requiring an issuer to register its securities, absent an exemption. An issuer must file with the Commission a registration statement that the SEC will review to ensure that investors receive adequate and accurate disclosure. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act, which prohibits gun-jumping, protects investors during the prefiling period.

A. Gun-Jumping

The SEC has historically prohibited gun-jumping, which is the making of an offer, as defined in section 2(3) of the Securities Act, by an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, before the issuer has filed a registration statement. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act codifies this prohibition. Section 5(c) stipulates that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium

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27 See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979) (explaining that "the 1933 Act was primarily concerned with the regulation of new offerings"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975) (clarifying that the Securities Act is "chiefly concerned with disclosure and fraud in connection with offerings of securities—primarily, as here, initial distributions of newly issued stock from corporate issuers"). The SEC also considers the protection of investors its primary purpose. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.

28 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994). This represents the period of time between when a company is "in registration" and the filing of its registration statement.

29 Section 4(1) of the Securities Act states that section 5 does not govern "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1).

of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security."31 Under section 2(3),

[t]he term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer to sell", "offer for sale", or "offer" shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.32

Section 2(10) defines a "prospectus" as "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security."33 Therefore, commencement by an issuer, underwriter, or dealer of a "public sales campaign" through a notice issued before registration violates section 5 of the Securities Act.34

The SEC further clarified in several releases that section 5(c) may proscribe prefiled publicity that falls short of an "express offer."35 The Commission therefore broadly construes the term "offer" in section 2(3). According to the Commission,

publicity efforts ... made in advance of a proposed financing, although not couched in terms of an express offer, may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer in a manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact part of the selling effort.36

31 15 U.S.C. § 77e (c). For a discussion of liability arising from gun-jumping under the federal securities laws, see Chiappinelli, supra note 30, at 463-66.
32 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3). However, section 2(3) states that "preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer ... and any underwriter or among underwriters who are or are to be in privity of contract with an issuer" are outside the purview of these definitions and the term "offer to buy" in section 5(c). Id.
33 Id. § 77b(10). Section 2(10)(b) exempts from this definition "a notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication in respect of a security" issued after registration that discloses (i) "from whom a written prospectus meeting the requirements of section 77j of this title may be obtained" and (ii) only certain limited information permitted by this section and by Rule 134. Id. § 77b(10)(b); see 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1997).
34 Publication of Information Prior to or After Effective Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 3844, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 3250, ¶ 3254-56, at 3147, 3149-52 (Oct. 8, 1957) [hereinafter Publication of Information Release] (offering examples of pre-filing publicity that violated section 5(c)).
35 Id. at 3149.
36 Id. The Commission used essentially the same language in a controlling case regarding gun-jumping as its rationale for holding that a press release issued by an underwriter six weeks before filing a registration statement, which described the nature of a proposed public offering and the value thereof, "must be presumed to set in motion or to be a part of the distribution process and therefore to involve an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy such securities prohibited by Section 5(c)." Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 851 (1959); see also Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5180, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,192, at 80,578, 80,579 (Aug. 16, 1971) [hereinafter Guidelines Release] (explaining that "the publication of information and
The Commission and the courts thus have been concerned about the effects of prefiling disclosure on investors.\textsuperscript{37} When investors, who lack either a sufficient opportunity or capacity to determine the inherent risks of a public offering, participate in a transaction primarily as a result of sales-oriented, prefiling publicity, the courts have deemed the publicity a violation of section 5(c). For example, in \textit{Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co.}, the Commission found that a prefiling press release the underwriter issued "arose\[ed\] and stimulat\[ed\] investor and dealer interest" in the offering.\textsuperscript{38} The SEC held that the press release constituted an illegal offer to sell and thus violated section 5(c) of the Securities Act.\textsuperscript{39}

The intent of the issuer or its agent is also a factor the Commission and the courts have considered in conducting a section 5(c) analysis of prefiling publicity. The SEC has explained that prefiling publicity that is “published by various means for the purpose of conveying to the public a message designed to stimulate an appetite for securities” may represent an offer under section 5(c).\textsuperscript{40} In \textit{Loeb, Rhoades & Co.}, the Commission found that the press release was “of a character calculated, by arousing and stimulating investor and dealer interest in [the] securities and by eliciting indications of interest . . . , to set in motion the processes of distribution.”\textsuperscript{41} In short, “the purpose of the release was [no] different from its effect—the stimulation of investor and dealer interest as the first step in a selling effort.”\textsuperscript{42} The intent of the underwriters, the content and timing of the release, and the manifest effect on investors led the Commission to conclude that the publicity violated the Securities Act.\textsuperscript{43}

The SEC’s Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in Registration (the “Guidelines Release”)\textsuperscript{44} reiterated that the “phrase ‘offer to sell’ [in section 5(c)] is broadly de-
fined by the [Securities] Act and has been liberally construed by the courts and Commission." Despite requests to "promulgate an all inclusive list of permissible and prohibited activities" under section 5(c), the SEC has declined to provide such a list because compliance with the statute is determined on a case by case basis. Nevertheless, the Guidelines Release cautioned issuers that are in registration to "avoid issuance of forecasts, projections, or predictions relating but not limited to revenues, income, or earnings per share . . . [and] publishing opinions concerning values."

Although the SEC was reluctant to publish a so-called "all inclusive list," the Second Circuit recognized that Rule 135 of the Securities Act serves this purpose with respect to the formal announcement of an offering. The court conceded that "the line drawn between an announcement containing sufficient information to constitute an offer and one which does not must be to some extent arbitrary." However, according to the court, Rule 135 sets forth a "checklist of features that may be included in an announcement which does not also constitute an offer to sell." The court encouraged interpreting Rule 135 as "an exclusive list." Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 135 most relevant to IPOs, an issuer may give notice that it seeks to undertake a public offering without violating section 5(c) if the notice is limited to: (i) an announcement that "the offering will be made only by means of a prospectus" and (ii) disclosure of only the identity of the potential issuer, the fundamental terms and timing of the offering, and a short statement regarding the nature and goal of the offering without identifying the underwriter. Rule 135 thus establishes

45 Guidelines Release, supra note 36, at 80,579.
46 See id. at 80,580; see also Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. at 853 n.20 (acknowledging that "[w]hether in any particular case publicity is an offer depends upon all the facts, and the surrounding circumstances including the nature, source, distribution, timing, and apparent purpose and effect of the published material").
47 Guidelines Release, supra note 36, at 80,580.
50 Id. (holding that "the assigning of a value to offered shares constitutes an offer to sell"). The court reasoned that "[o]ne of the evils of a premature offer is its tendency to encourage the formation by the offeree of an opinion of the value of the securities before a registration statement and prospectus are filed." Id. The court recognized that a prefiling announcement of a future sale of securities, coupled with "an attractive description of these securities and of the issuer," conveys information that would be found in a prospectus. Id. (citing S.E.C. v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1997). The Rule allows the notice of a proposed offering to contain additional information in the cases of rights offerings, exchange offerings, and offerings to employees. Id.
limits on the content of legal prefiling publicity that announces an offering.

The SEC has liberally recognized that offers need not "take any particular legal form." This position is consistent with the Commission’s broad construction of the meaning of “offer” for the purposes of section 5(c) and its strict definition of the contours of legal prefiling disclosure. “Offers” include a number of means of dissemination. For example, prefiling announcements delivered via a speech, press release, advertisement, article, broadcast, the Internet, or electronic mail about an offering may constitute an illegal offer under section 5(c).

This treatment of all modes of communication as potential "offers" under section 5(c) has led to de-emphasis of the scope of the dissemination as a measure of whether a communication is an “offer.” The SEC has not set forth a bright line test which would require that the publicity reach either a certain audience or a minimum number of those comprising that audience. In fact, publicity that is merely publicly available may still constitute gun-jumping.

In short, through sections 5 and 2(3) and Rule 135, “Congress has specified a period during which, and a procedure by which, information concerning a proposed offering may be disseminated to dealers and investors.” Further, the Commission has explained that “[t]his procedure is exclusive and cannot be nullified by recourse to public relations techniques to set in motion or further the machinery of distribution before the statutory disclosures have been made and upon the basis of whatever information the distributor deems it expedient to supply.”

This limited statutory tolerance of prefiling publicity reveals that the SEC could not broaden the availability of testing the waters to registered IPOs under the current federal securities laws. As Part V discusses, testing the waters, which allows prospective issuers to communicate an unlimited amount of information to potential investors,

54 Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 849 (1959); see also Chiappinelli, supra note 30, at 467-69 (discussing the various forms “offers” can take).

55 See Chiappinelli, supra note 30, at 468-69. Such publicity represents a “passive offer.” Id. Of course, if the prefiling publicity does not actually reach investors, a court may be less inclined to hold the issuer liable if it finds that the dissemination had little or no impact on investors. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. However, this may be a difficult conclusion to draw because prefiling publicity that does not directly reach the ultimate investors may affect the investors in other ways. For example, the publicity may influence the purchase price of the securities by driving away other investors or leading analysts and dealers to promote the offering to their customers. Consequently, investors, who cannot establish that they relied on the pre-filing communication, may still have a section 5(c) cause of action against an issuer.

56 Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. at 850-51.

57 Id. at 851.
would not find shelter from section 5 under current Rule 135. The Rules 135a-c currently exempt specific forms of publicity in particular circumstances from section 5, but none of these apply to the usage of testing-the-waters materials before a registered IPO. In the Testing Release, the Commission seeks to add a new exemption: Rule 135d. The heart of the controversy underlying the testing-the-waters proposal remains that although the Commission may have "previously drawn" a not-always-clear line between those forms of preregistration publicity that were permitted and those that were not..., no doubt existed that direct attempts to solicit the investor would not be tolerated." The testing-the-waters proposal invites issuers to pursue such a direct solicitation.

B. The Purpose of the Statutory Prohibition of Gun-Jumping

As discussed above, Congress enacted the Securities Act to protect investors, and imbued the Commission with the responsibility of fulfilling this objective through the administration and supervision of the federal securities laws. The gun-jumping prohibition represents the primary safeguard protecting investors during the prefiling period. The proscription of gun-jumping begins the "period of enforced silence" during which Congress, through section 5 of the Securities Act, comprehensively channels all communications from the issuer to prospective investors through the SEC.

Congress intended for section 5 to protect the public from misleading, fraudulent, illusory, or incomplete statements made by issuers or underwriters, who, in their efforts to persuade investors to participate in a financing, might fail to disclose material information. The Securities Act sought to afford the public an opportunity to carefully examine the particulars of the issuer and its offering as

58 See infra Part VA2.
60 John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate over Company Registration, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1143, 1151-52 (1995) (footnote omitted). In addition to the disclosure permitted under Rules 135 and 135a-c, there are other forms of prefiling publicity that the Commission currently appears to tolerate. See 3A Bloomenthal, supra note 11, § 6.09, 6-14 to 6-21 (discussing the SEC's liberal attitude towards the following types of prefiling publicity: "product advertising and industry publicity," "appearances before analysts," and "research department publications").
61 See supra notes 1-2, 27 and accompanying text.
62 Coffee, supra note 60, at 1151.
described in a prospectus the SEC had previously reviewed. Prefiling publicity causes investors "to form ... premature opinion[s] ... without [the] benefit of the full set of facts contained in a prospectus," the accuracy of which the SEC can attempt to verify. Professor Coffee candidly articulated why investors need protection and how the gun-jumping prohibition provides this protection:

The obvious premise to Section 5 was that if investors could receive glossy, promotional literature from the issuer, they might pay little attention to the dull, formalistic prospectus prepared in accordance with the rules of a government agency. Understandably, the government is not as slick, persuasive, or enticing as Madison Avenue, and thus, if its mandated disclosure document is to receive investor attention, the state needs a monopoly for at least a limited period on access to the investor. Section 5 essentially provides that monopoly. . . .

Prefiling publicity may have ramifications reaching far beyond the obvious harm to individual investors, which the gun-jumping prohibition seeks to address. For example, prefiling publicity may artificially interfere with the market price of the securities at the time of the offering. Further, the Commission suggested in Loeb, Rhoades & Co. that investor reliance upon such publicity may endanger "the health of the capital markets." When dealers or investors suffer losses as a result of a misleading statement made before the filing of a registration statement, they will be less likely to participate in similar offerings in the future. This threatens the success of future new issues.

C. Gun-Jumping as Applied to IPOs

The section 5(c) gun-jumping prohibition is particularly significant in the context of IPOs. Prefiling publicity regarding an IPO

66 Coffee, supra note 60, at 1151.
67 See Publication of Information Release, supra note 34, at 3149.
68 Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. at 854.
69 The legislature and the SEC often discuss gun-jumping in terms of a balancing dilemma. The Commission seeks to protect investors while simultaneously encouraging companies to disclose material information to its shareholders and the public. See, e.g., id. at 852. Full and fair disclosure to shareholders and the public represents the underlying purpose of the reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange Act. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (explaining that the primary purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is to "implement[] a "philosophy of full disclosure"); S. REP. No. 73-792, at 1-5 (1934); Guidelines Release, supra note 36, at 80,580; Publication of Information Prior to or After the Filing and Effective Date of a Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 5009, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,744, at 83,705, 83,706 (Oct. 7, 1969); Publication of Information Release, supra note 34, at 3147. However, this Note does not flesh out this argument.
may be more likely to have an effect on dealers and investors because there is much less information available to the public regarding private companies. Private companies are not subject to the reporting requirements prescribed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended ("Exchange Act"). There is typically less public familiarity with private companies. Private companies, especially smaller companies, usually have fewer shareholders than their public counterparts. Moreover, analysts primarily track public companies. Therefore, because there is comparatively less information available about private companies to compete with prefiling publicity, investors may need even more protection before an IPO than before a subsequent public offering by a seasoned issuer. In addition to this information gap, sellers of securities offered in an IPO may use exceedingly aggressive marketing tactics. Because the offering constitutes an issuer's first sale to the public, the issuer, especially eager to consummate the offering, may engage in puffing and overreaching to ensure the success of the offering.

The consequences of gun-jumping by small issuers who offer securities to the public pursuant either to Regulation A or another exemption may be even greater than those for registered IPOs. Smaller businesses that cannot afford a registered IPO may rely on Regulation A to conduct an offering via a short-form registration. Alternatively, these small issuers may choose to raise capital via an offering that is exempt from registration, for example, in reliance on Rule 504 of Regulation D. The aforementioned information gap may widen because businesses that contemplate these smaller public offerings often sell to investors who are less financially sophisticated. Conversely, professional underwriters often market registered IPOs to institutional investors, mutual fund companies, and brokerage houses which usually have more financial sophistication than the individual investors who are likely to purchase securities in a Regulation A or Rule 504 offering. Such investors are more susceptible to fraud and misrepresentation and thus need the protection of section 5(c).

Illegal prefiling publicity before both registered and exempt IPOs poses the same systemic dangers discussed earlier in the context of

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71 See infra Part II.B.2.
72 See infra Part II.B.3.
73 See NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9374.
74 See Zweig & Spiro, supra note 25, at 85-86.
75 See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. Corp. L. 1, 33-36 (1983) (discussing how fraud is more common in small issues).
registered IPOs. Such publicity can artificially inflate the market price and potentially harm the capital markets.\textsuperscript{76}

\section*{II

\textbf{THE NEED FOR TESTING THE WATERS}}

The promotion of capital formation has been a parallel policy aim of the Securities Act.\textsuperscript{77} Although there are a host of means by which a corporate entity can raise capital, public offerings, especially registered IPOs, offer issuers substantial benefits.\textsuperscript{78} As a result, the SEC in 1995 proposed testing-the-waters legislation in the form of Rule 135d that should help issuers to undertake registered IPOs. But before attempting to promote registered IPOs in this way, the Commission in 1992 first introduced the testing-the-waters concept via Rule 254 to help small businesses raise capital under Regulation A.

\subsection*{A. Introduction to Registered IPOs}

In a registered IPO, an issuer registers securities in compliance with federal and state securities laws and sells shares of its stock to the public for the first time. A company chooses to go public in order to avail itself of the advantages of public ownership.\textsuperscript{79} After a successful IPO, a newly created public company has access to capital and gains financial flexibility with which it can accomplish many ends. For example, the company can use the funds to satisfy debts, expand production, increase inventory, promote research and development, acquire or merge with another entity using its liquid stock to pay the

\textsuperscript{76} See \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 67-68.

\textsuperscript{77} See \textit{supra} note 3 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{79} For a discussion of the disadvantages of an IPO, see Hazen, supra note 78, § 1.6, at 62-65; Lipman, supra note 78, at 9-13; Schneider et al., supra note 78, at 3-5; Friedman, supra note 78, at 13-14; Salomon, supra note 78, at 127-31; Ten Eyck, supra note 78, at 100-03; Olson & Arp, supra note 78, at 29-32; Harry L. Henning, \textit{So Your Client Wants To Go Public, A.B.A. J., Mar.}, 1, 1986, at 58, 59-60; Roberta Maynard, \textit{Are You Ready To Go Public?, Nation’s Bus.}, Jan. 1995, at 30, 32; Private Lives, FORBES, Dec. 5, 1994, at 184; Taggart et al., \textit{supra} note 78, at 51-52.
purchase price, improve compensation, launch a marketing campaign, and make investments. The offering also enables the company to diversify management's risks, yet retain its current managers.

The establishment of a public market translates into liquidity for owners of the company. This is in stark contrast to the situation prior to the IPO, when shareholders, seeking to sell all or part of their shares, may find themselves without a ready market. The listing of the company's stock on an exchange or national broker quotation system increases its net worth and enables management to turn to the public market in the future to raise capital through subsequent public offerings. Furthermore, if the stock performs strongly, banks and other financial institutions will be more inclined to loan the company money. Finally, the company's new public status enables the public, suppliers, and customers to become more familiar with the company. This may trigger greater demand for a company's products and better sources of supply. An IPO can thus help a company both in the short term and in the long run.

The Commission encourages registered IPOs because scholars and industry experts recognize that IPOs benefit the capital markets and economy at large. According to an IPO expert, "[t]he IPO market is the most efficient allocator of capital ever devised in the world." Although the IPO market concededly delivers much of its fruits to institutional investors, this does not undermine the benefits of the allocation. A successful IPO generates substantial capital for an issuer in a short period of time and gives investors an equity interest together with an opportunity for capital appreciation. Moreover, IPOs pave the road for entrepreneurs to fulfill their visions. James H. Clark, founder and Chairman of Netscape, which completed an astoundingly successful IPO in August 1994, commented that absent IPOs, startup companies would not exist. Startups make important contributions to the economy, creating jobs, introducing new products into the marketplace, rejuvenating aging industries, spawning new industries, and injecting a fresh and energetic spirit into the market.

See Schneider et al., supra note 78, at 2; Olson & Arp, supra note 78, at 25-26. See generally Christopher Farrell et al., The Boom in IPOs, Bus. Wk., Dec. 18, 1995, at 64, 66 (citing the retention of management as the reason why "going public is the preferred route" of raising capital). See id. See id. at 2. See id. at 3. See id. at 3. Zweig & Spiro, supra note 25, at 86. See Farrell et al., supra note 81, at 64.
There is a symbiosis between the economy and the IPO market. A strong economy, coupled with a bullish stock market, fosters IPOs. Similarly, a successful IPO that transforms an undercapitalized startup into a thriving public company may, in turn, "have a catalytic effect on the economy." The last decade provides evidence that "[i]n the world of IPO capitalism, success feeds on success, and the pool of sophisticated investment money" continues to grow. This "entrepreneurial multiplier effect" has given rise to many startups in the past several years, and has propagated a record number of IPOs across many different industries. Professor Clifford Smith summed up the impact of initial issuances by declaring that "IPOs are a big part of what makes the whole capital market process possible[;] they allow[ ] the economy to tap into entrepreneurial zeal—and we’re all wealthier for it."

B. Prelude to the SBIs

1. IPOs and Small Businesses

For the aforementioned reasons, many small, private businesses have wanted to go public in the 1990s via a registered IPO. Small businesses often lack other opportunities to raise capital. They experience difficulty because lenders are often reluctant to provide assistance to small businesses that lack a sufficient record of performance. Private investors are similarly uneasy about providing capital. Many small businesses prefer to avoid private financings which dilute equity to a greater extent than public offerings. Hence, even though public offerings are generally more expensive than private financings, small businesses often seek to initiate IPOs.

However, a number of impediments hinder small businesses’ access to the registered IPO market. Huge financial and time commitments pose the most towering obstacles, and continue to be

89 See id. at 65.
90 Id. at 67.
91 Id. Even an unsuccessful IPO may benefit the economy because many entrepreneurs who lose in the IPO market will subsequently return to the arena and win. See id. at 72. Furthermore, in the wake of these inauspicious efforts to go public, a second wave of entrepreneurs will learn from their predecessors’ failures and prepare differently before entering the IPO market. See id.
92 Id. at 68.
93 Id. at 66 (quoting Clifford Smith, Professor of Finance, University of Rochester).
95 See id. at 512-13.
97 However, there is of course no guarantee that a small business will be able to find an underwriter willing to undertake an IPO.
particularly burdensome, for they do not subside after the IPO.98 Therefore, small businesses often are wary of going public because of the increased operating costs and time requirements incurred in running a public company.

A small business considering a registered IPO must be prepared to pay dearly before it receives any capital from the financing. The miscellaneous costs of an IPO vary depending on the size, difficulty, and timing of the offering. A private business that seeks to launch a small $5 million registered IPO can easily incur expenses of $500,000 to $750,000, or ten to fifteen percent of the offering price.99 Compliance costs, the legal, accounting, printing, and other expenses associated with compliance with federal and state securities laws, comprise the major share of these costs. These costs are especially onerous for small businesses because they are disproportional to the amount of proceeds the offering generates.100 Moreover, the company must pay these expenses before the actual offering begins.101

There are additional intangible costs. For example, a small business may not be able to afford the substantial diversion of management's time and attention from the operation of the company to the preparation for a registered IPO.102 The following figures estimate the average amount of time that management devotes to taking a company public: seventy-five percent of a chief financial officer's time, forty percent of a chief executive officer's time, and between twenty-five and thirty percent of other managers' time.103

Following a registered IPO, a small public company continues to incur substantial costs.104 Compliance with the Exchange Act's rigid reporting requirements is a costly undertaking: in total, after going public, a company incurs new expenses of approximately $50,000 to

98 See infra text accompanying notes 104-05.
99 For estimates of the costs of going public, see Lipman, supra note 78, at 51-52; Schneider et al., supra note 78, at 38-43; Loeb & Whalen, supra note 96, at 312-13; Olson & Arp, supra note 78, at 29-30.
100 See Impact of SBI's, supra note 94, at 512; Olson & Arp, supra note 78, at 23.
101 See Proposing SBI's Release, supra note 3, at 82,483-84.
102 See The Entrepreneurial Investment Act of 1996: Hearings on H.R. 2981 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Secs., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the House of Representatives Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 45, 48 (1996) (statement of Karl May, of Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, on behalf of National Small Business United) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2981] (explaining that as a result of the "enormous time spent on raising funds rather than concentrating on [running] the business[, o]ften the business suffers or deteriorates during the period that the owner is out seeking funds"). The cost to the business of the diversion of senior executives' time "cannot be easily translated to dollars, but is in many cases enormous." Id.
103 See Loeb & Whalen, supra note 96, at 312. Charles R. Stuckey, Chief Executive Officer of Security Dynamics Technologies Inc., a company with 150 employees that went public in late 1994, reported to Business Week that he spent 40% of his time preparing for the IPO. See Farrell et al., supra note 81, at 69.
104 See Schneider et al., supra note 78, at 4.
$200,000 per year.\textsuperscript{105} Management will in turn devote much of its time and energy to handling the day-to-day responsibilities of operating a public company.\textsuperscript{106}

IPOs are not only highly expensive, but also extremely risky ventures. Many IPOs are unsuccessful and the stock often plunges after the offering.\textsuperscript{107} Therefore, a larger private company with greater resources is usually more willing and better prepared to weather the storm. Moreover, a larger firm with more shareholders is more likely to know its market, which is essential for gauging investor interest. A smaller company may have trouble assessing whether the market is interested in its IPO.\textsuperscript{108} Furthermore, many small businesses cannot afford the regulatory costs necessary to determine if there is market interest.\textsuperscript{109} Testing the waters is intended to address these latter two problems.

2. \textit{Regulation A Before the SBIs}

In recognition of the formidable obstacles that preclude most small businesses from undertaking registered IPOs, the SEC has historically turned to Regulation A to help small issuers conduct public offerings.\textsuperscript{110} By exempting small businesses from the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act, Regulation A helps small businesses to offer securities to the public.\textsuperscript{111} When introduced in 1936, Regulation A exempted public offerings of only $100,000 or less.\textsuperscript{112} Over time, the SEC has increased this amount to adjust for inflation, and to make the exemption available to a greater number of small issuers.\textsuperscript{113} Prior to the SBIs in 1992, the ceiling for Regulation A exemptions was $1.5 million.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{105} See id. \textsuperscript{106} Mr. Stuckey, \textit{see supra} note 103, reports that he currently spends 10\% of his time "dealing with the demands of being a public company." Farrell et al., \textit{supra} note 81, at 69. \textsuperscript{107} \textit{See supra} note 25. In particular, small businesses have encountered considerable economic difficulties after going public. \textit{See infra} text accompanying note 146. \textsuperscript{108} \textit{See Hearings on H.R. 2981}, \textit{supra} note 102, at 47; Proposing SBIs Release, \textit{supra} note 3, at 82,483. \textsuperscript{109} \textit{See Financing America's Growth}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 82,467 (reporting that "a company may have to spend $200,000 or more just to prepare the mandated disclosure forms and financial statements without knowing whether there would be any investor interest in the company"). \textsuperscript{110} See Proposing SBIs Release, \textit{supra} note 3, at 82,485; An Analysis of the Use of Regulation A for Small Public Offerings, SEC, Directorate of Economic & Policy Analysis, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,207, at 85,052 (Apr. 1982). For the text of Regulation A before the SBIs, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-264 (1992). For the current provisions of Regulation A reflecting the SBIs revisions, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (1997). \textsuperscript{111} 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (1997). \textsuperscript{112} \textit{See 3 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation} 1322 (5d ed. 1989). \textsuperscript{113} \textit{See id. at} 1322-27. \textsuperscript{114} See Proposing SBIs Release, \textit{supra} note 3, at 82,484 & n.52 (discussing the 1992 version of Rule 254(a), codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1992)); Increase in Amount of
Regulation A's status as an exemption is somewhat misleading because an issuer seeking to commence a Regulation A offering must still prepare and file an offering statement with the SEC and deliver an offering circular to each purchaser.\textsuperscript{115} Commonly known as a "short form registration,"\textsuperscript{116} Regulation A simplifies the requirements of "registration" and reduces the concomitant costs small issuers incur.\textsuperscript{117} Prior to the SBIs, Rule 255(a), a Regulation A analogue to section 5(c), proscribed publicity before the filing of an offering statement with the SEC.\textsuperscript{118}

Although Regulation A requires that an issuer prepare and file an offering statement, it helps small issuers by decreasing the amount of mandatory disclosure that must accompany the offering statement.\textsuperscript{119} Regulation A also minimizes expenses incurred after a public offering because it does not necessarily trigger subsequent annual and quarterly reporting requirements under the Exchange Act.\textsuperscript{120} Finally, the offering materials, unlike those prepared for a fully registered offering, do not expose issuers to section 11 strict liability.\textsuperscript{121}

Despite these benefits, few small issuers availed themselves of Regulation A in the decade before the adoption of the SBIs.\textsuperscript{122} This was because Regulation A limited issuers to an offering of $1.5 million, an amount too low for many small issuers, especially in light of the compliance costs incurred in preparing and filing the offering statement with both federal and state regulatory agencies.\textsuperscript{123} Potential issuers were also uncertain whether there would even be market demand for their securities.\textsuperscript{124} Small Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 5977, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,710, at 80,877, 80,878-79 (Sept. 11, 1978). See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 45. The SEC added an exception for offerings of $100,000 or less for which offering circulars were not required. See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484 n.54 (discussing the 1992 version of Rule 257, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (1992)).

\textsuperscript{116} See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 45.

\textsuperscript{117} See 3 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 112, at 1319; SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 45.

\textsuperscript{118} See 3 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 112, at 1335-36; SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 46.


\textsuperscript{120} See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484; SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 46.

\textsuperscript{121} See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484 & n.55 (referring to 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1988)).

\textsuperscript{122} See id. at 82,485.

\textsuperscript{123} See 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-49. The SEC reported that there were only 44 Regulation A filings during the 1991 fiscal year. In fiscal 1981, there were 439. See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,483. Professors Loss and Seligman refer to the "near-total eclipse" of Regulation A before the SBIs. 3 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 112, at 1319.

\textsuperscript{124} See 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-49; Keith J. Mendelson & Cindy R. Shepard, The SEC's Proposed Small Business Initiative: Bold Reform or Opportunity Forgone?, IN-SIGHTS, July 1992, at 12, 17.
interest in their Regulation A offerings. Further, underwriters, seeking higher profits, were unwilling to handle most short form registrations, and insisted instead upon full registration.

3. Regulation D Before the SBIs

As Regulation A offerings waned in the early 1990s, small businesses that were interested in public offerings, but lacked the resources for a registered IPO, were able to raise capital under Regulation D. Rules 504, 505, and 506 of Regulation D have enabled many small issuers to conduct private placements. For example, Rule 505 of Regulation D enables an issuer to sell $5 million in securities within a period of twelve months without registering them. In addition, after the initial sale of securities, an issuer need only file a "notice of sales" of securities pursuant to Regulation D.

Like Regulation A, however, Rule 505 contains certain drawbacks that reduce its utility to small issuers. For instance, the issuer cannot be an investment company. Second, although an issuer may sell securities under Rule 505 to any "accredited investor," as defined in Rule 501(a), it cannot sell to more than thirty-five unaccredited investors, or "purchasers" as narrowly defined by Rule 501(e). Further, an issuer using Rule 505 or 506 cannot offer or sell the securities by means of "general solicitation or general advertising." If an issuer offers securities to nonaccredited investors, it is required to pay for the preparation of audited financials. Finally, small issuers may have difficulty finding investors for Rule 505 and 506 offerings because Rule 502 requires purchasers to wait until the Rule 144 holding period expires.

124 See supra text accompanying note 108.
125 See 3 Loss & Seligman, supra note 112, at 1320 & n.282 (reporting that underwriters handled only 10 of 104 Regulation A offerings in 1986); Schneider et al., supra note 78, at 46.
127 See Impact of SBIs, supra note 94, at 521.
129 Id. § 230.505(a).
130 For further discussion of the limited practical availability of Regulation D to small issuers before the SBIs, see Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others) Under Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems That Need Attention, 74 Ky. L.J. 127 (1985); Patrick Dougherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 Emory L.J. 67 (1989).
131 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(a).
132 Id. §§ 230.505(b), 230.501(e). Compare § 230.505 (permitting sales of securities up to $5 million to no more than thirty-five "purchasers"), with § 230.506 (permitting sales of securities in any amount to no more than thirty-five "purchasers," each of whom must have "such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment").
133 Id. § 230.502(c).
134 See id. § 230.502(b).
periods have expired before reselling the securities without registering them.\textsuperscript{135}

Rule 504, which exempts public offerings up to $1 million, has provided small businesses with another alternative to Regulation A.\textsuperscript{136} Unlike Rules 505 and 506, Rule 504 does not limit small issuers' options by restricting the number or nature of purchasers eligible to buy the securities.\textsuperscript{137} However, before the SBIs of 1992, Rule 504 imposed the same restrictions on general solicitation and advertising and resales by purchasers.\textsuperscript{138} An issuer that is either a reporting company, pursuant to sections 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, or an investment company cannot rely on Rule 504.\textsuperscript{139} The most limiting aspect of Rule 504 was, and continues to be, that the exemption applies to only very small offerings, those for which the aggregate offering over a twelve-month period is priced at or below $1 million.\textsuperscript{140} As with Regulation A, small businesses that seek to raise capital via Rule 504 also incur considerable expenses which discourage potential issuers, especially when they do not even know that investors will be interested.\textsuperscript{141}

4. Intrastate Exemption

Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act, which the SBIs did not amend, has provided another limited avenue for an exempt offering.\textsuperscript{142} An issuer may make an offering of any size to any number of purchasers, all of whom must reside in a single state or territory as long as the issuer (i) is incorporated in that particular state and (ii) conducts most of its operations in that state as well.\textsuperscript{143} This intrastate exemption is thus of limited utility because it allows an issuer to offer securities only within its own state. In addition, issuers conducting an intrastate exemption offering must comply with the Rule 147 safe harbor for such offerings, and with Rule 147(e)'s restriction on resales by purchasers, which further detracts from the appeal of the exemption.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{135} Id. § 230.502(d).
\textsuperscript{136} See Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 12.
\textsuperscript{137} See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484; supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{138} See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484; 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (1992).
\textsuperscript{139} See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484; 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a)(1)-(2) (1992).
\textsuperscript{141} See supra text accompanying note 108.
\textsuperscript{143} See id. Rule 147 outlines the specific requirements for both issuers and purchasers.
\textsuperscript{144} 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1992).
5. Economic and Political Backdrop

In light of the inadequacies of Regulation A, Regulation D, and the intrastate exemption, the prohibitive costs and demanding time commitments of going and remaining public via a registered IPO, the inherent risks of undertaking an IPO, and the uncertainty regarding the market's reception to an IPO, many small businesses in need of capital have not ventured into the IPO market. Additionally, success has eluded most small businesses with annual sales below $5 million that have attempted to go public.

These problems were particularly apparent in 1992. The U.S. economy was emerging from a recession, and small businesses were bearing the brunt of the economic downturn. The aforementioned obstacles denied small businesses access to the public markets. Further, small companies that were not prepared to go public had considerable difficulty obtaining private financing.

Nineteen ninety-two was also an election year. Members of both parties, including the two major presidential candidates, championed the cause of small business, and explained that the troubled state of small businesses was largely responsible for the recent sluggish economy. The resuscitation of small business was seen as the key to creating new job opportunities and restoring the economy. In addition, the Bush Administration repeatedly addressed the need to streamline the federal securities laws. The SEC ultimately adopted the SBIs just before the Republican National Convention. Critics have

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145 See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,483 (highlighting the decline in the number of small business IPOs between 1986 and 1991).
146 See Olson & Arp, supra note 78, at 23; Taggart et al., supra note 78, at 51.
147 See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,483 (noting, in particular, the decline in both venture capital and bank financing).
149 See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,482 (explaining that "[t]he approximately 20 million small businesses in the United States employ more than half of the domestic labor force, produce nearly half of the gross domestic product[,] and created the vast preponderance of new jobs during the period from 1988 through 1990") (footnotes omitted) (citing U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS AND COMPETITION (1990)); sources cited supra note 148.
commented that the political climate forced the SEC to hastily adopt the SBIs when additional time would have enabled the SEC to improve upon the proposed SBIs.  

Against this backdrop, the SEC proposed the SBIs in a release on March 11, 1992. In its Proposing SBIs Release, the SEC identified small businesses as "the cornerstone of the U.S. economy," and reiterated that "the Commission has historically recognized the distinct financing concerns of start-up and development stage businesses and companies newly entering the public markets." The SEC then set forth the following objectives of the SBIs: "[F]acilitating access to the public market for start-up and developing companies, and . . . lowering the costs for small businesses that undertake to have their securities traded in the public market." The prevailing economic and political pressures led to a foreseeable straining of the balance between encouraging capital formation and protecting investors. The testing the waters rule introduced in the SBIs strained this balance more than any of the other initiatives.

III

TESTING THE WATERS UNDER REGULATION A

The period for public comment on the Proposing SBIs Release ended on June 18, 1992. The SEC received substantial comments from interested parties, many of whom expressed concerns regarding the SBIs. The testing-the-waters initiative stimulated more concern

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151 See, e.g., Amy L. Goodman, A Farewell to Chairman Breeden, Insights, May 1993, at 2, 2 (reflecting that the Chairman of the SEC "rushed through the [SBIs] before the November 1992 election, ignoring ongoing negotiations among the state securities regulators, the bar and the SEC to create an acceptable 'test the waters' approach'"); Jonathan R. Laing, Errors of Commission: On Several Counts, the SEC Is Putting the Investor at Risk, BARRON'S, Sept. 7, 1992, at 8, 9 (describing the SBIs as a "political masterstroke," that is, "more a product of political grandstanding than genuine conviction and ameliorative intent"); Rosalyn Retkwa, States Slap Roadblock on SEC’s Small Business Initiatives, CORP. CASHFLOW, Apr. 1993, at 37, 37 (quoting an observer who commented that the SBIs were intended "'to put a small business feather in Bush's cap in preparation for the campaign'"); Kevin G. Salwen, State Regulators Criticize SEC Proposals, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1992, at B2 (quoting Congressman Edward Markey who expressed concern regarding "'election-year deregulatory proposals'" that may undermine investor protection); see also infra notes 282, 285, 288 and accompanying text (discussing the views of NASAA and the SEC).


153 Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,482.

154 Id. at 82,483.

155 See id. at 82,481.

156 For assessments of the SBIs, see infra note 206 and accompanying text. There were sixty-six comment letters filed with the SEC. See SEC Adopts Small Business Package, Some Say It May Fall Short of Goals, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1139, 1139 (July 31, 1992) [hereinafter SBIs May Fall Short].
from commentators than any of the other proposals contained in the SBIs Release.\footnote{See infra Part III.B.1.} Nevertheless, only four months after the Proposing SBIs Release, the SEC adopted the SBIs with relatively few changes in response to public comments.\footnote{See id.} The SBIs became effective on August 13, 1992.\footnote{See id.}

A. The SBIs

Before discussing the testing-the-waters initiative in detail, it is important to summarize briefly the other principal initiatives for four reasons. First, they show the SEC's commitment to assisting small businesses.\footnote{The SEC clarified in the SBIs Release what constitutes a small business. In ascribing a revenue-based definition to "small business issuer[s]," the SEC designed the SBIs to assist companies with revenues below $25 million. \textit{Id.} at 36,446; see also infra note 182 (defining "small business issuer" in greater detail).} Second, one must not view the testing-the-waters initiative in a vacuum, for it would achieve little without the further support of these provisions. Third, they demonstrate, by contrast, the originality of the testing-the-waters initiative. Fourth, these other initiatives do not address the problem confronting small businesses that testing the waters was designed to address—uncertainty as to market interest.

1. Amendments to Regulation A

In addition to the testing-the-waters initiative, the Commission overhauled much of Regulation A to make it more useful for small issuers.\footnote{See SBIs Release, \textit{supra} note 5, at 36,442; see also \textit{Loss & Seligman}, \textit{supra} note 112, Supp. 1996, at 355 (responding that the SBIs represented another effort by the SEC "to breathe life into Regulation A").} Addressing the primary problem with short form registration under Regulation A, the SEC increased the ceiling for offerings in a twelve-month period from $1.5 million to $5 million.\footnote{See \textit{id.} at 36,468 (codified at 17 C.F.R. \S\ 230.251 (1997)).} New Rule 251, as revised, now prescribes the eligibility requirements for issuers.\footnote{See \textit{id.} (codified at 17 C.F.R. \S\ 230.251(a)(4) (1997)).} Regulation A remains unavailable to issuers that are investment companies.\footnote{See \textit{id.} at 36,443, 36,468 (codified at 17 C.F.R. \S\ 230.251(a)(4)-(5) (1997)).} In addition, issuers that are reporting companies, "blank check" entities, or issuers of fractional undivided interests in oil or gas rights may not rely on Regulation A.\footnote{See \textit{id.} at 36,442; see also Loss & Seligman, \textit{supra} note 112, Supp. 1996, at 355 (responding that the SBIs represented another effort by the SEC "to breathe life into Regulation A").} The SEC extended eligibility to Canadian issuers that meet the other eligibility

\footnotetext[157]{See infra Part III.B.1.} \footnotetext[158]{SBIs Release, \textit{supra} note 5, at 36,442.} \footnotetext[159]{See id.} \footnotetext[160]{The SEC clarified in the SBIs Release what constitutes a small business. In ascribing a revenue-based definition to "small business issuer[s]," the SEC designed the SBIs to assist companies with revenues below $25 million. \textit{Id.} at 36,446; see also infra note 182 (defining "small business issuer" in greater detail).} \footnotetext[161]{See SBIs Release, \textit{supra} note 5, at 36,442; see also \textit{Loss & Seligman}, \textit{supra} note 112, Supp. 1996, at 355 (responding that the SBIs represented another effort by the SEC "to breathe life into Regulation A").} \footnotetext[162]{See SBIs Release, \textit{supra} note 5, at 36,443. The ceiling includes resales by purchasers of up to $1.5 million. \textit{See id.} The SEC also clarified that if small businesses availed themselves of other "small issues' exemptions" such as under Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D, it would not affect the ceiling. \textit{Id.} at 36,468 (codified at 17 C.F.R. \S\ 230.251 (1997)).} \footnotetext[163]{\textit{Id.} at 36,468 (codified at 17 C.F.R. \S\ 230.251(a)(4) (1997)).} \footnotetext[164]{See \textit{id.} (codified at 17 C.F.R. \S\ 230.251(a)(4) (1997)).} \footnotetext[165]{\textit{See id.} at 36,443, 36,468 (codified at 17 C.F.R. \S\ 230.251(a)(4)-(5) (1997)).}
Under revised Rule 251, otherwise eligible issuers that have violated Rule 262's "bad boy" provisions are disqualified from the Regulation A exemption.\textsuperscript{167}

The SEC also modified the disclosure requirements of short form registration.\textsuperscript{168} Although issuers must still file an offering statement, they now have the opportunity to prepare the document in a "question-and-answer format."\textsuperscript{169} This is significant because the abbreviated format is both cheaper and easier for many issuers. Regulation A issuers also now benefit from a safe harbor for forward-looking statements. The SBIs insulate Regulation A issuers from liability for fraud when they in good faith include forward-looking statements in offering statements.\textsuperscript{170}

At the same time, the SBIs retain important safeguards for investors. For example, an issuer may make a written offer only by means of an offering circular.\textsuperscript{171} The purchaser must receive the offering circular at least forty-eight hours before a broker or dealer is required to send the confirmation of a sale to the buyer.\textsuperscript{172} Sales of securities must await the "qualification" of the offering statement, which occurs twenty calendar days after the filing.\textsuperscript{173} The SEC also eliminated Rule 257 of Regulation A, which authorized an issuer to make an offering up to $100,000 without delivering an offering circular.\textsuperscript{174}

Lastly, the Commission introduced a "substantial and good faith compliance" standard to address circumstances when issuers fail to comply with the foregoing requirements.\textsuperscript{175} Under the standard established in Rule 260, the SEC will not automatically prevent an issuer who failed to meet a requirement under Regulation A from relying on the exemption, so long as the issuer shows that (i) the particular rule was not in existence for the protection of such investor, (ii) the violation did not materially affect the offering at large, and (iii) it made a good faith effort to meet the requirements of the Regulation.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{166} See \textit{id.} (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1) (1997)).
\textsuperscript{167} See \textit{id.} at 36,443 & n.51, 36,468 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(6) (1997)).
\textsuperscript{168} See \textit{id.} at 36,443-44.
\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Id.} at 36,444.
\textsuperscript{171} See \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{172} See \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{174} See \textit{id.} at 36,445; \textit{supra} note 115. According to the Commission, this change was unlikely to affect adversely small issuers because (i) the modifications to Rule 504 rendered "Rule 257 unnecessary" and (ii) few issuers in the preceding three years took advantage of the Rule. \textit{SBIs Release, supra} note 5, at 36,445 & n.63.
\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Id.} at 36,444, 36,471 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.260 (1997)).
\textsuperscript{176} See \textit{id.} at 36,471 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.260(a) (1997)). It is important to add that the "substantial and good faith compliance standard" does not protect an issuer who has failed to (i) qualify, (ii) file the requisite offering statement, or (iii) comply with the dollar ceilings. \textit{Id.} at 36,443-44.
2. Rule 504 of Regulation D

The Commission also sought to eliminate the disadvantages of Rule 504 that rendered the exemption unappealing to small issuers.\textsuperscript{177} The new Rule 504\textsuperscript{178} removes the proscription of general advertising and solicitation that constrained small issuers.\textsuperscript{179} Equally appealing to issuers, the SEC now permits purchasers, who are not affiliates of the issuer, to resell the securities immediately after the purchase.\textsuperscript{180} In fact, an issuer who conducts an offering that does not exceed $1 million within a one-year period is exempt from registering the securities with the Commission and from all federal securities laws except for antifraud and other civil liability requirements.\textsuperscript{181}

3. Integrated Disclosure System for Registration and Reporting

The SBIs streamlined disclosure requirements for small issuers as well. The SEC implemented Regulation S-B, an "integrated disclosure system" which eligible small issuers can use to (i) register securities under the Securities Act, (ii) meet reporting requirements under the Exchange Act, and (iii) comply with qualification procedures for trust indentures under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.\textsuperscript{182}

4. Testing the Waters—Rule 254

The revisions discussed in the preceding three subsections were intended to help small businesses tap the public market to raise capital by simplifying regulatory procedures and reducing compliance costs.\textsuperscript{183} To the extent the SBIs discussed above succeed in achieving these results, small issuers should have increased confidence in their ability to access the public market. However, these measures do not provide a small issuer with sufficient information to conduct a proper cost-benefit analysis regarding whether to pursue a public offering. If an issuer's offering does not attract sufficient market interest, more lenient disclosure and procedural requirements and lower compliance costs are immaterial.\textsuperscript{184} As mentioned earlier, a small issuer

\textsuperscript{177} See supra Part II.B.3.
\textsuperscript{178} 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1997).
\textsuperscript{179} SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,473 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (1997)).
\textsuperscript{180} Id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (1997)).
\textsuperscript{181} See id. at 36,445.
\textsuperscript{182} Id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 228 (1997)). An eligible small issuer is defined in the SBIs as a domestic or Canadian company with revenues under $25 million with a "public float," i.e., the total market value of voting stock that is held by nonaffiliates of the issuer, below $25 million. See id. at 36,449-50 (codified at § 228.10(a)(1) (1997)); see also 17 C.F.R. § 250.405 (1997) (defining, among other terms, "small business issuer").
\textsuperscript{183} See SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,442-43.
\textsuperscript{184} The converse is also true—a small issuer's knowledge that there are investors keenly interested in its IPO is irrelevant if compliance with the federal securities laws is too overwhelming for a small business to undertake or if the costs are prohibitive.
often does not know, or cannot afford to assess, whether its offering
will generate market interest.\textsuperscript{185} In response to this problem, the SEC
introduced the testing-the-waters initiative to assist a small issuer in
assessing market interest and determining whether to go public.

The SEC explained the value of testing the waters in the Proposing
SBIs Release. The Commission reported that the testing-the-waters
proposals would

for the first time, [permit] an issuer relying upon the Regulation A
exemption . . . to solicit indications of interest prior to filing the
mandated offering statement. Under this "test the waters" provi-
sion, a Regulation A-eligible issuer could use a written statement to
gauge investor receptiveness to a possible offering. The issuer
should then be better able to determine whether to incur the ex-
 pense of proceeding with a public offering of its securities under
Regulation A or to follow some other capital-raising plan.\textsuperscript{186}

The Commission was thus concentrating on its responsibility to pro-
mote capital formation. However, after setting forth the proposals,
the SEC addressed the second of its twin aims by "request[ing] com-
ment on whether the ‘test the waters’ . . . propos[al] . . . provides
adequate protection to prospective investors."\textsuperscript{187}

After reviewing the public comments, the SEC concluded that the
proposal "is consistent with investor protection interests."\textsuperscript{188} The Commission
reconfirmed that testing the waters would facilitate capital-
raising by eliminating the risk that a small issuer would incur
"[t]he full costs of compliance . . . without knowing whether there will
be any investor interest in the company."\textsuperscript{189}

Under Rule 254, an issuer that meets the Regulation A eligibility
criteria may publish or deliver to potential investors a solicitation doc-
ument to ascertain market interest in its offering.\textsuperscript{190} In addition, an
issuer may prepare scripted advertisements on radio or television for
the same purpose.\textsuperscript{191} An issuer must submit a copy of the written doc-
ument or script of the advertisement to the appropriate regional or
the main office of the Commission no later than the first day it uses
the materials to solicit indications of interest.\textsuperscript{192} The copy must iden-
tify a person to whom queries about the document or script can be

\textsuperscript{185} See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
\textsuperscript{186} Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,487.
\textsuperscript{187} Id.
\textsuperscript{188} SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,445.
\textsuperscript{189} Id. at 36,444.
\textsuperscript{190} See id. at 36,470 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997)).
\textsuperscript{191} See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997)).
\textsuperscript{192} See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1)) (1996)). The Commission has subse-
quently amended this provision to require small issuers to submit the testing materials to
the main office of the SEC in Washington, DC. See infra note 444.
directed. The materials may include any factually accurate information, but must state (i) that the issuer is not soliciting money or any other form of consideration; (ii) that a delivery of a detailed offering circular must precede any sale of securities or any purchase commitment; (iii) that a potential investor has no commitment whatsoever when he or she communicates interest; and (iv) the name of the issuer's chief executive officer as well as a brief description of the issuer's business practice and products. However, a potential issuer is required to submit only materials that are substantively different from materials previously submitted. The solicitation document or other materials submitted to the SEC become public documents. Finally, after sending the solicitation materials to the SEC, an issuer may speak with potential investors and air other advertisements. The antifraud regulations under the federal securities laws apply to all testing-the-waters communications.

An issuer may not make any solicitations of interest under Rule 254 after it has filed an offering statement. Only after (i) the qualification of the offering statement and (ii) twenty calendar days after the latest publication, document delivery, or aired advertisement may an issuer begin selling the securities.

Compliance with the foregoing requirements of Rule 254(b) is "not a condition to [the] exemption." Nevertheless, although the rules appear to be somewhat liberal, the Commission in the SBIs Release encouraged issuers to comply by explaining that violations of Rule 254(b) are "grounds for Commission suspension of the exemption."

The solicitation document can contain a coupon, which an interested, potential purchaser may return to the issuer with his or her name, address, and phone number for the purpose of expressing interest in a possible offering. But an issuer may neither solicit nor accept "money or other consideration" from a potential purchaser.

193 See SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,470 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(1) (1997)).
194 See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(2) (1997)).
195 See id. at 36,444-45 n.59 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(1) note (1997)).
196 See id. at 36,444 n.59.
197 See id. at 36,470 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997)).
198 See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997)). References herein to the antifraud provisions under the federal securities laws refer to section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1994). 
199 See SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,470 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(3) (1997)).
200 See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a), (b)(4) (1997)).
201 Id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1997)).
202 Id. at 36,445; see 17 C.F.R. § 230.258 (1997).
203 See SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,470 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(c) (1997)).
204 Id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997)).
Finally, Rule 254(d) addresses the situation where an issuer, after testing the waters, decides in good faith to pursue a registered offering instead of a Regulation A offering. Under these circumstances, an issuer must wait thirty calendar days after its last solicitation before it files an offering statement in order to avoid the integration of the testing-the-waters activity with the registered offering.205

A small issuer has no commitment to prospective investors after testing the waters. If an issuer decides that there is a lack of interest in its offering or that it no longer wishes to launch an offering for any other reason, the issuer is not required to (i) proceed with the offering, (ii) file further documentation with the SEC, or (iii) further correspond with interested investors.

B. Assessing the Testing-the-Waters Rule

1. Analysis of Rule 254

The testing-the-waters rule received mixed reviews from the public.206 Reactions to Rule 254 varied because of the disparate interests and concerns of scholars, practitioners, small businesses, the states, NASAA, bar associations, and other interested parties. However, most agreed that in contrast to the other SBIs, testing the waters was both an "innovative"207 and "controversial"208 means of helping small issuers to raise capital.

205 See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(d) (1997)). Rule 251(c) governs integration of Regulation A offerings with other securities offerings or sales. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c) (1997). An issuer that tests that waters under Rule 254 must wait six months to avoid integration with a Regulation D offering. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1997). Therefore, integration will probably force an issuer that wants to commence a Rule 505 or 506 private placement after relying on Rule 254 to wait six months, because the issuer will have presumably violated the general solicitation prohibition in Rules 505 and 506. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(c), 230.505(b), 230.506(b) (1997); see infra note 431 and accompanying text.


207 See, e.g., 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-65; Impact of SBIs, supra note 94, at 517, 520; Johnson, supra note 206, at 167; Keller, supra note 206, at 16; Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 17; Schneider, supra note 148, at 2.

208 See, e.g., Impact of SBIs, supra note 94, at 517; Levinson & De Toro, supra note 150, at 79; Retkwa, supra note 151, at 37.
The SEC itself recognized in the Proposing SBIs Release that the testing-the-waters initiative was innovative.\textsuperscript{209} The Commission explained that the proposed changes to Regulation A would allow small issuers "for the first time" to test the waters before filing an offering statement to assess interest in its public offering.\textsuperscript{210} Prior to the SBIs, old Rule 255(a), the Regulation A equivalent to section 5(c) of the Securities Act, proscribed prefilling publicity.\textsuperscript{211} With the introduction of Rule 254, the SEC needed to introduce new Rule 251(d)(1)(i) to exclude testing materials from the requirements regarding prefilling offers.\textsuperscript{212} Thus, Rule 254 afforded small issuers an opportunity formerly unavailable to issuers of any size.

In essence, Rule 254 permits gun-jumping. Testing-the-waters measures constitute an offer to sell under section 2(3) of the Securities Act.\textsuperscript{213} Rule 254 enables issuers to make an offer to sell prior to the filing of an offering statement with the Commission. Such conduct is quintessential gun-jumping.\textsuperscript{214} The SEC historically has not tolerated direct solicitations of investors before the filing of a registration statement.\textsuperscript{215} Testing the waters under Rule 254 epitomizes the Commission's traditional concern that "although not couched in terms of an express offer, [prefiling publicity] may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the [issue] in a manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact part of the selling effort."\textsuperscript{216}

However, in reality, issuers that test the waters under Rule 254 do not commit gun-jumping because (i) Regulation A issuers are exempt from the Securities Act registration requirements including section 5(c), and (ii) after the SBIs, Rule 251(d)(1)(i) specifically allows issuers to test the waters before filing an offering statement without violating Rule 251(d).\textsuperscript{217} Nevertheless, the testing materials still trigger the same concerns regarding investor protection. As discussed below, Rule 254 is controversial because critics are worried that it seriously exposes investors to misrepresentation and fraud.\textsuperscript{218}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{footnote1} Proposing SBIs Release, \textit{supra} note 3, at 82,487.
\bibitem{footnote2} \textit{See id.}
\bibitem{footnote3} \textit{See supra} text accompanying note 118.
\bibitem{footnote4} \textit{See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(i) (1997).}
\bibitem{footnote6} \textit{See Part I.A.}
\bibitem{footnote7} \textit{See supra} note 60 and accompanying text; \textit{infra} Part V.A.2.
\bibitem{footnote8} \textit{See supra} note 61 and accompanying text.
\bibitem{footnote9} \textit{See infra} notes 229-57 and accompanying text.
\end{thebibliography}
Others have not found that Rule 254 controversially helps issuers at the expense of investors. Although there was a consensus that testing the waters represented an innovative approach that should help small businesses to cost-effectively determine whether to undertake a public offering, some critics maintain that Rule 254 does not assist potential issuers enough. These critics acknowledge that Rule 254 reduces the onerous cost and burden of disclosure; however, they conclude that small issuers must still incur considerable expenses to test the waters.\textsuperscript{219} For example, an entrepreneur would still need to discuss with an attorney how to test the waters and how to comply with the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws that apply to the solicitation materials.\textsuperscript{220} Furthermore, the costs of preparing and distributing the testing materials may prevent or deter small issuers from relying on Rule 254. Identifying these and other costs, members of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association ("ABA") argued that small issuers should be able to speak with prospective investors before preparing the solicitation document.\textsuperscript{221}

Another shortcoming of Rule 254 is its limited scope. Commentators have suggested that the Commission should extend testing the waters beyond Regulation A so that small issuers contemplating private placements, other exempt offerings, or registered public offerings can test the waters.\textsuperscript{222} After the SBIs, an issuer may rely on Regulation A for offerings up to $5 million. This is considered a small offering, one that investment banks are often reluctant to underwrite.\textsuperscript{223} Although the SEC defined a "small business issuer" as a company with revenues under $25 million,\textsuperscript{224} Rule 254 currently provides no assistance to a small business interested in undertaking a public offering in excess of $5 million. A small business considering a public offering of more than $5 million will then need to choose between (i) conducting a smaller offering that will raise less funds than it requires to take advantage of Rule 254, and (ii) forgoing the testing-the-waters


\textsuperscript{221} See Letter from John F. Olson, Chairman, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, to Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC (Feb. 28, 1992), quoted in Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 18.

\textsuperscript{222} See Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 18; Schneider, supra note 148, at 4.

\textsuperscript{223} See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 11.

\textsuperscript{224} See supra note 182.
opportunity to pursue a larger offering. Similarly, a small business interested in immediately commencing a Regulation D or other exempt offering that wishes to test the waters is forced to instead conduct a Regulation A offering.\textsuperscript{225} In addition, a larger private company, uncertain of its market appeal, may wish to test the waters before conducting a public offering. However, unless the company is content with a Regulation A offering below $5 million, it may not rely on Rule 254.\textsuperscript{226}

In fact, the limited utility of Rule 254 might lead small businesses to abuse the testing-the-waters privilege. As discussed above, Rule

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\item \textsuperscript{225} Rule 502(a)'s integration requirements and the general solicitation prohibition that applies to Rule 505 and 506 offerings make it very difficult for an issuer to offer securities under Regulation D after testing the waters. \textit{See supra} note 205.
\item \textsuperscript{226} A possible solution to these problems is to raise the current Regulation A ceiling. Similar to the sentiment before adoption of the SBIs, \textit{see supra} text accompanying notes 123, 162, there has been an outcry since 1992 to raise the current $5 million Regulation A ceiling. \textit{See}, e.g., Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995, H.R. 2191, 104th Cong. 26 [hereinafter Fields Bill] (introducing legislation in section 7(a) to amend section 3 of the Securities Act in order to raise the ceiling prescribed therein to $15 million). In order to raise the Regulation A ceiling, Congress must first amend section 3(b) because the SEC's authority to promulgate Regulation A derives from this section. \textit{See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)} (1994) (authorizing the SEC to pass rules and regulations that exempt from registration "any class of securities" for which compliance with section 5 is "not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering"); Securities Act Release No. 627, 1936 WL 3434 (S.E.C.), at *1 (Jan. 21, 1936). The Fields Bill gave rise to the NSMIA, which added new section 28 to the Securities Act and corresponding new section 36 to the Exchange Act. NSMIA, \textit{supra} note 22, at 3424. Section 28 grants the Commission general exemptive authority:

\begin{quote}
The Commission, by rule, regulation, or order, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.
\end{quote}
\textit{Id.} at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. II 1996)).

After the passage of the NSMIA, some observers concluded that section 3(b) is no longer significant. \textit{See}, e.g., Mary E.T. Beach, \textit{Unregistered Offerings of Corporate Securities, in Private Placements} 1997, at 45, 49 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-983, 1997). The SEC can now adopt the section 3(b) exemptions under new section 28, and therefore either eliminate or alter section 3(b)'s current $5 million ceiling which has circumscribed its ability to raise the cap under Regulation A. \textit{See id.} Section 7(a) of the Fields Bill suggests that an increase of the Regulation A ceiling (as well as those for other exempt offerings) to as much as $15 million may be forthcoming. \textit{See Fields Bill, supra, at 26; Martha L. Cochran & David F. Freeman, Securities Regulatory Reform Legislation, in 28th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, at 299, 335 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-962, 1996); Richard H. Rowe, The Capital Formation Provisions of the 1996 Act, Insights, May 1997, at 8, 8 n.4.}

If the Commission raises the Regulation A ceiling, it would entitle many more small issuers to test the waters pursuant to Rule 254. For an analysis of why this development should not dissuade the SEC from adopting proposed Rule 135d, \textit{see infra} Part V.E.3. \textit{See infra} text accompanying notes 541-44 for a discussion of how the NSMIA affects the Commission's efforts to adopt proposed Rule 135d.
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254(d) addresses the situation where an issuer tests the waters and then decides in good faith to pursue a registered offering instead of a Regulation A offering.\(^\text{227}\) This allows an issuer to benefit from testing the waters when it would have lacked such an opportunity, if it had conducted a registered offering from the outset. It is uncertain whether the good faith standard and the threat of integration are strong enough to prevent issuers, who originally intend to conduct a registered offering, from profiting from Regulation A’s testing-the-waters exemption. In addition, Rule 254(d) only contemplates issuers that subsequently pursue registered offerings. However, issuers may test the waters, purportedly in preparation for a Regulation A offering, and then sell securities, for example, via the intrastate exemption to purchasers found as a result of testing the waters. Such purchasers may be particularly susceptible to fraud and misrepresentation because under federal securities law, issuers are not required to provide disclosure for this type of offering, unlike in a Regulation A or other public offering. The limited utility of Rule 254 is the initiative’s largest drawback for issuers, and as discussed below in Part IV, this concern gave rise to the Testing Release.\(^\text{228}\)

Although there is support for the proposition that Rule 254 did not do enough to help small businesses, the greater concern is that the Rule does not provide investors with adequate protection.\(^\text{229}\) Rule 254 is often characterized as “controversial” because many believe that it tilts the balance, previously maintained by old Rule 255(a), in favor of raising capital and away from protecting investors.\(^\text{230}\) The states, which have a compelling interest in guarding the interests of their resident investors, and NASAA, which represents the states, were the loudest proponents of this view.

Both state securities administrators and NASAA legitimately opposed Rule 254 because it left investors vulnerable. For example, they were concerned that Rule 254 did not provide any guidance regarding how businesses can test the waters.\(^\text{231}\) Moreover, because no rule requires the distribution of materials, entrepreneurs or their agents could file the testing materials with the SEC and then immediately begin cold calling.\(^\text{232}\) State regulators also warned of a greater danger: that issuers may actually sell their securities while they are testing the waters.\(^\text{233}\) In short, the states expressed concern that rather than test the waters, “unscrupulous operators will ‘boil’ the waters” by excit-

\(^{227}\) See supra note 205 and accompanying text.

\(^{228}\) See infra notes 380-81 and accompanying text.

\(^{229}\) See SBIs May Fall Short, supra note 156, at 1139.

\(^{230}\) See supra text accompanying note 118; supra note 208 and accompanying text.

\(^{231}\) See Retkwa, supra note 151, at 37-39.

\(^{232}\) See id. at 37.

\(^{233}\) See SBIs May Fall Short, supra note 156, at 1139.
ing prospective investors who will then ignore the disclosure in the offering circular.\textsuperscript{234}

Such practices give rise to two significant concerns. First, investors may become more susceptible to fraud and misrepresentation, which are more common in smaller issues.\textsuperscript{235} Investors lost a primary defense against these harms, the threat of section 12(a)(2) liability for issuers who made misrepresentations in prospectuses,\textsuperscript{236} when the SEC in April 1993 amended Rule 254 to effectively exempt written testing materials from section 12(a)(2).\textsuperscript{237} The SEC added Rule 254(e), which establishes that written testing materials distributed to the SEC in compliance with Rule 254 "shall not be deemed to be a prospectus as defined in section 2(10) of the Securities Act."\textsuperscript{238} Therefore, because section 12(a)(2) only applies to prospectuses, it does not apply to testing-the-waters materials, given that Rule 254(e) provides that these materials fall outside the definition of a "prospectus." Second, Rule 254 may cause systemic problems such as a "misallocation of capital."\textsuperscript{239} The SBIs encourage eager small businesses, which have not yet developed careful business plans, to approach investors hastily.\textsuperscript{240} As a result, investors who suffer losses may be reluc-

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\textsuperscript{234} Retkwa, supra note 151, at 37-39 (discussing the danger that "unethical operators will ‘drop the hook’ with an oral pitch, and investors won’t pay attention to the written disclosure documents that arrive later"). A state securities regulator described the obvious outcome when a roomful of unsophisticated investors are hit with the dog-and-pony show of an adept salesman. The sale will be made long before the investors ever get their hands on the SEC offering circular, which carefully delineates the company’s business and its risks. Most investors won’t even bother reading the prospectus.”

Laing, supra note 151, at 21 (quoting the then president-elect of NASAA and director of the Massachusetts Securities Division).


\textsuperscript{237} See infra note 238 and accompanying text. However, an oral solicitation made pursuant to Rule 254 can still trigger section 12(a)(2) liability. See Additional SBIs Release, supra note 213, at 84,123 n.46.

\textsuperscript{238} 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(e) (1997); see also Additional SBIs Release, supra note 213, at 84,122-23 (stating that written testing-the-waters material is not a prospectus); 3A Bloomenthal, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-70 (same); SEC Adopts Rules Further Relaxing Small Business Disclosure Requirements, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 619, 620 (Apr. 30, 1993) [hereinafter SEC Adopts Further Rules] (same). The language of Rule 254(e) excludes from the section 2(10) definition of a prospectus, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this definition, written testing materials that (i) comply with Rule 254 and (ii) have been submitted to the SEC. The Supreme Court held in 1995 that a “prospectus,” for the purposes of the federal securities laws, “refer[s] to a document that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling shareholder.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995).

\textsuperscript{239} Testing Rules Still Trouble States, supra note 225, at 1642.

\textsuperscript{240} See id.
\end{footnotesize}
tant or unwilling to invest in small businesses in the future.\textsuperscript{241} This would defeat the purpose of the SBIs because it would ultimately make it more difficult for small businesses to obtain capital.\textsuperscript{242}

NASAA reiterated the concerns of state securities regulators. In a caustic comment letter, NASAA remarked that the Commission’s “attempt to assist small business issuers by removing investor protection is short sighted.”\textsuperscript{243} NASAA was particularly concerned about small investors, noting that “the Commission has become too eager to favor small business concerns over those of the small public investor.”\textsuperscript{244} Although NASAA indicated its support for the Commission’s intended goal for testing the waters, it found “virtually no safeguards” in Rule 254.\textsuperscript{245} The small investor, often lacking financial sophistication, is especially vulnerable because Rule 254 allows issuers to orally solicit potential investors after merely filing testing materials that lack the more comprehensive disclosure provided in the forthcoming offering circular.\textsuperscript{246} NASAA’s comment letter explained that the SEC was “embarking on an attempt to facilitate the sale of the riskiest securities in the market to the least sophisticated of buyers.”\textsuperscript{247}

There are few safeguards built into Rule 254. For example, although the issuer must file a solicitation document, the Rule does not impose any content restrictions other than requiring the accuracy of all statements.\textsuperscript{248} In contrast, the SEC has explained that “Rule 254(b)(2)(iv) sets forth the minimum amount of information that must be provided.”\textsuperscript{249} As a result, prospective issuers may make exceedingly optimistic projections that would mislead small investors. Further, the requirement of “publication or delivery” of the solicitation document is ineffective because an issuer is not required to deliver the document to investors.\textsuperscript{250} Thus, issuers may contact investors who have not read the solicitation document prepared in compliance

\textsuperscript{241} See id. (identifying “a diversion of capital from better run enterprises” as a consequence of the SBIs that will harm small businesses).

\textsuperscript{242} See id.

\textsuperscript{243} NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9374.

\textsuperscript{244} Id.

\textsuperscript{245} Id. at 9379.

\textsuperscript{246} See id. at 9376-78. In fact, after publication or delivery of the solicitation document, an issuer is free to communicate with an investor who has not read the document. See id. at 9378.

\textsuperscript{247} Id. at 9374. NASAA’s reaction was largely influenced by the rampant penny stock fraud in the years before the adoption of the SBIs that harmed many individual investors who lost up to $2 billion per year. See 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-68; Steinberg, supra note 206, at 410 & nn.71-72; Testing Rules Still Trouble States, supra note 235, at 1642.

\textsuperscript{248} See NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9379.


\textsuperscript{250} NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9379.
with Rule 254. Rule 254(b)(4)'s so-called "cooling-off" period similarly fails to shield investors sufficiently from oral representations. Rule 254(b)(4) requires the postponement of sales "until [twenty] calendar days after the last publication or delivery of the document or radio or television broadcast." However, there is no cooling-off period between the final oral solicitation and the sale of the securities. In fact, Rule 254(b), which explains that noncompliance with the provisions thereof does not preclude an issuer from relying on the exemption, undermines the effectiveness of the few safeguards that are in place. Finally, Rule 254(a) prescribes the antifraud provisions as the liability standard, while Rule 254(e), in effect, precludes the application of section 12(a)(2) as the liability standard for testing materials. The prescription of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws as the basis of liability inadequately protects investors because recent case law and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 have made it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to bring and prevail in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private actions.

NASAA suggested that issuers may also suffer under Rule 254. Testing the waters may "raise[ ] false hopes for many persons eager to
start businesses . . . who are not really suited to raise capital from the public."\textsuperscript{258}

2. The "Coordination" Problem

The rift between the SEC, on the one hand, and the states and NASAA, on the other, was serious because the federal securities laws, including Regulation A, did not trump state securities laws, known as blue sky laws.\textsuperscript{259} Both the Securities and Exchange Acts recognized until the adoption of the NSMIA in 1996 that the federal securities laws did not preempt state laws.\textsuperscript{260} Blue sky laws in most states differ from federal securities laws in that they paternalistically provide investors with greater protection.\textsuperscript{261} Although the federal securities laws and the SEC primarily emphasize disclosure obligations,\textsuperscript{262} some states additionally impose "merit regulation" which securities administrators apply to determine whether an offering is "fair, just[,] and

\textsuperscript{258} NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, \textit{supra} note 18, at 9878. In response to these myriad problems with Rule 254, NASAA proposed further safeguards intended to protect investors without adding substantially to issuers' costs. \textit{Id.} at 9380-81. See \textit{infra} Part III.C.1 for a discussion of the NASAA model, which incorporates many of these proposed safeguards.


\textsuperscript{260} See section 18 of the Securities Act ("Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any security or any person.") (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994)); section 19(c)(3)(C) of the Securities Act ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as authorizing preemption of State law.") (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (1994)); section 28 of the Exchange Act ("Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.") (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994)). In October 1996, Congress essentially repealed this language in section 18 of the Securities Act and section 28 of the Exchange Act by passing the NSMIA. For a discussion of how the NSMIA has affected issuers' capacity to test the waters under Rule 254, see \textit{infra} Part III.C.3.

\textsuperscript{261} See Sargent, \textit{supra} note 259, at 486.

\textsuperscript{262} See \textit{supra} text accompanying note 2.
If an offering does not meet these "substantive standards," an issuer cannot compensate by providing more detailed disclosure. Rather, merit regulation prohibits the issuer from conducting the offering in the state.

Prior to 1996, many issuers were bound by the blue sky laws of most states which required issuers seeking to offer or sell securities in their state to register the securities with the state's securities division unless the state's laws provided an exemption. The most common means of state securities registration are qualification, notification, Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR), and coordination. Coordination is the simplest and least expensive for most issuers, because it allows an issuer to coordinate the filing of both state and SEC registration statements. However, virtually no states permit Regulation A issuers to register through coordination because such an issuer is registering securities with the Commission via an offering statement—not by means of a registration statement. Similarly, the most widely available exemptions under the various blue sky laws do not aid a Regulation A issuer.

Therefore, an issuer interested in offering securities pursuant to Regulation A in states that do not allow coordination must register the securities, via either qualification or notification, in every state in which it intends to offer or sell securities. In addition, a Regulation A issuer may have to meet the aforementioned merit criteria in multiple states. Compliance with federal and state requirements is very expensive and often confusing for issuers because federal securities laws

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263 Sargent, supra note 259, at 473.
264 Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J. Corp. L. 175, 177 (1997); see also Sargent, supra note 259, at 487 (noting that in merit regulation, "the individual's disadvantages cannot be offset by eliminating informational asymmetries through government-mandated disclosure"). Although many states followed the merit standards prescribed in section 306(a)(2)(A) of the Uniform Securities Act, a significant problem with merit regulation lay in that many states had standards that differed from those adopted by other states. See Campbell, supra, at 186.
265 See Campbell, supra note 264, at 177; Sargent, supra note 259, at 486.
266 See Campbell, supra note 264, at 185.
267 See id. at 185-86.
268 See id. at 186. Notification is actually cheaper than coordination; however, few issuers qualify because of strict earnings criteria.
269 See Schneider et al., supra note 78, at 46; Campbell, supra note 264, at 186, 193; Keller, supra note 206, at 18.
270 See Campbell, supra note 264, at 193. For an explanation of why the small offering exemption, the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (UOLE), the national securities exchange exemption, and the Uniform Securities Act exemptions are inapplicable to Regulation A offerings, see id. at 187-90.
271 In the case of private and limited offerings exempt from registration under the federal securities laws, such as Regulation D offerings, many states have exempted these offerings from their strict merit regulation. See Sargent, supra note 259, at 476-77. Similarly, states could exempt Regulation A offerings from merit scrutiny.
often differ from blue sky laws.\textsuperscript{272} As a result, testing the waters under Rule 254 may not be cost-effective for many small issuers because they still must pay the costs of compliance with both federal and state securities laws.

Given that there are only a small number of states that require the coordination of state law with federal securities law,\textsuperscript{273} the remaining states may enact laws that diverge from federal securities laws. The result is that "[t]he state regulators' sovereign ability to superimpose upon offerings in their jurisdictions additional, inconsistent or even prohibitory criteria means that they indeed have the last word, and that they can reduce the best-intentioned federal reforms to practical insignificance."\textsuperscript{274} In the case of Rule 254, issuers will not be able to test the waters effectively in states that do not either adopt Rule 254 or engage in corresponding rulemaking.\textsuperscript{275}

Congress recognized the importance of coordinating federal and state securities laws and decreed section 19(c) of the Securities Act, which authorizes the SEC to work with associations of state securities regulators, to "assist in effectuating greater uniformity in Federal-State securities matters."\textsuperscript{276} The Commission's efforts to adopt Rule 254 constituted a "violate[ion] of the spirit of Section 19(c)."\textsuperscript{277} According

\textsuperscript{272} See Campbell, supra note 264, at 193-94.
\textsuperscript{273} See Testing Rules Still Trouble States, supra note 235, at 1642. In a few states, state securities regulators must take measures such as holding hearings in order to deviate from federal law. See id.; Colo. Initiates Rulemaking Aimed at SEC Small Business Rules, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1529, 1529 (Sept. 25, 1992) [hereinafter Colorado Initiates Rulemaking].
\textsuperscript{274} Sargent, supra note 206, at 8.
\textsuperscript{275} See Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 18. Lack of coordination threatens not only the effectiveness of Rule 254, but also of a number of the other SBIs.
\textsuperscript{276} 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(1) (1994). The statute endorses "greater Federal and State cooperation in securities matters" in order to promote the (i) highest regulatory effectiveness, (ii) greatest regulatory uniformity in federal and state laws, (iii) minimum regulatory intrusion upon efforts to raise capital, (iv) raising of capital by issuers, especially small businesses, through a significant decrease in the requisite paperwork and compliance costs, and (v) minimization of the costs of government administration. Id. § 77s(c)(2). In addition, Congress intended to foster cooperation between the Commission and state and other securities regulators in the (i) exchanging of information concerning issuers' application for registration or exemption of issues within the states, and (ii) establishment of uniform forms, procedures, and an exemption for small issues. See id. § 77s(c)(3).
\textsuperscript{277} NASAA Comment Letter to SEC Secretary, Jonathan Katz, Regarding SEC Release Nos. 33-6950, 34-50969, 39-2288, [1986-1993 Transfer Binder] NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 9349, at 9390, 9390 (Oct. 5, 1992) [hereinafter NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Additional SBIs] (referring to additional SBIs); see also Richard H. Rowe, Financing Small Business in the Securities Markets: An Overview, in FINANCING A SMALL BUSINESS IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS 9, 66 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-816, 1993) (rhetorically questioning whether the Commission's adopted version of Rule 254 represents a "break down of [section] 19(c) [p]olicy?"). But see Johnson, supra note 206, at 175 (explaining that the SEC's consultation with securities regulators of the states and NASAA and its provision of a three-month comment period demonstrate that it complied with section 19(c)). The SEC's conduct prior to the SBIs is important to discuss because it differs significantly from that leading up to the promulgation of the Testing Release. See infra Part IV.A, D.
to NASAA, representatives of the Association, staff members of the SEC, and members of the American Bar Association worked together for two years to develop uniformity under Regulation A.\textsuperscript{278} Apparently nearing "a concrete proposal," NASAA complained that the SEC staff "unilaterally and without explanation terminated the deliberations in the fall of 1991."\textsuperscript{279} NASAA ultimately learned that the SEC planned to publish the SBIs from an article in the \textit{Wall Street Journal}.\textsuperscript{280}

The Commission's conduct made coordination improbable. In reaction to the SEC's unwillingness to work with the states, NASAA insisted that despite section 19(c), the Commission was not interested in working with the states to develop a coordinated approach to small businesses' issuances.\textsuperscript{281} NASAA concluded that the Commission's political concerns were greater than its concern for small businesses.\textsuperscript{282} In response, Richard Breeden, then Chairman of the SEC, contended that "[t]he states have set themselves up with a stranglehold on capital formation with the very types of companies that have traditionally provided the backbone for growth of the American economy."\textsuperscript{283}

Although the states, NASAA, and certain commentators have complained that the Commission's "unilateral" and "political" action destroyed an opportunity for coordination, certain scholars have noted that because the SEC sought to implement "bold reforms," there was not in reality a strong likelihood that the Commission and the states would find common ground.\textsuperscript{284} According to this view, if the SEC had waited for full coordination with the states, it may not have adopted the SBIs at all.\textsuperscript{285} An additional problem confronting the SEC during the discussions was that the securities administrators of the states did "not 'always speak with one voice.'"\textsuperscript{286} Furthermore, cooperation was further complicated because the SBIs "make transactions harder to track," which in turn "make the state regulators' jobs more difficult," and thus partially explains their opposition.\textsuperscript{287} However, these explanations are insufficient. Richard Roberts, former

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\item[278] NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, \textit{supra} note 18, at 9373.
\item[279] Id.
\item[280] See id.
\item[281] Id.
\item[282] Id.; see Goodman, \textit{supra} note 151, at 2.
\item[283] Salwen, \textit{supra} note 151, at B2. Breeden added that the SEC did not exist "to simply take suggestions from a trade association of state bureaucrats." Id.
\item[284] \textit{Impact of SBIs}, \textit{supra} note 94, at 524-26 & n.105.
\item[285] See id. at 525. Forced to choose between "a 'carrot or stick' approach toward coordinating regulation with state officials," the Commission pursued its agenda with the expectation that the states would follow its lead. \textit{SBIs May Fall Short}, \textit{supra} note 156, at 1139.
\item[286] \textit{SBIs May Fall Short}, \textit{supra} note 156, at 1139.
\item[287] Bradford McKee, \textit{Simpler Offerings for Smaller Firms}, \textit{Nation's Bus.}, July 1993, at 33, 34.
\end{enumerate}
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Commissioner of the SEC, offered a further explanation, conceding several months later that the political climate had forced the agency to depart from the coordinated rulemaking necessary for Rule 254 to succeed.288

After adoption of the SBIs, most observers and interested parties identified the absence of coordination as the greatest threat to the success of testing the waters under Rule 254. For example, scholars and practitioners certainly understood that cooperation between the Commission and the states as well as coordination of federal and state securities laws were prerequisites to the success of the SEC's testing the waters rule.289 This is particularly significant because coordinating Regulation A offerings with blue sky laws has historically been problematic.290 The ABA echoed the views of commentators that without cooperation with the states and coordination of federal and state securities laws, "'[a]ny simplification of the federal requirements will be both illusory and frustrating to the intended purposes of encouraging small business investment.'"291 Likewise, the SEC subsequently admitted that state adoption of testing the waters is essential.292 Not surprisingly, the states and NASAA also identified the absence of state and federal coordination as particularly worrisome.293

C. Aftermath of the SBIs

1. The States and NASAA

The contentious relations between the Commission, on the one hand, and the states and NASAA, on the other, continued after adoption of the SBIs.294 Some states immediately announced that they would not make corresponding amendments to their securities laws to conform them to the revised Regulation A rules because the SBIs provided investors with inadequate protection.295 For example, Colorado, one of the states whose securities laws are required to mirror those of the federal government, immediately expressed its dissatisfac-

289 See, e.g., 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, at 5-68.1 to 5-69; Janvey, supra note 206, at 45; Keller, supra note 206, at 18; Lander, supra note 150, at 9; Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 18; Sargent, supra note 206, at 8; SBIs May Fall Short, supra note 156, at 1139.
290 See supra text accompanying note 269.
291 SBIs May Fall Short, supra note 156, at 1139 (alteration in original).
292 See More Effort Needed, supra note 288, at 520.
293 See SBIs May Fall Short, supra note 156, at 1139.
294 See, e.g., NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Additional SBIs, supra note 277, at 9390.
295 See Rowe, supra note 277, at 66; Testing Rules Still Trouble States, supra note 235, at 1642.
tion with the testing-the-waters rule.\textsuperscript{296} Colorado securities regulators held a hearing and adopted a testing-the-waters rule that differed somewhat from Rule 254.\textsuperscript{297}

In September 1992, NASAA announced that it was attempting to develop a model for a testing-the-waters rule that would satisfy the states’ concerns regarding investor protection and harmonize with Rule 254.\textsuperscript{298} On April 25, 1993, the members of NASAA passed a resolution to launch a two-year pilot project inviting states to test its model.\textsuperscript{299} NASAA sought to determine whether it could achieve “the policy objectives underlying the testing-the-waters exemption” and “adequately ensure that investors are protected.”\textsuperscript{300} The NASAA testing-the-waters model, however, lacked legal effect until the states passed legislation adopting the model.\textsuperscript{301} NASAA published its “Statement of Policy on Solicitation of Interest (Test the Waters)” to facilitate uniform state implementation of the program, and to assess the feasibility of a testing-the-waters rule that does not sacrifice investor protection.\textsuperscript{302}

The NASAA testing-the-waters model retained many of the provisions of Rule 254, but incorporated several new safeguards to protect investors. For example, the model gave a state the opportunity to reject a potential issuer’s bid to test the waters.\textsuperscript{303} The model achieved this by requiring, in section (1)(c), that a potential issuer file a “Solicitation of Interest Form”\textsuperscript{304} or any other soliciting materials with a securities administrator ten business days prior to the first solicitation of

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  \item \textsuperscript{296} See Colorado Initiates Rulemaking, supra note 273, at 1529.
  \item \textsuperscript{297} See id. The Colorado rule requires that the solicitation document contain a statement that the sales of securities will not begin until after (i) the registration of the offering with the Colorado Securities Commissioner and (ii) the delivery of a qualified offering circular. See id. The Rule also requires issuers to file its solicitation document with the state securities commission before delivery to prospective investors. See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{298} New NASA Chief Calls for Split in Regulation of Smaller Offerings, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1528, 1528 (Sept. 25, 1992).
  \item \textsuperscript{299} See Testing Release, supra note 8, app. at 86,894-98 (setting forth the Resolution of the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., Regarding the Testing-the-Waters Exemption).
  \item \textsuperscript{300} Id. at 86,894.
  \item \textsuperscript{301} See Keller, supra note 206, at 18.
  \item \textsuperscript{304} For the format of the Solicitation of Interest Form, see Solicitation of Interest Form, [Current Transfer Binder] NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 4142, at 2545, 2545-46 (Apr. 25, 1993) [hereinafter Solicitation of Interest Form].
\end{itemize}
interest.\textsuperscript{305} In contrast, Rule 254 requires only that an issuer file the solicitation document or broadcast script as of the day it solicits interest.\textsuperscript{306} In addition, section (1)(d) of the NASAA program stipulates that issuers must submit any new or revised materials to the administrator five days before it uses them to test the waters—as opposed to Rule 254's requirement that issuers need only file substantively different materials.\textsuperscript{307} The NASAA model also provides in section (1)(f) that a prospective issuer must deliver to a potential investor whom it intends to contact a current Solicitation of Interest Form no later than five days after the issuer establishes contact.\textsuperscript{308} This provides prospective investors with more information about the company.

The Solicitation of Interest Form under the NASAA model calls for more disclosure than the Rule 254 solicitation document by providing more comprehensive disclosure regarding the company, the business, use of proceeds, and key personnel.\textsuperscript{309} Although the NASAA plan prescribes only minimum disclosure requirements,\textsuperscript{310} sections (1)(c) and (1)(d), which enable administrators to review all materials before solicitation, and the threat of liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal and state securities laws\textsuperscript{311} are intended to help protect investors from fraud and misrepresentation. The NASAA model also protects investors by introducing in section 1(i) a bad boy disqualification provision.\textsuperscript{312}

Section (1)(h), which provides that an issuer may not sell securities until seven days after delivering a prospectus to the investor, is another significant requirement that does not exist under Regulation A.\textsuperscript{313} This cooling-off period, lacking under Rule 254, is designed to give investors more time to review the prospectus before selling efforts begin. Section (3)(b) further insulates a prospective investor by prohibiting an issuer from selling securities until twenty calendar days

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  \item \textsuperscript{305} See NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, \textit{supra} note 302, at 2541. Section 1(e) prohibits an issuer from using a Solicitation of Interest Form or other material that a securities administrator has informed the issuer is unacceptable. \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{306} 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(1) (1997).
  \item \textsuperscript{307} NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, \textit{supra} note 302, at 2541; \textit{cf.} 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(1) note (1997). Section (1)(d) of the NASAA proposal exempts materials sent to a potential purchaser by request. NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, \textit{supra} note 302, at 2541.
  \item \textsuperscript{308} NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, \textit{supra} note 302, at 2541.
  \item \textsuperscript{309} Solicitation of Interest Form, \textit{supra} note 304, at 2545-46.
  \item \textsuperscript{310} \textit{Id.} at 2545.
  \item \textsuperscript{311} Despite its earlier concern regarding the prescription in Rule 254, as amended, of the antifraud provisions as the liability standard, \textit{see supra} note 256 and accompanying text, under the NASAA model, \textquotedblleft[m]aterials filed \ldots will be judged under anti-fraud principles.	extquotedblright NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, \textit{supra} note 302, at 2544 cmt. 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{312} NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, \textit{supra} note 302, at 2542-43. For a comparison with the Regulation A bad boy disqualification provision, \textit{see infra} text accompanying notes 713-18.
  \item \textsuperscript{313} \textit{Id.} at 2541.
\end{itemize}
after its last contact with the investor rather than twenty calendar days after the final publication or delivery of the testing materials.\textsuperscript{314} This, together with section (3)(b)'s prohibition of testing-the-waters communications with potential investors after the filing of an offering statement with the state\textsuperscript{315} and section (1)(h)'s "seven day cooling-off" period,\textsuperscript{316} should mitigate the danger of investor reliance on issuers' oral representations.

The NASAA model also differs from Rule 254 in its treatment of an issuer's failure to comply with its requirements. As discussed above, compliance with Rule 254(b) is "not a condition to [an] exemption."\textsuperscript{317} Rather, an issuer's failure to meet any of the requirements of Rule 254(b) entitles the Commission to suspend the exemption.\textsuperscript{318} Although this approach protects issuers, it leaves investors vulnerable because it does not preclude an issuer from further testing the waters, and does not automatically bar an issuer from proceeding with the offering. In contrast, the NASAA model accords different treatment depending on which provision an issuer has violated.\textsuperscript{319} In addition, section (4) of the NASAA model provides some flexibility by permitting state securities administrators to waive any of the requirements of the exemption at the request of an offeror who has demonstrated cause.\textsuperscript{320}

Further, the NASAA model addresses the problem that occurs when issuers test the waters and then decide to conduct a private placement under section 4(2) of the Securities Act. Under section (6) of the model, an issuer that has tested the waters must wait six months after its final contact with a potential investor before it may offer or sell securities pursuant to a private placement.\textsuperscript{321}

Although the NASAA model introduces many much needed safeguards, it also has its flaws. Because the plan focuses disproportionately on investor protection, its adoption by the states may exacerbate the problems facing small issuers discussed above with respect to Rule 254.\textsuperscript{322} The NASAA plan is more complex and imposes more demanding disclosure requirements than Rule 254. If the states enact the NASAA model,\textsuperscript{323} a potential issuer that tests the waters must comply both with the state procedure, which would follow the NASAA

\textsuperscript{314} Id. at 2543-44; cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(4) (1997).
\textsuperscript{315} NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2543-44.
\textsuperscript{316} Id. at 2541.
\textsuperscript{317} See supra text accompanying note 201.
\textsuperscript{318} See supra text accompanying note 202.
\textsuperscript{319} NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2543.
\textsuperscript{320} Id. at 2544.
\textsuperscript{321} Id.
\textsuperscript{322} See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
\textsuperscript{323} The more likely outcome is that only some states will enact laws that mirror the NASAA model. Other states may design their own rules. In that case, a small issuer that
model, and with Rule 254. The inconsistencies between Rule 254 and the NASAA model render compliance confusing and burdensome for small issuers. Such issuers would incur considerable expenses and would still need a lawyer to ensure compliance with both sets of laws. These burdens and high costs of compliance may discourage small businesses from testing the waters. Further, the model has limited utility. The model's scope is broader than that of Rule 254—section 1(b) provides that it also applies to Rule 504 offerings—however, the model is available only to potential issuers contemplating Regulation A and Rule 504 offerings. The model also does not alleviate NASAA's concern that small businesses, armed with the opportunity to test the waters, will develop unreasonable expectations regarding the offering. It also threatens to give rise to the same systemic problems that state securities regulators warned of with respect to Rule 254—a poor allocation of capital and skepticism toward investing in small companies.

As of September 11, 1995, eight states participated in NASAA's pilot program. Of these states, Massachusetts, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington adopted laws that mirror the NASAA plan. Kansas, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming enacted statutes that enable small issuers to test the waters; however, their laws differ slightly from the NASAA model. Colorado and Oklahoma implemented their own testing-the-waters procedures. As of November 1995, Arizona seeks to test the waters in multiple states is confronted with the daunting task of compliance with several different sets of procedures.  

324 NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.  
325 See supra text accompanying note 258.  
326 See supra text accompanying notes 299-42.  
329 See id. For a discussion of how the testing-the-waters rules adopted by these states differ from the NASAA program, see id.  

In 1994, California introduced a new exemption that permits eligible issuers to make solicitations that resemble testing the waters. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n) (West Supp. 1997). Under section 25102(n), offerings by California issuers, among others, who market securities to certain qualified purchasers, are exempt from state registration requirements. Id. § 25102(n)(1)-(2). The rule also allows eligible issuers to publish and distribute general solicitations regarding a potential offering. Id. § 25102(n)(5). According to the SEC, "[t]his general announcement process is modeled on the 'test the waters' concept being used by several of the states and by the Commission in [the form of Rule 254]." Small Business Registration Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7285, [1996-97 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,803, at 88,006, 88,008 (May 1, 1996) [hereinafter...
authorized the codification of a testing-the-waters rule based on the

The NASAA pilot project yielded unimpressive results. Participating states reported the following numbers of testing-the-waters filings: Kansas (none), Massachusetts (none), Oregon (three to five), Pennsylvania (one); Vermont (one, but disqualified), Virginia (one or two), and Washington (eight to ten). In Colorado, between twenty and thirty issuers relied on the testing-the-waters rule, while in Oklahoma, only one issuer tested the waters. These statistics are insufficient to provide a basis for a definitive conclusion regarding the project. NASAA conceded that it had "captured very little data [from the pilot project] due to the small number of filings." Nevertheless, after the two years, NASAA did conclude that under its model, testing the waters did not appear to "compromise . . . investor protection." A larger number of filings may have cast doubt on this conclusion.

2. The Commission

Confronted with the prospect of an ineffective Rule 254, the Commission set out in 1993 to secure its acceptance by the states.
Foreshadowing increased cooperation, the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance praised NASAA for its model and recognized that the "states' response has been 'constructive' in the rulemaking process." Nevertheless, the SEC did not wait until the end of the NASAA two-year pilot project to assess the impact of testing the waters. At an ABA State Regulation of Securities Committee meeting in September 1993, Richard Wulff, Chief of the Corporation Finance Division's Office of Small Business Policy, announced that the Commission considered the SBIs "a 'very successful revision.'" He reported that as of September 27, 1993, thirty small issuers, representing many different industries, had tested the waters. Five of these issuers, the so-called "success stories," subsequently began Regulation A offerings. The SEC concluded that Rule 254 was a success.

3. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act

The NSMIA does not increase the likelihood that Rule 254 will be a success. In order to reduce issuers' costs and the burden of complying with expensive, excessive, and at times inconsistent, blue sky laws, Congress amended section 18 of the Securities Act and section 28 of the Exchange Act to authorize federal preemption of certain state securities laws regarding "covered securities" or securities that will be "covered securities" after a transaction. The NSMIA signals the end of blue sky registration of and qualification requirements for, as well as merit regulation of, offerings of covered securities. Congress defined four levels of covered securities in section 18. The first level consists of "nationally traded securities," which are those listed or approved for listing on the New York or American Stock Exchanges, the NASDAQ National Market System, or an exchange that the Commission deems to have equivalent listing requirements. Second, covered securities include securities issued by investment

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340 SEC Adopts Further Rules, supra note 238, at 620.
342 See id. at 1342.
343 Id.
344 However, if the Commission relies on new section 28 of the Securities Act to raise the Regulation A ceiling, then more small issuers should test the waters. See supra note 226.
345 See supra text accompanying notes 271-75.
347 See Rowe, supra note 226, at 8. However, the states will retain their authority to investigate and enforce violations of state antifraud laws and illegal broker-dealer conduct, permit notice filings, and collect existing fees. See NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3419-20 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (Supp. II 1996)).
348 Id. at 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1) (Supp. II 1996)).
companies registered, or with registration statements filed, under the Investment Company Act. Third, securities offered to so-called "qualified purchasers" are covered. Finally, securities offered or sold pursuant to the following Securities Act exemptions are covered: (i) sections 4(1) and 4(3), if by an issuer that has reporting obligations under the Exchange Act; (ii) section 4(4); (iii) section 3(a) excluding subparagraphs (4) and (11); and (iv) section 4(2).

The passage of the NSMIA should make it easier and less expensive for many issuers to offer and sell securities. However, the NSMIA does not provide any assistance to issuers seeking to rely on Regulation A. New section 18(b) of the Securities Act does not include securities offered or sold pursuant to Regulation A in its definition of covered securities. Consequently, the states retain jurisdiction over Regulation A offerings. As a result, small businesses interested in testing the waters under Rule 254 must still comply with the duplicative, expensive, and often inconsistent blue sky laws of all states in which it seeks to offer or sell securities under Regulation A. As discussed earlier, most issuers are effectively unable to test the waters in many states. The NSMIA thus leaves the coordination problem largely unresolved and has not increased accessibility to Rule 254.

There is hope that Congress, or the Commission, will preempt state securities laws regarding Regulation A offerings, or at least testing the waters before such offerings. Section 102(b) of the NSMIA includes a note to new section 18, requiring the SEC to assess the extent to which the states have taken steps to achieve "uniformity of State regulatory requirements for securities or securities transactions . . . for securities that are not covered securities" and to report to Congress on the results of this review no later than October 11, 1997. In addition, the NSMIA authorizes the Commission to subse-

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349 See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2) (Supp. II 1996)).
351 Municipal securities, exempt under section 3(2), which are offered or sold in the state where the issuer is located, are not covered. See id. at 3418-19 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C) (Supp. II 1996)).
352 See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (Supp. II 1996)).
353 See Rowe, supra note 226, at 8.
356 See supra text accompanying notes 261-75.
357 See supra text accompanying notes 269-75.
358 NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3420 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r note (Supp. II 1996)).
quenty amend the definition of "qualified purchaser." This authority may enable the Commission to expand the definition of covered securities to include Regulation A, thereby preempting state securities laws concerning the offering or sale of securities pursuant to this exemption. If the Commission does exercise this authority, new section 18(b)(3) of the Securities Act requires the Agency to ensure that this expansion is "consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors."

4. Synthesis

The SEC's declaration of the success of the testing-the-waters rule only thirteen months after its adoption was a hasty conclusion to draw. As with the NASAA pilot program, only a small number of potential issuers tested the waters. Yet in contrast to NASAA's appropriate circumspection, the Commission was quick to trumpet the success of Rule 254. Instead of waiting until the end of NASAA's pilot program, meeting with members of the Association to discuss the results under both testing-the-waters procedures, and issuing a joint statement, the SEC once again chose to proceed on its own.

There are several possible reasons why the SEC was anxious to proclaim Rule 254 a success. The Commission ultimately recognized that it had erred in abandoning the states and NASAA in order to force through the SBIs. The SEC thus had a very strong interest in the success of Rule 254, because of criticism it would receive if the Rule failed. Success could help to justify the agency's overt discontinuation of its negotiations with the states and NASAA. Further, successful testing-the-waters filings might encourage more states to adopt testing-the-waters legislation. After NASAA launched its pilot project, the SEC had an even greater interest in the success of its testing-the-waters rule. States that adopted rules based on Rule 254, rather than the NASAA model or entirely different legislation, would reduce both compliance costs for small issuers and the confusion of inconsistent securities laws. The SEC may have also felt pressure because of the continued politicization of the small business cause.

As of June 27, 1995, the Commission reported that sixty-one small businesses had filed solicitation documents and twenty-six of these issuers had taken steps to offer securities. The SEC reiterated that Rule 254 was a success. But, like the representation in September

359 Id. at 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (Supp. II 1996)).
360 See Campbell, supra note 264, at 207.
361 NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (Supp. II 1996)).
362 See SEC Pleased with SBI, supra note 341, at 1341.
364 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,886.
365 See id.
1993 that Rule 254 was a success,\(^{366}\) this report was premature, for Rule 254 helped only a fraction of small businesses.\(^{367}\)

There are a number of plausible explanations for the low number of testing-the-waters filings. Rule 254 had been on the books for only three years. Further, it has been available only to nonreporting companies seeking to raise up to $5 million in capital, many of which may have been ignorant of the opportunity. In addition, most states' blue sky laws have not exempted Regulation A offerings by small issuers from registration with state regulators.\(^{368}\) The costs of compliance with blue sky laws, especially those incurred in pursuit of registration, have been prohibitively expensive for many small issuers.\(^{369}\) Moreover, most states have not adopted testing-the-waters rules, thereby precluding small issuers from soliciting indications of interest in those states. Section 18, as currently amended by the NSMIA, will not encourage more small issuers to test the waters under Rule 254 because it does not apply to Regulation A.\(^{370}\)

Another problem is that the Commission addressed only the number of Rule 254 solicitations and Regulation A filings.\(^{371}\) To determine whether Rule 254 has succeeded, one must take other factors into account. For example, the Commission must consider the success of the ultimate offering. If the ultimate Regulation A offering fails to raise sufficient capital for the issuer, then Rule 254 should not necessarily be considered a success. In such a case, testing the waters may have failed to introduce enough actual investors to the issuer. A tremendous response to an issuer's solicitation of interest is insignificant if investors do not purchase the securities.

Similarly, the SEC has not focused on the small businesses that test the waters, and decide not to undertake a Regulation A offering because of a lack of interest. For such companies, however, Rule 254 was a success, for it saved them considerable expense. At the meeting of the ABA's State Regulation Committee, Richard Wulff mentioned the significance of the twenty-five small businesses who tested the waters, yet did not conduct Regulation A offerings, only after a lawyer in attendance noted that these were the "real success stories."\(^{372}\) In fact,

\(^{366}\) See supra text accompanying notes 341-43.

\(^{367}\) See Impact of SBIs, supra note 94, at 520 n.81; supra text accompanying note 364.

\(^{368}\) See supra note 270 and accompanying text.

\(^{369}\) See supra text accompanying note 272.

\(^{370}\) See supra text accompanying notes 354-57.


\(^{372}\) SEC Pleased with SBI, supra note 341, at 1342. The SEC has subsequently emphasized how Rule 254 can help small issuers when it dissuades them from an offering. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the California Capital Access Forum (May 2, 1996), available
one must take the analysis a step further. The SEC should have contacted the twenty-five small businesses to learn why they did not pursue public offerings. If they chose not to proceed because testing the waters revealed that there was not enough interest to raise sufficient capital under Regulation A, then Rule 254 helped these companies. Alternatively, if they decided not to proceed with the offering for other reasons, testing the waters under Rule 254 may not have influenced their decision.

The success of Rule 254 also requires that testing the waters not have an adverse effect on investors. Neither the SEC nor NASAA have said much beyond their naked declarations that testing the waters under their respective models did not appear to harm investors. In fact, the Commission has conceded that it "had seen more 'puffing' than had been expected." These reports suggest that Rule 254 may need stricter requirements regarding the content of solicitation materials in order to protect inexperienced investors from puffing by issuers.

The SEC and NASAA should contact investors who received solicitations of interest and purchased securities in a Regulation A offering to ask them about their experiences with either Rule 254, the NASAA model, or other testing-the-waters rules that any of the states have adopted. Without such an effort, the Commission or NASAA would presumably learn that testing the waters has harmed investors only from investors' complaints or lawsuits. However, the absence of reported complaints or lawsuits does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Rule 254 does not harm investors. It is conceivable that Rule 254 has harmed investors who have not resorted to either of these courses of action. Furthermore, investors may not recognize that they suffered as a result of testing the waters. For example, they may have reviewed the offering circular, but relied primarily on excessively optimistic projections conveyed orally by the issuer in a Rule 254 solicitation of interest. The effect of testing the waters is thus very difficult to measure. Rule 254 had not been in existence long enough for the SEC to make a fair determination of its impact on investors. Admit-

\bhin 1996 WL 222411 (S.E.C.), *5-*6 \[hereinafter Remarks by Arthur Levitt\] (recalling how a particular small business tested the waters, discovered that its customers, whom it solicited, would not be able to help the company raise a sufficient amount of capital under Regulation A, and then conducted a very successful registered IPO with the assistance of an underwriter).

\bh373 For example, a company might not begin a public offering if it received a loan from a bank or decided to remain private because it was uncomfortable with the disclosure requirements that arise in preparation of and following an offering.

\bh374 Leonard J. McGill, Innovative New California Transactional Exemption for Sales to Qualified Purchasers, Insights, May 1995, at 23, 24. In California, the Department of Corporations conducted an independent analysis of testing the waters and agreed with this finding. See id.
tedly, SEC discussion of issuers who declined to offer securities or of investor protection does not constitute publicity that rivals stories of small businesses that have tested the waters and then undertaken Regulation A offerings. Nevertheless, an analysis that takes these two factors into account is critical to accurately determine if testing the waters has been a success. A careful evaluation will help the Commission make any necessary revisions to the Rule and will shed light on the wisdom of expanding the availability of testing the waters.

A proper conclusion that Rule 254 does not harm investors could give rise to three outcomes, all of which would help small issuers. First, the SEC could exercise its authority under new section 28 to increase the Regulation A ceiling. Second, the Commission may have the authority to add the Regulation A exemption to new section 18’s definition of covered securities, and thereby preempt state securities laws regarding securities offered or sold pursuant to the Regulation A exemption. Third, more states, encouraged by NASAA, might exempt Regulation A offerings or adopt testing-the-waters rules based on, or coordinated with, Rule 254.

Small businesses that lack a market for their stock need a testing-the-waters rule to enable them to make a rational business decision whether to conduct a Regulation A offering. In theory, testing the waters either under Rule 254 or the NASAA model should help small businesses. However, the NASAA model appears to strike a better balance than Rule 254 between facilitating capital formation and protecting investors. Nevertheless, like the three-year period that followed the adoption of the SBIs, the two-year trial period was inadequate to properly determine the impact of testing the waters on investors.

IV
TESTING THE WATERS BEFORE REGISTERED IPOs UNDER PROPOSED RULE 135D

A. Background to the Testing Release

The foregoing criticism of the SEC’s hasty conclusion is significant because the SEC proposed an extension of testing the waters to

375 See supra text accompanying note 343.
376 Section 106(b) of the NSMIA requires that when the SEC is making rules, pursuant to the NSMIA, that require consideration of the effect on the “public interest,” it must take into account “the protection of investors” as well as “whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (Supp. II 1996)). However, SEC Chairman Levitt has subsequently explained that investor protection is the most important of these considerations. See Market Issues Weighed in Rulemaking: Investor Protection Is First, Levitt States, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 297, 297 (Mar. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Investor Protection Is First].
377 See supra text accompanying notes 296.
378 See supra text accompanying notes 359-61.
registered IPOs based on its determination that Rule 254 helped small businesses.\textsuperscript{379} Thus, if the SEC drew an improper conclusion, the foundation of the Testing Release is weak.

As discussed earlier, certain critics of the SBIs argued that Rule 254, available only to businesses considering Regulation A offerings, has very limited utility.\textsuperscript{380} For instance, small issuers seeking to raise more than $5 million could not test the waters, for such an offering would exceed the Regulation A ceiling. These critics proposed the extension of the testing-the-waters rule to other types of offerings that would benefit small businesses.\textsuperscript{381}

In 1995, politics dictated neither the scope of the Testing Release nor the pace of its adoption to the same extent as before the SBIs Release.\textsuperscript{382} Rather, the remarkable success of the IPO market during the 1990s, which enabled issuers in the first four and one-half years of this decade to raise $114.8 billion, prompted the Commission to propose extending testing the waters to registered IPOs.\textsuperscript{383} The Commission thus recognized the advantages registered IPOs offer companies in need of capital; however, it also understood that the prohibitive costs of going public and operating a public company preclude many businesses from pursuing this means of raising capital.

In contrast to its approach in the SBIs Release, the Commission incorporated some of the views of NASAA into the Testing Release. For example, the Testing Release discussed the NASAA pilot project and contrasted it with Rule 254.\textsuperscript{384} In addition, the SEC attached NASAA’s resolution regarding testing the waters and its Proposed Statement of Policy on Solicitation of Interest as an appendix to the

\textsuperscript{379} See Testing Release, \textit{supra} note 8, at 86,886. The SEC reported that: Experience under Regulation A suggests that the “test the waters” initiative provides issuers of small offerings a useful and cost effective means of assessing whether there is sufficient potential interest in the company as an investment to proceed with a Regulation A offering. To date [June 27, 1995], these solicitations do not appear to have raised significant investor protection concerns. Accordingly, the Commission today is soliciting comment on the appropriateness of providing a similar “test the waters” option for registered IPOs.

\textsuperscript{380} See \textit{supra} notes 222-28 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{381} Two such proposals that particularly influenced the SEC were a July 8, 1993 comment letter from members of various committees of the ABA on the SBIs and a March 31, 1995 report by the Subcouncil on Capital Allocation of the Competitiveness Policy Council. \textit{See} Testing Release, \textit{supra} note 8, at 86,886 & nn.13-14.

\textsuperscript{382} See \textit{supra} notes 148-51 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 282, 288.

\textsuperscript{383} \textit{See} Testing Release, \textit{supra} note 8, at 86,887 (explaining that “[t]he IPO market is one of the great strengths of the U.S. capital markets, and its breadth and depth is [sic] unique”).

\textsuperscript{384} \textit{Id.} at 86,886.
Testing the Waters

The SEC took these measures because it knew that for this proposal to succeed, it would need the support of the state securities regulators. In sum, the SEC had learned from its experience in 1992.

B. The Testing Release

The SEC issued the Testing Release on June 27, 1995, and the period for public comment was to end on September 8, 1995. The Commission's primary inquiry for commenters was whether its proposed new Rule 135d, entitled "Solicitation of Interest Document for Use Prior to an Initial Public Offering," would help businesses reasonably ascertain the market's interest in their IPOs without leading investors to disregard the disclosure they would subsequently receive pursuant to the federal securities laws.

1. Proposed Rule 135d

Under proposed Rule 135d, written, published, broadcasted, or oral solicitations of interest that comply with the Rule do not represent an offer of securities for the purposes of section 5 of the Securities Act. The Rule is not available to an issuer who is (i) a reporting company under the Exchange Act, (ii) a development stage or blank check company, (iii) a penny stock issuer, (iv) an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, (v) an issuer of asset-backed securities, or (vi) a partnership, limited liability company, or other "direct participation investment program" following the IPO. The proposal prescribes five requirements for the solicitation document or script of the radio or television broadcast. First, the issuer must state that the solicitation of interest does not constitute an offer to sell securities, which will be made only via a future detailed prospectus available from the issuer. Second, the issuer must explain that it is not soliciting any consideration, which, if paid, will be re-

385 See id. at 86,894-98.
386 Id. at 86,885. The SEC did not treat this as a firm deadline. See, e.g., infra note 533 and accompanying text.
387 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893.
388 Id. at 86,886-87.
389 See id. at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)).
391 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (1)). In the Testing Release, the Commission proposed new Rule 100(a)(8) which would define a direct participation program as: "any program (other than an investment company . . .) that provides for flow-through tax consequences regardless of the structure of the legal entity or vehicle for distribution, including, but not limited to, partnerships, limited partnerships, real estate investment trusts . . ., and limited liability companies." Id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.100(a)(8)).
392 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (2)).
393 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (2) (i)).
Third, the issuer must state that it will neither sell securities nor accept an offer to purchase until the Commission declares a filed registration statement effective, or after the issuer properly relies on an exemption from registration.\(^{395}\) Fourth, the issuer must assert that if a potential investor expresses interest, he or she does not incur any obligation.\(^{396}\) Fifth, the document or script must name the issuer’s chief executive officer and broadly discuss its business and product line.\(^{397}\) These represent only the minimum requirements; issuers may provide any other information such as pricing information, unaudited financial statements, and forward-looking statements.\(^{398}\) All representations in the solicitation materials must be accurate, for the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to them.\(^{399}\)

In addition, an issuer may send a coupon along with the solicitation document through which a prospective investor can convey interest in a registered IPO by returning the coupon to the issuer.\(^{400}\) The coupon must reiterate that its completion does not commit a prospective investor to purchasing the securities and that the prospective investor should not send money.\(^{401}\) Further, the coupon may ask for the prospective investor’s name, address, and telephone number, but may not inquire as to his or her financial status.\(^{402}\)

The issuer must submit a copy of its testing materials to the Commission before it can rely on proposed Rule 135d.\(^{403}\) An issuer may submit the copy either in paper format or electronically, via EDGAR.\(^{404}\) The main office of the SEC must receive the copy no later than the first day on which the issuer uses the materials to solicit indications of interest.\(^{405}\) The submitted copy is then available for public inspection.\(^{406}\) The submitted copy must include the name and telephone number of an individual who can respond to inquiries regarding the testing materials.\(^{407}\) Finally, the issuer is required to submit only material that is substantively different from materials that an issuer has previously submitted to the Commission.\(^{408}\)

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394 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(2)(ii)).
395 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(2)(iii)).
396 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(2)(iv)).
397 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(2)(v)).
398 See id. at 86,888.
399 See id. at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(4) note).
400 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(b)).
401 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(b)).
402 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230-135d(b)).
403 See id. at 86,888, 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(4)).
404 See id. at 86,889 n.38.
405 See id. at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(3)).
406 See id. at 86,889 n.38.
407 See id. at 86,893-94 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(3)).
408 See id. at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(3) note).
An issuer may speak directly with prospective investors after submitting its solicitation materials to the SEC. Proposed Rule 135d imposes many of the same restrictions on oral communications that it does on written materials. An issuer may neither solicit nor accept any form of consideration from an investor. Moreover, during the course of oral communications, an issuer cannot accept a commitment from a potential investor to purchase. Finally, barring an exemption from registration, an issuer may not orally sell securities until the SEC declares its registration statement effective. As with written materials and scripted broadcasts, the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply.

The Testing Release explains that the proposal in no way restricts the "means of dissemination of the 'test the waters' solicitation." Communication via any print, broadcast, telephone, facsimile, or electronic medium, including the Internet, is permitted. An issuer must meet all of the requirements of proposed Rule 135d for each communication, publication, or broadcast. In fact, the Testing Release explains that an issuer must meet all of the requirements of proposed Rule 135d to rely on the Rule. After an issuer has tested the waters, it has no obligation to interested investors should it decide not to proceed with an offering.

Following the filing of a registration statement with the Commission, an issuer may no longer test the waters. In addition, sales pursuant to a registration statement may not be made until twenty calendar days after the final publication or delivery of the written document or radio or television broadcast.

Proposed subparagraph 135d(c), modelled after Rule 254(e), provides that written materials, submitted to the Commission and meeting the other requirements of Rule 135d, would not fall within the meaning of a prospectus under section 2(10) of the Securities Act. This protects issuers from potential section 12(a)(2) liability.

409 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(4)).
410 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(4)).
411 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(4)).
412 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(4)).
413 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(4) note).
414 Id. at 86,888.
415 See id.
416 See id.
417 Id. at 86,890.
418 See id. at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(5)). An issuer's receipt of a coupon from a prospective investor, in accordance with proposed Rule 135d(b), after it has filed a registration statement does not violate this provision. See id.
419 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(6)).
420 Id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(c)).
421 See id. at 86,889.
2. Proposed Amendments to Rule 254

The Commission also proposed revisions to Rule 254 in the Testing Release that would enable an issuer to conduct a Regulation A offering after it has tested the waters under proposed Rule 135d in contemplation of a registered IPO.\footnote{Id. at 86,890.} A proposed revision to Rule 254(b)(4) would preclude issuers from selling securities via an offering circular or a registration statement until twenty calendar days after the final publication or delivery of the written document or broadcast on radio or television “pursuant to this rule or pursuant to [proposed Rule 135d].”\footnote{Id. at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(4)).} In addition, the Commission proposed removing from Rule 254(d) the restriction on an issuer’s ability to undertake a registered IPO until thirty days after testing the waters in good faith under Regulation A’s Rule 254.\footnote{Id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(d)). When an issuer in good faith changes its intention and registers an offering after testing the waters, current Rule 254(d) provides that Regulation A’s “exemption . . . will not be subject to integration with the registered offering, if at least 30 calendar days have elapsed between the last solicitation of interest and the filing of the registration statement with the Commission, and all solicitation of interest documents have been submitted to the Commission.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(d) (1997). The Testing Release proposes to remove the thirty-day waiting requirement. Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(d)).}

3. Application of Proposal to Other Exempt Offerings

As discussed above, proposed Rule 135d does not limit the means by which an issuer may disseminate testing materials before a registered IPO.\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 414-15.} However, the Commission warned in the Testing Release that “[i]f an issuer wants to maintain full flexibility to proceed with an offering under Regulation D and Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, the means of dissemination of the ‘test the waters’ solicitation would have to be consistent with the limitations under the regulation and statute.”\footnote{Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,888 n.55.} Of particular importance is the Rule 502(c) prohibition of general solicitations and advertising.\footnote{17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1997); supra text accompanying note 133. For discussion of the ban on general solicitation, see Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Markets for Small Issuers: The Barrier of Federal Solicitation and Advertising Prohibitions, 38 U. Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1986); Dougherty, supra note 130.} The Commission published a release concurrently with the Testing Release which proposes, among other things, the elimination of the Regulation D prohibition of general solicitations.\footnote{Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues, Securities Act Release No. 7185, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,636, at 86,871 (June 27, 1995).} Unless the SEC adopts this proposal, an issuer may not subsequently offer securities under Rules 505 or 506 if “its testing the waters activity was done in a way that involved general
advertising or other activities constituting general solicitation." The Commission would have to make this determination on a case-by-case basis.

The SEC explained in the Testing Release that an issuer seeking to offer securities under Rules 505 or 506 cannot allow an integration of the exempt offering with solicitation activity. The Commission expressed concern that such an integration might reduce the utility of proposed Rule 135d. In the Testing Release, the Commission asked commenters about the viability of another approach: the creation of "a special integration safe harbor for private placements following a Rule 135d 'test the waters' solicitation." The Commission elaborated, proposing that an issuer would be required to wait twenty days after its final delivery or broadcast of a solicitation, and then could proceed with a private placement.

4. Comparison of Proposed Rule 135d with Rule 254 and the NASAA Model

The language of proposed Rule 135d is, unsurprisingly, very similar to that of Rule 254. Nevertheless, the rules differ in important respects. Proposed Rule 135d did not borrow much from the NASAA model. As a result, the differences between proposed Rule 135d and the NASAA model reflect essentially the same differences that exist between Rule 254 and the model.

Proposed Rule 135d goes beyond Rule 254 by permitting more issuers to test the waters. By making testing the waters available to
issuers contemplating registered IPOs, proposed Rule 135d enables larger issuers and small issuers that seek to raise more than $5 million to test the waters. Although Regulation A is reserved for American and Canadian issuers, proposed Rule 135d does not deny foreign issuers access to testing the waters in the United States. In addition, unlike Rule 251(a)(6) and section 1(i) of the NASAA model, proposed Rule 135d does not contain a bad boy disqualification provision. In the Testing Release, the SEC solicited comments regarding the appropriateness of the exclusions proposed Rule 135d(a) prescribes. The Commission considered removing some of these exclusions and extending them to other types of issuers. In fact, the SEC even requested comment on whether it should add to Rule 135d(a) those issuers that NASAA excluded under its model. In a troubling step backwards, the Commission also asked commenters if it should limit availability of the Rule to small business issuers.

Proposed Rule 135d also requires that an issuer submit a copy of its solicitation materials to the Commission’s main office. In contrast, Rule 254 originally gave an issuer the option of submitting a copy to the regional SEC office in the area in which the issuer conducts or plans to conduct its principal business operations. Proposed Rule 135d also contains language that necessarily differs from that of Rule 254 to reflect the differences between short form registration pursuant to Regulation A and full registration. For example, proposed Rule 135d(a)(2)(i) requires that the written document or scripted broadcast state that an issuer will make any public offering via a prospectus. Rule 254(b)(2)(ii) has different language because a Regulation A issuer must deliver an offering circular rather than a prospectus.

Another important difference is that under proposed Rule 135d, full compliance with the provisions of the Rule is a precondition to reliance on the Rule. In contrast, compliance with the require-

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438 See supra text accompanying notes 167, 312. For a recommendation that the Commission adopt such a provision, see infra Part V.F.3.
439 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887-88.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 Id. at 86,888; see also infra Part V.E.3 (discussing why this would be a misstep).
443 See supra text accompanying note 405.
445 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (proposed Rule 135d(a)(2)(i)).
446 See supra text accompanying note 417.
ments of Rule 254(b) is "not a condition to [the] . . . exemption." 447 For example, submission of the solicitation document or scripted broadcast to the Commission does not constitute a condition to testing the waters under Rule 254. 448 Pursuant to the guidance offered in the SBIs Release and Rule 258(a), 449 failure to meet the requirements of Rule 254(b) is grounds for "[t]he Commission . . . [to] enter an order temporarily suspending a Regulation A exemption." 450 Conversely, in order to exempt a solicitation from section 5, an issuer seeking to solicit indications of interest under proposed Rule 135d must submit the materials to the Commission and meet all other requirements the Rule prescribes. 451 This also differs from the more complicated provisions of the NASAA model regarding compliance. 452

Although the Commission followed Rule 254 rather than NASAA's model rule in drafting proposed Rule 135d, it did give NASAA's model serious consideration. Throughout the Testing Release, the SEC asked commenters to consider various revisions to proposed Rule 135d, many of which were part of NASAA's testing-the-waters program. 453 In most of these instances, the SEC failed to mention that these proposals were included in the NASAA rule and in effect in some states. 454 Nevertheless, the Commission was clearly trying to appease NASAA and coordinate federal and state securities laws.

C. Reactions to the Testing Release

1. Déjà Vu

Given that the SEC modelled Rule 135d on Rule 254, the proposal, unlike its antecedent, was not regarded as innovative. Familiarity with the concept of testing the waters and anticipation that the Commission followed Rule 254 rather than NASAA’s model rule in drafting proposed Rule 135d, it did give NASAA’s model serious consideration. Throughout the Testing Release, the SEC asked commenters to consider various revisions to proposed Rule 135d, many of which were part of NASAA’s testing-the-waters program. In most of these instances, the SEC failed to mention that these proposals were included in the NASAA rule and in effect in some states. Nevertheless, the Commission was clearly trying to appease NASAA and coordinate federal and state securities laws.

447 SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,470 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1997)).
448 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,889.
450 Id.
451 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890.
452 See supra text accompanying note 319.
453 See, e.g., Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887-88 (soliciting comment as to whether "any of the exclusions [regarding types of issuers] in the NASAA draft policy statement [should] be specifically incorporated into the proposal"); id. at 86,888 (asking commenters "whether additional information should be required in the soliciting material, such as that required by the NASAA draft policy").
454 See, e.g., id. at 86,890 (soliciting comment on whether the Commission should grant investors more time to review the prospectus when an issuer has tested the waters—this idea originated in section (1)(h) of NASA's model, see supra text accompanying note 313); id. at 86,889 (seeking comment on whether the Rule should require issuers to deliver a copy of the solicitation document to each person from whom they solicit indications of interest—this suggestion derives from section 1(f) of the NASAA model, see supra note 308 and accompanying text).
mission would extend the concept beyond Regulation A may explain why few commenters submitted letters in response to the Testing Release, and why there has been a dearth of scholarly work written about the proposal since its introduction in June 1995. Nevertheless, the comments submitted to the SEC are important because they, in part, have contributed to the SEC's extended review of its proposal. Before the Testing Release, the Commission noted that its proposal to extend testing the waters to registered IPOs had received mixed reviews. As with Rule 254, responses to the proposal after the Release's publication were mixed.

2. Controversial?

Although not innovative, proposed Rule 135d, as with Rule 254 when the Commission introduced it, is extremely controversial. The Testing Release suggests that the SEC knew its proposal was controversial and expected the public comments to question its authority to adopt a rule that would introduce such sweeping change to the Securities Act. The Commission recapitulated the relevant language of sections 5(c) and 2(3) of the Securities Act, explaining how proposed Rule 135d constituted an exception to the gun-jumping prohibition. The SEC acknowledged that it was “cognizant that rulemaking in [the testing-the-waters] area is circumscribed by the statute’s prohibition of conduct constituting an ‘offer’ prior to the filing of a registration statement.” In addition, the SEC explained that under Rule 254, testing-the-waters measures constitute offers under section 2(3). The Commission also reiterated language from a 1957 release in which it had explained that prefiling publicity that is not “couched in terms of an express offer,” but “contribute[s] to conditioning the public market or arousing public interest in an issuer or its

Commenters submitted thirteen responses, including two actiongrams, which briefly indicate a commenter’s support of, or opposition to, the proposal. See Comment Letter File for S7-18-95 (on file with the SEC). By contrast, there were sixty-six comment letters submitted in response to the SBIs Release. See supra note 156. The more comprehensive nature of the SBIs may explain why that Release prompted more responses.

See SEC Advisory Committee Moves Agenda Toward Model for Company Registration, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 708, 709 (May 12, 1995) [hereinafter Toward Model for Company Registration].

See supra note 206 and accompanying text. It is important to recognize that the commenters have various personal and professional interests that help explain their positions regarding the Testing Release. Furthermore, the comments do not necessarily reflect the views of an individual commenter’s entire organization, association, or firm. Unless the letter suggests otherwise, one should attribute the views to the individual who wrote the letter, or the committee to which the individual belongs.

Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,891-92.
id. at 86,891.

Id. at 86,892; see supra text accompanying note 213.
securities" may violate section 5(c).\textsuperscript{461} In support of its authority to adopt proposed Rule 135d, the Commission cited its past experience in adopting rules such as Rules 135 and 135a-c, and in taking "interpretive positions" in releases regarding "application of the statute to other types of public communications made prior to the filing of a registration statement."\textsuperscript{462} The SEC concluded by stating its intention to review the relevant statutory language as well as its past interpretations "in considering the historical scope of permissible 'test the waters' activities and the appropriateness of the provisions of proposed Rule 135d."\textsuperscript{463}

Despite the undoubtedly controversial nature of the proposal, few public commenters, including NASAA, either questioned the Commission's authority or addressed the inherent difficulty of reconciling proposed Rule 135d with sections 5(c) and 2(3) of the Securities Act. Only one comment letter discussed this problem. Marc Steinberg, Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University and a former SEC attorney, responded that "proposed Rule 135d . . . is in contravention of [section] 5(c) of the Securities Act" and "amounts to an effective administrative repeal of [section] 5(c) in the case of IPOs."\textsuperscript{464} According to Professor Steinberg, testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d represents an illegal offer to sell.\textsuperscript{465} Professor Steinberg added that the Rule allows an issuer to "condition the market," adversely affect[ing] unsophisticated investors.\textsuperscript{466}

3. Necessary?

A few commenters expressed doubts as to whether proposed Rule 135d was necessary. According to this view, testing the waters before a registered IPO is unnecessary because professional underwriters work with the issuer to assess the viability of an IPO.\textsuperscript{467} Because an issuer usually needs an underwriter to conduct a registered IPO, this view suggests that rather than testing the waters, an issuer should let the

\textsuperscript{461} Testing Release, \textit{supra} note 8, at 86,891-92; \textit{see} \textit{supra} note 36 and accompanying text. The Commission posited the idea of testing the waters via a "simplified registration procedure" as a means of navigating around the gun-jumping problem. Testing Release, \textit{supra} note 8, at 86,892.

\textsuperscript{462} Testing Release, \textit{supra} note 8, at 86,891 & n.66.

\textsuperscript{463} \textit{Id.} at 86,892.

\textsuperscript{464} Comment Letter from Marc I. Steinberg, Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 1 (Aug. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Steinberg Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC) (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., \textit{Is the Securities Act of 1933 Obsolete? The SEC Increasingly Appears To Believe So But Has Not Yet Adopted a Consistent Policy To Replace It}, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 4, 1995, at B4).

\textsuperscript{465} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{466} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{467} \textit{See} Comment Letter from Gary P. Kreider, Partner, Keating, Muething & Klekamp, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 1 (July 24, 1995) [hereinafter Keating Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC).
underwriters assess the viability of an IPO. As a result, proponents of this position have commented:

It is difficult to imagine an issuer of the type involved in a normal IPO gaining anything from the "test the waters" concept. Regardless of the degree of advertising involved in this manner, an underwriter would make its own judgment as to the success of a real offering. The procedure would . . . be of benefit only to the most marginal of offerings, ones that could not normally make it in [the] regular IPO scenario.

In the same vein, a school of thought argues that "the opportunity to test the waters for an IPO by floating promotional materials isn't necessary for mainstream companies whose products have already found a market; those firms . . . can get ample advice on the marketability of their stocks from investment bankers." Proposed Rule 135d would therefore be detrimental because it "would mainly benefit 'marginal companies' that pose riskier prospects for investors."

Similarly, there were commenters who questioned the need for proposed Rule 135d on the ground that the Commission was mistaken in thinking that small businesses incur considerable costs conducting IPOs that fail. In support of this position, the Capital Markets Committee of the Securities Industry Association ("SIA"), a trade association representing over 700 securities firms in North America, maintains that only a few issuers have withdrawn their registrations after filing registration statements in preparation for an IPO. According to SIA, underwriters serve as "'filters'" that prevent an issuer from incurring substantial expenses if the IPO appears unlikely to succeed. Unlike attorneys and accountants, underwriters' compensation is contingent on consummation of the offering. Therefore, as a result of this "'no consummation, no compensation'" custom, underwriters are unlikely to underwrite an IPO that is unpromising. Furthermore, a failed IPO is also detrimental to an underwriter's reputation. These disincentives of zero compensation and negative

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468 An issuer could attempt to self-underwrite a registered IPO, but this would be extremely difficult. See infra text accompanying notes 594-95.
469 Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 1.
471 Id.
473 Id. at 1 n.1, 2.
474 Id. at 2.
475 See id. at 3.
476 Id.
477 See id.
publicity render an underwriter a "'gate keeper,'" who carefully assesses "which private companies are ready for [public] markets and ... prevent[s] companies from incurring the expenses that are part of a public offering when the likelihood of success is inadequate." An IPO specialist commented that the intended benefits of proposed Rule 135d do not justify the reduction of "'investor protection'" because IPOs "'are easy to do.'" In contrast to underwriters and IPO firms, management or business owners usually lack the experience necessary to determine if the market will be interested in an IPO. SIA questioned an issuer's ability to properly assess the extent of investor interest in an IPO. In short, these critics disagree with the Commission, arguing that the compliance costs are prohibitive only for "shaky investment schemes" that should not consider IPOs in the first place—not for "substantial business enterprise[s]."

In fact, testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d may still be expensive for an issuer. In order to ensure full compliance with the proposed Rule and state laws, understand the ramifications of testing-the-waters activity, and avoid liability under the federal and state antifraud provisions, an issuer should still consult a lawyer. Legal fees and the expenses incurred in preparing, submitting, and distributing or broadcasting the solicitation materials may prohibit or discourage some potential issuers from testing the waters under the proposal.

Commenters, questioning the need for proposed Rule 135d, also feared that the proposal may hurt the public markets. To the extent investors are misled by prefiling solicitations or suffer as a result of an ill-conceived offering, "a dilution of confidence in [the United States] capital markets" may result.

Despite these comments, Part V below argues that a testing-the-waters rule is necessary. In particular, the foregoing commenters failed to discuss how the Rule might help businesses that are not "mainstream" and "whose products have [not] found a market" who may, primarily as a result of a successful testing-the-waters experience, be able to retain an underwriter.

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478 Id.
480 See SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 2-3.
481 Id.
482 Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 2.
483 See, e.g., id.
484 SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 4.
485 Taylor, supra note 470, at A4.
4. Benefits for Issuers

Most commenters responded that the proposal would help small businesses. Commenters appreciated the proposal's easing of the regulatory burdens on issuers and the flexibility it affords small businesses that are frequently forced to conduct Rule 505 or 506 offerings instead of IPOs due to the uncertainty of investor response to a public offering.486 According to the New York State Bar Association ("NYSBA"), the proposal will provide easier access to the capital markets for private businesses who are reluctant to go public due to the "high initial costs" and the risky nature of an IPO.487 The ABA also appreciated the value of giving issuers a chance to solicit indications of interest in an IPO of greater value than that permitted by the Regulation A ceiling.488

The ABA acknowledged that issuers who can secure the services of an experienced underwriter for a "firm commitment" underwriting489 are unlikely to use proposed Rule 135d.490 However, the ABA supported proposed Rule 135d because, among other reasons, it (i) gives issuers the opportunity to assess market interest before meeting with underwriters, and (ii) may permit underwriters to test the waters on behalf of issuers, both of which would enable more issuers to secure firm commitment underwritings.491 Further, in the case of a "best efforts" underwriting or a self-underwritten offering, the proposal will authorize issuers both to

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487 Comment Letter from Michael Iovenko, Chair, Committee on Securities Regulation of the Business Law Section of the New York State Bar Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 1 (Sept. 7, 1995) [hereinafter NYSBA Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC); see also Comment Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 1-2 (Sept. 22, 1995) [hereinafter Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC) (discussing financial constraints of the registration process).

488 Comment Letter from John M. Liftin et al., Chairpersons, Committees on Federal Regulation of Securities, State Regulation of Securities, and Small Business Committee of the ABA, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 21 (Oct. 25, 1995) [hereinafter ABA Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC).

489 In a firm commitment underwriting, the underwriter agrees to buy the securities offered and then resells the shares to the public. See Lipman, supra note 78, at 50; Schnei- der et al., supra note 78, at 51. For a discussion of the difference between "firm commitment" and "best efforts" underwritings, see Lipman, supra note 78, at 50-51; 1 Loss & Seligmman, supra note 112, at 924-42.

490 ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21.

491 Id.

492 In a best efforts underwriting, the underwriter agrees to make its best efforts to sell the securities, but is not obligated to sell the securities unless it finds enough investors to buy all of the shares or an amount established in the underwriting agreement. See Schnei- der et al., supra note 78, at 31-32.
ascertain whether an IPO would sell and to tailor the offering to the wishes of the market before it must shoulder considerable expenses. In short, the proposal makes a registered IPO a more feasible avenue for raising capital.

In fact, several commenters advocated a further extension of the availability of testing the waters to help still more issuers. For example, the ABA recommended that proposed Rule 135d contain language expressly permitting underwriters and other agents to solicit indications of interest on an issuer’s behalf. Sullivan & Cromwell, a large corporate law firm, opined that in light of the difficulties foreign companies face in determining market interest in the United States, the proposal should expressly permit foreign and sovereign issuers to test the waters. Some commenters suggested that the Commission remove certain types of issuers from proposed Rule 135d(a)(1)’s exclusionary provision to enable more issuers to test the waters. Finally, many commenters encouraged the Commission to extend the availability of testing the waters beyond the Regulation A and registered IPO markets. A common suggestion was to repeal or amend Rule 502(c)’s prohibition on general solicitation, facilitating issuers’ ability to test the waters and subsequently conduct Rule 505 and 506 offerings. One commenter even advocated the expansion of test-

See ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21.
See, e.g., ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 20 (commenting that “the exclusion of ‘direct participation investment programs’ is unnecessary and, as proposed to be defined, is excessively broad and would unnecessarily deprive many legitimate operating companies of the benefits of the rule merely because they chose to organize in other than corporate form”); Comment Letter from Tony M. Edwards, Vice President and General Counsel, National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 2-3 (June 6, 1996) [hereinafter NAREIT Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC) (maintaining that real estate investment trusts should not be excluded from the proposal); Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 2 (responding that proposed Rule 135d should be available to all classes of issuers with the exception of blank check and penny stock issuers). But see Comment Letter from Michael S. Caccese, Senior Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary, Association for Investment Management and Research, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 4 (Sept. 8, 1995) [hereinafter AIMR Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC) (finding that the Commission’s “exclusions are appropriate for the reasons set forth in the [Testing] Release”); NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,052-53 (recommending (i) exclusion of “businesses that engage in extractive industries,” and (ii) inclusion of catch-all and bad boy disqualification provisions).
See, e.g., ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 23-24; AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 3, 6-7; Hershner Comment Letter, supra note 486, at 1; NYSBA Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 3-4. NASAA has already indicated its willingness to permit issuers to test the waters before Rule 504 offerings. See supra text accompanying note 324.
5. **Investor Protection**

Some commenters were satisfied that proposed Rule 135d contained enough safeguards to protect investors. For example, the ABA concluded that the threat of liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, the twenty-day waiting period, and cautionary language requirements for the solicitation materials provided prospective investors with sufficient protection. Furthermore, some commenters pointed out that investors would still enjoy protection not only under the regular registration process that would precede a public sale of securities, but also from the documentation distributed before any exempt offering.

Commenters generally approved of the Commission’s decision to require issuers to make only limited disclosures in the solicitation materials while allowing issuers to disseminate any factually accurate information. In light of the deterrent power of the general antifraud provisions, these commenters were not concerned that this would harm investors. Similarly, commenters supported the Commission’s emphasis on permitting dissemination via a wide range of media. In fact, the responses of certain commenters suggest that the proposal may go too far in protecting investors. The NYSBA, for instance, proposed limiting application of the filing requirement to situations where an issuer commences an IPO after testing the waters.

Both the Association for Investment Management and Re-

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498 See, e.g., Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 6-7. The SEC could accomplish such an extension by exempting solicitation materials from Regulation S’s proscription of “directed selling efforts.” Id.

499 See, e.g., ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21-22; AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 3-6; Herschner Comment Letter, supra note 486, at 1; NYSBA Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 1-2; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 3-6.

500 ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21-22.

501 See, e.g., AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 3; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 3.

502 See, e.g., ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 22; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 4. But see AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 4-5 (advocating additional disclosure, but opposing inclusion of highly specific pricing information regarding the offering, unaudited financials, and forward-looking statements).

503 See ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 22; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 4; see also NYSBA Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 2 (supporting the SEC’s decision to rely on the antifraud provisions to protect investors).

504 See, e.g., AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 5; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 5-6.

505 NYSBA Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 3 (contending that “[t]he mere existence of the filing requirement may well negatively impact the desire of private companies, not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC to so subject themselves prior to a determination to have an IPO”).
search ("AIMR"), an international nonprofit organization comprised of more than 50,000 members and candidates employed in investment management, and Sullivan & Cromwell even went so far as to oppose proposed Rule 135d(a)(3)'s requirement that issuers submit a copy of the testing materials to the Commission before they use them to solicit indications of interest.\(^{506}\) AIMR also objected to the proposal's restrictions on the content of the coupon an issuer may include with its soliciting materials.\(^{507}\)

However, as expected, other commenters' concerns regarding the proposal's insufficient protection of investors prompted them to oppose the entire proposal. Reflective of this position was the comment that "the cost to public investors of this proposal far outweighs any benefit to legitimate issuers."\(^{508}\) Many of these concerns echoed those made in response to Rule 254.\(^{509}\) For example, one commenter charged that proposed Rule 135d left investors too vulnerable to fraud and misrepresentation.\(^{510}\) There was also concern that in "permitting IPO issuers to 'condition the market,'" proposed Rule 135d "adversely affects unsophisticated investors."\(^{511}\) The principals of potential issuers, unlike underwriters, generally lack experience in soliciting investors.\(^{512}\) Unfamiliar with federal and state securities laws and eager to promote their offerings, principals may "lack either the experience or self-restraint to ignore the sudden rush of interest in their companies and the opportunity for free advertising."\(^{513}\) Therefore, during the solicitation process, such issuers may illegally sell securities or engage in overreaching and puffing; in short, critics of the proposal believe that issuers who test the waters under proposed Rule 135d may actually be "poisoning the waters."\(^{514}\)

In contrast, NASAA, a vociferous critic of Rule 254's inadequate investor protection, did not reject proposed Rule 135d due to its insufficient investor protection. NASAA submitted a brief comment letter in response to the Testing Release.\(^{515}\) The Association reiterated its support for "the policy of facilitating capital formation by allowing

\(^{506}\) AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 1 n.1, 46; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 5.

\(^{507}\) AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 5.

\(^{508}\) Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 1; see also id. at 2 (concluding that the "proposal should be abandoned as being contrary to the interest of investors and the integrity of the public markets. It is a proposal not worthy of the Commission.").

\(^{509}\) See supra notes 229-58 and accompanying text.

\(^{510}\) See Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 2.

\(^{511}\) Steinberg Comment Letter, supra note 464, at 1.

\(^{512}\) See SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 3-4.

\(^{513}\) Id. at 3.

\(^{514}\) Id.

\(^{515}\) For discussion of NASAA's longer, more acrimonious comment letter submitted in response to the SBIs Release, see supra text accompanying notes 243-47, 278-82.
a company to make an early assessment of the public interest in the purchase of its securities.” However, NASAA added that it “believe[ed] that, at least on the state level, there is a need for a regulatory structure that assures that those who utilize this process are not problematic and those investors that are solicited are not preconditioned to such an extent that the final document is meaningless.” The way to achieve these two elements of investor protection, according to NASAA, was to pattern proposed Rule 135d on the NASAA model rule, which contains safeguards protecting both investors and issuers. After summarizing the key provisions of its model, NASAA concluded that “within the structure of our Model Rule, we believe that expanding the opportunity to ‘test the waters’ beyond Regulation A to registered offering[s] will be beneficial to capital formation and will not compromise investor protection.”

NASAA was thus satisfied with the provisions of proposed Rule 135d that resembled sections of its model rule or comported with its findings after the pilot project. For example, NASAA agreed with the Commission’s decision not to limit what an issuer may disclose in the solicitation materials. Similarly, NASAA reached the same conclusion as the ABA and NYSBA that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws provide investors with adequate protection from fraudulent or misleading solicitations. On the other hand, NASAA suggested ways in which the SEC could further protect investors. For example, the Association advocated that the Commission further restrict who may test the waters in reliance on the Rule. In addition, NASAA recommended that proposed Rule 135d impose restrictions on cold calling, a means of dissemination that, as states in the pilot program discovered, was prone to abuse. NASAA also suggested that the SEC could further protect investors by incorporating a cooling-off period that resembles the seven-day period section (1) (h) of its

516 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,052.
517 Id.
518 Id.; see supra Part III.C.1.
519 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053 (emphasis added).
520 Id.
521 Id.; ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21-22; NYSBA Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 2. Therefore, NASAA, the ABA, and the NYSBA opposed the establishment of section 11 or section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act as the “standard of liability.” Imposition of the higher standard of liability under sections 11 or 12(a)(2) would dramatically increase the cost of testing the waters because an issuer would then certainly want to consult a lawyer before delivering, broadcasting, publishing, or transmitting its solicitation materials. See NYSBA Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 2; infra Part V.F.5.
523 Id. at 13,053; see also Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 2 (recommending a ban on telephone solicitation because of “policing” problems).
model rule prescribes. With respect to extending the testing-the-waters proposal to other exempt offerings, NASAA expressed its willingness to work with the Commission to reach an agreeable solution. On the ground that twenty days was too short a waiting period, NASAA opposed the Commission's proposal that twenty days after an issuer has ceased testing the waters, it could conduct a private placement. NASAA thus had concerns regarding investor protection, but appeared confident that if the Commission followed NASAA's model rule, it could cure the proposal's deficiencies.

6. Coordination

Before the NSMIA, coordination of proposed Rule 135d with blue sky laws was considered essential for the proposal to be effective. NASAA addressed the importance of coordination when it wrote, "We support any move toward making our two rules as uniform as possible. . . ." Nevertheless, a careful reading of NASAA's comment letter suggests that the state securities regulators may not support the proposal unless it incorporates more of the safeguards found in the NASAA model rule.

Following publication of the Testing Release, the SEC began taking measures to align federal and state law with respect to testing the waters. For example, at the annual 1996 Conference on Uniformity of Securities Law attended by representatives of the Commission and NASAA, the testing-the-waters proposal was on the agenda. The conferees were scheduled to discuss how Rule 254 has affected issuers and investors through a "review [of] their experience with amended Regulation A and the use of 'test the waters' documents."

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524 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053. Investors currently have only forty-eight hours to review the prospectus before a broker or dealer is required to mail the confirmation of a sale. See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890 (citing Rule 15c2-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8 (1997)). AIMR also commented that forty-eight hours was insufficient. AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 6.
525 NASA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053.
526 Id.; see also Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 2 (recommending "[a] longer safe harbor, such as three to six months"). For discussion of the SEC's proposal, see supra text accompanying notes 433-34.
527 See, e.g., 3A Bloomenthal, supra note 11, § 6.09, at 6-28. These concerns predated the NSMIA. For a discussion of how the NSMIA obviates most of these concerns, see infra Part V.D.
528 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,052. The Association also stated its amenability to working with the SEC on a possible change to the current prohibitions on general solicitation and advertising under Rules 505 and 506. Id. at 13,053.
529 See supra text accompanying note 519.
531 Id.
D. The Commission's Response

1. A Lengthy Review

In stark contrast to its race to adopt the SBIs,\textsuperscript{532} the SEC has taken its time considering the pros and cons of proposed Rule 135d. Although the comment period ended on September 8, 1995, the SEC continued to accept comment letters submitted much later.\textsuperscript{533} Perhaps the mixed reactions to the proposal have made the SEC hesitant. However, there was an even greater disparity of opinion regarding the SBIs which did not delay the Commission's adoption of Rule 254.\textsuperscript{534}

There are a number of other possible reasons for the Commission's judicious delay in making a determination on testing the waters. While the IPO market has remained strong, its appeal cannot compare to the political pressure which drove the SEC to adopt the SBIs before the 1992 election.\textsuperscript{535} Unlike in 1992, the SEC, through a review of solicitations of interest in reliance on Rule 254, now has the opportunity to assess how testing the waters functions in practice. This has given the Commission a chance to tailor its proposal accordingly, work with NASAA to try to coordinate state securities regulations with the federal rule, and avoid criticism for hastily adopting a controversial proposal.

The controversial nature of the proposal has also contributed to the Commission's protracted review. Proposed Rule 135d is a more controversial proposal than Rule 254, for it directly clashes with section 5(c) of the Securities Act.\textsuperscript{536} Furthermore, the Commission acknowledged in the Testing Release that section 5(c) ties the agency's hands when it comes to rulemaking in connection with prefiling solicitations.\textsuperscript{537} The Commission's defense of its authority to make rules regarding prefiling publicity and its promise to consider other alternatives prompted a scholar to remark that "[i]n proposing Rule 135d with such unusual tentativeness, the Commission seems to be testing the waters itself."\textsuperscript{538}

While this initial tentativeness has endured, the Commission's eagerness to extend testing the waters beyond Regulation A has not relented. The Commission has repeatedly stated that an expansion of testing the waters remains a priority. For example, at a speech in late January 1997, one-and-a-half years after the SEC published the Testing Release, the Chairman of the SEC reiterated: "[W]e should permit

\textsuperscript{532} See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{533} See, e.g., NAREIT Comment Letter, supra note 496 (dated June 6, 1996).
\textsuperscript{534} See Comment Letter File for S7-4-92 (on file with the SEC).
\textsuperscript{535} See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 288.
\textsuperscript{536} See infra Part V.3.
\textsuperscript{537} See supra text accompanying note 459.
\textsuperscript{538} 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 6.09, at 6-30.
some form of 'testing the waters' in more offerings. . . . I don't want to make . . . this sound too easy; as always, the devil is in the details. But I believe that we can and should make progress in [this] . . . area[.] soon."

In addition to wrestling with these details and coordinating them with the states, the Commission has struggled with the issue of its authority. In the past, the SEC has asserted that it would welcome a grant of general "exemptive authority which would make it easier for the Commission to implement . . . the pending 'test-the-waters' proposal." Pursuit of general exemptive authority was undoubtedly a higher priority for the SEC in 1996 than the adoption of the Testing Release.

Enacted in October 1996, the NSMIA has accorded the Commission this general exemptive authority. The SEC can rely on this authority to exempt issuers that test the waters from the section 5 requirements. However, as discussed above, the Commission may exercise this authority only "to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors." The SEC must therefore first establish both of these points, which will require an extensive inquiry. The Commission has not yet invoked its section 28 authority to adopt proposed Rule 135d.

2. The Potential Disarmament of Section 5(c)

The availability of this general exemptive authority may forebode the end of the section 5(c) gun-jumping prohibition. Critics of the gun-jumping prohibition and other scholars have discussed its "obsolescence," "metaphysical" and "hyper-technical" nature, and its potential to lead to inconsistent results. Linda Quinn, former Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, has observed that in the modern age of technology, it may "no longer [be] possible . . . to expect that information flows to investors can be limited effec-

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541 See supra note 226.
542 See Rowe, supra note 226, at 8.
543 NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. II 1996)); see also supra note 226 (discussing the Commission's general exemptive authority).
544 See infra Part V.B-C.
545 See Rowe, supra note 226, at 8.
546 See Coffee, supra note 60, at 1150; Michael McDonough, Comment, Death in One Act: The Case for Company Registration, 24 PERS. L. REV. 563, 598 (1997); Coffee, supra note 464, at B4; see also Chiappinelli, supra note 30 (arguing for the elimination of the gun-jumping prohibition).
548 See McDonough, supra note 546, at 600-02; Backman & Kim, supra note 547, at 18.
The adoption of Rule 254 has ushered in a more liberal SEC attitude towards gun-jumping. As a distinguished scholar in the securities field concluded in September 1995, proposed Rule 135d represents such a radical departure from the Commission's historical prohibition on gun-jumping that it "can be understood only as reflecting an implicit judgment that Sec[tion] 5(c) has become obsolete and imposes regulatory costs in excess of its benefits."

The Commission thus has recently re-evaluated the utility of the gun-jumping prohibition. A July 1996 report by the Advisory Committee on Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes (the "Advisory Committee") further hints that the SEC may be approaching this conclusion. The Advisory Committee Report even suggests that the gun-jumping prohibition may actually harm investors. According to the Advisory Committee,

[Although the gun-jumping doctrine may serve to protect purchasers in the offering by hindering circumvention of the registration requirements, it also may chill or delay the disclosure of some company-related information that is beneficial to the marketplace. The Committee questioned whether the chilling effect of the gun-jumping doctrine serves investor protection when the issuer is required to supply the markets with extensive public disclosures on an ongoing basis through its Exchange Act filings.]

This argument closely resembles the Commission's traditional policy interpretation that the gun-jumping ban necessitates a balancing of the competing interests of encouraging disclosure and protecting investors. The difference is that the tone has changed. The Commission's historical deference to the gun-jumping prohibition appears to have given way to skepticism regarding its value. The testing-the-waters issue has precipitated debate challenging a part of the

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551 See Coffee, supra note 464, at B4; see also McDonough, supra note 546, at 598-601 (agreeing with Professor Coffee's assessment).
552 Coffee, supra note 464, at B6 (commenting that the "SEC is coming to view Sec[tion] 5 as antiquated and possibly an obstacle to efficient capital formation").
554 Id. at 88,444.
555 Id.
556 See supra note 69.
557 See Coffee, supra note 60, at 1149-53 (explaining that even ten years ago, the gun-jumping prohibition was a "[s]tatutory norm[ ]... treated as inviolate," but recently it "has been disrupted by major SEC staff initiatives"); see also McDonough, supra note 546, at 600 (describing section 5(c) as one of the "basic concepts once considered indispensable to the Securities Act").
bedrock of the Securities Act. This debate may ultimately revolutionize the registration process, going far beyond helping small businesses launch registered IPOs.\textsuperscript{558} The SEC has perhaps shelved consideration of proposed Rule 135d until it can adopt the proposal as part of a broader reform of the Securities Act.\textsuperscript{559} The seriousness of this undertaking further explains the SEC’s delay in proceeding with proposed Rule 135d.\textsuperscript{560}

V

RESTORING THE BALANCE—AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TESTING-THE-WATERS PROPOSAL

A. Proposed Rule 135d and Section 5(c)

1. The Authority Issue

Although some observers have questioned the Commission’s authority to adopt proposed Rule 135d,\textsuperscript{561} the language of section 19(a)\textsuperscript{562} of the Securities Act, in effect as of the publication of the Testing Release, suggests that the agency does in fact have such authority.\textsuperscript{563} Section 19(a) grants the Commission the “authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter [the Securities Act], including . . . defining accounting, technical, and trade terms used in this subchapter.”\textsuperscript{564} The statute further provides that “[t]he rules and regulations of the Commission shall be effective upon publication in the manner which the Commission shall prescribe.”\textsuperscript{565} Perhaps one could argue that the proposed rule is not “necessary to carry out the provisions” of the statute. However, as the ABA commented, the SEC has relied in the past on this grant of authority to make rules in which it has defined the terms “offer” and “prospectus.”\textsuperscript{566} Proposed Rule 135d would refine the definition of

\textsuperscript{558} See infra Part V.B.4.
\textsuperscript{559} See infra notes 652-54 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{560} See NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9381.

[F]rom a broader perspective, it strikes us that this proposal may represent a major conceptual change in the Commission’s implementation of the Securities Act by providing for vastly different treatment of offers and sales. While we cannot predict the possible consequences of such a fundamental change, we . . . think the Commission should proceed very carefully in tampering with a regulatory approach which has served us well for almost 60 years.

\textsuperscript{561} See, e.g., 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 6.09, at 6-29 to 6-30.
\textsuperscript{563} Id.
\textsuperscript{564} Id.
\textsuperscript{565} Id.
\textsuperscript{566} ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 22; see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134-230.139 (1997).
"offer" by excluding from the term's scope solicitations of interest made in accordance with the Rule. As Linda Quinn explained, "[T]he authority to define terms under the Securities Act has been used by the Commission over the past sixty years to take communications outside the scope of [s]ection 5 where it believed the basic purposes of the Securities Act would be served."567 This history, in conjunction with the express language of section 19(a), establishes that the Commission possesses the authority to draft and adopt the Rule.

If adopted, proposed Rule 135d, like Rules 135a-c, would enable an issuer that has fully complied with the Rule to disseminate certain prefiling publicity without violating section 5. The Commission's proposal to exclude testing-the-waters activity from the definition of "offer" via the creation of Rule 135d is analytically sound and consistent with how it has previously chosen to legitimize pre-filing publicity under the securities laws.568 Therefore, if adopted, the proposal properly exempts solicitation materials from the requirements of section 5.

Enacted after the publication of the Testing Release, the NSMIA confers further authority on the Commission to adopt proposed Rule 135d. New section 28 of the Securities Act, which grants the SEC general exemptive authority, empowers the Agency to exempt issuers that test the waters from the requirements of section 5(c).569

Furthermore, the SEC has not abused its authority. The Commission has not unilaterally adopted a rule and foisted it upon the public. Rather, it has worked cooperatively to draft a rule that attempts to help issuers, protect investors, and strengthen the capital markets. The extensive comment period and consideration of NASAA's proposal exemplify the Commission's efforts to involve others in the rulemaking process. Demonstrating its careful deliberation, the Commission has still yet to act with respect to the proposal.

2. Epitome of Gun-Jumping

Skepticism as to the Commission's authority to promulgate Rule 135d perhaps arose because of the proposal's far-reaching implications. Soliciting indications of interest before an IPO is precisely the type of conduct that section 5(c) was designed to address. As Part I discussed, the Commission and the courts have interpreted the term "offer" very broadly.570 Section 2(3) "scarcely could define the term 'offer' more broadly than it does."571 For the purposes of section 5,

567 Quinn, supra note 549, at 28.
568 See supra text accompanying notes 566-67.
569 See supra text accompanying notes 542-43.
570 See supra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
571 Coffee, supra note 464, at B4.
the courts and the SEC have construed an "offer" to include prefilling publicity that does not constitute an "express offer," but "contribute[s] to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer." An issuer that tests the waters will not eschew "arousing public interest" in its issue, for a favorable reception to its potential offering is precisely what the issuer desires. It is difficult to conceive of how a well-prepared solicitation via a radio or television advertisement, a cold call, or a personal visit to a prospective investor would not have the effect of at least "conditioning the public mind," if not "arousing public interest." The coupon, which an investor can complete and return to the issuer, memorializes the "arous[al]" of its interest. Therefore, the proposal is inconsistent with section 5(c) of the Securities Act. The Commission clearly lacks the authority to adopt on its own a revision to section 5(c), which would require Congressional approval. The SEC was forced to adopt a testing-the-waters rule by a different avenue.

Furthermore, the current rules and regulations promulgated under the Securities Act do not provide a safe harbor for solicitations of indications of interest before a registered IPO. Rule 135, which allows issuers to publicize certain information without triggering section 5, cannot shield testing-the-waters activities. The testing-the-waters proposal establishes only minimum requirements for the solicitation materials, permitting an issuer to communicate or publicize unlimited information by any means available, including direct contact with investors, as long as the information is factually accurate. This goes far beyond the publicity that Rule 135 permits. Similarly, proposed Rule 135d authorizes an issuer to disseminate prefilling publicity that is much more detailed and potentially more harmful than that permitted under Rules 135a-c.

3. Effective Repeal of Section 5(c)

Therefore, in order to adopt a rule that permits testing-the-waters before registered IPOs, the SEC needed to invoke its rulemaking authority to propose a new exception to the gun-jumping prohibition. The Commission justified this exception on the ground that it would

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572 Publication of Information Release, supra note 34, at 3149.
573 Rule 254, the NASAA model, and proposed Rule 135d all require issuers to make certain disclosures in the solicitation document or scripted broadcasts, but do not limit what they may impart to prospective investors via solicitation documents, broadcasts, or oral communications beyond the requirement of factual accuracy. See Keller Enterprises No-Action Letter, supra note 249, at 78,752 ("Rule 254(b)(2)(iv) does not limit the information that may be included in Rule 254 materials;... [i]nstead, Rule 254(b)(2)(iv) sets forth the minimum amount of information that must be provided.").
574 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
575 See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
576 See supra text accompanying notes 562-64.
help many small businesses unable or unwilling to incur the substantial compliance costs and burdens of conducting a registered IPO without some confidence that its offering will sell.\(^{577}\) Despite the legitimacy of this claim, the broad definition of "offer" in section 2(3), case law, and SEC releases reviewed in Part I reveal that "in the past this rationale would not have justified a rule that amounts to an effective administrative repeal of Sec[tion] 5(c) in the case of IPOs."\(^{578}\)

The problem is that the exception has such broad ramifications that it swallows up the rule codified in section 5(c). The fundamental policy aim of the Securities Act is the protection of investors.\(^{579}\) Therefore, a proper exception to a rule can be justified only (i) if the exception represents a limited intrusion upon the policy underlying the rule or (ii) if the exception is adopted because a competing interest in certain cases justifies trumping the policy behind the rule.

In response to these two justifications for a proper exception to section 5(c), this Note begins with the assumption that the key to securities regulation, and to the success of the securities industry, is the maintenance of the balance between facilitating capital formation and protecting investors.\(^{580}\) Therefore, one must try to assess the proposal's impact on issuers and investors based on an analysis of the proposed rule, as drafted,\(^{581}\) and on the empirical data regarding testing-the-waters activity under Rule 254 and other state-adopted rules.\(^{582}\) If proposed Rule 135d (i) is unlikely to compromise investor protection, and (ii) is likely to effectuate the goal of improving small businesses' access to capital with only a minimal impact on investor protection, it is a proper exception to section 5(c). This Note concludes that testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d, as drafted, does not meet these two criteria. In short, proposed Rule 135d appears to tilt the balance too far in favor of issuers, which is neither a limited intrusion nor a satisfactory result, even if the proposal helps businesses raise capital. Consequently, testing the waters is not an exception to sec-

\(^{577}\) Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,886.

\(^{578}\) Coffee, supra note 464, at B4. For a discussion of how a repeal of section 5(c) to allow testing the waters before registered IPOs may usher in other changes to the registration process, see infra Part V.B.4.

\(^{579}\) See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

\(^{580}\) The SEC believes in the same fundamental assumption. See, e.g., Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,483. As discussed above in Part IV.D.2, there is currently some skepticism with respect to the value of the gun-jumping proscription. The gun-jumping prohibition remains valuable only if it successfully protects investors. Skeptics contend that the ban on gun-jumping may harm investors by denying them access to significant information. See supra text accompanying note 555. Therefore, much like advocates of the gun-jumping prohibition, these skeptics emphasize the importance of this balance; however, they disagree as to the means to achieve it.

\(^{581}\) See infra Part V.B.

\(^{582}\) See infra Part V.C.
tion 5(c), but rather, a repeal of the statute, its related case law, and SEC rules and interpretive positions.583

B. The Impact of the Proposal on Paper

1. Issuers

The value of proposed Rule 135d to issuers varies depending on the nature of the issuer. For example, a large company that has an established customer base and a market following and is contemplating a registered IPO valued at $15 million or higher probably does not need to test the waters.584 Such a company probably already knows the extent to which the market is interested in its IPO. Further, this larger business can engage an underwriter who has experience in ascertaining public interest.585 This company can probably also secure

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583 A possible response to this claim that testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d is irreconcilable with section 5(c) is that the gun-jumping prohibition is obsolete, and therefore unnecessary. See supra note 546 and accompanying text. The Advisory Committee, for example, questioned the benefits to investors of the gun-jumping prohibition. See supra text accompanying notes 554-55. Although an assessment of the value of the prohibition is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to show that this possible response may be infirm, for a determination that the gun-jumping ban is unnecessary does not necessarily translate into support for proposed Rule 135d. A careful reading of the Advisory Committee Report reveals that the Committee and similar skeptics should actually oppose proposed Rule 135d if it inadequately protects investors. The Advisory Committee was concerned that the prohibition may harm investors by "chill[ing] or delay[ing] the disclosure [by issuers] of some company-related information that is beneficial to the marketplace." Advisory Committee Report, supra note 553, at 88,444 (emphasis added). In the Advisory Committee Report, "[t]he Committee unanimously recommend[ed] that the Commission act promptly both to strengthen existing investor safeguards and to reduce the costs of corporate capital formation in the United States." Id. at 88,404 (emphasis added). Therefore, given that the Committee sought to improve investor protection, if proposed Rule 135d lacks enough safeguards that offer this protection, the Committee should oppose the proposal in spite of the likely reduction in the costs of capital formation.

Further, the Advisory Committee Report suggests that the Committee's skepticism largely does not apply to gun-jumping before a registered IPO. The Advisory Committee expressed its skepticism as to the need for the prohibition in light of issuers' mandatory "ongoing" disclosure responsibilities under the Exchange Act. Id. at 88,444. This argument does not apply to gun-jumping prior to a registered IPO because a private company considering a registered IPO is typically not required to comply with the Exchange Act until after the offering. The Advisory Committee Report does not discuss whether testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d represents impermissible gun-jumping because under the Advisory Committee's recommended "company registration" system an eligible issuer is [technically] always in registration, and hence 'gun jumping' in violation of [section] 5(c) simply does not occur." John C. Coffee, Jr., 1933 Act Deregulation: A Guide for the Perplexed, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1996, at 5, 6.

584 See Stephen I. Glover, In Proposals Designed for Small Businesses, the SEC Would Permit Issuers to 'Test the Waters' and Would Shorten Holding Periods for Restricted Securities, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 21, 1995, at B6; see also ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21 (explaining that issuers that can now obtain "a firm commitment from a responsible underwriter" will probably not use Rule 135d).

585 See Glover, supra note 584. For a discussion of the advantages of hiring an underwriter, see supra text accompanying notes 474-78.
a firm commitment underwriting whereby the underwriter agrees to buy the stock and resell it to the public.586

The proposal may also be unnecessary for a large private company with institutional shareholders because the company itself may be able to measure the likely appeal of a potential offering to these and other prospective institutional investors.587 Indications of interest by institutional investors are significant because such investors generally purchase the vast majority of the stock offered in an IPO.588 In addition, if a small company intends to conduct a larger IPO, then the company may be able to attract an underwriter if there is a strong likelihood that the offering will sell. As a rule of thumb, as a company’s chances of engaging an underwriter increases, the necessity for testing the waters decreases.

Nevertheless, a company that can attract an underwriter may still want to test the waters before it invests considerable time and resources into planning to go public. For example, a business may want to test the waters among its customers and current private shareholders before shopping for an underwriter. If they do not express interest, the market is likely to be uninterested as well. In the case of a best efforts underwriting, a company would surely benefit from soliciting indications of interest in reliance on proposed Rule 135d because an underwriter is not obligated to sell the securities unless it finds enough purchasers to buy either all of the securities or an amount set forth in the underwriting agreement. The results of testing the waters may also give the company a comparative basis for evaluating the underwriter’s views regarding market interest in an offering. In addition, if a company has tested the waters and received promising indications of interest, it may be able to negotiate a lower underwriting commission.

The proposal should be extremely helpful to a smaller company, lacking a market, that wants to avail itself of the advantages of going public.590 Regulation A, which exempts offerings up to only $5 million, is of limited use to small businesses.591 Rule 254 currently forces a small business to choose between either testing the waters and conducting an inadequately small offering, or depriving itself of the opportunity to test the waters and conducting an expensive, registered

586 See supra notes 489-90 and accompanying text.
587 See Elgin, supra note 479, at 14.
588 See Coffee, supra note 464; Zweig & Spiro, supra note 25, at 84 (reporting that institutions have the opportunity to purchase nearly sixty percent of the garden variety IPO, and around eighty percent of a “hot deal”).
589 See ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21.
590 See Glover, supra note 584. For discussion regarding these advantages, see supra text accompanying notes 79-88.
591 See supra text accompanying notes 222-26.
IPO that may prove unsuccessful. Rule 254 thus greatly restricts a small business's opportunity to test the waters.

Registration is very expensive and burdensome for small businesses. Testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d should help a company make a cost-effective decision whether to take itself public. This is especially important because IPOs above Regulation A's ceiling of $5 million, but below $10 million are often too small to attract underwriters, particularly larger ones with established reputations. As a result, a company may consider self-underwriting the offering. Testing the waters should help a small company decide whether to proceed with a self-underwritten IPO, which is an exceedingly difficult undertaking for a small company. If a company does consummate a self-underwritten IPO, the stock may ultimately underperform because it "is likely to lack professional sponsorship in the financial community and may have a weak or inactive aftermarket." Alternatively, testing the waters may help those small businesses that are unable to engage an underwriter and intending to self-underwrite, because a favorable response may play a role in convincing an underwriter to sell the offering. In addition, a positive response to a company's testing-the-waters efforts may enable it to enlist the aid of a venture capital firm. Underwriters should be more willing to sell an IPO to which a venture capital firm has committed.

The argument that proposed Rule 135d is unnecessary because underwriters are available to evaluate market interest thus does not pass muster. As discussed above, even a company capable of engaging an underwriter may still wish to test the waters. Moreover, many small companies, which would benefit from underwriters' assistance, will be unable to secure the services of an underwriter. Principals of a business may lack the expertise to determine whether its IPO would sell; however, if a company cannot attract an underwriter, it has no choice but to try to test the waters itself. Similarly, the position that proposed Rule 135d would help only companies contemplating marginal offerings that are not worthy of the capital markets is untenable. This reasoning presupposes that any issue an underwriter does not agree to underwrite is marginal and ill-suited for the market. This generaliza-

592 See supra Part II.B.1.
593 See supra text accompanying note 223.
594 See Elgin, supra note 479, at 17.
595 SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 10.
596 See 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-67 (discussing how Rule 254 may help an issuer attract an underwriter); Elgin, supra note 479, at 17 (quoting a lawyer with IPO expertise who commented, "Testing the waters could help, but the key is still finding an underwriter").
597 See, e.g., SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 3-4.
598 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 470; Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 1.
tion, if taken to its logical conclusion, leads to the inequitable result that issuers unable to engage underwriters should not receive assistance to conduct registered IPOs.

Testing the waters should help both potential issuers, that is, businesses that do not proceed with a registered IPO, and actual issuers, which represent businesses that do. A potential issuer of any size benefits tremendously when it tests the waters under proposed Rule 135d and concludes, due to a poor response to its solicitation efforts, that it should not commence an IPO. The potential issuer has spent relatively little money to test the waters, and saved considerable time and money by deciding not to expend resources on an IPO with dubious prospects. If the SEC repeals the general solicitation prohibition, it will pave the road for an issuer to use the information it gains from testing the waters to offer securities pursuant to Rules 505 and 506. There are also the intangible benefits of communicating with current private shareholders, customers, and institutional investors. A company that tests the waters may learn where it has disappointed shareholders or customers, enabling it to improve its operations. Further, the company may take advantage of such input to restructure the offering so that it appeals to potential investors.

An issuer that decides to proceed with an IPO would similarly profit from proposed Rule 135d. As a result of its testing-the-waters activities, an issuer can conduct a better cost-benefit analysis in considering whether to proceed with a registered IPO. Testing the waters may give an issuer the confidence it needs before commencing a registered IPO. As discussed earlier, a positive response to the issuer's solicitations may enable it to engage an underwriter or improve its bargaining power with an underwriter. Furthermore, testing the waters should help the underwriter (or the issuer in the case of a self-underwriting) to sell the securities more efficiently. The solicitation process and, in particular, the coupons interested investors return, should provide the issuer with a list of prospective investors who are already familiar with, and interested in, the offering. In addition, communicating with prospective investors may help an issuer or underwriter to price the offering and to determine the appropriate size of the offering. Finally, like potential issuers, actual issuers enjoy

599 See supra text accompanying notes 427-30.
600 The Commission's determinations on the issue of integration and solicitation affect this potential opportunity. In its comment letter, the ABA looks forward to the opportunity when issuers can discuss the various ways to structure the offering with investors: "Particularly if the integration/general solicitation problem . . . is dealt with, it would permit issuers to engage in discussions with prospective institutional investors to determine whether a public offering, Rule 144A transaction, offshore sale or conventional private placement would make the most sense." ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21.
601 See Elgin, supra note 479, at 14.
the intangible benefits of communication with private shareholders, customers, and institutional investors.

In sum, businesses that lack an established market need a testing-the-waters rule to determine whether it is in their economic self-interest to undertake a registered IPO. Proposed Rule 135d was designed to, and should succeed in, giving many more issuers access to public markets, thereby raising much needed capital more cost-effectively. Proposed Rule 135d expands upon the inadequate utility of Rule 254 by permitting foreign and domestic businesses of all sizes to test the waters. In addition, the proposed amendments to Rule 254 will enable more issuers to test the waters before a Regulation A offering. The proposal, as drafted, gives the prospective issuer substantial flexibility in determining how to test the waters. Moreover, the Commission insulated issuers by prescribing the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws as the "standard of liability" rather than section 11 or 12(a)(2) liability. Compliance with the proposed rule imposes minimal burdens and costs on a prospective issuer. In short, proposed Rule 135d goes to great lengths to help issuers.

2. Underwriters

Underwriters' concerns regarding proposed Rule 135d clarify the Rule's potential impact on both issuers and investors. Investment bankers conveyed opposition to proposed Rule 135d before the Commission even published the Testing Release. The SIA comment letter suggests that underwriters are concerned that principals of companies, inexperienced in measuring the interest of the market, will be unable to test the waters accurately. Additionally, because of their eagerness to go public, these principals may find it difficult to be objective in assessing the level of investor interest. A solicitant may mistake potential interest for definite interest. Owners and managers of small businesses, unlike professional underwriters, are also typically unfamiliar with the numerous federal and state securities regulations with which they must comply. As a result of such an issuer's inability to test the waters with accuracy and objectivity, companies will decide whether to proceed with a registered IPO on the basis of possibly unreliable information. This may lead to unsuccessful offerings. If a company solicits indications of interest and fails to comply with a requirement of proposed Rule 135d or violates a securities law, it may

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602 See NYSBA Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 1.
603 Id.
604 See supra text accompanying note 399.
605 See Toward Model for Company Registration, supra note 456, at 709.
606 SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 5-4.
607 See id. at 4.
608 See id.
forfeit the opportunity to rely on the Rule or expose itself to substantial liability.

These concerns also shed light on the impact the proposal may have on investors. Unsophisticated investors are at the mercy of companies that test the waters, especially by means of cold calls or personal visits. The risk that an investor will suffer from puffing or overreaching at the hands of a company testing the waters is much higher than if a professional underwriter is testing the market. An issuer’s failure to comply with the Rule or other securities laws not only subjects the issuer to liability, but also exposes investors to fraud and misrepresentation. Investors may also lose in the long run. Consider a situation where the principals of a business have tested the waters, but solicited an insufficient number of prospective investors, focused only on individual investors rather than institutional investors, misconstrued the responses to the solicitation, or exaggerated the level of investor interest. Assume that these deficiencies in the solicitation process were careless or unintentional errors, reflecting only the inexperience or overeagerness of the solicitant. The company then proceeds with a self-underwritten (or perhaps even a best efforts underwritten) registered IPO on the basis of the response to its solicitations. The stock of the company may not sell, which would drive the price down, thus hurting investors who have already purchased shares. This may lead to “a dilution of confidence in capital markets.”

Proposed Rule 135d may have a limited effect on underwriters. A potential issuer will typically rely on an underwriter to prepare and sell the IPO if the issuer can engage one. In most cases, underwriters will still conduct their own analyses regarding market interest in light of the “no consummation, no compensation” industry practice. Therefore, an issuer’s testing-the-waters activity may at best supplement an underwriter’s analysis of investor interest. Although underwriters may be unhappy about competing with entrepreneurs over assessing market interest, they will not free ride on the results potential issuers report. This should better protect both issuers and investors because the combination of the results from an issuer’s testing-the-waters measures and an underwriter’s analysis is more likely to lead to an accurate determination of market interest than an underwriter’s analysis alone. If a potential issuer’s testing-the-waters efforts enable it to engage an underwriter, proposed Rule 135d benefits underwriters.

On the other hand, underwriters may suffer to a minor extent from proposed Rule 135d. It is possible that the proposal will lead to

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609 Id.
610 Id. at 3.
a greater number of self-underwritten offerings, if companies gain confidence in their ability to solicit indications of interest with accuracy. If many of these self-underwritten offerings are in fact ill-advised, then the greater number of failures of such IPOs may decrease confidence in the capital markets. This development, in turn, may harm underwriters. Further, if the proposal leads to a series of failed offerings, the fear of a failed offering may dissuade companies from conducting registered IPOs that would require the services of underwriters. Alternatively, unsuccessful self-underwritten offerings that follow testing the waters may encourage other issuers to engage underwriters.

Absent a testing-the-waters rule for registered IPOs, companies turn to underwriters or other professionals with similar expertise to determine market interest. Proposed Rule 135d gives issuers the opportunity to compete with underwriters in this evaluation. It would seem that underwriters’ vast resources and experience would ensure that they are better equipped to gauge investor interest. However, in the case of a small business without a market, it is conceivable that the company’s communications with its private shareholders and customers may yield accurate results. Underwriters’ techniques for determining if an IPO will sell may be ill-suited to smaller offerings or offerings by companies in particular industries. Therefore, companies that test the waters under proposed Rule 135d may alter the current practices of underwriters. In sum, these possible effects on underwriters are somewhat attenuated; however, recognition of these effects highlights how the proposal may neither satisfy issuers nor investors.

3. Investors

A testing-the-waters rule necessitates some compromise of investor protection. Nevertheless, the Commission, in drafting proposed Rule 135d, attempted to avoid this compromise. Throughout the Testing Release, the Commission explained that it sought to maintain investor protection. Nonetheless, while the proposal provides investors with greater protection than Rule 254, it still leaves them too vulnerable.

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611 For a recommendation that the Commission follow the ABA’s suggestion to add language to the Rule that would expressly permit underwriters to test the waters on an issuer’s behalf, see infra Part V.F.3. If the final rule does permit underwriters to test the waters for issuers, underwriters will certainly benefit from both the additional business and the higher likelihood of a successful offering.

612 See, e.g., Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,886 (reiterating that “[i]n considering whether to provide a ‘test the waters’ process for registered IPO’s [sic], the Commission is committed to assuring that the interests of investors are not compromised”); id. at 86,890 (seeking comment on “whether the proposed . . . rule is . . . in investors’ interest in the context of registered IPOs”); id. at 86,892 (reiterating that the Commission designed the rule with an eye towards “not sacrificing investor protection”).
For example, proposed Rule 135d improved upon Rule 254's provision of investor protection by introducing a full compliance standard.\textsuperscript{613} The full compliance standard protects investors because it forces issuers to comply with the existing safeguards.

There are additional potential benefits to investors. Potential investors, including customers, private shareholders, and institutional investors, will learn of investment opportunities before the rest of the market. Although the public can inspect the solicitation document or script of the broadcast submitted to the SEC, oral communications with issuers may help solicited investors become aware of more valuable information. As a result, they may be in a better position to evaluate the offering's appeal. This is especially beneficial if the IPO looks destined to be a hot deal. In addition, if an investor returns a coupon to the issuer, he or she may have a better opportunity to purchase shares once the securities are offered.\textsuperscript{614} Although, as mentioned previously, institutional investors purchase most of the shares offered in a registered IPO,\textsuperscript{615} a completed coupon may help an individual investor buy into the offering.

Furthermore, the solicitation process may enable prospective investors to influence the price and structure of the offering.\textsuperscript{616} This is particularly true in the case of institutional investors. After consulting with prospective institutional investors, an issuer may adjust the price and structure of the offering in order to cater to the preferences of interested investors. Current private shareholders and customers may benefit from the opportunity for increased interaction with management. In explaining the reasons for their interest or lack of interest in a registered IPO, shareholders and customers may induce the company to make changes that help them.\textsuperscript{617}

Despite these potential benefits, proposed Rule 135d is more likely to harm investors. Because the proposal is modelled on Rule 254, many of the potentially harmful effects on investors will sound familiar.\textsuperscript{618} Issuers will solicit individuals, some of whom will be unsophisticated investors. These investors are those whom the SEC is primarily concerned with protecting. The susceptibility of unsophisticated investors is even greater in the case of an IPO where business owners or managers, who may also be somewhat unsophisti-
Solicitants may also lack familiarity with securities laws designed to protect investors. In fact, there is a genuine danger that the individuals who test the waters on behalf of potential issuers will sell the securities to investors. Of course, this would directly violate section 5 because the solicitant will have sold the securities in advance of the effective date of a registration statement.

Nearly every provision of proposed Rule 135d that benefits issuers has a potentially harmful concomitant effect on investors. For example, the proposal's high level of accessibility to issuers may be detrimental to investors. The SEC could have further shielded investors by incorporating a bad boy disqualification provision. Further, the tone of the Testing Release and the comments thereto suggest that the Commission may wish to extend testing-the-waters privileges to issuers contemplating Regulation D and other exempt offerings. In the case of a Rule 504 offering, for instance, a potential issuer will often solicit unsophisticated individual investors. Such investors are more susceptible to overreaching and puffing.

In addition, the flexibility of the proposed rule, while advantageous to issuers, may hurt investors. During the solicitation process, issuers may make any accurate statement. Extremely optimistic projections, for example, may not constitute a materially inaccurate or misleading statement that triggers antifraud liability. Therefore, there is the danger that those who test the waters "will unduly hype the issuer ... or [engage in] ... other abusive practices." The danger is that "allowing the issuer to attempt to pre-sell the deal invests enormous discretion in the one participant (the issuer) who is exempt from the suitability and other self-regulatory standards of the NASD and the stock exchanges, but who has the greatest incentive to cheat."

Moreover, proposed Rule 135d(a)(2) requires only very limited disclosure. In most cases, investors will have very little information to review in determining whether they are interested. The proposal

See supra text accompanying notes 512-14.
See Hearings on H.R. 2981, supra note 102, at 48; supra text accompanying note 513.
See supra text accompanying note 514.
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.262 (1997); NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2542; infra Part V.F.3.
See supra text accompanying note 247.
See supra text accompanying notes 392-98.
But see Advisory Committee Report, supra note 553, at 88,448 n.43 (conveying the sentiment of a Committee member who is "'thoroughly convinced that a one-page pro-
also accords issuers substantial flexibility as to the means by which they may test the waters. Unsophisticated investors are especially vulnerable when they receive cold calls or personal visits, which the proposal permits. The SEC did not limit what an issuer may communicate in a solicitation by telephone or in person. In addition, when an issuer tests the waters via a cold call or a personal visit, investors will usually not have a copy of the submitted testing materials to review during or after such a solicitation.

As discussed above, in order to provide the maximum benefit to issuers, the proposal imposes minimal burdens and costs on an issuer seeking to test the waters. Once again, this benefit is at the expense of investor protection. For example, proposed Rule 135d(a)(3) requires the issuer to submit a copy of the solicitation materials only to the SEC. It does not require the issuer to "officially file[ ]" the materials with the Commission. Further, the proposal does not require the SEC to review the solicitation materials before an issuer utilizes them to solicit indications of interest. In fact, an issuer may wait to submit a copy to the Commission until the first day on which it uses the materials to test the waters. In addition, given that the proposed rule requires an issuer to submit only materials that are substantively different from those submitted in the past, there is an even greater chance that the SEC staff will not review the testing materials. In the absence of Commission review, an investor thus has little assurance, other than the threat of liability for fraud under the securities laws, that the materials are accurate or complete. The fact that an issuer need not deliver a copy of the solicitation document to a prospective investor whom it solicits compounds the problem. Investors thus may not have anything in writing to review. Moreover, an individual investor is unlikely to inspect a copy of the materials submitted to the Commission.

spectus would actually give investors more information and more protection and not less").

630 See supra text accompanying notes 414-15.
631 The proposal also prescribes somewhat different disclosure requirements for written solicitation materials than for oral communications. See SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 4-5.
632 The proposed rule requires only that the issuer submit the written solicitation materials to the Commission to be available for public inspection. See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,889 & n.38.
633 See supra Part V.B.1.
634 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(3)).
635 Id. at 86,889 n.38 (emphasis added).
636 See id. at 86,888.
637 See id. at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(3)).
638 See supra text accompanying note 408.
639 See supra text accompanying notes 250-51 (discussing the solicitation materials in connection with Rule 254); supra notes 403, 632 and accompanying text.
The proposal also fails to fully protect investors after the issuer has tested the waters. Proposed Rule 135d(a)(5) protects investors by precluding an issuer from testing the waters after it has filed a registration statement. However, NASAA's concern regarding the cooling-off period between the final solicitation and the date on which an issuer can commence sales under Rule 254 also applies to proposed Rule 135d. The current proposal provides that an issuer must wait twenty calendar days after its final publication or delivery of solicitation materials before it can sell the securities. Although oral communications probably pose the greatest danger to investors, proposed Rule 135d(a)(6) addresses only "publication or delivery," seemingly not requiring issuers to wait twenty days after oral testing-the-waters solicitations. This omission in the cooling-off period provision increases the chances that an investor will decide whether to purchase securities on the basis of the issuer's oral representations.

Finally, the prescription of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws as the standard of liability ultimately compromises investor protection because of the difficulties confronting plaintiffs that seek to bring a Rule 10b-5 private action. By removing testing materials from the section 2(10) definition of a prospectus, proposed Rule 135d(c) insulates issuers from liability under section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Only the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws would protect investors. Imposition of liability under section 12(a)(2) might dissuade issuers from testing the waters without consulting with lawyers. Although this heightened standard would deter issuers from testing the waters, it would also reduce the likelihood of fraudulent, misrepresentative, or incomplete statements in the testing materials. Once again, there is a tradeoff.

These individual concerns regarding insufficient investor protection add up to the larger fear that investors will not read the prospectus, and specifically, the mandatory disclosure within it. The sales-oriented prefiling solicitation, which is designed to capture a potential investor's interest, in conjunction with the short forty-eight hour period reserved for investors to read the prospectus before brokers or dealers must mail a confirmation of sale, increases the danger that investors will disregard the prospectus. The drafters of the Securities

640 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(5)).
641 See supra text accompanying notes 252-54.
642 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(6)).
643 Id.
644 See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
645 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,889, 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(c)).
646 See Coffee, supra note 60, at 1153.
Act intended for section 5(c) to prevent this very result. Proposition Rule 135d thus "represents a major retreat from the old orthodoxy, which insisted that the prospectus be the only selling document that the investor saw prior to the effectiveness of the registration statement." If adopted, the proposal "seems likely to convert the prospectus into little more than a memento of the transaction." The ultimate concern is that investors will decide to purchase securities based on the issuer's sales-oriented prefiling solicitations rather than on a careful reading of the prospectus. If investors rely on prefiling solicitations, investors may be more susceptible to fraud and misrepresentation.

The foregoing discussion is not intended to suggest that the Commission modify every provision of the Rule that might harm investors. This would of course dissuade issuers from testing the waters. Rather, the foregoing assessment demonstrates that, in its current form, the proposal goes too far in sacrificing investor protection.

4. The Registration Process—A Slippery Slope

The proposal will not change the current registration process for a registered IPO. The Commission reassured the public in the Testing Release that the proposal would preserve all of the safeguards that protect investors during full or short form registration. This assurance rests on a key assumption: the investor will read the prospectus.

Nevertheless, the SEC is currently re-evaluating the relevance of the Securities Act, and appears to be leaning towards further deregulation of the registration process. For example, the Advisory Com-

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647 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
648 Coffee, supra note 60, at 1153.
649 Coffee, supra note 583, at 6.
650 For example, this Note argues that the Commission adopted the proper standard of liability even though it does not protect investors as well as sections 11 or 12(a) (2). See infra Part V.F.5.
651 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890; AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 3.
652 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890. According to the SEC, [the] proposal[,] would not alter the type and amount of information available to investors in connection with an IPO. Issuers making use of the proposed "test the waters" procedure would continue to be subject to all the current IPO disclosure requirements, and IPO registration statements would continue to be subject to Commission staff review if the issuer determined to proceed with a registered offering after soliciting investor interest.

Id.

mittee recommended to the Commission the development of “a company-based registration system” that would dramatically change the registration process.\(^{654}\) This system would include, among other things, the elimination of the section 5(b)(2) prospectus delivery requirement.\(^{655}\) Proposed Rule 135d, if adopted, may be the first step towards further deregulation.

Although currently applicable only to registered IPOs, the Commission may ultimately extend testing-the-waters privileges under proposed Rule 135d to other issuers. In the Testing Release, the SEC already considered allowing a Regulation D issuer to test the waters.\(^{656}\) In the future, the Commission may permit any issuer contemplating a public offering to test the waters. For example, a small issuer, that went public in 1998 with relatively few shareholders and a very specialized practice may wish to access the public markets again some years later. Such a company may have difficulty assessing market interest. Therefore, the Commission may decide to allow it to test the waters.

The Commission thus may be proceeding down a slippery slope. With proposed Rule 135d, the SEC has begun chiseling away at the safeguards that the registration process currently provides to protect investors. The testing-the-waters proposal, as drafted, effectively repeals section 5(c) because it permits issuers to “offer” securities before filing a registration statement.\(^{657}\) A relaxation or elimination of the prospectus delivery requirement, which protects investors after an issuer has filed a registration statement during the waiting period, may follow. Such deregulation is more likely after the NSMIA. The grant of general exemptive authority and the authority to preempt state regulation of many securities offerings\(^{658}\) will enable the Commission to further deregulate the registration process for not only registered IPOs, but all public offerings.

5. Capital Markets

Proposed Rule 135d should benefit the capital markets to the extent issuers rely on the Rule and properly assess market interest while distributing accurate information to investors. The proposal should “prove beneficial to the capital raising markets due to the increased

\(^{654}\) Advisory Committee Report, supra note 553; Coffee, supra note 60, at 1144; McDonough, supra note 546; Coffee, supra note 583; Quinn, supra note 549.

\(^{655}\) Advisory Committee Report, supra note 553, at 88,404.

\(^{656}\) See id. at 88,447-48. The Fields Bill also contained legislation that would, in effect, end the prospectus delivery requirements under the Securities Act. Fields Bill, supra note 226, at 25-26.

\(^{657}\) See supra text accompanying note 623.

\(^{658}\) See supra Part V.A.3.

\(^{658}\) See supra note 226; supra Part III.C.3.
efficiency that ought to follow its utilization."\textsuperscript{659} If an issuer tests the waters and consummates a successful registered IPO, the capital markets have matched legitimate issuers with interested investors. The public markets benefit from the increase in investor confidence. Investors may in turn invest more money in the stock market. In addition, successful IPOs encourage other issuers to pursue this avenue of raising capital.\textsuperscript{660} In "potentially opening up those markets to more risk averse entities,"\textsuperscript{661} the proposal may help startups in important growth industries such as technology to raise capital. This provides the public with a wider array of investment opportunities.

Even if a business decides, as a result of unenthusiastic investor response, not to conduct a registered IPO, the capital markets benefit. A company that cannot drum up interest among its customers and private shareholders is unlikely to enjoy greater success with outside investors. Therefore, proposed Rule 135d may prevent companies that are not ready for a registered IPO from attempting to raise capital via this route, filtering out poor offerings that ultimately may hurt the health of the capital markets.

Consequently, if the proposal fails to filter out inferior offerings, the capital markets may suffer.\textsuperscript{662} If a company tests the waters, erroneously concludes that the market is interested in its offering, and then proceeds to offer the securities, this may lead to an unpopular offering that harms the capital markets. Further, if an issuer misrepresents information in its solicitation materials and purchasers invest in reliance on the issuer's representations and incur substantial losses, investor confidence in public markets deteriorates.\textsuperscript{663} As Congress explained in 1980, "'reform' that results in undermining investor confidence in the integrity of the marketplace would have an effect precisely the opposite of its intended benefits on capital formation."\textsuperscript{664} Pervasive fraud surrounding the capital markets "hurt[s] issuers every bit as much as investors."\textsuperscript{665} The impact of the proposal on capital markets is thus largely a product of how well the Commission balances issuers' needs with investors' needs. If the Commission balances these respective interests, the capital markets will benefit from the facilitation of capital raising. However, given that the proposal appears to compromise investor protection, it may harm these markets.

\textsuperscript{659} NYSBA Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 487, at 1.
\textsuperscript{660} See \textit{supra} notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{661} NYSBA Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 487, at 1.
\textsuperscript{662} See SIA Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 472, at 4.
\textsuperscript{663} See \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{664} S. REP. No. 96-958, at 5 (1980).
\textsuperscript{665} NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, \textit{supra} note 18, at 9374.
6. **Synthesis**

Businesses, especially smaller enterprises, need the opportunity to test the waters. Proposed Rule 135d, on paper, appears likely to achieve its objective of enabling businesses to determine cost-effectively market interest in a registered IPO. This will improve access to the capital markets and facilitate the raising of capital. However, the proposal, as drafted, does not go far enough to ensure achievement of the second objective, namely, that the proposal must not "caus[e] investors to overlook the full disclosures mandated by the federal securities laws."\(^{666}\)

C. The Impact of the Proposal in Light of Experience Under Rule 254 and Other Testing-the-Waters Rules

The above analysis of the proposal’s "on paper" impact on issuers and investors represents only half of the requisite analysis. Since August 1992, small businesses have had the opportunity to test the waters in reliance on Rule 254. Similarly, several states have adopted or experimented with various testing-the-waters rules. Some states have adopted rules that conform to Rule 254, while others follow the NASAA model, and still others have rules that differ from both.\(^{667}\) Proposed Rule 135d closely resembles Rule 254. In order to properly assess the impact of proposed Rule 135d, the Commission must evaluate the impact Rule 254 and state-adopted testing-the-waters procedures have had on issuers and investors.\(^{668}\)

I. **Postponement of Decision**

The Commission should not adopt a testing-the-waters rule until at least the end of 1997. This would afford the SEC, NASAA, and the states the opportunity to assess the impact of Rule 254 on issuers and investors over a five year period.

2. **Review of the Empirical Data**

Responses to the proposal suggest that businesses approve of the testing-the-waters rule.\(^{669}\) However, as of the Testing Release, relatively few small businesses had tested the waters either under Rule 254

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\(^{666}\) Testing Release, *supra* note 8, at 86,890.

\(^{667}\) See *supra* notes 273-75, 327-33 and accompanying text.

\(^{668}\) See *supra* notes 327-33 and accompanying text. The SEC should also assess to what extent the "general announcement" provision of section 25102(n) of California's Corporations Code has helped issuers, and whether it has undermined investor protection. See *supra* note 330. A study of its impact after the SEC's adoption of Rule 1001 in May 1996 may be especially insightful. See *supra* note 330.

In contrast to the SEC, NASAA at least recognized the insufficiency of the data. The benefits may be insufficient to justify the extension of testing the waters because so few businesses have availed themselves of it so far. There may be important reasons why more small businesses have not relied on Rule 254, which, on paper, appears very appealing for small businesses.

There is little information available to the public to explain why Rule 254 "has generated only a lukewarm response." Perhaps the lack of coordination of state securities laws with the federal Rule has precluded many small businesses from relying on Rule 254. Perhaps the Commission needs to market the availability of the Rule to small businesses. The Commission designed the Rule so that small business owners do not need to retain lawyers to solicit indications of interest. As a result, it is probable that most small business owners are unaware of the opportunity. The SEC must identify the reasons for Rule 254's unpopularity because the same reasons may discourage businesses from using proposed Rule 135d. If few issuers similarly rely on proposed Rule 135d, the potential risks to investors are difficult to justify.

In addition, the Commission should attempt to determine if businesses relying on Rule 254 were able to assess market interest with accuracy. This determination includes the very important assessment of whether testing the waters under Rule 254 dissuaded issuers from an offering that was likely to be unsuccessful. A proper appraisal of Rule 254's impact on issuers must go beyond an analysis of the rule "on paper," which suggests that Rule 254 should have helped more businesses.

The Commission must also attempt to better ascertain how Rule 254 and the states' testing-the-waters rules have affected investors. The SEC must probe deeper to learn if investors have suffered as a result of testing the waters. The Commission has apparently acknowledged that businesses that have tested the waters have engaged in an unexpectedly high amount of "'puffing.'" Investors can easily...
suffer as a result of such conduct. If the Commission concludes that prefiling solicitations under Rule 254 leave investors too vulnerable to fraud or misrepresentation or that they tend to supplant the offering circular as the controlling basis for purchasing securities, it must add further safeguards.

3. Method

The Commission can obtain the foregoing types of information only through careful cooperation with NASAA, state securities regulators, small businesses, and investors. The Commission should establish a committee with the responsibility of assessing the impact of Rule 254 on issuers and investors for the purposes of revising or adopting proposed Rule 135d. The Commission already moved in this direction when representatives of the SEC and NASAA discussed their reactions to testing the waters in April 1996 at the Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securities Law.\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 530-31.} The committee's objective would be to recommend a proposal that would best enable issuers to solicit indications of interest with accuracy with the least threat to investor protection.

4. Summary

The SEC should not adopt a testing-the-waters rule that applies to registered IPOs until it has scrupulously examined the empirical data regarding the various testing-the-waters rules.\footnote{Once again, the SEC should also review data regarding issuers' and investors' experiences under the California exemption. See supra note 330.} By the end of 1997, the Commission will have two more years of additional data to review. Until the SEC establishes the adequacy of Rule 254's safeguards, it should err on the side of investor protection.

In fact, in order to invoke its general exemptive authority under new section 28 of the Securities Act to exempt testing the waters before registered IPOs from the section 5 requirements, the Commission must demonstrate not only "that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest," but also that it "is consistent with the protection of investors."\footnote{NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. II 1996)).} Therefore, the SEC should continue to resist the temptation to exercise this authority with respect to proposed Rule 135d until it has conducted a review approximating that outlined above.

For now, the proposal appears "appropriate in the public interest." However, it would seem that proposed Rule 135d does not go far enough beyond Rule 254 to ensure investor protection.

\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 530-31.}
\footnote{Once again, the SEC should also review data regarding issuers' and investors' experiences under the California exemption. See supra note 330.}
\footnote{NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. II 1996)).}
D. The Coordination Problem Revisited in Light of the NSMIA

As with Rule 254, there has been concern that a lack of coordination with state securities laws may render proposed Rule 135d ineffective.\textsuperscript{680} One authority maintains that the success of a testing-the-waters rule for registered IPOs is contingent on "the cooperation of NASAA and the blue sky administrators, or preemptive legislation from Congress."\textsuperscript{681} In its comment letter, NASAA indicated its support for a testing-the-waters rule for registered IPOs, but one that conformed to its model.\textsuperscript{682} Despite the SEC's efforts to fulfill its responsibilities under section 19(c) of the Securities Act,\textsuperscript{683} the two sides still stand apart.

The NSMIA constitutes the aforementioned "preemptive legislation."\textsuperscript{684} Under new section 18(a)(1)(B), no state securities "law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action . . . requiring, or with respect to, registration or qualification of securities . . . or . . . securities transactions . . . shall directly or indirectly apply to a security that . . . will be a covered security upon completion of the transaction."\textsuperscript{685} Securities offered in a registered IPO will usually represent "covered securit\[ies\] upon completion of the transaction." After the completion of a registered IPO, the securities will typically fall within the first level of the definition of covered securities: securities that an issuer lists, or is authorized to list, on the New York or American Stock Exchanges, the NASDAQ National Market System, or a national securities exchange with equivalent listing criteria.\textsuperscript{686} Therefore, federal securities regulations preempt state regulations that apply to securities offered in a registered IPO that are to be listed, or authorized to be listed, on a national securities exchange, as required by section 18(b)(1).

While the NSMIA does not preempt state securities laws regarding testing the waters before a Regulation A offering,\textsuperscript{687} it thus resolves the coordination problem with respect to proposed Rule 135d. Nevertheless, the Commission should still seek the support of NASAA and the states. To the extent that states are in favor of proposed Rule 135d, more issuers are likely to avail themselves of the opportunity to test the waters. Opposition from the states could undermine the full

\textsuperscript{680} See 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 6.09, at 6-28.
\textsuperscript{681} Id.
\textsuperscript{682} See supra text accompanying note 519; see also supra Part III.C.1 (comparing NASAA's model rule with Rule 254); supra Part IV.B.4 (comparing NASAA's model rule with proposed Rule 135d).
\textsuperscript{683} See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{684} See supra text accompanying note 681.
\textsuperscript{685} NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3417 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (Supp. II 1996)).
\textsuperscript{686} See id. at 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1) (Supp. II 1996)).
\textsuperscript{687} See supra Part III.C.3.
potential of the Rule. As a result, the SEC should consider adding further safeguards to its proposal to secure NASAA and state support.

E. Availability of Testing the Waters to Larger Businesses

1. Asymmetrical Result Under Rule 254

Because larger businesses generally need to raise more capital than the Regulation A ceiling permits, the restriction of the availability of testing the waters to Regulation A offerings effectively deprived larger businesses of this opportunity. If a large, private business seeks to tap the public markets to raise capital, it typically conducts a registered IPO. Therefore, given that (i) smaller businesses are much more likely to conduct a Regulation A offering than larger businesses and (ii) testing the waters under federal law is currently available only to issuers considering a Regulation A offering, small businesses currently have an advantage unavailable to larger businesses.

2. Correction of Asymmetry

Proposed Rule 135d corrects this asymmetrical result. In the Testing Release, the SEC explained that the proposal would help "persons that are small entities, as defined by the Commission's rules."\(^688\) However, the SEC elaborated that proposed Rule 135d would do more than help small businesses. According to the SEC, the proposal "would affect small entities in the same manner as other registrants. The proposed rule and amendments . . . are designed to decrease potential costs to all issuers, including small businesses."\(^689\) Proposed Rule 135d thus departs from Rule 254's focus on issue size and seeks to help issuers of any size determine whether conducting a registered IPO of any size is cost-effective.

3. Approval of the Correction

Despite its assertion that the proposal's purpose is to help "all issuers," the Commission has not ruled out the possibility of limiting access to the Rule to small business issuers. The SEC asked commenters if "the rule [should] be limited to small business issuers."\(^690\) Such a limitation would be unwise.

The history of small businesses and Rule 254 demonstrates the merits of allowing larger issuers to test the waters. The Commission introduced a testing-the-waters rule in 1992 that applied only to Regu-
lation A offerings because (i) the Commission was committed to revamping Regulation A, (ii) small businesses were struggling to raise capital, and (iii) Regulation A was considered the most cost-effective means of providing assistance. In contrast, registered IPOs were a more expensive avenue of capital formation that small businesses would find more difficult to pursue. Therefore, in 1992, the Commission adopted Rule 254 and not a corresponding rule that applied to registered IPOs. At the time, Rule 254 appeared to be an efficient way to help small businesses.

In the early 1990s, small businesses suffered while larger businesses were somewhat less vulnerable to the economic woes troubling the country because larger businesses had capital-raising alternatives that were not as available to small businesses. In contrast to small businesses, larger companies usually have established customer bases and can therefore assess whether there is investor interest in the company before commencing an IPO. Further, larger businesses typically have more success than their smaller counterparts in attracting underwriters. In other words, the SEC adopted Rule 254 rather than a broader rule because small businesses considering Regulation A offerings experience far more uncertainty with respect to market interest than larger enterprises. The SEC’s decision was a response to the troubles of small businesses; it did not reflect a generalization that small businesses, compared to large businesses, are less likely to harm investors when testing the waters.

In fact, small business owners who are overexcited, financially unsophisticated, and unacquainted with the miscellaneous securities regulations pose a greater risk to investors. In addition, small business owners contemplating a Regulation A offering will usually first solicit friends, family, customers, suppliers, and current private shareholders. These types of prospective investors may be the most likely to disregard the prospectus and rely on oral representations. When small businesses test the waters, the potential impact on investors is not without its dangers.

In contrast, larger businesses are often more experienced in investment matters. They invariably have in-house counsel or outside

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691 See supra Part II.B.5.

692 See SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 3-4; supra text accompanying notes 511-14, 619-21.

693 See Hearings on H.R. 2981, supra note 102, at 46 (relating how entrepreneurs often go to family and friends for funds); Laing, supra note 151, at 21 (predicting that entrepreneurs who would test the waters were previously “unable to get friends [and] . . . relatives . . . to buy into their dreams”); Kevin G. Salwen, SEC Acts To Aid Small Business on Financing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1992, at A3 (explaining that small businesses that rely on Regulation A typically first try to raise funds from family and friends); Remarks by Arthur Levitt, supra note 372, at *5 (relating how a small business that relied on Rule 254 solicited indications of interest from its customers).
lawyers who provide advice regarding compliance with federal and state securities regulations. In preparing for a registered IPO, a larger company can usually engage a professional underwriter that should attempt to ensure that the company does not commit fraud, practice puffing, or misconstrue the market reaction to the solicitation. In addition, although a large business may solicit indications of interest from individual investors, institutional investors purchase the majority of shares in a registered IPO. Institutional investors are generally more sophisticated and, therefore, do not require the same level of protection as individuals. For example, a number of people beyond the person solicited will have input into the institutional investor's final decision.

Consequently, it is very difficult to justify the denial of testing-the-waters privileges to businesses (small or large) that are interested in conducting registered IPOs. As Section C of this Part explained above, the Commission must reevaluate Rule 254 to determine its impact on issuers and investors. If the Commission concludes that issuers should continue to have the opportunity to test the waters before Regulation A offerings, it should allow large businesses considering registered IPOs to test the waters even though they may not have as great a need to test the waters as small businesses before Regulation A offerings. This is especially true because it appears that testing the waters in advance of a registered IPO is less likely to harm investors than solicitations before a Regulation A offering. It is also conceivable that a large business in an obscure industry, for example, both lacks a steady customer base from which it can assess potential investor interest and cannot engage an underwriter. For such a business, testing the waters before a registered IPO could be very important. Furthermore, successful consummation of registered IPOs by large companies also benefit investors and capital markets.

For the foregoing reasons, even if the Commission, in reliance on section 28 of the Securities Act, raises the Regulation A ceiling, enabling potential issuers to test the waters before offerings of up to ten or fifteen million dollars, it should still permit larger issuers to test the waters prior to registered IPOs. Testing the waters benefits all issuers and, as the subsequent Section demonstrates, can be consistent with an adequate level of protection for investors.

694 Studies have confirmed that smaller issues have historically been greater sources of fraud than larger issues. See Seligman, supra note 75, at 33-36. For a discussion of reasons why an issuer may desire to test the waters even if it can hire an underwriter, see supra Part V.B.1.

695 See supra note 588 and accompanying text.

696 See supra note 226.
F. Proposed Safeguards

1. Single Testing-the-Waters Rule

As the preceding subsection suggests, the purpose of testing the waters, as well as the potential problems arising therefrom, remain the same for both Regulation A offerings and registered IPOs. As a result, this Note recommends that the Commission should work with NASAA to adopt a single testing-the-waters rule, codified both as new Rule 135d and revised Rule 254, applicable to both Regulation A and registered IPOs.

The idea of a single testing-the-waters rule has roots in the Testing Release. The Commission's proposed amendments to Rule 254 in the Testing Release foreshadow a linking of the two rules. The SEC asked commenters "whether proposed Rule 135d should be used for 'testing the waters' with a view to either a registered or a Regulation A offering, thus replacing Rule 254."697

The new rule should contain language that is appropriate for both registered and Regulation A offerings.698 The only difference that should remain between new Rule 135d and revised Rule 254 is the current first clause of Rule 135d(a), which reads, and should continue to read, "For purposes only of Section 5 of the Act."699 Rule 254 does not include this language because Regulation A offerings are exempt from section 5. The rule should create a safe harbor for prefiling solicitations of indications of interest made in contemplation of either a Regulation A offering or registered IPO. If the SEC decides to permit issuers to test the waters before Regulation D offerings, the proposed single rule, which would require further revision, should also govern.

A single rule could facilitate the Commission's efforts to preempt state securities regulations regarding all testing-the-waters activities.700 The SEC could accomplish this goal by expanding the definition of "qualified purchasers" in new section 18(b)(3) to include all eligible purchasers who were offered securities to be sold pursuant to a Regulation A offering.701 This definition would correct the current incon-

697  Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890.
698  For example, Rule 254(b)(3) currently provides that "[s]olicitations of interest pursuant to this provision may not be made after the filing of an offering statement." 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(3) (1997) (emphasis added). On the other hand, proposed Rule 135d(a)(5) requires that "[s]olicitations of interest in reliance upon the provisions of this section are not made after the filing of a registration statement under the [Securities] Act." Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(5)) (emphasis added).
699  Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)).
700  Currently, federal securities regulations do not trump state regulations regarding testing the waters before Regulation A offerings. See supra Part III.C.3.
701  This definition would apply to testing the waters under Rule 254 because solicitations of indications of interest pursuant to Rule 254 constitute an offer. See supra text
sistency, which appears to retain blue sky laws with respect to testing the waters before a Regulation A offering, but not before a registered IPO.

The Commission and state securities regulators should therefore benefit from the adoption of a single testing-the-waters rule. A single rule should be more administrable than the present approach, which involves two distinct rules that are similar, but subtly different.\footnote{702} The casual observer may even overlook the differences. A single rule would eliminate the potential for any confusion and may also pave the road for further regulatory simplification. For example, it may lead to relaxation of the integration rules. It would also eliminate the need for the proposed revisions to Rule 254 which the Commission discussed in the Testing Release. In addition, the efficiencies that may result from the codification of a single testing-the-waters rule may encourage more states to support the rule.

Issuers and investors may also prefer a single testing-the-waters rule. Small issuers and their lawyers should appreciate the convenience of having all of the provisions of the rule before them, as opposed to searching for cross-referenced provisions.\footnote{703} As a result, an issuer will never risk consulting the wrong rule regarding testing the waters. If the rule is successful, the Commission may extend its scope to cover other exempt offerings, such as Regulation D offerings.

2. Background

These proposed safeguards use proposed Rule 135d as a foundation. Proposed Rule 135d is preferable to Rule 254 as a base for a more balanced, accessible testing-the-waters rule because it provides slightly more protection than its Regulation A equivalent through its full compliance requirement.\footnote{704} Proposed Rule 135d is also an all-inclusive rule. By contrast, Rule 254 has several cross-referenced provisions.\footnote{705} Furthermore, proposed Rule 135d retains enough provi-
sions of Rule 254 so that an empirical study of the effectiveness of those provisions is still valuable.\(^\text{706}\)

This Section does not attempt to advance an entire alternative to the proposal. Moreover, it does not suggest additional incentives for issuers because the current proposal already disproportionately favors issuers. A fair and effective testing-the-waters rule needs further safeguards for investors beyond what either Rule 254 or proposed Rule 135d currently provides. These additional safeguards cannot be too onerous on issuers, for this would discourage them from testing the waters and would undercut the rule's goal. In fact, some of the proposed safeguards actually benefit issuers as well.\(^\text{707}\) This Section borrows heavily from NASAA's work in this area, returning to some of the provisions in its model rule.\(^\text{708}\) However, some of the proposed safeguards discussed below go beyond what NASAA has recommended.

3. Eligibility of Issuers

Proposed Rule 135d precludes a blank check company and a penny stock issuer from testing the waters in reliance on the Rule "because of the substantial abuses that have arisen in such offerings."\(^\text{709}\) The Commission asked commenters, "Are there additional classes of issuers that should be excluded . . . because of the . . . potential for abuse?"\(^\text{710}\) The next question posed was "Should any of the exclusions in the NASAA draft policy statement be specifically incorporated into the proposal?"\(^\text{711}\) NASAA answered the first question in the affirmative, responding that, pursuant to section (1) (i) of the NASAA policy statement, the states had excluded bad boys from testing the waters.\(^\text{712}\) The standard for disqualification under section (1) (i) was whether "[t]he offeror does not know and in the exercise of reasonable care, could not know that" any of the aforementioned entities was subject to the specified remedies or sanctions.\(^\text{713}\) In response to the Commission's first question, it is clear that such conduct constitutes "potential for abuse" especially if the bad boy has violated laws or regulations in

\(^{706}\) See supra Part V.C.

\(^{707}\) See, e.g., infra note 725 and accompanying text (recommending that the rule expressly permit underwriters to test the waters).

\(^{708}\) For a review of NASAA's model rule, see supra Part III.C.1.

\(^{709}\) Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887.

\(^{710}\) Id.

\(^{711}\) Id. at 86,887-88.

\(^{712}\) NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,052-53. Section (1) (i) identified these bad boys as "the issuer or any of the issuer's officers, directors, ten percent shareholders or promoters" who are subject to any of the specified remedies or sanctions identified therein. NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2542. Violations of federal or state laws or securities regulations that resulted in these remedies and sanctions are of primary concern.

\(^{713}\) NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2542.
connection with a securities offering. The answer to the second question is therefore also in the affirmative.

The SEC has adopted Rule 251(a)(6), disqualifying bad boys from conducting a Regulation A offering, which in turn prevents them from testing the waters under Rule 254.\footnote{17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(6), 230.262 (1997).} Under Rule 262, the issuer, any of its predecessors or any affiliated issuer . . . [or] any director, officer or general partner of the issuer, beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of any class of its equity securities, any promoter of the issuer presently connected with it in any capacity, any underwriter of the securities to be offered, or any partner, director or officer of any such underwriter that is subject to any of the remedies or sanctions listed therein is disqualified from availing itself of the Regulation A exemption.\footnote{Id. §§ 230.262(a)-(b). The Rule also disqualifies bad boys from relying on a Rule 505 exemption. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii).} Rule 262 lists more conduct that triggers disqualification than section (1)(i) of the NASAA rule does. The standard Rule 262 prescribes is stricter than the one NASAA requires. Unlike section 1(i) of the NASAA model, under Rule 262, the Commission does not care whether the offeror was aware of the proscribed conduct or whether it reasonably should have known.\footnote{See supra note 715 and accompanying text.} The rule under Regulation A is that if the issuer (or other person identified in the Rule) is subject to the specified remedies or sanctions, the issuer may not rely on the exemption.\footnote{See 17 C.F.R. § 230.262 (1997).} However, the SEC can waive the disqualification "upon a showing of good cause and without prejudice to any other action by the Commission."\footnote{Id.}

Both the Commission and NASAA thus recognized the importance of disqualifying small business issuers who were so-called bad boys or affiliates of bad boys. The concern is that investors and capital markets may suffer as a result of recurring improper conduct by these bad boys. NASAA correctly asserted, "We see no real need to limit this [bad boy disqualification provision] to small business issuers."\footnote{NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053.} If the Commission has disqualified bad boys from testing the waters under Rule 254, it should similarly preclude them from testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d. Investors solicited before a registered IPO are as vulnerable to improper conduct as those solicited in advance of a Regulation A offering. The adoption of a bad boy disqualification provision will deny some issuers access to the rule. However, the considerable protection provided to investors and capital markets offsets this slight decrease in availability.

\footnote{714 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(6), 230.262 (1997).}
The Commission should therefore follow its example under Regulation A and adopt a bad boy disqualification provision. The provision should replicate Rule 262, prescribing its stricter standard rather than the more liberal section (1)(i) of the NASAA rule. The latter rule's focus on the offeror's knowledge or reasonable exercise of care emphasizes the wrong point. Even if an offeror did not know of an issuer's egregious violation of a federal securities regulation, that issuer, as opposed to the offeror, can still act in a manner that harms investors. A testing-the-waters rule is risky enough for investors; the Commission should reduce the potential risks by disqualifying issuers who in the past have acted, or been connected to others who have acted, unlawfully. The provision that gives the SEC discretion to waive the disqualification protects issuers from an inequitable result.\(^\text{720}\)

The foregoing discussion hints at another problem with proposed Rule 135d's eligibility requirements which the SEC can cure by adding another safeguard. Proposed Rule 135d(a)(1) states the eligibility requirements for an issuer to test the waters.\(^\text{721}\) Rule 251(a), which establishes the eligibility requirements for testing the waters under Regulation A, similarly speaks only of issuers.\(^\text{722}\) On the other hand, the NASAA rule applies to "offer[s] . . . of a security made by or on behalf of an issuer for the sole purpose of soliciting an indication of interest in receiving a prospectus (or its equivalent) for such security."\(^\text{723}\) In addition, NASAA's bad boy disqualification provision speaks of the "offeror," as opposed to the issuer.\(^\text{724}\)

This Note recommends that the final testing-the-waters rule permit issuers and their agents to test the waters before a Regulation A offering or registered IPO. One can imagine that the owner of a small business or a foreign firm may want to test the waters, but lacks the time or confidence to properly solicit indications of interest. 'The owner may prefer to hire another individual or firm to test the waters on his or her behalf. The rule should allow an issuer's agent, for example, a professional underwriter, to test the waters on behalf of the potential issuer.\(^\text{725}\)

By incorporating language that enables an issuer's agent to test the waters, the rule would help issuers by allowing them to concentrate on running their businesses while deferring to the experience of professional underwriters and others to determine market interest. Underwriters currently conduct their own analyses to measure inves-
tor interest. If underwriters also test the waters, they are more likely to accurately assess the extent of market interest. Therefore, extending availability of testing the waters to underwriters would more efficiently and accurately indicate whether an issuer’s offering will succeed, benefiting issuers and underwriters without imposing additional costs.

This recommended addition to proposed Rule 135d is not only a pro-issuer incentive, but also a safeguard that further protects investors. Underwriters are less likely than issuers to violate securities regulations or engage in other improper solicitation practices. Similarly, an independent agent who tests the waters may be less likely than a principal to make overzealous solicitations or to exaggerate the investor response to the solicitation. The combination of an underwriter’s standard analysis and the results from its testing-the-waters efforts is more likely to filter out subpar offerings that will harm investors. The application of agency law ensures that investors will have a cause of action against the issuer if liability arises. Furthermore, many of the proposals discussed below will better enable investors to confirm and supplement oral representations an issuer’s agent makes.

4. Content of Solicitation Materials

The more demanding the disclosure requirements are for the solicitation materials, the less likely a potential issuer is to test the waters. Accordingly, there is much support for the argument that the testing-the-waters rule “would be most useful if the content of the solicitation material were left to the judgment of those involved in the solicitation.” However, if an issuer makes only the minimum disclosures, prospective investors will lack sufficient information to make a reasonable decision about whether to indicate their interest. If an investor communicates his or her interest to an issuer on the basis of such limited disclosure, the response may be unreliable because the investor may lose interest once the issuer makes more complete disclosure. Therefore, indications of interest by investors may lead the issuer to conclude mistakenly that the market is interested in an offering when, in fact, investors are merely conveying preliminary interest which may not survive fuller disclosure. This can create an unsuccessful offering that harms both issuers and investors. On the other hand,
if issuers provide too much information in the testing materials, investors may mistake the solicitation document for a "solicitation in connection with a full-blown registered offering." The SEC must strike a balance between disclosing too little information and disclosing too much.

Consequently, this Note recommends that the final rule incorporate several changes to the requirements in proposed Rule 135d(a)(2) regarding the content of the solicitation materials. The rule should require a more precise description of the business. Second, it should also provide that the issuer must disclose how it intends to use the proceeds. These two additional requirements will provide prospective investors with valuable information that will enable them to make their indications of interest on a more informed basis. However, the rule should also limit the amount of permissible disclosure by not permitting an issuer to include pricing, detailed financial, or technical information regarding the potential offering. At present, the proposal allows issuers to include pricing information, unaudited financials, and forward-looking statements. However, these disclosures may be extremely speculative, especially in the case of a young startup company. Providing too much financial information may confuse and overwhelm investors. Further, the inclusion of highly specific information may lead investors to think that the solicitation document is a prospectus or an offering circular. The omission of pricing materials will make the testing materials somewhat less informative for potential investors. However, because the pricing information will certainly change by the time an issuer prepares a prospectus or offering circular and investors will have the opportunity to review the prospectus or offering circular, the omission of pricing information from the testing materials should not really deprive investors. In addition, the omission of pricing information should encourage interested investors to read the prospectus or offering circular, which will include pricing details. Finally, the rule should require issuers to include in the testing materials a statement that would inform investors that the SEC has neither reviewed the solicitation materials nor ap-

730 AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 5; see also supra note 629 (insisting that minimal disclosure benefits investors).

731 See AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 4.

732 See id.

733 See id. at 5.

734 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,888. An issuer that tests the waters should consider excluding forward-looking statements from the testing materials in order to avoid triggering a possible duty to update these statements in the future should they become materially inaccurate or misleading. For a discussion of this duty to update, see Jeffrey A. Brill, Note, The Status of the Duty to Update, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. Pol'y (forthcoming Winter 1998).

735 See AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 5.
proved of the offering contemplated therein.\textsuperscript{736} This statement, which should appear in the form of a legend emblazoned on the front page, should convey to investors the preliminary nature of the solicitation, reminding them that review by the Commission would be forthcoming once the issuer files a registration or offering statement.

The Commission should also require that if, after testing the waters, an issuer distributes a prospectus or offering circular to interested investors, it must include a separate section that identifies and explains any material statements in the prospectus or offering circular that differ from the representations in the testing materials that the issuer used. In this way, the prospectus or offering circular would alert investors to material misstatements or omissions in the testing materials, and would reduce the likelihood that investors will rely solely on these solicitations rather than on the prospectus or offering circular when considering the offering.

5. Standard of Liability

In accordance with Rule 254(a) and the note to proposed Rule 135d(a)(4), the solicitation materials would be subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.\textsuperscript{737} Although this standard does not provide investors with as much protection as sections 11 or 12(a)(2),\textsuperscript{738} the ABA and NYSBA make convincing arguments for retaining this standard.\textsuperscript{739} The imposition of section 11 or section 12(a)(2) liability would deter issuers from making false, misleading, or incomplete statements in the solicitation materials. However, it would also discourage issuers from relying on the rule and would increase compliance costs because an issuer is almost certain to consult with an attorney to ensure that the solicitation does not render the issuer liable. In addition, after the NSMIA, the states, which have a compelling interest in protecting investors who are residents, retain jurisdiction to investigate and enforce violations of state antifraud regulations.\textsuperscript{740} In light of these considerations, “[a]t this stage, it makes sense to avoid over-regulation and allow issuers to experiment. If abuses develop, the SEC can take steps to reform the rule and eliminate problems.”\textsuperscript{741}

A requirement that an issuer include the solicitation materials as part of the prospectus or offering circular for the registered initial

\textsuperscript{736} For a consideration of whether the Commission should be required to review the solicitation materials before an issuer may use them, see infra Part V.F.6.

\textsuperscript{737} See 17 C.F.R. § 290.254(a) (1997); Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 290.135d(a)(4) note).

\textsuperscript{738} See supra note 257 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{739} See supra notes 503, 521 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{740} See supra note 347.

\textsuperscript{741} Glover, supra note 584, at B6.
public or Regulation A offering is an example of a reform the SEC could adopt if abuses in fact develop.\textsuperscript{742} This measure would protect investors because the testing materials would be subject to section 12(a)(2) liability\textsuperscript{743} since they would be included in a prospectus, as defined by section 2(10). For a registered IPO, the incorporation of the testing materials in the prospectus, which must be included in the registration statement, would thereby subject the materials to section 11 liability. This proposal would enable all interested investors to review the testing materials that an issuer used to solicit indications of interest. Investors originally solicited pursuant to the testing-the-waters rule would be aware of any material differences between the testing materials and the prospectus or offering circular because, as proposed above, this Note recommends that the final rule require issuers to disclose in the prospectus/offering circular any such differences.\textsuperscript{744} The filing of the solicitation materials as part of the prospectus/offering circular would marginally add to an issuer’s costs. In most instances, the testing materials will not be lengthy, which means that the cost of including them in the prospectus/offering circular should be low. Moreover, this cost increase would affect only issuers who go on to pursue public offerings, not potential issuers who test the waters and decide not to offer securities.

6. Regulatory Submission Requirements

Determining the proper degree of regulation for testing the waters represents a dilemma for the Commission. Rule 254(b)(1) and proposed Rule 135d(a)(3) require an issuer to submit a copy of the solicitation materials to the SEC only on, or prior to, the first usage of the materials for solicitation.\textsuperscript{745} The Commission is not required to review the materials. Investors would enjoy much more protection if the final rule required issuers to file the testing materials with the Commission, which, in turn, must review the materials before an issuer can use them to test the waters.

This revision would lead to higher compliance costs for issuers, for the Commission would probably set a filing fee in order to recoup the costs of staff review and correspondence with issuers. This would prolong the length of the process, perhaps discouraging issuers that seek a quick exploration of market interest.

\textsuperscript{742} The Commission considered in the Testing Release requiring an issuer to file the testing materials as part of the registration statement if it proceeds with a registered IPO. Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,889.

\textsuperscript{743} See id.

\textsuperscript{744} See supra p. 571.

\textsuperscript{745} 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(1) (1997); Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(3)).
In contrast, section (1) (c) of the NASAA model rule requires the offeror to file any materials intended for use as solicitation devices with the state securities administrator ten days before their first use.\textsuperscript{746} In a comment to the Proposed Statement of Policy, NASAA explained that "[t]he [Administrator] may or may not review the materials filed pursuant to this rule."\textsuperscript{747} This would give states the discretion whether to review the materials. This proposal would also forbid an issuer or its agent from using any materials to test the waters that the state securities regulator finds do not comply with the final testing-the-waters rule or other securities regulation.\textsuperscript{748} Given that the NSMIA did not remove the states’ authority to collect filing fees,\textsuperscript{749} a rule that follows the NASAA example may be too costly, especially for issuers seeking to test the waters in many states.

The final testing-the-waters rule should borrow from both examples. It should require submission of materials to the main office of the SEC in Washington, DC ten days prior to usage. Applying an antifraud standard, the Commission’s staff would be entitled, but not required, to review the testing materials.\textsuperscript{750} If the issuer failed to comply in any respect with the final testing-the-waters rule or other regulation, it would not be permitted to use the materials. Ten days should afford the staff enough time to review the materials. Although the ten-day requirement may postpone issuers’ efforts to test the waters, the compliance costs would remain low because issuers would not need to wait for approval from the Commission and state securities regulators.

The final rule should also eliminate the notes to Rule 254(b)(1) and proposed Rule 135d(a)(3) which requires issuers to submit only testing materials that are substantively different from or additional to materials previously submitted.\textsuperscript{751} This vague standard is unnecessarily confusing for issuers. Section (1) (d) of the NASAA model rule eliminates this provision, requiring offerors to submit any amended or additional materials with the state securities administrator five busi-

\textsuperscript{746} NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, \textit{supra} note 302, at 2541.
\textsuperscript{747} \textit{Id.} at 2544 cmt. 2 (second alteration in original).
\textsuperscript{748} See, e.g., section (1)(e) of the NASAA model rule in NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, \textit{supra} note 302, at 2541.
\textsuperscript{749} See \textit{NSMIA, supra} note 22, at 3419-20 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(c) (Supp. II 1996)).
\textsuperscript{750} The Commission would also have the opportunity to review the solicitation materials if the final rule requires an issuer to file them as part of the prospectus.offering circular. See \textit{supra} notes 742-44 and accompanying text. Furthermore, investors would know that the Commission has not necessarily reviewed the testing materials because of the legend recommended above. See \textit{supra} text accompanying note 736.
ness days before the first use of the materials. A requirement that issuers submit all testing materials to the Commission will further protect investors. The five-day period gives the SEC staff enough time to review the updated or new materials. This requirement will add to expenses only marginally, and it may encourage issuers to prepare the original testing materials with greater diligence.

7. Delivery and Solicitation Procedures

As proposed Rule 135d intends, the final rule should give issuers the opportunity to use a wide range of media to test the waters. The testing-the-waters rule needs further safeguards to protect investors when issuers or their agents solicit indications of interest via a telephone call or a face-to-face conversation. NASAA recommended limitations on cold calling because it learned of abuse. This would excessively restrict an issuer's ability to test the waters. Rather, a less restrictive solution is to provide investors solicited by telephone or in person with more information.

The final rule should require that an issuer deliver to an interested investor a copy of the solicitation document no later than seven days after soliciting that investor's interest via an oral communication. This may even be preferable to delivery at the time of or before the communication because, assuming there is not a follow-up oral solicitation, an investor will have the opportunity to read the written document shortly after hearing the oral solicitation. The written document, which an investor keeps and can later review, may become more memorable than the oral representations. Given that an SEC staff member may have reviewed the solicitation document and that the solicitation document is in writing, it is less likely to be inaccurate or misleading than an oral representation which the Commission cannot regulate.

In addition, the final rule should provide that during an oral solicitation, an issuer or its agent must, by the end of the communication, give the solicited investor the name of an individual who can answer any questions in the future or reconfirm any information the issuer's agent conveyed. This would be consistent with the current requirements under both Rule 254(b)(1) and proposed Rule 135d(a)(3) that the issuer must identify in the solicitation materials the name and telephone number of an individual who can answer.

752 NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.
753 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,888.
754 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053.
755 Section (1)(f) of the NASAA model rule requires that the offeror provide the offeree with a current copy of the document no later than five days after a communication. NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.
questions about the materials. This Note suggests that the final rule require the contact person to be the owner, a director, an officer, or a high level manager of the issuer. Although difficult to police, this provision would prompt solicitors to give prospective investors the name of a contact.

Finally, the testing-the-waters rule should add a requirement that an issuer must maintain on file a copy of the solicitation document for a specified period of time. Upon request from an interested investor, the issuer would be obligated to send a copy of the solicitation materials free of charge. This would provide investors with yet another means of obtaining a copy of the solicitation document. Although the requirement represents a minor inconvenience and expense for issuers, it is in their best interest to save a copy of the solicitation document as well.

8. Cooling-Off Periods

The ultimate goal of all of these safeguards is to ensure that investors make a well-reasoned investment decision. A careful review by the investor of the prospectus or offering circular contained in the registration or offering statement is the best basis for such a decision. In this way, the securities laws try to ensure that investors will have time to read the prospectus. Investors currently have only forty-eight hours to review the prospectus before brokers or dealers are required to send a confirmation of a sale. However, when an issuer or its agent has solicited investors, they may need additional time to cool off from the solicitation to review the prospectus. In the Testing Release, the Commission acknowledged this concern and "requested [comment] as to the need for additional procedures to assure investors a sufficient opportunity following a 'test the waters' solicitation to review and assess the full information about the issuer, its management, the securities and the offering provided by the registration statement and prospectus."

Sufficient investor protection requires additional procedures. Section (1)(h) of the NASAA model rule provides for a cooling-off period, lasting seven days after delivery of the prospectus to investors, during which the issuer may not sell the securities. In its comment letter, NASAA reported that this cooling-off period has not been disadvantageous to issuers. The final testing-the-waters rule should

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756 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(1) (1997); Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(3)).
758 See supra note 524 (discussing Rule 15c2-8).
759 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890.
760 NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.
761 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053.
adopt a similar cooling-off period that would give investors a better opportunity to review the prospectus.

Finally, the current twenty day cooling-off periods under both Rule 254(b)(4) and proposed Rule 135d(a)(6)\(^{762}\) are insufficient. In accordance with these Rules, an issuer may not sell securities pursuant to an offering or registration statement until twenty days after the final publication or delivery of the solicitation document or broadcast of the television or radio solicitation.\(^{763}\) The duration of the cooling-off periods is adequate; the problem is that the Rules, strangely, do not require an issuer to wait twenty days after an oral communication with an investor.\(^{764}\) Section (3)(b) of the NASAA model rule extends the cooling-off period to cover oral communications by proscribing issuers from selling securities "until at least twenty . . . calendar days after the last communication made in reliance on this rule."\(^{765}\) While NASAA did not reiterate in its comment letter regarding the Testing Release the need to expand the cooling-off period provision to include oral solicitations, AIMR advocated such an extension.\(^{766}\) In light of legitimate concerns regarding the lingering effects of oral solicitations, the final testing-the-waters rule should require issuers to wait twenty calendar days after its final communication of any sort in reliance on the testing-the-waters rule before it may begin to sell securities. This safeguard will protect investors should the Commission decide to revise Rule 254(b)(3) and proposed Rule 135d(a)(5) to permit issuers to test the waters after filing an offering or registration statement.

9. **Effect of Proposed Safeguards**

The aggregate effect of these proposed safeguards, bolstered by the full compliance standard, should provide investors with much greater protection at an essentially negligible cost to issuers. These added procedures also benefit issuers because they will enable them to obtain more accurate information from investors, and thus increase the likelihood of a successful offering. If an issuer solicits indications of interest in reliance on the rule (including the proposed safeguards) and declines to proceed with the offering, it will have spent little money relative to the potential expenditures of pursuing the off-

\(^{762}\) 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(4) (1997); Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)(6)).

\(^{763}\) See sources cited supra note 762.

\(^{764}\) See AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 6; NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9379.

\(^{765}\) NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2543-44 (emphasis added).

\(^{766}\) AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 5-6.
fering. Those issuers who consummate a successful Regulation A offering or registered IPO will recoup their costs.

The Commission would enjoy substantial benefits from adding these safeguards. A single testing-the-waters rule would dramatically improve the administrability of the process. Even more significantly, these safeguards should garner the support of NASAA and state securities regulators because they either resemble the NASAA model rule or otherwise improve investor protection. Therefore, a testing-the-waters rule that includes similar safeguards to those proposed in this Section may help to resolve the coordination problem confronting issuers seeking to offer securities under Regulation A. It should also increase the likelihood that issuers will test the waters under Rule 254 and proposed Rule 135d without harming investors in the process. Finally, a testing-the-waters rule containing these or similar safeguards should give the Commission greater confidence that the rule “is consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors.” 767 Such confidence would enable the SEC to exercise its apparent authority under new section 18 of the Securities Act to adopt legislation preempts state securities regulations regarding Regulation A offerings, which would give issuers the opportunity to rely on Rule 254 to test the waters in all states. 768 This confidence would also enable the Commission to exercise its general exemptive authority under new section 28 to exempt issuers that test the waters prior to registered IPOs in reliance on proposed Rule 135d from section 5. 769

CONCLUSION

Congress enacted and has amended the Securities Act to, among other things, protect investors before, during, and after IPOs. As SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has explained, “investor protection is the SEC’s most important priority.” 770 At the same time, the Commission seeks to facilitate the promotion of capital formation.

The Commission has struggled to maintain the balance between encouraging capital formation and protecting investors in its efforts to draft and adopt testing-the-waters rules. The innovative and contro-

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767 NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (Supp. II 1996)).
768 See id.; supra text accompanying notes 359-61.
769 See NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. II 1996)) (granting the Commission this authority "to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors"); supra text accompanying notes 541-44, 569.
770 Levitt Unveils Series of Proposals Designed To Improve Capital Formation, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 671, 672 (May 5, 1995); see also Investor Protection Is First, supra note 276, at 297 (quoting SEC Chairman in March 1997 as stating that “[n]othing should come ahead of investor protection in terms of what the [C]ommission does or how it operates”) (first alteration in original).
versial testing-the-waters concept permits a potential issuer to solicit indications of investor interest during the prefiling period, that is, before it incurs the considerable compliance costs that often preclude or discourage smaller businesses from accessing the public markets. Both of the Commission's rulemaking efforts to introduce testing the waters have been problematic. Rule 254, adopted in August 1992, represents the Commission's first experience with testing the waters. Reliance on the Rule is limited to businesses, usually small entities, that are considering a Regulation A offering. Rule 254 has three primary shortcomings. First, the scope of the Rule is too limited, rendering it unavailable to many potential issuers. Second, the Rule appears ill-equipped to protect financially unsophisticated investors from the sales-oriented overtures of inexperienced and overeager principals of small businesses. Third, the utility of the Rule has been further limited because, in the absence of preemptive legislation regarding securities offered pursuant to Regulation A, the SEC has thus far failed to coordinate the Rule with the securities laws of most states.

After prematurely declaring Rule 254 a success, the Commission published the Testing Release in June 1995 in which it proposed to extend the availability of testing the waters to businesses contemplating registered IPOs. The Commission hoped to increase access to the booming IPO market. Proposed Rule 135d remedied the first problem experienced in practice under Rule 254. Under the proposal, many more issuers would be able to test the waters. The proposal deserves praise for extending to large businesses the opportunity to test the waters before registered IPOs, for there had been no rational justification for denying larger businesses access to testing the waters. However, the Commission made little progress in the area of investor protection. The controversial proposal currently caters to the needs of issuers at investors' expense. A testing-the-waters rule is needed to help businesses raise capital in a cost-effective manner. In the modern age, controlling the dissemination of information to investors is admittedly difficult. Although some have maintained that this reality is grounds for further deregulation, the argument that more investor protection is necessary is more convincing. Moreover, the SEC may again encounter difficulties securing wide-scale approval from the states. Despite its authority to preempt blue sky laws regarding the offering of what would typically constitute covered securities under section 18, the Commission has neither adopted nor published an amended version of proposed Rule 135d.

Nevertheless, the Commission's continued enthusiastic support for a broader testing-the-waters rule and the availability of general ex-

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771 See Quinn, supra note 549, at 28.
emptive authority suggest that it will take measures to expand the availability of testing the waters in the near future. The SEC may have shelved adoption of proposed Rule 135d until the Agency can include it as part of a more comprehensive revision of the Securities Act, such as a company registration system. The Commission clearly has the authority to adopt a testing-the-waters rule. There is little doubt that in relying on this authority, the Commission has thus far attempted to draft a rule that would not compromise investor protection.\textsuperscript{772} Current leading officials of the SEC staff remain committed to this goal.\textsuperscript{773}

Proposed Rule 135d, as currently drafted, is irreconcilable with section 5(c) of the Securities Act because it poses substantial risks to investors that the potential benefits to issuers and the capital markets cannot justify. The proposal is such a broad rejection of section 5(c) that, if adopted, it would radically change how issuers prepare for an IPO during the prefiling period. Of perhaps still greater importance, the proposal may represent the first step toward further deregulation of the registration process. It is therefore especially necessary to install sufficient safeguards into a testing-the-waters rule, for further deregulation may leave investors even more vulnerable.

This Note recommends the adoption of a single testing-the-waters rule that would apply to both short form registration and registered IPOs. The principal distinction between this rule and proposed Rule 135d is the incorporation of additional safeguards that will protect investors without significantly discouraging issuers from availing themselves of the rule. These safeguards would help the SEC to achieve what should be its ultimate objective for testing the waters: to facilitate the matching of quality potential issuers with investors, who, after learning of an investment opportunity as a result of a prefiling solicitation of interest, will defer making investment decisions until they have reviewed the mandatory disclosures in the prospectus. In addition, these safeguards would help justify both an exercise by the Commission of general exemptive authority and further preemptive rulemaking. The former would further legitimize the adoption of the rule, and the latter would increase the likelihood of its success. An effective testing-the-waters rule will never be reconcilable with the interpretation of section 5(c) that has prevailed since 1933. However, if the final rule provides investors with greater protection through the inclusion of additional safeguards similar to those suggested in this Note, the rule will at least be consistent with the policy objectives guiding the Commission and underlying section 5(c).

\textsuperscript{772} See supra note 612 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{773} See supra note 770 and accompanying text.