Whitehead’s “Destructive Coordination” Voted Among the Best Corporate and Securities Articles of 2011
Ithaca, New York, April 19, 2012
Cornell Law Professor Charles Whitehead’s article, “Destructive Coordination,” has been voted by the nation’s corporate and securities law professors as one of the top ten corporate and securities law papers of 2011. Published in the Cornell Law Review, “Destructive Coordination” highlights a paradox: Regulations and standards that benefit financial firms and markets can also be destructive. By promoting coordination, they can erode key presumptions underlying financial risk management, potentially increasing the magnitude of a drop in the financial markets, a result that can have systemic consequences.
For eighteen years, the Corporate Practice Commentator has polled corporate and securities law faculty to select the ten best articles published during the prior year. This year’s list contained more than 580 articles. Upon learning that his peers had selected his paper for this distinction, Professor Whitehead commented, “I’m honored to be included among the distinguished faculty whose articles, this year and in prior years, have been selected as among the year’s top ten.”
The results of the poll will be published in an upcoming issue of the Corporate Practice Commentator.